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Abstract 
 
The process of arbitration in the UAE is at a crossroads, having reached the 
point at which it could be used as a tool to elevate the way in which adjudication 
works in the UAE, or as a tool to funnel disputes into the courts. This study presents 
arguments in favor of deploying arbitration to improve adjudication, and against 
having it become simply a method for channeling disputes into the courts. It 
emphasizes the importance of having both systems in place, coexisting and working 
together to reach the common goal of providing adjudicatory relief to individuals. 
Finally, this paper emphasizes the importance of using arbitration in non-commercial 
disputes, and discusses how it can ease the load on the courts. 
 This work illuminates certain court practices that affect the manner in which 
arbitration disputes are funneled into the courts and seeks ways to streamline this 
process. This dissertation also highlights various issues that have complicated the use 
of arbitration in the UAE, and emphasizes the importance of solving these issues 
before the full-scale use of arbitration is promoted. 
 Chapter Two examines the courts’ views on arbitration, and how these views 
directly influence the court’s decisions. Chapter Three considers exceptions to the 
courts’ views of arbitration. Chapter Four examines certain decisions made by the 
various civil circuit courts in the UAE and highlights the problems that continue to 
complicate the use of arbitration. Finally, Chapter Five proposes a working solution 
for these problems.  
Arbitration is no longer a tool used exclusively by commercial parties; 
therefore, the solution proposed in this study (while it might also affect commercial 
parties) is meant to encourage the use of arbitration by non-commercial parties. 
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“The time has come for the Public and Private sector to work together to develop the country” 
H.H. Sheikh Mohammad bin Rashid Al-Maktoum Ruler of Dubai 
 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1. Problem Statement 
 
This dissertation assesses the views of the United Arab Emirates’ court system1 on 
the use of arbitration. These views, as well as the rules of the Islamic Shari’a and 
various pieces of UAE legislation, have had a wide-ranging affect on the practice of 
arbitration in the UAE, which this paper also addresses. 
The UAE is a small country located on the Arabian Peninsula, founded 
December 2, 1971 by the unification of seven Emirates: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, 
Fujairah, Ras Al Khaimah Umm, Al Quwain and Ajman.2 
 This developing country has its sights set on becoming an international hub for 
commerce and trade in the Middle East, and it does not want to depend on a single 
source of revenue. The UAE has been working to broaden its sources of income and 
in turn attract investors from all over the world to base operations in the UAE. The 
UAE’s population has been growing in the past several decades, and a growth in 
population in a small country of finite size may be easily understood to coincide with 
an increase in interpersonal disputes, which must be resolved3. Societies use many 
methods to resolve the disputes that arise from human transactions, such as litigation 																																																								
1 The United Arab Emirates, hereinafter “UAE”. 
2 The United Arab Emirates Constitution of 1971, article 1. 
3 Maria Dakolias states that “economic and social progress cannot sustainably be achieved without 
respect for the rule of law, democratic consolidation, and effective human rights protection; each of 
which requires a well-functioning judiciary that can interpret and enforce the laws equitably and 
efficiently”, see Maria Dakolias, court performance around the world: A comparative perspective, 2 
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 87, 87 (1999). 
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in front of a court. However, an increase in the number of disputes submitted to the 
court would ultimately require government assistance to ease this load. The increased 
caseload is a result of the flood of cases related to transactions between individuals4. 
These can only be resolved if the government allocates resources to the court, creates 
more circuits and appoints new staff. Dispute resolution methods that work side by 
side with the courts could also help to lighten the courts’ caseloads; this is where 
arbitration comes into play.5  
 The UAE is a relatively newly formed state, and arbitration is a relatively new 
subject and field of study in the country. The practice of arbitration has yet to find a 
permanent foothold among the various forms of dispute resolution in the UAE, and 
establishing this foothold has entailed disturbing established judicial practices. 
However,  arbitration has become a popular method of resolving disputes, especially 
in matters related to commerce, family and certain civil transactions. The UAE’s 
legislature has begun to recognize the importance and increasing popularity of 
arbitration; it ratified the New York convention6 and has begun to work on an 
independent law that regulates arbitration.7 However, as of now, arbitration is still 
regulated through the UAE’s civil law procedure of 1992.8 
 Arbitration currently seems to be used more and more often as a funnel that 
sends disputes into the courts, rather than being (or becoming) an independent method 
of dispute resolution with the authority to first hear and to then settle disputes. This is 																																																								
4 Dakolias argues that “ An effective judiciary is predictable, resolves cases in a reasonable time frame, 
and is accessible to the public.” id at 88. 
5 W. B. Rayner, Arbitration: Private Dispute Resolution as an Alternative to the Court”, 22 U. W. 
Ontario L. Rev. 33, at 37 (1984), the author in here explains how “several American Jurisdictions 
attempted to channel small claims disputes into arbitration, either voluntary or compulsory.” Which 
was in an effort to “alleviate court congestion” as he puts it. 
6 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature 
June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S 3. The UAE accessed to this convention in 2006, based on the Federal 
decree no. 43/2006, on 6/13/2006. 
7 A Draft law on arbitration was published in 2010. However, it still remains pending. 
8 Federal Law no.11 of 1992, Concerning Civil Procedures, the chapter that concerns arbitration is 
located and discussed in the appendix of this study, see the appendix at 247. 
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facilitated partly by the courts’ practices and partly by the civil procedures law. The 
result of arbitration serving as triage, in a way, for the courts—rather than being an 
independent and legitimate dispute resolution method—has tended to increase the 
time it takes for disputants to have their cases resolved. This amounts to a delay of 
justice.9  
 To understand how arbitration works in the UAE, this dissertation examines 
the judicial institute in charge of resolving disputes and applying the law (the court). 
It also outlines the operations of the courts and discusses case law as it relates to 
arbitration.10 
 
 
 
2. Objective of the Study 
	
This dissertation poses specific questions that relate to a number of problems 
facing arbitration in the context of the UAE’s legal system. How may a functioning 
arbitration system in the UAE be established? Must certain laws be amended? How 
does the appeal procedure impact arbitration? Can arbitration resolve civil transaction 
disputes in the UAE? Several sub-questions and factors are relevant to the above 
questions: 
1. Is there a relationship between the courts’ definition of arbitration and their 
decisions? Does the nature of the dispute have any bearing on the courts’ 
																																																								
9 Which is a manifestation of the legal Maximus “Justice Delayed is Justice Denied”, this concept has 
been explored by a number of authors such as Tania Sourdin & Naomi Burstyner, Justice Delayed is 
Justice Denied, 4 Victoria U.L. & Just. J. 46 (2014), the authors in here explain that this concept is not 
knew and in fact it had been mentioned by William E. Gladston a British statesmen and a former prime 
minister in the late 1800’s, they further state that it outdates him, and traces of this statement can be 
found in the bible as well. 
10 Dakolias explains that “little quantitative data on judicial efficiency currently available, making 
assessment of judicial reform difficult.” If such were the case when it comes to the court then it is twice 
as hard when it comes to arbitration, and the difficulty increases when trying to piece together cases 
relating to arbitration from the court, see Dakolias supra note 3 at 89. 
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decision to allow it (or not) to go to arbitration? Do the various courts in the 
UAE all agree in their decisions regarding arbitration?  
2. Is Shari’a-based arbitration found in the UAE? Can it be used to resolve some 
of the issues that affect the arbitral process? Do the rules of the Islamic Shari’a 
affect the courts’ decisions on arbitration? Are family disputes subject to 
arbitration under the rules of the Islamic Shari’a? 
The Islamic Shari’a is one of the primary sources of law in the UAE. Therefore, it 
is imperative to identify the courts’ position on Shari’a, and to identify whether 
the courts’ practice towards arbitration conforms to the rules of the Islamic 
Shari’a. 
3. Do lease disputes in the UAE fall into the spectrum of arbitration? What are 
the lease dispute committees in the UAE? Can they be considered arbitral 
tribunals? Can such schemes be adopted to resolve some of the issues that face 
arbitration? 
Legislators in more than one Emirate established special decrees that regulate 
lease contracts in the UAE, and they gave jurisdiction for settling those disputes to 
specialized committees. The existence of these committees and their functions in 
relation to arbitration raises questions of whether individuals have the right to opt-
out into arbitration for certain contracts. 
4. How does the Civil Circuit address arbitration? Is arbitration independent from the 
courts’ influence? Is there such a thing as a finality of awards? Does the court 
view arbitrators as experts and their awards as expert reports?  
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The way that the civil circuit addresses arbitration11 highlights the problem facing 
arbitration in the UAE: at its core, the parties’ right to arbitrate is undermined by the 
courts’ practices, which jeopardizes the legitimacy of arbitration in the UAE. If the 
legitimacy of arbitration continues to be undermined, it will lose its appeal for 
individuals, which in turn would contribute to an ever-growing flood of disputes 
filling the Judges’ chambers. Ultimately, individuals that choose to arbitrate may be 
left questioning their decision to opt-out into arbitration. 
5. Is the Civil Procedures law able to regulate the arbitration process? Is there a 
need to have an independent law that regulates arbitration? 
A draft arbitration law was published in 2010; however, to this point, it is still not 
enforced. It is a positive step to have an independent law that regulates arbitration, but 
the issues facing arbitration in the UAE are not a matter of regulation or the lack of it. 
If arbitration cannot reach its full potential as a dispute resolution procedure, 
independent regulation may be a step forward. However, without the proper 
foundation for this regulation, it will not flourish or achieve the goals of supporting 
successful arbitral practice in the UAE. 
 
 
3. Significance of the Study 
This dissertation includes an examination of seventy-eight cases that were 
issued by different high courts in the UAE, translated and analyzed the author. 
The cases highlight the problems facing arbitration in general, and the problems 
facing civil and Shari’a-based arbitration. One of the main issues addressed is how 																																																								
11 The disputes that are submitted to this circuit, incorporate all civil transaction disputes, therefore, it 
would address disputes that relate to arbitration that raises from a civil contract according to the 
definition of the civil transaction law, such as construction contracts, lease disputes, family arbitration, 
into issues relating to the enforcement of award..etc, see general ALI ABDUL HAMID TURKI, Al Wasit 
Fe Sharh Al-ijrat Al-Madaniah Al-Imaratiah (The Intermediate to explain the Emirati Civil 
Procedures), (1st ed. 2009). Furthermore, some disputes that would be discussed in here would be of a 
purely commercial nature, due to the fact that the court  
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and why an individual’s agreement to arbitrate ends up in litigation in front of a 
court, which calls their decision to opt-out into arbitration into question. 
Furthermore, as long as arbitral awards are dependent on the courts’ recognition 
for enforcement, it is necessary to understand the relationship between the courts 
and the practice of arbitration.  
 The UAE’s courts are flooded with cases; arbitration could help solve this 
problem. Therefore, it is essential to resolve this flooding so that individuals do 
not come to feel that there is no difference between litigation and arbitration in the 
UAE, or that arbitration may never be a good choice, because resolving a dispute 
in the courts seems more economically reasonable and quick. Note that at present, 
a court’s decision provides more judicial guarantees for enforcement than an 
arbitral award.  
 
4. Methodology 
This study analyzes issues relating to civil arbitration from the UAE’s courts’ 
viewpoint and also with respect to UAE laws. Therefore, the methodology 
adopted in this dissertation focuses on the decisions of the high courts and the 
UAE civil procedures law. 
This study is a descriptive analytical study, which describes and analyzes civil 
arbitration. It also considers whether the courts’ decisions are in conformity with 
the Islamic Shari’a. It examines how long it takes for a dispute concerning 
arbitration to be settled, and whether there is such thing is the finality of awards. 
The research conducted for this dissertation compares different decisions 
made by the courts to determine whether there is consensus between courts on the 
same subject. In this way, it is an in-depth analysis of the UAE’s courts’ 
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perspective on arbitration; it does not seek to compare the UAE with other 
jurisdictions, except when necessary to highlight similarities or identify solutions 
that other jurisdictions have found.  
Data Collection methods 
Primary and secondary sources were consulted for this research. 
1. Primary Sources: 
This study investigated laws and regulations that concern arbitration in the 
UAE, in addition to international conventions, to gain an understanding of 
(1) how the UAE’s judiciary interprets these sources and (2) how they (the 
sources) affect the judiciary’s ideas about how arbitration should operate 
in the UAE. 
2. Secondary Sources: 
To understand how courts operate in the UAE, and to understand the 
foundations behind their decisions, this study considers selected articles 
and studies that explain the courts’ views, and it also explores solutions 
proposed by those studies that may have the potential to resolve some of 
the questions surrounding arbitration in the UAE. 
	
 
5. Limitations of the Study 
While this study focuses on the decisions of the UAE high courts regarding 
arbitration, it cannot incorporate all decisions issued by those courts on this 
subject, nor can it present all the hurdles that face arbitration within the court 
system. Therefore this study focuses on the decisions of the civil circuit court, 
which excludes disputes of a commercial nature, since they fall under the 
jurisdiction of the commercial circuit. That said, some disputes examined by the 
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civil circuit include commercial issues, especially those from the earlier days, 
when the civil circuit examined all disputes of a non-criminal nature. 
Nevertheless, the majority of disputes examined in this study are of a civil nature.  
The lack of digital copies of cases presents a further challenge for this study. 
Some of the cases examined, especially those issued by the Dubai Cassation 
Court, very difficult to find. The court in Dubai publishes a collection of its 
decisions that contains certain decisions that the court believes are representative 
of its jurisprudence; publishing these decisions was put on hold several years ago. 
The Supreme Court publishes decisions online through the Ministry of Justice 
website, which makes things easier for researchers and law students. However, in 
both instances, these are selected decisions only and not a complete account of all 
the disputes examined by the court. Moreover, the decisions of the lower courts, 
such as the courts of the first instance and the appeals court, are not made 
available to the public or to researchers at all. I had to schedule a meeting with the 
head of the court of appeals in Dubai in order to gain access to, and a copy of, 
those decisions, and even then I only managed to secure a portion of the decisions, 
and I still have not gained access to the Federal Court’s lower courts’ decisions. 
Translation is another challenge; the official language of the court and the 
laws in the UAE is Arabic. Translating from Arabic to English requires selecting 
the correct terminology. The UAE’s Ministry of Justice provides a translation of 
the UAE’s laws on its website; however, some of them lack the proper 
terminology. The translation of cases and legal articles discussed in this research 
required great time and effort. 
 
6. Structure of the study 
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This paper proceeds as follows: Chapter One is an introduction that explores the 
goals and limitations of the study and outlines its structure. 
The second chapter explores the general background of arbitration in the UAE, 
and it emphasizes the courts’ views on arbitration and how these views affect their 
decisions. 
The third chapter explores how the court addresses issues relating to Shari’a and 
arbitration in the UAE by exploring disputes that relate to Family law, as well as 
certain appeals to the high court regarding conflict between the Islamic Shari’a and 
arbitration. 
Chapter Four explores the decisions of the civil circuit courts on arbitration, 
beginning with an introduction to the UAE’s civil procedures law—this law governs 
the arbitration process in the UAE—and noting how this law contributes to the 
problems that face the practice of arbitration in the UAE. It then explores lease 
disputes and their relationship to arbitration in the UAE, including how they are 
governed and what can be learned from them. The Chapter then delves further into the 
decisions of the civil circuit court in cases involving arbitration. 
The fifth chapter concludes the dissertation by emphasizing important findings 
and recommendations that may be used to improve and develop the arbitration 
process in the UAE. 
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Chapter Two 
Background of Arbitration in the UAE 
 
2.1 Arbitration in the UAE 
Before beginning to examine the issues, certain preliminary points must be 
clarified to provide an understanding of the UAE’s legal system. 
 
2.2 The legal system in the United Arab Emirates 
This section introduces the UAE’s legal system and sheds light on the country’s 
constitution and how its federal government functions. In general, the UAE is 
considered to be governed by a system of civil law,12 although it is understood that 
some legislation is influenced to varying degrees by Islamic Shari’a law.13 Sharia 
gains its power from the UAE’s constitution,14 which gives Shari’a precepts a 
foothold within the country’s civil legal system. Therefore, the UAE may be 
considered to have a mixed legal system, rather than one governed by a purely civil 
legal code.15 Discussing the UAE’s laws (both civil and Shari’a), as well as the 
functioning of its federal government, provides insights into how legislators and 
judges view arbitration; this in turn helps to clarify the courts’ relationship to 
arbitration. Therefore, this section introduces three factors that affect the arbitral 
																																																								
12 ESSAM ALTAMIMI, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES 5, (1st ed. 2003), in which he explains that the UAE’s laws were modeled after the Egyptian 
legal system, which in turn is influenced by the French and Roman laws. 
13 For instance, personal status and civil transaction laws of the UAE both have provisions that are 
derived from Islamic Shari’a. see general Federal law No.5 of 1985 on the Civil Transaction Law of the 
United Arab Emirates state, issued on December 14 1985, as amended, February 14 1987, hereinafter 
civil transaction. And the Personal Status law was issued on 19/11/2005 and was published in the office 
gazette in 30/11/2005, Federal Law no.28 on personal status, hereinafter-personal status. 
14 United Arab Emirates Constitution, Art. 7.  
15 Willam Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: common law v. civil law (codified and uncodified), 60 La. L. 
Rev. 677, 678-681 (2000), were the author goes into details about the characteristics of a mixed 
system. 
	 11	
process: (1) the legal system in general; (2) the constitution of the UAE; and (3) the 
federal system of the UAE. 
2.2.1 The Legal System 	
 As mentioned above, the UAE is considered part of the family of civil law 
countries, with the primary source of law being a statutory code. The UAE’s system is 
based on the Egyptian model,16 and it therefore contains French and Roman 
influences. This is because a jurist named Abd al-Razzaq Al-Sanhuri17 was tasked 
with drafting the new Egyptian civil transaction law, and given that he was educated 
in France and Egypt, his civil code reflects a blend of French and Islamic law.18 
Therefore, the UAE’s legal codes are generally considered to have both Islamic and a 
French roots, which makes it inaccurate to categorize the UAE as either a purely civil 
law country or an Islamic one. 
 Clearly, then, the UAE’s legal system is mixed for the same reasons that the 
Egyptian system is considered to be mixed.19 Understanding this blend in the UAE 
will help explain how the UAE’s courts operate; one example would be that civil law 
as practiced in the UAE tends to focus on the rights and obligations of individuals.20 
This mixture enriches the theoretical basis of the legal system of the UAE; however, 
some of the provisions of the different sources of law (Islamic and French) contradict 
each other in some cases. If left unchecked, such discrepancies may become a cause 
of concern. The sources of the UAE’s laws also are the main guides for the UAE’s 																																																								
16 Al Tamimi, supra note 12 at 5. 
17 See general, GUY BECHOR, THE SANHURI CODE, AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN ARAB CIVIL 
LAW (1932 TO 1949) (2007). In this book the author is giving an insight into the work of one of the 
most prominent modern Arab jurists, one who helped in drafting a number of laws and Arabian 
constitutions including the UAE constitution. 
18 Dan E. Stigall, Iraqi Civil Law: its sources, substance, and sundering, 16 J. Transnat’ L. & Pol’y. 1, 
10-11(2006). See general, Bechor  id. 
19 Vernon Valentine Palmer, Mixed Legal System the Origin of the Species, 28 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 
103, 119 (2013). 
20 Tetley supra, note 15 at 708. This example is crucial to understanding some of the courts practices 
when it comes to arbitration. 
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judges, who are directly affected by the mixture of source codes, as may be deduced 
by examining the courts’ decisions. 
 2.2.2 The Constitution 
The constitution of the UAE consists of 151 Articles21 and was created on 
December 2, 1971. This constitution was based on the desire to create unity and 
cooperation between the Emirates. Six Emirates22 joined the union on December 2, 
1971 to form the United Arab Emirates. The following year, Ras Al Khaimah also 
joined the union, on February 10, 1972. The original constitution was amended in 
1996.23 
 When drafting the constitution, the UAE looked to the experience of its 
neighbors; at that time Kuwait stood out as a likely template24. The Kuwaitis had 
relied on the Egyptian experience and modeled their constitution after Egypt’s. This 
Egyptian influence is further exemplified when considering the people who drafted 
the Kuwaiti constitution, and one of the contributors to both the Kuwaiti and UAE 
constitutions was Prof. Abd al-Razzaq Al-Sanhuri.25 
 The UAE choose Islamic Sharia law as one of its main sources.26 
Consequently, this source would ultimately have a major affect on how arbitration 
																																																								
21 United Arab Emirates Constitution supra note 2. See general NAWAF KANAN, Al-Nitham Al-Distori 
w Al-Siasi Le-Dwalt Al-Emarat Al-Arabia Al-Mthadah (The Constitutional and poltical System of the 
United Arab Emirates), ( 2nd ed. 2006). In which the author discusses in detail the constitutional law of 
the UAE. 
22 Those six emirates are: “ Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman Fujirah and Um Al Quwain” in addition 
to those six the early meetings was attended by two other states which are Qatar and Bahrain. 
23 Al Tamimi, supra note 12, at 1. 
24 In this authors view the reason behind choosing Kuwait as a template, relates to the fact that they 
gained their independence before the UAE, and given the close cultural backgrounds of both the UAE 
and Kuwait. This fact is further supported by Al-Muhairi, he states that:” The Kuwaiti Constitution 
formed the basic model for the UAE constitution, which cited many of its articles….” See Butti Sultan 
Butti Ali Al-Muhairi, The position of Shari’a Within the UAE Constitution and the federal Supreme 
court’s Application of the Constitutional Clause Concerning Shari’a, 11 Arab L.Q. 219, 220 (1996) 
25 id Al-Muhairi at 220). See also Bechor supra note 17, who’s theories and influence can still be felt in 
the UAE and most Arabian jurisdictions to this day. 
26 United Arab Emirates Constitution, supra note 2, Article7.  
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was viewed and practiced in the UAE, especially vis a vis court decisions,27 which 
can be traced to the Kuwaiti (and thus the Egyptian) constitution28 and to Prof. Al-
Sanhuri.29 
 
2.2.3 The Federal System 
 The UAE designed its federal system in a way that best suited its unique 
situation. Since each Emirate was considered a sovereign state before the unification, 
the UAE comprises seven individual states, each with its own ruling families and civil 
institutions that are now united into a singular entity. Therefore, the UAE’s 
constitution allowed each Emirate to administrate its own local affairs, and ultimate 
authority in each Emirate remained in the hands of the ruler of that Emirate. These 
rulers have executive powers and legislative authority to rule their Emirates.30 On the 
other hand, the federal government has sole jurisdiction over matters such as foreign 
affairs, so in essence, the individual Emirates have jurisdiction over matters of a 
regional nature within their Emirates, unless they have surrendered these to the 
federal government.31 Furthermore, the constitution gives the Emirate the right to 
retain its own judicial body, which has resulted in the existence of both federal and 
local courts. The federal courts are administered by the federal government,32 and 
therefore fall under the jurisdiction of the federal Supreme Court, which is based in 
Abu Dhabi.33 Each local court has its own high court or court of Cassation. Both types 																																																								
27 Mostly in Shari’a based arbitration. 
28 Al-Muhairi, supra note 24, at 220. 
29 The influence of Egypt is not limited to the constitution but as we shall later on see it also tend to 
influence the way the judges rule and decide in some cases, such as the ones concerned with riba. 
30 Al Tamimi supra note 2, at 1-2. 
31 id; see also, UAE Constitution, Articles 120-122. 
32 As of now there are 4 Emirates that are still within the Federal Court system, which are Ajman, 
Sharjah, Um Al Quwain and finally Fujairah, 
33 Recently Abu Dhabi have decided to rescind from the Federal system, as of now two high Courts 
have their seat in Abu Dhabi, the Federal Supreme Court and the Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation, which 
was established on 1/9/2007. 
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of courts apply the federal law in addition to local laws and regulations enacted by the 
Ruler of the Emirate.  
If a conflict should rise between federal and local laws, the federal law 
prevails.34 However, unlike in the United States and other jurisdictions that have a 
similar federal system, the UAE lacks a constitutional court or a court that is superior 
to both the federal and local courts. The decisions of the federal Supreme Court in the 
UAE are not binding on the local courts—for example, the Dubai Cassation court is 
not bound by the decisions of the UAE’s supreme court—and the local courts often 
differ on certain aspects of the law. This creates a significant and interesting area of 
legal research and theoretical debate, but at the same time, it can have a negative 
affect when it comes to the applying the law. Legal practitioners must be 
knowledgeable about the requirements of each court and to adapt his practice 
accordingly; adding arbitration to this mix complicates the situation further. 
Therefore, there is a need to create a Constitutional Court, which would consider and 
resolve those diversities by creating guidelines that unify the practice of law within 
the UAE.35 
 
2.3 Historical Background on Arbitration in the UAE 
Arbitration had begun to gain momentum and popularity within the UAE in recent 
years. However, upon examining the history of the region, it becomes apparent that 																																																								
34 Al Tamimi, supra note 12, at 4. 
35 This proposition was raised by Dr. Abdul-Wahab Abdul then head of the Federal Supreme Court of 
the UAE, in a workshop discussing “the challenges facing the UAE judicial scene”, which was reported 
in the newspaper http://www.albayan.ae/across-the-uae/2008-05-29-1.642923. The ministry of 
presidential affairs also shares the same idea of unifying the high courts, however, unlike Dr. Abdul-
Wahab, who propose the creation of a new high court, they discussed whether or not its suitable for the 
Federal Supreme Court, to hear all appeals submitted by the federal and local appeal courts. A 
colleague who received it from Dr. Ashor Mabrook of Dubai Police Academy gave this document to 
me; sadly this document has no indication to the author’s name nor a clear way to cite it. 
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arbitration can be traced back to the early days of Islam, and even further back to the 
days before Islam, when tribes relied on arbitration and other dispute settlement 
methods to resolve their conflicts. The following section considers this history in 
three periods: (1) arbitration before the Federation (before 1971); (2) arbitration 
during the period between 1971 and up to 1992; and (3) arbitration since 1992. 
 
2.3.1 Arbitration within the UAE before the Federation 
 Given the fact that the UAE as a state did not exist before 1971, and in order 
to better understand the roots of arbitration as practiced within the UAE, this section 
is divided into three subsections: 
1- Arbitration before Islam 
2- Arbitration under the rule of Islam 
3- Arbitration as practiced in individual Emirates up until the foundation of 
the UAE; more specifically, during the 19th century and up to 1971. 
 
a) Arbitration Before Islam 
 The roots of arbitration may be traced back as early as the beginning of human 
society. The origin of arbitration in early societies can be attributed to religion, 
customs and tradition; tribes functioned then as sovereign states do today. As societies 
continued to grow, so did the problems and challenges of daily life, including all of its 
interactions, civil and commercial.36 
There has always been a need for dispute resolution mechanisms. Indeed, long 
before the creation of public court systems, mediation and arbitration flourished in 																																																								
36 Arbitration roots can be traced to fourth century B.C. Greece. See, See general, SHEILA L. AGER, 
INTERSTATE ARBITRATIONS IN THE GREEK WORLD, 337-90 B.C. (1996), at 3. See also NAJEEB 
AHMAD AL-HALABI, al-TAHKEEM QABL al-ISLAM (ARBITRATION BEFORE ISLAM), 3 (2006), in which the 
author discuses the practice of arbitration before Islam in Yemen, he also states that arbitration was the 
dominating practice at that time. 
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early societies, as certainly was the case in the Arabian Peninsula. Arbitration was 
commonly used as the best way to handle disputes, and the use of arbitration was not 
limited to settling disputes between individuals. It was also used to settle conflicts that 
arose between disputing nations and tribes.37 
 In general, societies in pre-Islamic Arabia were governed by the tribes, since 
the concept of a state in those days did not exist. A person’s loyalty was to his tribe, 
and people were forced to abide by longstanding tribal rules and customs. Effective 
conflict resolution was crucial, as even the small conflict could escalate into wars 
between tribes that spanned entire generations.38 
 Therefore, as the societies of pre-Islamic Arabia lacked the modern structure 
of a functioning judicial system (as did most societies of that era), Arabs resorted to 
arbitration and mediation to settle their disputes. The prominent feature of such 
proceedings was their simple, direct nature.39 
 
b) Arbitration After Islam 
 Islamic Shari’a40 sets down rules that govern all aspects of individual conduct, 
including arbitration.41 Different schools of thought42 provide further explanation and 
guidelines about situations regarding arbitration and the use of different tools, as well 
																																																								
37 See general Ager id were the author gives example of number of disputes that were resolved by 
arbitration in ancient Greece. See also ABDEL HAMID EL-AHDAB & JALAL EL-AHDAB, ARBITRATION 
WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES, at 5-6 (2011). 
38 El-Ahdab El-Ahdab id at 5-6. 
39 Id. at 6. For example they require the presence of both parties of the arbitration proceedings and 
taking an oath to prove their claim would have been done in front of the Idols. 
40 The definition of Shari’a is discussed in detail in the chapter dealing with Shari’a, see infra 3.1 the 
introduction to Shari’a. 
41 The way Shari’a governs Arbitration will be explained in greater detail in the Chapter discussing the 
issue of Arbitration and Shari’a and Family law within the UAE, see infra the Chapter dealing with 
Shari’a. 
42 The different schools and their influence on the Islamic Shari’a are explained in the Shari’a chapter, 
see infra 3.2. 
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as about the sources of the Islamic Shari’a.43 Also, there are a number of famous 
arbitration cases that happened during the Islamic era.44 
The location of the Emirates that would become the UAE meant that it came 
under the influence of Islam from its early days; this, along with the tribal nature of 
the Emirates at the time meant that Shari’a and customary laws were the norm and the 
source of governance.45  
  
c) The Nineteenth Century   
 This period was critical for the small coastal states of the UAE region, and it 
saw great changes.46 This treaty gave the UAE its former name of the Trucial States.47 
British influence increased after the discovery of oil within the region,48 which 
resulted in an increase in trade and commercial activities in the region and the 
increased flow of traders, especially from India.49  
However, the society of the Trucial States was small at this time, which meant 
that the number of disputes was minimal and conflict usually was settled through 
mediation.50 The nature of disputes in this period were bound to the nature of the 																																																								
43 See infra 3.1.2, in which the different sources of the Islamic Shari’a are explained. 
44 See general infra 3. 
45 See general, NORAH SAQER AL-FLAHI, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN THE TRUCIAL COAST FROM 1890 
AD- 1971 AD, at 29-30 and 67-69 (2014). 
46 Id at 63, were the author mentions a treaty signed in 1820 AD and another in 1892 AD, as well as the 
treaty of 1879 AD, id at 28, For example, during this period, western powers established a foothold in 
the region, the British in particular. A treaty has been signed between the Emirate Sheikhs and the UK 
recognizing British presence in the region.. 
47 E.g., Al Tamimi supra note 12, at 1; El- Ahdab & El-Ahdab supra note 37, at 777. Some used to call 
the region as Pirate Coast or the Trucial Coast, see Al-Flahi supra note 45 at 16. 
48Al-Flahi Supra note 45 at 65. 
49 id at 16-28, were the author discusses the political scene in the region. Note that India at that time 
was considered a British colony. The oil trade and the start of WWII contributed to the establishment 
of a law that resulted in the creation of the judicial council of the Trucial states in 1938, see id at 101. 
Which essentially was a first attempt at modernizing the judicial situation in the region. However, this 
resulted in a dual judicial system, because it meant that all foreigners (British nationals and non-
Muslims) would fall under UK laws, while everyone else would fall under the influence of the local 
ruler’s judicial authority. see id at 102-109. 
50If mediation failed, the disputing parties would seek a prominent figure in the society (usually 
someone educated or with stature; i.e. a Sheikh, Teacher, or Imam) to settle their dispute., see Id at 41-
45. 
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transactions that tended to occur in the societies of the time; these differed based on 
the geographical location of the society.51 
 The above factors resulted in the limited presence of a judicial system or 
written laws. The existence of courts in the modern sense (physical or legislative) was 
limited or non-existent.52 Government in the modern sense did not exist until after the 
establishment of the federation; while some Emirates did have courts and laws in this 
period, they were quite limited, as noted.53 Therefore, it can be concluded that 
arbitration was governed in this period in the same way that it had been in the 
previous period. The recognition of the Emirates on the international scene that 
occurred when they signed the unification treaty that created the UAE introduced 
significant changes in how these societies viewed and practiced laws.  
 
2.3.2 Arbitration within the UAE from 1971-1992 
 This period saw the unification of the Emirates and subsequently the creation 
of the United Arab Emirates; moreover, it saw the development of state entities and 
the birth of a unified constitution.54 During this time, federal courts replaced the 
existing judicial institutes in the five Emirates that chose to remain within the federal 
																																																								
51 In the coastal areas the disputes focused around the main sources of income-product related to the 
sea. Therefore, commercial activity was mainly fishing and pearl diving or trade with India, along with 
other civil disputes Id at 54-63, were the author gives examples to how the system worked at that time 
and the name of famous Judges and cases that occurred at that time. Disputes that happened in the 
desert, mostly between Bedouin tribes living near oases or villages or moving through the Arabian 
Desert, were mostly related to pasture, the ownership of cattle, the borders of each tribe, and the 
ownership of water supplies such as wells. Id at 50-51. 
52 At that time a disputing party seeking a resolution of their dispute would either seek a judge or an 
arbitrator either where ever they can be found, this might be in their homes or the rulers forts, a school 
or the mosque, thus procedures of submitting cases were not of existence and a record keeping of cases 
were not existence or limited at that time, even decision were not written in most cases and the 
exception was having a written decision. 
53 For example Dubai created a court in 1956, see Al-Flahi supra note 45 at 110, Abu Dhabi first 
attempt of creating a modern court were in the 1960’s and the first record of it were in 1964, id at 115, 
in Sharjah the British records show that a court exited in the 1960, however, cases were held before 
that in the rulers fort were a room in the fort were allocated for that purpose, id at 119.  
54 See general the UAE constitution, supra note 2. 
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system.55 Most laws were not enacted or were not federalized, meaning that each 
Emirate had to regulate its own courts and enact its own civil procedural laws. Each 
Emirate varied in the way it regulated arbitration; however, most Emirates shared the 
commonality of regulating arbitration within their civil procedural laws.56 
 A significant distinction between this period and the previous one was the 
creation of civil institutions and authorities in an attempt to modernize the country; 
the courts and various judicial institutes were on the front lines of this change. This 
might be one reason that the use of arbitration declined during this period; namely, the 
courts began to gain popularity. Prior to this time, the UAE had a significant illiteracy 
problem, and very few people held a law degree at the time unification occurred. 
Thus, the UAE had to rely on foreigners and foreign experience to shape its judicial 
system.57 
As courts of law were introduced, the continued development of ADR as the 
main way to resolve disputes slowed (including arbitration); courts began to assume 
the entire burden of dispute resolution and adjudication.58 This may be attributed to a 
number of factors; one key factor is how a judge’s educational background influences 
decision-making process and attitude toward arbitration, which (in the UAE) has not 
always been positive.59 																																																								
55 Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Fujairah, Ajman, Um Al Quwain. However Abu Dhabi have recently rescinded 
from the federal system and established their own cassation court following the two other Emirates 
(Dubai Ras and Al Khaimah). Supra note 22-23. 
56 Such as the case in Abu Dhabi, where arbitration was regulated in the civil procedures law of 1970 in 
the Emirate of AD, see Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 254/11, issued on 20th of 
February 1990. 
57 Which at this stage promoted the resolution of disputes through the newly formed judicial institute. 
See general Al-Tamimi supra note 12 at 5. 
58 This is the moment of eclipse of arbitration described by Kellor, See, FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ITS HISTORY, FUNCT ION AND ACHIEVEMENTS, at 5 (1st ed. 1948). Many Arabian 
scholars were enlisted to help build the foundations of the emerging judicial institutes in the UAE; their 
help meant gave them influence over how the UAE’s courts would be defined and would evolve, see 
Al-Muhairi supra note 24 at 220, and Bechor supra note 17. 
59 Kellor explained this phenomena in the chapter talking about the historical pattern, she explained that 
“little effort was made to educate the public.”, and “Education in the knowledge or use of arbitration 
was unheard of, nor was there source material available, nor had teachers thought of instruction in the 
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2.3.3 Arbitration within the UAE after 1992 (the introduction of the federal law 
on civil procedures) 
  The continuous development of the UAE’s institutions encouraged the 
government to improve the laws within the UAE and to unify the civil procedures in 
the courts; this effort was manifested in the unification of the civil procedures law. 
Since arbitration is considered a dispute settlement method, the drafters of the civil 
procedures included it in this law in order to regulate it.60 They also included the 
Enforcement of domestic awards in this law,61 and also by international treaties, such 
as the NY convention.62 
This law can be traced to a number of sources, including Egypt, because Egypt 
was and still is at the forefront of legal research and development in the Arabic world. 
Many Arab nations look to Egypt for guidance as they draft their own laws; even non-
Egyptian jurists look to the laws of Egypt for guidance as they judge and manage their 
own caseloads.63  
 Finally, this period saw a resurgent of arbitration, which is increase and 
interest in arbitration, which is manifested in the number of litigation cases that 
																																																																																																																																																														
subject. Generally speaking, unawareness was the phenomenon of this early period….” id. at 7-8. 
Which in comparison is the same phenomenon experienced nowadays within the UAE. 
60 Specifically, arbitration is treated in the third chapter of the second book of the civil procedures law, 
and it is regulated in fifteen different Articles (203- 218), see infra the appendix domestic arbitration, 
page 247. 
61 Articles (235-236), see infra the process of enforcement, page 268. 
62 In the mid-twentieth century, arbitration gained momentum as a form of dispute resolution. Its status 
was perhaps amplified the most by the NY convention which also contributed to the image of 
arbitration as a primary tool for resolving disputes in the commercial realm, especially those that 
involved international commerce, see Supra note 3. The predecessor to this convention was the Geneva 
Protocol of 1923, Protocol on arbitration clauses 27 L.N.T.S 1923, and Convention of 1927, 
Convention on the Execution of foreign Arbitral awards, 92 L.N.T.S 1927, See, ALAN REDFERN & J. 
MARTIN HUNTER, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAITON, 515 (5th ed. 2009). See 
El-ahdab and El-ahda supra note 37 at 818. 
63 See al-Muhairi supra note 24 at 220, not to mention that in the UAE the judges that interpret this law 
are non-UAE nationals, see al-Tamimi supra note 12 at 6, were he states that: “Almost 90 per cent of 
Judges in the UAE courts are from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan and a few from North African 
Countries.”  
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concern arbitration and the increase in the number of disputes resolved through 
arbitration, as exemplified by the creation of arbitration institutes such as the DIFC-
LCIA64.  
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 The diverse social and legal-historical background of the UAE helped to shape 
the judicial system, causing it to be influenced by legal practitioners from other 
jurisdictions, especially from Egypt, who helped develop and shape the courts in the 
UAE. Understanding this background helps to explain how the UAE’s courts 
function, and how their decisions affect the use of arbitration. The influence of the 
UAE’s unique history can be seen in how the courts practice, especially when they 
either promote the practice of arbitration or deter individuals from submitting disputes 
to arbitration. Indeed, deciphering the courts’ attitude toward arbitration is the first 
step in formulating solutions that may help the courts accept and even promote the use 
of arbitration. Thus, after explaining this historical background of arbitration in the 
UAE, the next section will look more closely at how the courts view arbitration. 
 
 
2.5 What is Arbitration? 
 
The following section examines the general principles that govern arbitration 
in the UAE, as seen from the courts’ perspective. The section is divided into two 																																																								
64 This center was established in 2008, between the Dubai International Financial center and the 
London Court of International arbitration, to create the DIFC and LCIA Arbitration center, see 
http://www.difc-lcia.org/overview.aspx##, see El-Ahdab &El-Ahdab supra note 37 at 786-788. 
Furthermore, there are other arbitraiton institutes that are being governed by the chamber of commerce 
of each emirates and other arbitral institutes, see Al-Tamimi supra note 12 at 147. 
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parts: (1) defining arbitration from the courts perspective; and (2) providing insight 
into how the general principles of the courts affect arbitration.  
 
 
2.6 Defining Arbitration 
As every building needs a foundation, research on arbitration needs to start by 
defining arbitration. It is crucial to understand arbitration as a concept of both law 
and legal studies, as well as to distinguish it from other forms of dispute resolution, 
such as mediation and negotiation,65 as well as litigation. This requires exploring the 
definition of the term from three aspects. The first concerns the views of jurists that 
are foreign to the UAE, in particular western legal scholars. The second explores the 
term from the Arab jurist’s point of view and then from the perspective of Islamic 
Shari’a scholars. Finally, UAE legislation regarding arbitration is considered. This 
final viewpoint may be examined by analyzing this legislation and how UAE courts’ 
view arbitration. 
2.6.1 Foreign Jurists 
Many legal scholars attempted to define the concept of arbitration according to a 
similar pattern. For instance, Redfern and Hunter define arbitration as any instance in 
which:  																																																								
65 Born states that: “Arbitration is only one of alternative dispute resolution (i.e., mechanisms for 
resolution of disputes outside of national courts). Other forms of “ADR” adopt a variety of procedural 
mechanisms, aimed at different types of problems and parties.” He distinguishes between arbitration 
and mediation by stating that:” These procedures do not provide for a binding decision to be imposed 
on the parties; rather, they provide for a non-binding process that may (or may not) assist the parties in 
reaching a consensual settlement.” PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND 
CONCILIATION IN UNCITRAL MODEL LAW JURSDICTIONS, 7, (3rd. ed. 2010). The American Health 
Lawyer Association gave distinction between arbitration and mediation by stating that:” Unlike 
mediation, arbitration is a private hearing process presided over by a third party neutral (the arbitrator) 
or panel of neutrals which culminates in an enforceable, final decision rendered by the arbitrator or 
panel of arbitrators. The arbitrator is essentially a private contract judge engaged by the parties.”, see 
AHLA Seminar Material, Long Term Care and the Law Orlando, FL February 21, 2007, written by 
Greg Binford. See also EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE (eds.), FOUCHARD GAILLARD 
GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 12-17 (1999), the author in here 
distinguishes arbitration, conciliation and mediation as well.  
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Parties who are in dispute agree to submit their disagreement to a person 
whose expertise or judgment they trust. They each put their respective cases 
to this person—this private individual, this arbitrator—who listens, considers 
the facts and the arguments, and then makes a decision. That decision is final 
and binding on the parties because the parties have agreed that it should be, 
rather than the corrective power of any state.66  
Other scholars have followed the same line of reasoning when defining 
arbitration. One, for example, has concluded that: 
Arbitration is a device whereby the settlement of a question, which is of 
interest for two or more persons, is entrusted to one or more other persons—
the arbitrator or arbitrators—who derive their powers from a private 
agreement, not from the authorities of a State, and who are to proceed and 
decide the case on the basis of such an agreement.67 
Similarly, arbitration is defined as a means of resolving disputes in front of an 
independent individual who, in most cases, is an expert in the field to which the 
conflict pertains and is tasked with evaluating the issues of the dispute and rendering a 
final binding decision.68 Arbitration is a process that individuals seek for the benefit 
of having an expert rule on a dispute, and out of the hope of incurring less expense 
than a court case.69 The process gains authority from agreement of both parties to 
abide by the arbitrator’s decision. The similarity between this process and litigation is 
that parties give up the right to having a say about the outcome of the decision. 
However, arbitration differs from both mediation and negotiation in that the ultimate 																																																								
66 Redfern and Hunter supra note 62, at 1. See general, MARTIN DOMKE, GABRIEL WILNER AND 
LARRY E. EDMONDSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2013). In part one of this book titled 
the nature of commercial arbitration the author addresses the question of “What is arbitration?”, the 
author provides an extensive and detailed definition of arbitration. See also Harry Arkin, New 
opportunities for arbitration in East/West Trade, 3 Transnat’l Law. 495, 496 (1990), in which the 
defines arbitration from a commercial point of view and also paraphrase Domke to provide his 
definition. 
67 Gaillard & Savage, supra note 65 at 9. Another author defines arbitration as: “Arbitration is the 
institution by which a third party decides on a dispute between two or more parties by exercising the 
jurisdictional mandate conferred on him by the latter.” JEAN-FRANCOIS POUDRET AND SEBSATIEN 
BESSON, COMPARTIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 1, (Stephen V. Berti and Annette Ponti 
trans., 2nd ed.)  
68 Richard C. Downing & Patrick R. James, Arbitration of a Securities Dispute: An Overview for the 
Practitioner, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 621, (1991). See general Peter Chow, Managing and 
Resolving Business Disputes in China: Strategies, Pitfalls, and practical tips, Thomson Reuters/ 
Aspatore, 1, 2 (2009).  
69 It should be noted that not all forms of arbitration are less expensive. Forms such as commercial 
arbitration are costly procedures to conclude. See, e.g. Ali Assareh, Forum Shopping and the Cost of 
Access to Justice-Cost and Certainty in International Commercial Litigation and Arbitration, 31 J.L. & 
Com. 1, 44 (2012-2013), the author in this article emphasis the importance of properly identifying and 
choosing the forum in order to not incur extra costs.   
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goal and outcome of arbitration is a binding award; if the parties fail to uphold the 
award, it may be enforced upon them through legal means.70  
Problems arise when trying to distinguish arbitration from other dispute 
resolution tools. For example, considered from an international perspective, 
arbitration may involve different definitions of various industry terms that have been 
adopted by different legal systems, as well as the fast pace at which international trade 
has expanded and invented new tools for settling disputes.71 Altogether, the definition 
of arbitration is nevertheless similar in most legal systems. Barring minor variations, 
it refers to a private adjudicating mechanism whereby parties choose an expert body 
(i.e., the arbitrator) to settle a dispute and render a final and binding decision, based 
on the parties agreeing as a stipulation of the arbitration process to abide by such 
decision.72 
However, there is no definition of arbitration in most statutes,73 including the 
United States Federal Arbitration Act,74 the UK Arbitration Act75 and the French Civil 
																																																								
70 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL, 15–16 (3rd ed., 2012). See also Maya 
Ganguly, Tribunals and Taxation: An Investigation of Arbitration in Recent US Tax Conventions, 29 
Wis. Int’l L.J. 735, 738–739. 
71  Carbonneau supra note 70. at 10. 
72 Therefore as one author suggests: “ there is no universal definition of arbitration. Within different 
legal systems the arbitration process is carried out in different ways and subject to different legal 
rules…”, see ANDREW TWEEDALE & KEREN TWEEDDALE, ARBITRATION OF COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 
INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW AND PRACTICE, 33 (2010). Another author suggest that arbitration 
should be defined as follow: “arbitration should be defined by reference to two constituent elements 
which commentators and the courts almost unanimously recognize. First, the arbitrators’ task is to 
resolve a dispute. Second, the source of this judicial role is a contract; the arbitrators’ power to decide a 
dispute originates in the common intention of the parties. Thus, arbitration comprises both a judicial 
and a contractual element.” Gillard and Savage supra note 65 at 11. 
73Peter binder states that:” The Model Law, like most conventions and national laws on arbitration, 
does not define the term ‘arbitration’. it merely clarifies, in its article 7(1)1, that it covers any 
arbitration ‘whether or not administrated by a permanent arbitral institution’….”. see PETER BINDER, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION IN UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 
JURSDICTIONS, 41, (3rd. ed. 2010).Nevertheless the UNCITRAL mode law attempt to define arbitration, 
leaves room to improvement, Peter Binder states that:” the number of additional definitions included in 
some states’ corresponding provisions indicate that the term provided by the model law were not 
enough to satisfy many legal systems…”, see BINDER, at, 46-47.  
74 The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1-14 (1925). Hereinafter FAA. Carbonneau states:” the court 
reasoned that, because the FAA did not define the term “arbitration,” any submission to a third party 
constituted an agreement to arbitrate. The court stated that no “magic word such as ‘arbitrate’ … [were] 
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Procedures Code.76 Therefore, the courts of any given country should step in to 
explain what is meant by arbitration in that country, although this likely would result 
in a great many different definitions of the term.77 
An example of a decision that involved confusion over the definition of 
arbitration can be found in a case in the US: Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp.78 In this 
case, the court admitted that the FAA lacked a definition of arbitration.79 However, 
the presiding judge (Judge Weinstein) opined that there is no need for a formalistic 
definition of arbitration: “[a]t no time have the courts insisted on a rigid or formalistic 
approach to a definition of arbitration.”80 Despite this, Judge Weinstein defined 
arbitration, and his definition was quoted by the court thusly: “[a]rbitration is creature 
of contract, a device of the parties rather than the judicial process. If the parties have 
agreed to submit a dispute for a decision by a third party, they have agreed to 
arbitration.”81  
																																																																																																																																																														
needed to obtain benefits of the Act [the FAA].” See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND 
MATERIAL ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE, 1-2, (6th. ed.) 
75 Arbitration Act, 1996, c.23 (U.K.). This act lacks a definition of arbitration as well, however, it 
contains a definition of the arbitration agreement, furthermore, it only applies to written arbitration 
agreements, see Louis Flanner, Chapter 11: The English Statuary Framework, in ARBITRATION IN 
ENGLAND, WITH CHAPTERS ON SCOTLAND AND IRELAND, 208-210 (2013). 
76 CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 1442-1507 (Fr.). According to one author: “ The main 
sources of current French arbitration law, which have already been citied, are the provisions of articles 
2059 to 2061 of the Code Civil and Articles 1442 to 1507 of the Code de Procedure Civil (cpc).” See 
JEAN ROUCHE, GERALD H. POINTON, FRENCH ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE: A DYNAMIC CIVIL 
LAW APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 9 (2ND ED. 2009). Another author suggests that 
domestic arbitration in France is regulated by one further source which is article 631 of the commercial 
code, see Christopher R. Seppala, French Domestic Arbitration law, 16 Int’l L. 749,  753 (1982). 
According to another arbitration in France can be defined as follow: “In France, arbitration is 
traditionally defined along the following lines: Arbitration is a device whereby the settlement of a 
question, which is of interest for two or more persons, is entrusted to one or more other persons-the 
arbitrator or arbitrators-who derive their powers from a private agreement, not from the authorities of a 
State, and who are to proceed and decide the case on the basis of such an agreement.” Gaillard and 
Savage supra note 65 at 9. It becomes clear by examining these authors and the legislations in France, 
that this legislation lacks a definition of arbitration. 
77 Born suggests that:” This has left national courts, arbitral tribunals and commentators with the task 
of defining what constitutes “arbitration.” Born supra note 65 at 3. 
78 Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., 111 F.3d 343, (3d. Cir. 1997).   
79 id. at 351. 
80 id.   
81 id. 
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This definition of arbitration is further emphasized by AMF Inc. V. Brunswick 
Corp.82 His view embodies the principle of freedom of contract, stating that 
arbitration is “[a] creature of contract,”83 which suggests that the courts support an 
eventuality in which the parties opt into arbitration, and that there is no need for a 
rigid and formalistic definition to bind and limit the will of these parties. In essence, 
there is no limitation placed upon the will of the parties to design and shape their own 
arbitration regime as they see fit; rather, the only requirement is “[t]o submit the 
dispute for a decision by a third party.”84 Accordingly the requirements for arbitration 
are: (1) a dispute (2) an agreement of all parties to arbitrate (3) the submission of the 
dispute to a third party for settlement. The most important element according to Judge 
Weinstein is the arbitrator,85 and thus “[m]agic words such as arbitrate or binding 
arbitration or final dispute resolution are [not] needed to obtain the benefits of the 
act.”86 In this statement, this judge and his court state a liberal view of the process of 
arbitration—one that is free from the bounds of formalistic procedures. Additionally, 
Weinstein’s view suggests that judicial hostility toward arbitration in the US has 
largely waned: “[j]udicial hostility to the arbitration process is, and should remain, a 
thing of the past.”87 This point is further emphasized by the purposes that the US 
Congress was trying to achieve in enacting the FAA; namely: to “[e]liminate the 
hostility of American courts to the enforcement of arbitration agreements and thereby 
to compel judicial enforcement of a wide range of written arbitration agreements.”88 
The practice of arbitration in the US has been further developed and guided by this 
																																																								
82 Judge Weinstein wrote the opinion in AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F.Supp. 456, (E.D.N.Y. 
1985).   
83 id. at 460. 
84 id. at 460. 
85 id. at 461. 
86 id. at 461. 
87 id. at 461. See also, Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 1977). 
88 Carbonneau supra note 74 at 53. 
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congressional intent. Indeed, the goal of relieving the courts of some of the burden of 
their civil litigation caseloads evolved into a federal policy supporting arbitration.89 
 However, a problem rose from such over-generalizing and unlimited support 
given to arbitration, which is that the scope of arbitration has been widened by some 
US courts to incorporate other forms of dispute resolution, such as mediation. In 
essence, courts are saying that the FAA will govern such disputes, and that the 
benefits of the Act would follow. This point is illustrated by a decision of a US court 
in a case titled Richard Ellis, Inc. v. American Envtl. Waste Mgmt.90 While there was 
a mediation clause available, the court decided that the FAA should govern the 
dispute, and the court’s decision stated that “[b]ecause the mediation clause in the 
case at bar manifests the parties’ intent to provide an alternative method to “settle” 
controversies arising under the parties’ 1997 agreement, this mediation clause fits 
within the Acts’ definition of arbitration.”91 
Questions arise from the previous statement: why did the court decide that 
mediation falls under the scope of the FAA? Answering this question reveals that the 
reason a mediation clause may be seen to fall under the scope of the FAA relates to 
the existence of a federal policy supporting arbitration92 and to the US Supreme court, 
which supports that federal policy.93 The desire of the US Congress to eradicate 
judicial hostility toward arbitration,94 and the purpose of establishing a policy that 
promotes arbitration, lies in the desire to solve a number of problems that are specific 
																																																								
89 i.d at 55. 
90 CB Richard Ellis, Inc. v. American Envtl. Waster Mgmt.,1998 WL 903495, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 
1998). 
91 id. at 6. 
92 id. at 8.  
93 See. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).see also, AT&T 
Techs. V. Communs. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, (1986). 
94 AMF, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., Supra note 82 at 461. See Carbonneau, supra note 74 at52-55. 
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to the US legal system, including to find an alternative to civil adjudication for 
individual and to reduce the number of cases heard in the courts.95 
The US and the west in general have generally taken a pro-arbitration stand, and 
this has had a positive effect on the way arbitration is being defined by the courts in 
the US, essentially when it comes to dismantling judicial hostility toward arbitration 
and the formalistic procedures that have restricted the development and growth of 
arbitration. 
2.6.2 Shari’a View of Arbitration 
The Islamic Shari’a definition of arbitration is similar to that of the west: an event 
in which an arbitrator appointed by the parties to a dispute settles the dispute.96 The 
Majallat al-Ahkam al-’Adliyyah97 also defines arbitration in this way, particularly in 
Article 1790,98 which states: “Arbitration is the appointment of an arbitrator by the 
parties of the dispute in order to settle the dispute.”99 Shari’a views of arbitration are 
also non-formalistic, which, in countries that adhere in some way to Shari’a law, may 
help to dismantle certain bureaucratic procedures that have restricted the use of 
arbitration in the UAE.100 																																																								
95 See Carbonneau, supra note 74 at 55. 
96 Samirah defined arbitraiton as: “ the appointment of an arbitrator or more by the parties based on 
their free will to decide a dispute between them based on the rules of the Islamic Shari’a” see, 
SAMIRAH AL-ZAEEM AL-MANJID, AL-THKEEM AL-ISLAME FE NITHAM GHIER ISLAMIE [Islamic 
Arbitration in Non-Islamic Systems] 48 (2nd ed., 2013). Another author states that: “ the classic Islamic 
jurists definition of arbitration is: “the appointment of an arbitrator by the parties to resolve their 
dispute” he gave a second definition by the classical jurists which states:” the appointment of an 
arbitrator by the parties to resolve their dispute, the arbitrator acts as a judge between the parties and as 
a mediator in regard to third parties.” He continued to give the definition of the contemporary jurists 
stating that it is:” a contract between to disputing parties in which they appoint a third party as an 
arbitrator to resolve the dispute between them” see MSAAD AWAAD AL-JHANI, AL-THKEEM FE AL-
SHARI’AH AL-ISLAMYAH [Arbitration in Islamic Shari’a] 33 (1st ed. 1994). 
97 Majallat al-Ahkam al-’Adliyyah, was the Ottoman Empire’s attempt to codify its civil law. 
Hereinafter majallat. 
98 Al-Manjid. Supra note 96, at 48. 
99 majallat, supra note 97 Article 1790. 
100 El-ahdab and El-ahdab, gave a more detailed account to the views of Islamic Jurists when it comes 
to arbitration, they hold that some of the scholars view arbitration as: “ a form of conciliation, close to 
equity arbitration (amiable composition), which is not binding on the parties.” See El-ahdab and El-
ahdab supra note 37 at 11. The second view holds that: “if one is authorized to judge, one is authorized 
to make judgments with a binding character. An arbitral decision settles disputes and thus must be 
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2.6.3 Arab Jurists’ View of Arbitration 
Arab jurists have defined arbitration as: 
a special adjudication conducted by disputing parties and exception to the 
general rule that the adjudicating process falls under the supervision of the 
government, specifically the judicial branch; legislators have stipulated 
certain conditions and erected certain boundaries for this special kind of 
adjudication, which to enforce must run through the court system.101 
 
The key feature of this definition is that arbitration is it considered as an 
exception to the normal course of resolving disputes or as an exception to litigation. 
This can also be inferred from the definition of the Egyptian court, quoted by prof 
Ahamd Hindi,102 which states: 
Arbitration is an exceptional mean of resolving disputes away from the 
normal course of adjudication and the guarantees which it provides, 
and the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal even though it is based on 
the law that allows it to extend its jurisdiction upon the courts…103 
 
 The Egyptian law on arbitration, which is based on the UNCITRAL model 
law, and it has thus adopted the definition provided by the model law: 
 For the purpose of this Law, the tern ‘arbitration’ means voluntary 
arbitration agreed upon by the two parties to the dispute according to 
their own free will, whether or not the chosen body to which the 
arbitral mission is entrusted by agreement of the two is a permanent 
arbitral organization or center.104 																																																																																																																																																														
binding upon the parties…” they continue to states that “ no doctrine or school has adopted a clear 
position in this respect and there are numerous opinions in each of the four schools of the Sunni Islamic 
Fiqh…” they conclude that “ the two concepts known in the Shari’a have features which do not 
coincide with those of the two concepts known throughout the rest of the world.” Furthermore, they 
state that “ The Ottoman “Medjella,” which was the first civil codification of Islamic Law, adopted 
another solution. It provided that arbitration was an attempt at conciliation.” They also gave another 
view by Islamic scholars: “in the Shari’a, arbitration in equity (amiable composition) is the rule and 
arbitraiton in law is the exception. According to these authors, in the absence of a clear expression of 
the parties’ will to resort to arbitration in law, one must resort to equity arbitration.” see El-ahdab and 
El-ahdab supra note 37 at 13. Furthermore, as one author puts it: Arnitration law under Arab systems 
cannot be fully understood without the preliminary study of Shari’a as a common background.” SAMIR 
SALEH, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST, SHARI’A, LEBANON, SYRIA, AND 
EGYPT,1 (22nd ed. 2006) 
101 WALEED MAHMOOD HAMOODAH, AL-JAME AL-QANONI FE AL-TAHKEM [The Inclusive Legal Text on 
Arbitration] 19 (2011). 
102 Professor Ahmad is professor of civil and commercial procedures in Alexandria University of 
Egypt.  
103 AHMAD HINDI, al-TAHKEEM DRASH IJRAI’AH [ARBITRATOIN A PROCEDURAL STUDY] 2 (2013). 
Furthermore, he provides that under no circumstances arbitration can be adhesive or compulsory. 
104 The Republic of Egypt Law no, 27/1994 Concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
article 4/1. See general, Binder supra note 73 at 41.  
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Those two quotes provide an illustration of the Arabic view on arbitration, which 
can be expressed as an exception to litigation.105 Once arbitration is viewed in this 
manner, then it will not come as a surprise that some courts have a hostile view of 
arbitration.106 This view can be identified through the UAE courts’ practices when 
faced with questions regarding arbitration; in essence this view argues that the 
practice of arbitration is flawed, because it lacks the guarantees that can be found in 
the comfort of the court.107 A judge following this view would likely decide that 
arbitration is inferior to litigation, and that since it is an exception and inferior to, 
litigation, it should not be used. This attitude would undermine the use of arbitration, 
especially if courts have an even more hostile view of the practice; namely, as a sort 
of parasite that requires the support of the courts in order to function.108 However, it 
should be noted that arbitration naturally cannot function if it is constantly under 
attack.109  
To better understand this view and how it came into existence, a flashback into 
the history of Arabic law is required, particularly with respect to the father of Arabic 
civil law—Prof al-Sanhuri—and the philosophy behind his Civil Code, which aimed 
to “[a]dvance and encourage the strong, but by deterring or ‘striking’ (to use 
Sanhuri’s terminology) the strong, it sought to maintain the interests of the weak, who 																																																								
105 Hamoodah supra note 101 at 19, and Hindi supra note 103 at 2. 
106 According to Paulsson: “the idea of arbitration is that of binding resolution of deputes accepted with 
serenity by those who bear its consequences because of their special trust in chosen decision –makers. 
It is difficult for courts to achieve this kind of acceptance; public justice tends to be distant and 
impersonal.” JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION, 1 (1st 2d. 2013). 
107 See infra 2.6.5 UAE Courts view of the definition of arbitration. 
108 Paulsson gives an explanation to the reason behind the Arab countries hostility towards arbitration 
stating that: “modern Arab states, hostility to arbitration as they regained independence was not, 
however, so much a reflection of Muslims values as that of dual preoccupation of nation-building 
governments: to establish the authority of embryonic formal institutions internally, and to resist 
perceived foreign encroachments on sovereignty.” Paulsson supra note 106 at 12. 
109 Paulsson also notes that :” Competition between judges and arbitrators is indeed harmful to both. 
The idea of arbitration is that of freedom; judges who quash that idea and impose their power for its 
own sake run the risk of all despots: disaffection.” Paulsson supra note 106 at 265. Therefore, this 
definition of arbitration is a key factor in understanding the ideology of the courts in the UAE and by 
understanding it would open the door in producing solution to this problem. 
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was often unable to do so by himself ‘to protect him from the strong, and even from 
himself.”110 The sentiments expressed in this quotation explain why an Arabic jurist 
and subsequently the courts would view arbitration as an exception to litigation,111 
and further as something weak and in need of the strength of the courts in order to 
stand on its own. Sanhuri also advanced the idea that the parties to the arbitration 
were not educated in law, and therefore were weak and needed the strength and 
support of the court to guide them. 
The Arab Jurist’s definition discussed in this section has influenced how 
arbitration is practiced by UAE courts, particularly given the view that arbitration is 
an exceptional means of resolving disputes, and that the courts are superior and 
should supervise the arbitration process. This stance clearly influences how UAE 
courts view arbitration. 
 
2.6.4 UAE Legislators’ View of Arbitration 
There is no definition of arbitration in UAE Civil Procedure112, which creates a 
problem in the event that the award is contested in court, or if one of the parties 
decides to contest any stage of the arbitration process in court.113 UAE courts, 
however, have defined arbitration, and this definition and its implications are 
examined in the following section. 
																																																								
110 Bechor, supra note 17 at 154-155. In this book the author is giving an insight into the work of one of 
the most prominent modern Arab jurists, one who helped in drafting a number of laws and Arabian 
constitutions including a contribution in the UAE constitution. 
111 Which is supported by the definitions of Hindi Supra note 103 at 2, and Hamoodah supra note 101 
at 19. 
112 or the proposed Draft Law. 
113 An examination of the civil procedures law and the articles that relates to arbitration, is found in the 
appendix, article 203 of the civil procedures is the first article that discusses arbitration and holds the 
requirements of the arbitration agreement. See general El-ahdab and El-ahdab supra note37 at 782-829. 
The authors in there give a detailed account of the civil procedures law with a comparison to the draft 
law on arbitration. Al-tamimi also gives an introductory explanation of the civil procedures provisions 
on arbitration, Al-tamimi supra note 12 at 14-161. 
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2.6.5 UAE Courts’ View of the Definition of Arbitration 
This section will introduce the UAE courts’ view of arbitration by elucidating 
how judges interpret the term. Currently, since arbitration has not been defined in 
UAE law, legislation such as the UAE Civil Procedures Code114 lacks a definition of 
the term. As such, concluding arbitrated disputes requires further consideration of 
how UAE courts have defined arbitration. 
The Dubai Court of Cassation has defined arbitration as:  
an agreement between disputing parties to appoint a neutral party to settle the 
dispute without resorting to litigation, according to a certain agreement that 
defines the terms of arbitration . . . arbitration is built around two columns: 
the will of the parties to arbitrate, which can be concluded from the 
agreement, and the will of legislators to allow individuals to submit their 
disputes to arbitration, for without this will, it will not be possible to submit 
disputes to arbitration, for the enforcement of justice is a state right enforced 
by the courts . . . arbitration shall not be drawn only through the silence of 
one party to the proposal of another to submit the dispute to arbitration, for 
arbitration is not to be presumed.115 
 
A few ideas may be concluded from this statement. First, arbitration in this 
statement aligns with most Arabian jurists’ definitions regarding the topic.116 Also, it 
can be inferred from the court’s reasoning that it views arbitration as an exception to 
litigation, stipulating that the court sees arbitration as “the will of legislators to allow 
individuals to submit their disputes to arbitration, for without this will, it will not be 
possible to submit disputes to arbitration.”117 The Dubai Court of Cassation views 
arbitration as inferior to litigation in addition to being flawed; according to the Court, 
arbitration cannot rival the supremacy of submitting disputes to the court. In order to 
submit a dispute to arbitration, a clear intent to arbitrate must be established, since 
such intent may not be presumed. 																																																								
114 Supra note 8, nor the proposed Draft law. 
115 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 92/2007 dated 19 June 2007. 
116 Hindi Supra note 103 at 2, and Hamoodah supra note 101 at 19. 
117 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 92/2007 dated 19 June 2007. 
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Arbitration as an exceptional means of resolving disputes is exemplified further 
by another decision of the Dubai Court of Cassation: 
As has been the case in the jurisprudence of this court that arbitration is an 
exception to the norm—that the court has the jurisdiction to hear disputes 
regarding civil and commercial matters—every clause in the contract shall 
therefore be explained in a strict manner and in a way that will not exceed 
the will of the parties.118  
 
The same court also gave this corresponding decision:  
Arbitration is an exceptional means of resolving disputes, which is an 
exception to the general norm stating that the courts have the right to hear all 
disputes, except those mentioned in special legislation, and that the 
arbitration clause shall be explained and defined in a strict manner.119  
 
This view of arbitration may be found as well in a decision by the Ras Al Khaimah 
Cassation Court,120 which supports the same ideas and gives the same reasoning form 
them as provided above by the Dubai Cassation Court. 
A pattern emerges upon examining the previous reasoning given by the court 
when faced with questions regarding arbitration; namely, that according to the views 
of the UAE judiciary, arbitration is an exception, and not equal, to the court’s 
jurisdiction. Viewing arbitration in this context helps explain the reasoning behind the 
courts’ strict methods of explaining the clause in contracts that address arbitration, 
and it suggests that UAE courts have defined arbitration in this strict manner in order 
to protect the rights of the parties, as well as their right to a fair trial.121 
Thus, we may summarize that the purpose of arbitration according to the UAE 
judiciary may be stated as such: “to settle disputes by way of starting procedures in 
front of the arbitration tribunal . . . . Therefore, in order to do so, a dispute should 
have arisen before the start of those proceedings, and the purpose of the dispute 																																																								
118 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 261/2002 dated 2 November 2002. 
119 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 192/2007 dated 27 November 2007. 
120 Ras Al Khaimah Court of Cassation appeal no. 14/1 dated 11 March 2007. 
121 Which also exemplifies Paulsson statement of the harmful affect of having competition between 
judges and arbitrators. Paulsson supra note106 at 265. 
	 34	
should be to protect the right of individuals or their legal status.”122 The emphasis in 
the previous paragraph is on the protection of individuals’ rights and legal status, 
because the court views arbitration as an uncertain and inferior alternative to litigation 
that may endanger the parties’ rights.123 It is the role and obligation of the court and 
judges to prevent this risk or at least to limit it, which can only be achieved if the 
courts strictly regulate and monitor the process of arbitration. This attitude has 
contributed to a plethora of bureaucratic procedures that limit the affect and power of 
arbitration. While this bureaucracy has become cumbersome, the procedures have 
been seen to be required to ensure a fair and functioning arbitration process. 
 The Abu Dhabi Cassation Court has defined arbitration in a manner that is 
similar to how the other UAE courts define it; however, it adds certain alternative 
aspects, including that “in any case arbitration cannot be adhesive.”124 The general 
definition of arbitration is also exemplified by another judgment of the same court, 
which explains the meaning of arbitration according to the Civil Procedures Code, 
particularly Article (203)125:  
Arbitration is a special form of judicial litigation in which the parties of the 
arbitration agreement resort to an arbitrator without submitting their disputes 
to the court in order to settle their dispute arising through a contractual 
relation or non-contractual relation by rendering a binding award after 
hearing the case and what the parties have to say.126 
 
In essence, the reasoning of the Abu Dhabi court in defining arbitration falls in line 
with that of the other UAE courts. The Abu Dhabi court then goes further and 
explains the Civil Procedures Code and states the reasoning of legislators. 
																																																								
122 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 167/2002 dated 2 June 2002. 
123 Again this is also highlighted by the quote mentioned earlier by Paulsson  see supra note 108, were 
he discusses how arbitration is being treated in the modern Arab States, Paulsson supra note 106 at 12. 
124 Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation appeal no. 554/2008 dated 25 December 2008. 
125 See the appendix domestic arbitration article 203. 
126 Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation appeal no. 519/2008 issued on the 25 December 2008. 
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 Most importantly, all of the above courts’ definitions follow the same pattern, 
and all view arbitration as an exceptional means of resolving disputes. They also all 
hold that arbitration requires special treatment from the courts in order to protect the 
rights of parties that decide to submit their disputes to arbitration. 
 
2.6.6 Conclusion  
To recap, the courts in the UAE are influenced by the views of the Arabian 
scholars on arbitration, which can be seen from the similarity in the views of the UAE 
courts and those scholars on the subject of arbitration. The court and scholars have 
been influenced significantly by the late Prof al-Sanhuri and his theory on justice. 
This theory holds that one purpose of justice is to achieve a balance between weaker 
and stronger parties, and in the case of arbitration, the weaker party needs the courts’ 
protection. 127  
The UAE courts have shown some hostility and resistance toward arbitration, 
which can be traced to the way the Arabic Jurists view arbitration. This view 
contradicts both western and Shari’a views of arbitration; these two systems tend to 
see arbitration as an independent form of adjudication and not as an exception to (or a 
degrading of) an individual’s right to seek their natural judge.128 
 It seems clear from the UAE courts’ general definition of arbitration, as well 
as from their reluctance to relinquish jurisdiction over disputes, that this view will 
have a negative affect on the use and enforcement of arbitration. Such hostility toward 
arbitration is not limited to one court within the UAE, but rather occurs commonly 
throughout various UAE courts, as discussed above. To promote the use of arbitration 
within the UAE, UAE courts should abandon their practice of viewing arbitration as 																																																								
127 See Bechor, supra note 17 at 154-155. 
128 See Paulsson supra note 106 at 12. 
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inferior to litigation. This would allow the UAE judicial system to rely more on 
arbitration for dispute resolution, and not restrict the use of arbitration to commercial 
disputes. Allowing all forms of disputes to flow through a robust and functioning 
arbitral system may attract investors and to improve the UAE’s economic situation by 
reducing the expenses of the judicial branch. Funding thus saved could be allocated 
for use in other areas of government and infrastructure in the UAE.129 
 
2.7 Examples of the Courts View on Arbitration 
This section introduces selected examples that show the courts general view on 
arbitration, which goes against the general principles of arbitration (see below), 
affects the process and may cause the parties involved to chose not to use arbitration. 
Generally speaking, arbitration is governed by the principle130 that the arbitration 
process can provide an arbitral award issued by an impartial party without little delay 
or expense, and further that the parties involved have the will and freedom of contract 
to govern how their disputes should be conducted without court interference.131 
 The seven examples explained here by means of examination of the following 
case studies highlights this issues, furthermore they are not limited to the process of 
																																																								
129 These benefits can only be achieved in the UAE if the courts and in turn the government were 
willing to support arbitration, as Rayner puts it: “However, government assistance may well be 
required to foster its use in Canada……”, Rayner supra note 5 at 73. 
130 The general principles governing arbitration can be a subject of a separate thesis and how they are 
applied in the UAE, thus this thesis is going to refer to a couple of authors that have discussed them in 
length. See General, Klaus Peter Berger, General Principles of Law in International Commercial 
Arbitration How to find them - How to apply them, vol.5-2 World Arb. & Med. Rev. 97 (2011). Where 
the author gives an intensive discussion of how to apply the general principles in international 
commercial arbitration and also discuses the principles of Translex and if the parties choose to adopt 
GP in their disputes. See also, Andrew D. Mitchell, The legal basis for using principles in WTO 
Disputes, vol. 10-4 J Int. Economic Law 795 (2007). Which explains the relationship between the 
principles and the theories that interpret them. See also Jay Ellis, General Principles and comparative 
law, vol. 22-4 Eur. J. Int. Law 949 (2011). Where she discuss why the general principles have been 
exploited to such a limited extent. See, Anna Mantakou, General Principles of law and International 
Arbitration, 58 RHDI 419 (2005), in here the author explains that no person may against his will be 
deprived of the judge assigned to him by law in this principle a reference to another principle is made 
which the party autonomy, which is similar to the way UAE think. 
131 What is Arbitration? (Jan. 5, 2014), http://www.mediate.com/articles/grant.cfm# . 
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arbitration, but rather also extends to other forms of disputes submitted to the courts 
within UAE.132 
 
2.7.1 Understanding the Facts of the Case and Weighing the Evidence 
In one case,133 the court was faced with a question about the facts of the case and 
how to weigh the evidence, and it answered the following: 
the trial court has the right to understand the facts of the case and to weigh the 
evidence submitted to it, for if the court bases its understanding on solid 
evidence, then its decision will not form the base of the review.”134  
 
This statement (quoted directly above) implies a principle that the reasoning of 
the trial courts is not subject to review. It suggests that high court decisions are by 
definition based on solid reasoning, because the high courts in the UAE (in this case, 
the Supreme Court) are courts of law, not trial courts; therefore, while they may 
review faults in the application of the law, they will not review the merits of any 
particular case. Moreover, these courts will not discuss evidence more than once or 
hear pleas regarding the facts.135 Viewed in the context of arbitration, the statement 
quoted above suggests that the case at hand was one that concerned a specific kind of 
arbitration—Shari’a-based arbitration.136 While Shari’a-based arbitration is a highly 
favored form of arbitration and even favored by the courts in the UAE, it did not 
escape the affects of this view.  
If arbitration seen as equal to court proceedings, then this rule would be applied 
to the reasoning of the arbitrator and the arbitral award.137 It seems likely that the 																																																								
132 Nevertheless, these issues even the ones of a general nature, when adding arbitration to the mix only 
adds to the difficulties faced by the parties that choose arbitrate. 
133 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 264/24 dated 26 June 2004. 
134 id. 
135 Articles 173–188 of the civil procedures, explain the procedure of appealing cases to high courts in 
the UAE. 
136 See infra, Shari’a based arbitration, cases involving family law disputes, appeal no.264/24. 
137 As supported by civil procedures law Article 216, which lists the circumstances in which a request 
of nullification can be made. 
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UAE courts does not apply the same principles to arbitration that it does to court 
proceedings, because courts in the UAE view arbitration as an exception.138 This 
would cause the court to refrain from hearing any arguments based on the merits of a 
case, if the case were related to litigation, while it would hear such arguments if it 
involved arbitration. Thus, in order to promote the presence and status of arbitration 
in the UAE, this rule should be put into practice and not simply be a line item in legal 
writings or the civil procedures law. For such a change to occur, courts must view 
arbitration as equal to a court proceeding. 
 
2.7.2 The Court’s Lack of Obligation to Wait for the Arbitral Award before 
Commencing the Litigation Process 
Another peculiar rule regarding arbitration in UAE courts emerged in a decision 
of the Dubai Cassation Court. The court decided that, despite the facts that an 
arbitration proceeding had commenced, when one of the parties decided to litigate the 
same decision, the court was not obliged to stop its proceedings and wait for the 
arbitrator to decide to issue an award, since the arbitration at hand was also being 
arbitrated by the court. In its decision, the court stated that:  
Article 213 of the Civil Procedures Law139 states that the court’s authority in the 
case of an arbitration processed by the court does not end if the arbitration 
proceedings have not yet commenced. Rather, it continues until the award has 																																																								
138 Supra 2.6.5 UAE courts view of the definition of arbitration. 
139 Article 213 of the civil procedures states: “1. In the case that arbitration proceeds through the court, 
the arbitrators should deposit the decision with the original arbitration record, the reports, and the 
documents in the clerk’s office of the court authorized principally to examine the action within fifteen 
days following the decision’s delivery; the arbitrators should deposit a copy of the decision in the 
clerk’s office to deliver them to each party within fifteen days from depositing the original, and the 
clerk’s office shall compile a report with that deposition to manifest to the judge or division manager, 
depending on the circumstances, in order to appoint a session within fifteen days in order to 
authenticate the decision; the two parties shall be notified therewith. 2. If arbitration was appellate case, 
then the deposit shall be in the clerk’s office authorized principally to examine the appeal. 3. As for the 
arbitration occurring between the litigant parties outside the court, the arbitrators should deliver a copy 
of the decision to each party within five days from the delivery of the arbitration decision, and the court 
shall examine the authenticity or nullity of the decision according to the request of one of the litigant 
parties through the usual procedures of the action prosecution.” 
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been issued and ratification of the award is in process. Therefore, the court is not 
obliged to stop its proceedings, even when the issuance of an award by an 
arbitrator is already underway.140  
 
The above suggests that the court’s view on an arbitration that was commenced in 
the court is that it is still part of the jurisdiction and authority of the court.141 The court 
still holds authority over the proceeding, even though the parties agreed to submit 
their dispute to arbitration, and the court continues to have a supervisory role over the 
arbitration.   
The court views the plea by the one of the arbitrating parties as a form of 
obligation. In fact, the plea is an extra incentive to the court to reopen and rehear the 
case, despite the parties having agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration. The court 
seems to view such action as a form of preserving and protecting justice. As discussed 
earlier, arbitration is an exception to proper legal proceedings in the view of the UAE 
courts, and in order to preserve justice, the court feels obliged to answer the party that 
seeks to submit its dispute to litigation, and to grant that party the opportunity to 
litigate again.142 By pursing this notion of justice, the court loses on the practical 
side.143 This protocol perpetuates disputes, which contradicts one part of the ideal 
justice that the court seeks to preserve. Furthermore, one of the reasons that parties 
seek arbitration is the swiftness and finality that comes with an arbitral award, which 
is lost when an arbitral decision is appealed and the dispute returns to litigation.144 
 																																																								
140 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 167/2002, issued on the 2nd of June 2002. 
141 In essence, this rule highlights the courts practice when it comes to court-annexed arbitration. Levin 
defines court-annexed arbitration as a mandatory arbitration and the arbitrators are typically 
assigned by a third party and the award is not binding and is typically assigned by a statute, and in 
some cases subsequent to filing a case. See, A. Leo Levin, Symposium: reducing court costs and delay: 
court-annexed arbitration , 16 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 537, 538 (1983). 
142 Supra 2.6.5 UAE Courts view of the Definition of arbitration. 
143 which is an application the legal Maximus “Justice Delayed is Justice Denied”, see Sourdin & 
Burstyne supra note 9 at 46. 
144 See Born supra note 65 at 13, were the author discusses the finality of the award. And Carbonneau 
supra note 74 at 11, were the author states that” The reduction of litigious obfuscation results in an 
economy of time and money.” 
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2.7.3 An LLC145 Manager’s Powers Regarding the Conclusion of an 
Arbitration Agreement 
This ruling relates to LLCs, and more precisely to the agreement to enter into 
arbitration of the managers of LLCs146. The court allows such agreements if they are 
rendered by the manager147; a court decision explained this by stating that: 
According to the view of this court and to Article 237148 of company law, the 
manager of a limited liability company has total authority to manage the 
company, including his or her ability to agree to arbitrate on behalf of the 
company. This fact does not change, though Article 58/2149 of the Civil 
Procedures Code states that it is not valid without special authorization, the 
declaration of the right prosecuted or the disclaiming of such a right, the 
reconciliation or arbitration therein, the approval of the oath, or the direction, 
repulsion, or release of litigation . . . for this article falls to the actions of the 
agent in a dispute in the court and is not concerned with the authority of the 
limited liability company.150 
 
This legal fact is a key instrument in understanding the UAE courts and how they 
function. Though the courts view arbitration as a flawed form of dispute settlement 
that requires the court’s strict supervision, they are nevertheless obliged to obey the 
law. Certain statutes, such as the one at stake in this case, deter the courts from 
intervening. In this case, had there been no legislation governing the matter, the court 																																																								
145 Limited Labiality Company. 
146 The importance of this example is highlighting the affect of the courts view on arbitration on 
commercial disputes. 
147 Which is the companies manager. 
148 Federal Law No. 8 concerning commercial companies, Article 237 states: “Unless the powers of the 
manager are fixed in the company’s statutes, the company’s manager shall have full powers to carry 
out the management affairs of the company, and his [or her] actions shall be binding on the company, 
provided that they are substantiated by the capacity under which he [or she] acts. Provisions pertaining 
to liabilities of directors of a joint-stock company shall apply to the said manager, and any condition 
stipulated in the company’s statutes to the contrary shall be null and void.” 
149 Article 58/2 of the civil procedures law. 
150 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 462/2002 dated 2 March 2003. According to this judgment, 
agreements to arbitrate that are concluded by the managers of an LLC would be permitted and would 
not fall under the exclusion of the Civil Procedures Code, Article 58/2. In essence, such agreements are 
an exception to an exception, for arbitration itself is considered an exception by the UAE courts—
which may explain the affect of the courts view on arbitration, and why a case such as this one 
managed to reach the Cassation court. Following the court’s jurisprudence, it is safe to assume that an 
agreement such as this one, i.e., one that was concluded by an LLC manager, would be nullified, and 
that accordingly, this manager should not be permitted to arbitrate disputes. However, since an article 
in the law allows such action, the court’s hands are tied and they may not interfere in the arbitration 
process 
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would almost certainly would have ruled in favor of nullifying the agreement 
concluded by the manager of the company. This result implies that certain statutes 
exert a deterring effect on the courts. However, this deterrent factor must be 
somewhat limited, given that this case did actually reach the Cassation court. This 
raises the question of how such a case get to the Cassation court, when there is a 
provision in the law that gives the manager of an LLC the power to enter into an 
arbitration agreement.151 
The simple answer would go back to they way in which the UAE courts define 
arbitration; namely, they view arbitration in a narrow way that limits any provision in 
any given law that would have the affect of increasing the influence of arbitration.152  
 
2.7.4 The Ability to Appeal Decisions That Concern Jurisdictional Issues 
Another ruling that is relevant to the question of arbitration opines that decisions 
that concern the court’s jurisdiction are appealable, as stated in a decision by the 
Dubai Cassation Court:  
According to the judgment of this court and according to Article 151 of the 
Civil Procedures Code,153 the court is not allowed to appeal decisions issued 
by hearing the case and cannot end the dispute until a decision has been 
rendered, except for temporary and/or urgent decisions concerning the 
termination of the dispute, the decisions that concern enforcement, and the 
decisions on jurisdiction. According to the court’s view, the decision to 
refuse to hear the case based on the existence of an arbitration clause is a 
decision concerning the jurisdiction of the court, and therefore any dispute 
concerning this plea is appealable.154 
 
																																																								
151 which is according to article 237 of the commercial companies law, supra note 148. 
152 Supra 2.6.5 UAE courts view of the Definition of arbitraiton. 
153 Article 151of the civil procedures state: “It is not possible to appeal the decisions delivered during 
the progression of the action since the litigation has not been terminated therewith, except for the 
delivery of the decision terminating all the litigation, and that with the exception of the temporary and 
summary decisions, decisions issued for staying the action, decisions liable to obligatory execution, 
and sentences issued deciding the lack of jurisdiction, unless the court has the authority to judge in the 
action.” 
154 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 152/2004 dated 27 February 2005. 
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This decision again stems from the way the UAE courts define the process of 
arbitration. By means of this principle (embedded in the quote cited directly above), 
the court opens a door to appealing arbitration when that arbitration affects matters 
concerning jurisdiction. Though the court decided to dismiss the case based on the 
existence of an arbitral clause, this decision was found to be appealable. The court 
followed the same pattern of reasoning when deciding this case—reasoning by which 
the court justified its interference in and supervision of the arbitration process.155  
In this case study, the decision at hand addresses labor arbitration, which tends to 
involve cases in which the court feels obliged to interfere in order to protect the party 
(usually the employee) that is considered to be weaker.156 Given that the employee is 
about to enter into arbitration, which the courts view as a dangerous mechanism of 
settling disputes, the court is more likely to step in and scrutinize the issues and legal 
clauses brought to bear.157 The court’s action in this case led both parties in the 
arbitration agreement to lose time and bear additional expenses. Then, after a long 
process, the court dismissed the case based on the existence of an arbitration clause. 
However, the court’s decision did not change the fact that the Cassation Court’s 
principles enabled such an appeal, which in the end benefitted neither party, nor did it 
uphold or preserve justice in the way the court system has expressed it means to do. 
The author of this paper would argue that the court used the time of the litigants in 
																																																								
155 This attitude towards arbitration is best explained by Paulsson, he states that: “In communities 
where the government sees its role as the realization of a social program demanding discipline and 
conformity, court judgments are occasions to implement collective policies. In contrast, where the 
government perceives itself principally as the custodian of a pacific environment, permitting a wide 
range of individual strategies for self-fulfillment and community participation, judgments serve to 
resolve individual conflicts without forcing them onto a Procrustean bed of predetermined policy.” 
Paulsson supra note 106 at 7. 
156 Which again is a direct influence of the teaching of prof. Sanhuri. See. Bechor supra note 17 at 154-
155.  
157 Which again is an illustration of the Arab jurists view on arbitration, Hindi supra note 103 at 2 and 
Hamoodah supra note101 at 19. 
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this manner because, once again, of its view that arbitration is an exception to 
litigation. 
 
2.7.5 Issues Related to the Arbitration Clause also Relate to the Court’s 
Jurisdiction 
The following ruling relates to one discussed earlier:  
The plea to the court to dismiss the case based on the existence of an 
arbitration clause is one that relates to jurisdiction, since it intends to nullify 
the jurisdiction of the court. The decision of the court to dismiss the plea or 
to decide upon the subject matter is a decision that implies the court’s 
competence158 in hearing the case and that the case cannot be appealed on its 
own, as long as the decision does not settle the dispute, unless the court is not 
competent to hear the dispute.159 
 
This decision embodies another principle concerning the court’s jurisdiction and 
implies that an arbitration clause does not necessarily preclude parallel proceedings. 
More precisely, having such a clause does not deter the court from scrutinizing the 
arbitration clause in order to nullify it, which raises certain issues. For one, how can 
resources be balanced between the court and the arbitration tribunal? Is it fair and just 
to ask the party upholding the arbitration clause to fight on two fronts? Does the 
allowance of parallel proceedings contradict the principle of freedom of contract? 
Additionally, this decision is not appealable on its own, which creates two further 
scenarios. First, if the court decided to dismiss the case based on the existence of an 
arbitration agreement or clause, that decision may be appealed, because the decision 
would end the dispute as long as the dispute related to the clause or the agreement to 
arbitrate. Second, if the court decides to hear the case, then that decision (to hear) 
would not be appealable until the court rendered a decision on the case itself, which 																																																								
158 In a meeting with Dr. Ali Al-Imam of the Dubai Cassation Court,in which I asked him about the 
principle of kompetenz-kompetenz, to which he expressed his reservations regarding the principle. see 
general Carbonneau supra note 74 at 30-31, were the author discusses this principle. 
159 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 56/2005 dated 10 October 2005. 
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only then may become subject to enforcement. The result of both scenarios is the 
ability to appeal such a decision regardless of the outcome of the case. 
The court understands that it creates further opportunities for appeal; in the 
court’s view, this is necessary to preserve justice. However, despite the notion of 
justice that the court aims to achieve by allowing parallel proceedings, time and 
money are likely often being wasted.160 Furthermore, when one party must tackle two 
fronts at the same time, this most likely will result in resources being rerouted from 
the party seeking arbitration into other fronts, which contradicts the notion of justice 
typically endorsed by the court and in turn the parties freedom of contract161. This is 
yet another instance that demonstrates the view of arbitration as an exception, given 
that even the arbitration clause is subject to the courts’ jurisdiction and scrutiny.  
 
2.7.6 The Need of Causation as a Criterion for Accepting an Appeal 
The Dubai Cassation Court also requires the appealed decision to be based on 
causes; an appeal request to the court would be cause to dismiss the appeal, as has 
occurred in at least one decision, which states the following:  
When filing an appeal to the Cassation Court, the causes of the appeal shall 
be attached . . . the failure of which would be cause to dismiss the appeal. . . . 
According to Article 177 of the Civil Procedures Code162and the 
jurisprudence of this court, when filing an appeal, the cause shall be attached 
by the appellant. Furthermore, the appellant shall explain those causes in an 																																																								
160 Furthermore, when one party must tackle two fronts at the same time, this most likely will result in 
resources being rerouted from the party seeking arbitration into other fronts, which contradicts the 
notion of justice typically endorsed by the court. This is yet another instance that demonstrates the view 
of arbitration as an exception, given that even the arbitration clause is subject to the courts’ jurisdiction 
and scrutiny. 
161 See general Carbonneau supra note 74 at  24-25, were the author discuses the freedom of contract. 
And Hindi supra note 103 at 2-3, were the author defines this concept from an Arab jurists point of 
view and supports it by two decisions of the Egyptian constitutional court. 
162 Article 177/4–5 of the civil procedures states: “4. The plead should include, besides information 
related, the opposing parties’ names, competences, addresses of each one listed the docket of the 
decision against which the appeal has been prosecuted, the date of its issue, the date of its notification, 
if the notification has already taken place, and an explanation of the reasons upon which the appeal was 
based and the appeal’s requests. 5. If the appeal has not occurred in the manner mentioned above, it 
shall not be accepted, and the court shall automatically decide its disapproval.” 
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adequate manner that does not leave room for doubt, given the fact that the 
appellant explained his or her causes in a general form is not enough to 
accept the appeal.163 
 
For the Court of Cassation to accept an appeal, the appellant must to explain the 
causes for the appeal upon filing. The court explains the minimum requirements of the 
parties that must be stated in the appeal:  
to show the insufficiency of the claim of the parties and its effect on the decision by 
the arbitrator and the failure to uphold the arbitration proceeding and the areas in 
which the arbitrator failed to apply the arbitration proceedings and the areas in which 
the arbitrator exceeded the scope of arbitration.164  
Having causation as one of the criteria necessary for an appeal to be accepted is not a 
strange concept nor is it limited to appeals that are related to arbitration.165 This 
principle, in essence, is meant as a filter to limit the number of appeals submitted to 
the court. However, the court has set the bar very low for accepting appeals that are 
related to arbitration; this will, in practice, render this principle useless. The reason 
the courts are willing to accept almost any arbitration-related appeal is to attempt to 
provide proper justice, i.e., the kind of justice they believe arbitration cannot provide 
since it is an exception to litigation. 
 
2.7.7  New Pleas to the Court 
Another rule states that:  
New pleas in front of the appeal court shall be dismissed. For example, if the 
appellant requested from the first court that the arbitration shall be according 
to a certain agreement and then requested from the appeal court that the 
arbitration shall be according to the construction contract . . . according to 
																																																								
163 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 265/2008 dated 3 February 2008. 
164 Id. 
165 Turki explains the requirements needed to accept a suit in the UAE, he discuses this in length and 
the introduction to this discussion can be found in his book, see Turki supra note 11 at 603-606. 
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Article 165/2 of the Civil Procedures Code,166 new requests in front of the 
appellate court shall be dismissed by the court.167 
 
This principle entails the parties’ right to appeal and primarily aims to preserve 
the hierarchy of appeal.168 Furthermore, in order to not forfeit the chance to plead the 
case again, the court of appeals is obliged to dismiss any new requests.169 In the event 
that the court fails to dismiss any new requests, then its decision would become void 
and therefore subject to nullification.170 Even though new pleas shall be dismissed if 
they are presented to the appeals court, they may become subject to a separate suit 
submitted to the court. This possibility becomes a real concern for parties submitting 
their dispute to arbitration, which may mire them in a revolving cycle of litigation due 
to the courts need to preserve justice and their view that arbitration is inferior to 
litigation, which justifies the court action to prioritize the individual right to appeal, a 
right that undermines the arbitral process. 
 
2.7.8 Conclusion 
The principles discussed here are merely the tip of the iceberg when it comes to 
arbitration in the UAE. As aforementioned, the principles are not limited to 
arbitration; the seven cases mentioned here represent examples of how the courts 
views about arbitration affect their decision making process. The reason for choosing 
these seven cases is that they address general principles of the court as they relate to 
arbitration. 
																																																								
166 Article 165/2 civil procedures states that “2. The court shall examine the appeal on the basis of what 
is submitted thereto of the evidences, pleas and new aspects of defense and what had been submitted, 
before that to the court of first instance.” 
167 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 342/2007 dated 4 March 2008. 
168 See general Turki supra note 11 at 379-384. 
169 i.d. at 380. 
170 Which is considered one of the general principles and the parties are not allowed to waiver, i.d. at 
381. 
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These principles furthermore provide a general idea of the hurdles facing 
arbitration in the UAE. The UAE courts’ protectiveness of individual rights is the 
cornerstone of their reasoning when justifying their resistance to arbitration; this is 
exemplified by the courts’ view of the definition of arbitration as an exceptional 
means of resolving disputes, which suggests that arbitration lacks the tools necessary 
to protect the parties in the adjudicating process. The need to protect the weaker party 
in a dispute may be traced back to Professor Sanhuri171 and his theory about the 
balance of power and justice, which in turn exemplifies the role played by Egyptian 
scholars in shaping up the identity of the UAE courts. Understanding these concepts 
helps to explain and decipher the courts’ rationale with regard to arbitration, and 
becomes a key factor when recommending that the courts accept and support the use 
of arbitration. 		
	 	
																																																								
171 See. Bechor supra note 17 at 154-155. 
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Chapter Three 
Shari’a Law and Arbitration in the UAE 
 
In the UAE, arbitration law and its practice cannot be isolated from Shari’a law. 
All legislation in the UAE—as in all Islamic countries—must comply with the 
provisions of Shari’a law, or else it becomes null and void.172 
The UAE Constitution considers the Shari’a the primary source of lawmaking 
power,173 as stated in Article 7 of the UAE’s Constitution: “Islam is the official 
religion of the Federation and the Muslim Shari’a is “a main source of its 
legislation.”174 As a result, any legislation that counters a provision of Shari’a law 
should not be incorporated or enforced by UAE law enforcement entities. By 
extension, UAE courts are governed and bound by Shari’a law and Islamic 
jurisprudence—fiqh—in applying procedural and substantive law to decide all legal 
matters. To what extent, then, are the courts in fact applying Shari’a and Islamic 
provisions in practice?175 Is the influence of Shari’a on arbitration decreasing in the 
UAE? 
This chapter begins with an introduction to Shari’a law, explaining how it 
functions and how it is situated in the UAE legal system. The chapter establishes the 
premises for an in-depth comparison of the Islamic arbitration system versus the 
modern practice of arbitration, particularly in UAE courts. After establishing the 
position of Islamic Shari’a within the UAE, the chapter explores the various forms of 
arbitration that are influenced by Shari’a. 
																																																								
172 United Arab Emirates Constitution, Article 7. See general Al-Muhairi supra note 24 at 219-220. See 
also El-ahdab and El-ahdab supra note 37 at 782.  
173 Al-muhairi supra note 24 at 219. 
174 United Arab Emirates Constitution Article 7. 175	Saleh	supra	note	100	at	342.	In	here	the	author	explains	the	practice	of	Sahri’a	arbitration	in	Egypt	and	how	it	started	to	have	a	secondary	role	as	a	result	of	commercial	pressure.		
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3.1 Introduction to Shari’a 
The following subsections describe and distinguish Shari’a and Islamic law, 
discussing whether Shari’a is synonymous with Islamic law, and how these concepts 
function in the UAE. 
3.1.1 Defining Shari’a 
In Arabic, Shari’a refers to “the path or the way”176 or “the path to be followed, 
or clear way to be followed.”177 As an official path designed by God for humans to 
follow, Islamic Shari’a governs all sides of Islamic life, and it establishes rules and 
requirements that guide each Muslim’s daily life and overall conduct.178 The Shari’a 
is distinct from fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence, which is only part of the Shari’a. Fiqh 
consists of scholarly Islamic interpretations of the Shari’a’s primary and secondary 
sources.179 More literally, fiqh means “precious understanding,” although it also 
signifies knowledge of the Shari’a’s practical provisions, as derived from detailed 
sources.180  
Essentially, the Islamic Shari’a is a doctrine that governs the entire life of a 
Muslim; therefore, it is important to understand Shari’a in order to understand the 
mindset of a middle-eastern judge or jurist.181 This understanding will help 
contextualize Shari’a-related decisions made by the courts, as well as other forms of 
arbitration. 
 																																																								
176 Charles P. Trumbull, Islamic Arbitration: A New Path for Interpreting Islamic Legal Concept, 59 
Vand. L. Rev. 609, 627 (2006). 
177 Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin an elements, 7 J. Islamic L. & Culture 
27, 35 (2002). See also, Mona Rafeeq, Rethinking Islamic Law Arbitration Tribunals: Are They 
Compatible with Traditional American Notions of Justice?, 28 Wis, Int’1 L.J. 108, 118 (2010) 
178 Ahmad Alkhamees, International Arbitration and Shari’a Law: Context, Scope and Intersections, 
28 J.Int’L Arb. 255, 256 (2011). 
179 Id. At 256. 
180 Omar Bin Saleh Bin Omar, Al-Madkhal ila Al-Fiqh Al-Islami [Introduction to Islamic 
Jurisprudence Studies] 15 (2nd ed. 2006). See also Trumbull, supra note 176 at 628. 
181 See generally, Saleh supra note 100 at1, where the author gives an extended explanation of the 
importance of the role of Shari’a in Arabian societies.  
	 50	
3.1.2 Sources of Shari’a 
For fiqh and in general, the sources of the Shari’a are diverse and require 
categorization. According to Omar bin Omar, each source should be grouped as a 
primary or secondary source, as a reason, or as an agreement or disagreement.182 The 
sources examined in this chapter will be grouped chiefly as either primary or 
secondary sources. 
Primary sources of the Shari’a include the Quran—the Muslim holy book—and 
the Sunnah of the Prophet Mohammad: his teachings, sayings, actions, decisions, and 
judgments.183 
Secondary sources of the Shari’a are far more numerous:184  
Those sources are used by Muslim scholars to either confirm or disregard a 
certain issue from an Islamic perspective, and arbitration is confirmed by both the 
primary sources (Quran and Sunnah) and the secondary sources.185 The Sunnah and 
the secondary sources also confirm the viability of arbitration; examples of this will 
be discussed in the second section of this chapter when the Principles of Islamic 																																																								
182 Id. At 191-192. 
183 Alkhamees, supra note 178, at 256. See also Saleh supra note 4, at 10. 
184 The secondary sources categorization varies based on how jurists perceive them, in any case the 
secondary sources function as a tool of reasoning and forming legal views. See Saleh, Supra note 144, 
at 11, which are Ijma refers to scholarly or expert consensus on a certain matter in Islamic 
jurisprudence. See Bin Omar supra note 180 at 206. See also Alkhamees, supra note 178, at 256. See 
Saleh supra note 100, at 11. Qiyas are analogies used to make judgments and interpret implications for 
issues left unresolved by the Shari’a’s primary sources. BIN OMAR, supra note 180 at 210. See also 
Alkhamees, supra note 178, at 256, See Saleh supra note 100, at 11 Istishab refers to the rationale that 
a circumstance is presumed to perpetuate until evidence can be found that proves that the circumstance 
or its perpetuation is impossible. For instance, if a person buys a good, he or she is considered to own 
that good until his or her ownership can be shown to have ceased. see BIN OMAR, supra note 180 at 
240. Istihsan refers to the reversal of a clear Qiyas to an ulterior Qiyas or analogy, or the reversal of a 
general rule to an exception, based on evidence requiring such a reversal. Id. at 215, Shara mn Qblna 
refers to the decisions or rules submitted by God to other religions before the existence of Islam that 
have not been altered (e.g., provisions in Christianity and Judaism). Id. at 236 Al-Masalih al-Mursala, 
or public interest, refers to issues left unresolved by the Shari’a. . Urf refers to customs and common 
usage. Id. at 225. See also Alkhamees, supra note 178, at 256. Sd Al-thra refers to the prohibition of 
certain actions that, although mbaha (allowed), may facilitate haram—a sinful act forbidden in Islam. 
Id.	at	232.	
185The Quran mentions arbitration in verse 35 of Surat Al-Nesaa’ which states: “If a couple fears 
separation, you shall appoint an arbitrator from his family and an arbitrator from her family; if they 
decide to reconcile, GOD will help them get together. GOD is Omniscient, Cognizant.” See RASHAD 
KHALIFA, QURAN THE FINAL TESTAMENT, 84 verse 35 (1989). 
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Arbitration are explained.  
 
3.1.3 The Shari’a Definition of Arbitration 
The Islamic Shari’a defines arbitration as an event in which an arbitrator 
appointed by the parties of a dispute settles that dispute.186 The Majallat al-Ahkam al-
’Adliyyah187 also defines arbitration in this way, particularly in Article 1790,188 which 
states: “Arbitration is the appointment of an arbitrator by the parties of the dispute in 
order to settle the dispute.”189 EL-Ahdab defines it as a 
procedure where the parties to a dispute empower an arbitrator to resolve their 
claims; however arbitration is the expression by virtue of which a party suggests 
it and the other party accepts, i.e. such procedures is based on the parties’ 
agreement.190 
 The above discussion makes clear that arbitration as discussed in the Islamic 
Shari’a takes the form of a contract.191 
 
3.2 Islamic Madhahib, or Schools of Thought 
The Islamic Madhibs are an essential tool or understanding and deciphering the 
Islamic Shari’a. These schools represent different approaches to solving Shari’a 
questions,192 and the followers of the schools rely on the sources for Islamic Shari’a 
when answering a Shari’a-related problem. The differences among these schools 
derive from how they interpret and allow the use of the secondary sources in their 
attempts to solve legal issues.193 
																																																								
186 Al-Manjid, supra note 96, at 48. 
187 supra note 97. 188	Al-Manjid.	Supra	note	96,	at	48.	
189 Majallat al-Ahkam al-’Adliyyah article 1790 supra note 99. 
190 EL AHDAB & EL AHDAB supra note 37 at 7. The author in here gives a number of examples from 
Islamic Authors on the definition of arbitration. 
191 Id. at 7. 192	SALEH,	supra	note	100	at	7.	193	Id,	at	7.	
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The following schools of thought, or madhahibs,194 are important for providing 
interpretations of Shari’a rules,195 because UAE legislators gave these schools a legal 
shape when they included an Article in the Civil Transactions Code that guides judges 
when faced with Shari’a questions. The Article states:  
In the absence of a text for this Law, the judge shall adjudicate according to 
the Islamic Shari’a, taking into consideration the choice of the most 
appropriate solutions in the schools of Imam Malek and Imam Ahmad Ben 
Hanbal and, if not found there, then in the schools of Imam El Shafe’i and 
Imam Abou Hanifa, as interest so requires. Where no such solution is found, 
the judge shall decide according to custom, provided it is not incompatible 
with public policy and morals. In the case that the custom is restricted to a 
specific Emirate, it shall be effective therein.196 
 
This implies that judges in the UAE, in the absence of guidance from the 
legislature in the form of substantive law, are bound by the teachings of these four 
schools in the order noted in the Article quoted just above. If no solution is present 
within the teachings of the schools, then a judge must seek a solution from customary 
law. Some questions arise. How did the legislature choose the order of the schools? 
How and from where would a judge derive a solution from the Madhib? And finally, 
how does this affect arbitration? Answering the first question requires a knowledge of 
how the UAE as a political entity was formed and how it functions.197 The reason the 
schools are divided relates to the fact that different Emirates follow different 
Madhibs. The Maliki school198 is given high regard, because it is the established 																																																								
194 There are a great number of Madhibs in the Islamic Shari’a, therefore this study would be limited to 
discussing the schools mentioned by the UAE legislator. The schools discussed in here form the main 
Sunni Schools, they are considered as such because the students and the followers of those schools 
have been able to maintain and record down their Imams teaching and spread their ideas and teaching 
through the Islamic nations, some of the major Imams and scholars of the Islamic Shari’a and many of 
their teachings and ideas have been either lost or forgotten due to this fact of their students failure to 
spread their teachers ideas. See general El-ahdab and El-ahdab supra note 37 at 13. 
195 Trumbull, supra note 176, at 628. 
196 Civil Transaction Law Article 1. 
197 See supra 2.3 Historical Background on Arbitration in the UAE, page 14. 
198 This school founder is Malik ibn Anas Al-Asbahi Al-Hamyari (93-179 Hijri) from Madina (Which 
is equivalent to (711-795 AD)). See, BIN OMAR, supra note 180 at 99, see also SALEH, supra note 100 
at 8. In addition to the primary sources and the secondary sources, Maliks Madheb is distinguished 
from the other schools by its use of one more significant source: the customs of Medina or the Ijma of 
the people of Medina(Madina was the city of the prophet and this is the reason why the customs and 
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Madhib of two of the major emirates in the UAE: Abu Dhabi (the capital) and Dubai 
(the financial capital of the Emirates).199 The Hanbali Madhib is the prominent 
Madhib in Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah,200 the two emirates that come after Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai in the importance. The rest of the emirates differ in their following 
of the Madhibs, and they tend to vary. Therefore, it may be assumed that those who 
wrote the Article quoted above chose the remaining two Madhibs (Shafei201 and 
Hanifi202) based on their own personal preferences. 
																																																																																																																																																														
the Ijma of the people of Madina was used as a source in Maliks Madheb, however Malek did not view 
it as part of Ijma of the Muslim scholars. See BIN OMAR, supra note 180 at 102. See also SALEH, supra 
note 144 at 8). Additionally, Malek is considered a scholar who prefers ra’y or subjective opinion. BIN 
OMAR, supra note 180 at 103. See also SALEH, supra note 100 at 8. When it comes to arbitration, this 
madheb holds two views: to not promote arbitration, yet to allow it if it occurs; or to ban it. Fiqh 
Encyclopedia, infa note 202 at 236. However, the established view of this school is to allow arbitration. 
It also allows the appointment of one of the parties in a dispute as an arbitrator, and it considers the 
arbitrator’s decision to be binding unless it contains flagrant injustice. If such injustice is shown to have 
occurred, then a judge could interfere. Finally, the effect of an arbitral award is limited to the parties of 
the agreement and does not affect a third party’s rights. BIN OMAR, supra note 180 at 107. See also 
SALEH, supra note 100 at 8-9.   
199 BIN OMAR, supra note 180 at 104-105. 
200 Id, at 116, which refers to Ahmad ibn Mohammad ibn Hanbil (164-241 Hijri) founded this school in 
Baghdad. 780-855 AD) See, BIN OMAR, supra note 180 at 113, see also SALEH, supra note 144 at 9. 
The school tends to focus mainly on the main sources of Shari’a law (Quran and Sunnah) See, BIN 
OMAR, supra note 149 at 118, see also SALEH, supra note 100 at 9. Thus, this Madhib can be said to 
follow the Hadith school rather than the ra’y. Hanbali jurists allow arbitration, see Fiqh Encyclopedia, 
infra note 202 at 236, and they consider an arbitrator’s decision to be binding and to have the same 
strength as a decision made by a judge; therefore, the parties to the arbitration are considered to bound 
by the award see EL AHDAB & EL AHDAB supra note 37 at 15. 
201 Mohammad ibn Idris ibn Al-abaas ibn Shafi (150-200 Hijri) founded the Shafii Madheb or school. 
Al Shafi studied in Iraq, which was famous for being the school of Ra’y at the time he was there, as 
well as in Medina, which was considered the school of Hadith. See BIN OMAR, supra note 180 at 107. 
See also SALEH, supra note 100 at 8-9. This school has three camps regarding arbitration: to ban it, to 
permit it if no judge is present in the city to hear a case, and to allow it in cases involving monetary 
transactions (i.e., trade and commerce). The Shafii consensus permits arbitration. see Fiqh 
Encyclopedia, infra note 202 at 236. However, the school consider the arbitrator’s role and status is to 
be inferior to that of a judge, because an arbitral appointment can be revoked or dismissed, whereas a 
judge cannot be dismissed. The school also agrees that the use of arbitration is required when judges 
are found to be corrupt. See EL AHDAB & EL AHDAB supra note 37 at 14 
202 The Hanafi school is named after its founder, Abu Hanifa Al Naman ibn Thabit (80-150 Hijri). 
Which is equivalent to (699-767 AD). See, SALEH, supra note 100 at 8 see also BIN OMAR, supra note 
180 at 94. Founded in Iraq, the main feature of this school is its use of subjective opinion Ra’y, see 
SALEH, supra note 100 at 8, and Qiyas, see BIN OMAR, supra note 180 at 94-95. According to the 
teachings of this school, arbitration is legal and allowed, based on the fact the Quran and Sunnah, in 
addition to Ijma and Qiyas, confirm and authorize it. See EL AHDAB & EL AHDAB supra note 37 at 13. 
However, some Hanafi scholars dismiss the idea of arbitration, because they consider arbitrators in 
general to be unfit to decide and settle cases. Their dismissal comes despite this madhab’s consensus to 
permit arbitration. see Al-Mwsoe Al-Fiqhya [The Fiqh Encyclopedia] Volume 10,236 (2012). 
[hereinafter Fiqh Encyclopedia]. See also EL AHDAB & EL AHDAB supra note 37 at 13-14.  In addition, 
this school classifies arbitration as”[l]egally quite close to agencies and conciliation.” See EL AHDAB & 
EL AHDAB supra note 37 at 14. Furthermore, the teachings of this school influenced the drafters of the 
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Around the work of the four Imams of the four schools grew the structure of the 
schools themselves, and as noted earlier, these four schools are considered to be 
supplementary sources of law in the UAE. They function to illuminate the actual 
meaning of legal rules, in case that the primary sources have left an issue 
unresolved.203 As such, these schools have influenced a substantial part of the Shari’a 
law currently practiced in most Muslim nations.204 Though other schools exist, these 
four are the most widespread, and they are the schools that are most relevant to the 
UAE.  
Fully examining the Islamic Schools’ views on arbitration is a subject for a 
different thesis; for the purposes of this paper, it may be concluded that the Four 
Schools mentioned here permit the use of arbitration, with some minor opposition 
from jurists in some of the madhahib, because they generally consider that Shari’a 
law tolerates it. Understanding the views of these schools, especially the Maliki, is 
important because they play a major role in Shari’a-based arbitration in the UAE, 
because the courts tend to relay on their teachings when deciding cases that relate to 
the Islamic Shari’a.205 
  
3.3. Principles of Islamic Arbitration 
Having established that arbitration has precedent and an established jurisprudence 
in the Islamic Shari’a, we may now further explore arbitration from the Islamic 
perspective. This is a wide subject that is narrowed in this paper to the consideration 
of family law arbitration and commercial arbitration only. The following three 
subsections illuminate certain aspects of arbitration in principle and in practice: 																																																																																																																																																														
Majallat al-ahkam al-‘Adliyyah, See general, Majallat al-ahkam al-‘Adliyyah supra note 97, SALEH, 
supra note 100 at 8. 
203 Al-Muhairi, supra note 24, at 223. 
204 Trumbull, supra note 176, at 629. 
205 Civil transaction law Article 1. 
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1.  The first subsection discusses general principles of Islamic arbitration 
and compares them with modern standards and practice.  
2. The second discusses family law arbitration from the perspective of the 
Islamic Shari’a and where it falls within the UAE’s legislation. 
3. The third discusses arbitration matters related to trade and commerce in 
the UAE. 
 
3.3.1 General Principles of Islamic Arbitration206 
According to Al Jhani, the principles of Islamic arbitration can be deduced from 
the definition of arbitration—“the appointment of an arbitrator by parties to settle a 
dispute.” These principles are threefold: (1) the vocalization of parties’ intent to 
arbitrate, in which there should be both an offer and an acceptance that constitute the 
arbitration agreement; (2) the identification of the disputing parties; and (3) the 
presence of an arbitrator. Al Jhani states that classical jurists referred only to the 
vocalization of parties’ intent to arbitrate,207 suggesting that it is possible to establish 
an arbitration agreement orally.  
The principles of Islamic arbitration derive from the sources of the Islamic 
Shari’a,208 which binds arbitration to those principles. However, this link does not 
mean that Islamic arbitration may not evolve and change. On the contrary, Shari’a law 
promotes and encourages such evolution, which can be attributed to the flexibility 
embedded in the Islamic Shari’a and fiqh that allows these laws to fulfill the ongoing 																																																								
206 Paulsson proposes the idea that: “Some classical authors were hostile to arbitration because it could 
lead to decisions by persons not adequately versed in the Shari’a, or because it detracted from the rule 
of sovereigns; others accepted it only with respect to geographic zones where there were no judges.” 
He continues to state that:” historical arbitration laws are hardly indicative of a unified Islamic view of 
arbitration because they tended to be predominantly anchored in one or another school of 
jurisprudence.”Paulsson supra note 106 at 12. 
207 Al Jhani supra note 96 at 129. 208Which	can	be	derived	from	either	the	primary	sources	or	the	secondary	ones,	see	supra.	3.1.2	Sources	of	Islamic	Shari’a	
	 56	
needs of people’s daily lives and experiences.209 However, this flexibility is also 
limited in that it must not infringe on the purpose of the Islamic Shari’a and its main 
rules. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the Islamic Shari’a is inherently flexible, nor 
that one of its main principles or rules (such as the rules that govern the Muslims 
prayer), may be changed. Rather, Shari’a may be considered to be flexible with regard 
to certain customs and transactions. Shari’a may also be considered flexible in cases 
of transactions about which the Shari’a is silent; indeed, jurists have a right to invent 
and evolve laws related to such transactions. Sanhuri explained the flexibility of the 
Shari’a by saying that: 
 the Fiqh of this Shari’a is like a dress that the legislator (Allah) created to fits ones 
body, which was small at the time of the making of the dress, which He noticed and 
made room for the body to grow within the dress.210    
 
3.3.2 Family Law Arbitration  
Family law arbitration has its basis in the Quran and takes its strength from this 
verse: 
If ye fear a breach between them twain, appoint (two) arbiters, one from his 
family and the other from hers; if they wish for peace, Allah will cause their 
reconciliation, for Allah hath full knowledge and is acquainted with all 
things.211 
This verse indicates that family arbitration is the Sharia’s solution to family 
disputes, and the modern practice of legislators in Islamic states and the courts’ 
endorsement of arbitration in family matters can be attributed to this verse.212 The 
verse adds to the significance and importance of this form of arbitration within the 
Islamic Shari’a, unlike other forms of arbitration family that derive authority from one 																																																								209See	general,	Bin	Omar,	supra	note	180.	210	id	at	26.		
211 Verse 35 of the Surah of the Women ABDULLA YUSUF ALI, THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR’AN, 
44 (2010), See also El-ahdab and El-ahdab supra note 37 at 12. 
212 Which shows the influence of the Shari’a on the UAE legislation since it was codified in the 
Personal Status Law, supra note 13, El-ahdab and Elahdab supra note 37 at 8-9. See also Al-jahni supra 
note 96 at 56-63. 
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of the primary sources of the Shari’a—the Quran, judges have limited authority over 
questions regarding family arbitration.213  
 
3.3.3 Arbitration Involving Trade and Commerce 
Arbitration is commonly known as a tool for solving commercial disputes. The 
Shari’a is replete with examples on this topic, including a dispute between Omar bin 
Al Khtaab214 and Abu bin Kaab over a farm, which Zaid bin Thabt arbitrated; and 
another between Omar Bin Al Khtaab and a man who sold him a horse, which 
Shraeyh arbitrated.215 In both occasions, the decision of the arbitration was made 
according to the rules of the Shari’a and was considered enforceable and final with no 
room for appeal. These examples show the importance of arbitration as a tool for 
dispute resolution in Islamic Society, given the fact that the head of state at the time 
of Omar bin Al Khtaab, and prominent figures such as the Prophet’s other 
companions, commonly sought arbitration to solve their disputes.216 
																																																								
213 Which shows that in addition to having a legal obligation, judges are bound to the Islamic Shari’a 
The legislator emphasized this idea by codifying more than one principle of the Islamic Shari’a in more 
than one law. They are also bound by social and moral codes and norms Which is exemplified by the 
nature of the UAE society, being a tribal society and an Islamic one, which in turn add pressure on the 
Judges to oblige with the rules of the Islamic Shari’a. Even if they come from different backgrounds 
and nationalities. Specifically, they are bound by: a) speaking and writing in Arabic, and b) they should 
be Muslim and have taken a course in the Islamic Fiqh in college. These two features characterize 
judges in the UAE, moreover, until recently, a law certificate awarded in the UAE would be given for a 
degree in “Shari’a and Law.” see general Al Tamimi note 12. In addition, there is a Shari’a circuit  in 
the federal courts and the local courts. This diversity in the backgrounds of the judges is one of the 
reasons that Article 1 of the civil transaction law; established  a set of rules for the judges to follow. 
The Article was written in an attempt to solve the problem of judges’ diversity and create a unified 
approach to solving legal problems. Furthermore, the judges in some Shari’a circuits are educated 
primarily in the Islamic Fiqh, and some are in loan from other Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia 
214 Omar bin Al Khtaab was the Second Caliph of the Islamic Rashidun Caliphate and a companion of 
the Prophet. See general El-ahdab and El-ahdab supra note 37 at 7, in the footnote number 29 he 
explains the meaning of Rashidun: “The Rashidun Caliphs )”Rashid” meaning “wise”) are those who 
immediately succeeded the Prophet.”  
215 Shraeyh was a famous judge at the time. Fiqh Encyclopedia supra note 202 at 235-236. 
216 Another example is when Othman (the third Caliph) and Talha (one of the Progphets companion), 
asked Jobair  (another companion of the prophet) to act as an arbitrator in a dispute between them. 
Moreover, neither Jobair nor Shrayeh were judges. Fiqh encyclopedia supra note202 at 236. 
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In commercial arbitration from an Islamic perspective217, the issue of most 
concern is riba, which is translated as interest and usury. This paper discusses riba, 
because some arbitral awards contain interest rates that are recognized and enforced. 
Riba affects the UAE constitution, and UAE courts have rendered a decision on this 
matter. Above all, riba is of great concern to the UAE where trade and commerce are 
concerned, because Islamic jurists consider usury/interest to fall under the doctrine of 
riba.218  
Arbitration is permitted and governed under the Islamic Shari’a. However, its 
roles is starting to diminish in the courts, because they are devising solutions that are 
contrary to Islamic Shari’a, rather than taking the time to look at a solution that may 
already exist within the Shari’a. This creates a problem, because the constitutions of 
most Islamic Nations include a provision that states that the Islamic Shari’a is a 
source of law; this is certainly true for the constitution of the UAE. The Shari’a rules 
and principles allow and encourage the evolution of arbitration; however, the courts 
are ignoring the use of such tools.219 Therefore, the issue at hand relates to judges’ 
practice and how it affects arbitration? Even though judges have the power to change 
and evolve arbitration, this power remains mostly untapped, meaning that most cases 
																																																								
217 Al-manjid study on Islamic arbitration is worth mentioning in here, she gives an in depth analysis to 
how an Islamic arbitration system can function, she goes even further to propose the creation of an 
Islamic arbitration system, see Al-manjid supra note 96 at 160-190. 
218 See infra 3.4.3 Riba (usury), which discusses this issue in great detail. Furthermore, In the UAE, 
trade and commerce-related arbitration would not fall under the jurisdiction of the Shari’a circuit. It 
would fall under the commercial or civil circuit, in which, unlike the Shari’a circuit, judges are 
influenced by their background in Shari’a. The judges in the commercial circuit are specialists in 
commercial or civil law, and they make decisions based on their respective backgrounds and training. 
When faced with issues that concern Islamic Shari’a, they may not always come to the same 
conclusions as judges who specialize in Shari’a; this becomes evident when examining cases that 
address riba. 
 
219 El-ahdab and El-ahdab when explaining “the rules of arbitration and the evaluation of law” quoted 
Sanhury more than once in explaining how the Islamic rules on Shari’a evolved, they stated that:” 
Snhury adds that Islamic Law, however, did not remain rigid in its first stages. On the contrary, it had 
largely evolved and had enlarged that which had been reduced due to the needs for the stability of 
transaction” they continued to state that: “arbitration in Islam did not escape from this rule of the 
evoluation of legal systems….”, El-ahdab and Elahdab supra note 37 at 16. 
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concerning Islamic arbitration are limited to Family disputes, and even those are 
treated as conciliations or mediations. 
 
3.4 Cases Related to Islamic Arbitration in the UAE 
Substantive and procedural laws govern UAE courts, and they comply with the 
basic tenets of Shari’a law. This section analyzes decisions issued by a number of 
UAE courts, particularly with regard to how the courts apply Shari’a law. This section 
summarizes the facts of the cases and analyzes each decision. This analysis aims to 
illuminate the current practice of the court and evaluate whether it is in conformity 
with the legislation and how it affects arbitral practice in the UAE. In what follows, 
each case selected relates primarily to one of two different aspects of Shari’a law—
family law and riba. The reason for choosing these two subjects relates to the contrast 
in how the court addresses each issue. 
 
3.4.1 Cases Involving Family Law Disputes 
Arbitration in UAE family law originates in the Shari’a and is governed by 
Shari’a law. The UAE codified the Shari’a in Federal Law no. 28 on Personal Status, 
issued on 19 November 2005.220  Examining cases of family law arbitration can 
therefore illuminate how UAE courts manage family law arbitration, which can in 
turn clarify the issue of arbitration in the UAE. Federal Law no. 28 requires the 
parties to mediate their dispute before submitting it to arbitration.221 Most of the 																																																								
220 The Personal Status law was issued on 19/11/2005 and was published in the office gazette in 
30/11/2005, Federal Law no.28 on personal status. Hereinafter-personal status. 
221 Article 16 of the Personal Status, “1 - The lawsuit concerning personal status matters shall not be 
admitted before the court unless it has previously been submitted to the Family Orientation Committee. 
Are excepted from this provision, matters concerning wills, inheritance and like matters, summary and 
provisional lawsuits concerning alimony, fostering, guardianship as well as cases that cannot be settled 
by conciliation such as evidence of marriage or divorce. 2 - Where conciliation between the parties 
takes place before the Family Orientation Committee, it shall be recorded in a minutes signed by the 
parties and the competent member of the Committee. The minutes shall be sanctioned by the competent 
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disputes are divorce disputes222 with two possible outcomes: divorce, or, if the 
arbitrator managed to reach a settlement upon which both parties could agree, the 
continuation of the marriage. However, arbitrators cannot award the parties additional 
damages and rights; they may only help guide the parties to one of these two primary 
outcomes. The importance of this form of arbitration comes from the arbitrators’ right 
to award extra damages, to determine which party shall assume custody of any 
children, and to determine whether a dowry shall be paid or not.  
The Shari’a requires parties involved in a dispute over a marriage to mediate 
before allowing them to arbitrate, given the social and monetary consequences that 
follow this form of arbitration and out of respect for an underlying intent to preserve 
the sanctity and stability of the family. Therefore, most arguments presented by 
appellants (those appealing an arbitral decision, such as in the case studies discussed 
below) revolve around complaints that the arbitrator failed to successfully reconcile 
the parties. 
i. Appeal No. 372/25 to the Federal Supreme Court of the UAE223 
This case raises certain questions: does the case at hand comply with Shari’a 
Law requirements for the appointment of arbitrators? Does this dispute constitute an 
arbitration proceeding? 
The definitions of arbitration noted earlier in this chapter in the introduction to 
																																																																																																																																																														
judge , enforced as an executory deed and shall not be subject to any means of appeal except if it is in 
violation to the provisions of this Law .3 - The Minister of Justice , Islamic Affairs and Wakfs shall 
issue the implementing regulation organizing the work of the Family Orientation Committee.” 
222 It should be noted that the divorce according to the Islamic Shari’a can fall under a number of forms 
and to give a couple of example to it they are either: 1- the divorce by the husbands sole power 2- Khal 
which is the consent of both parties 3- divorce by the adjudication 4- Automatic divorce according to 
the Shari’a. the third form is the one of concern, which contain in it the procedures of arbitration and 
the powers of the arbitrator. See general MAJID ABO-RKHAYH & ABDULLAH MOHAMMAD AL-
JBORI, Fiqh Al-Zwaj W Al-Tlaq [The Fiqh of Marriage and Divorce] 115-199 (2006). 
223 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, Appeal no. 372/25, issued on the 12th of June 2004. This case 
would be available in full in the appendix. 
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the Shari’a224 are of interest here, given that the parties did not appoint the arbitrators 
per se. Instead, the court chose the arbitrator based on a delegation by one of the 
parties, which conflicts with what the Shari’a requires. Also, unlike other forms of 
arbitration of Family Law, divorce cases are exceptional, because the Shari’a requires 
that the arbitrators in divorce cases be related to the parties of the dispute. The court 
chose to uphold the first instance court’s decision of the appointment of a non-relative 
as an arbitrator based on the request of the appellant, despite the fact that this does not 
follow the conditions set down by the Shari’a and also despite the appellant having 
argued this matter: 
At the same time, the Supreme Court appealed to an exception of the rule 
requiring that arbitrators be relatives of a disputing party’s family; namely, that in 
the event that no one from among the relatives of the parties can fulfill the role of 
an arbitrator, then the obligation to determine the arbitrator falls to the court.225 
Moreover, once arbitrators have been appointed and have determined an award, 
according to the Maliki madhab, not only is that award considered to be binding 
and final, but the court is also obliged to confirm and enforce the award, even if it 
conflicts with the judge’s madhab226 or one of the parties dispute the award.227 
 
 The court’s reasoning follows the teaching of the Maliki madhab, and it cited 
certain Maliki Scholars to support its claim, including Mohammad Arfah al-Desoki’, 
Abdul-Aziz al-Mubarak and Ali ibn Abdulslam al-Tsoli.228 These scholars argued that 
if there is no one competent and capable to serve as an arbitrator from the families of 
the disputing parties, the court shall appoint the arbitrators as it sees fit from outside 
																																																								224	see	general	2.6.2	The	Shari’a	view,	page	28.	
225 See, MOHAMMAD ARFAH al-DESOKI’, HASHYAT’ al-DESOKI AL’A al-SHARH al-KABIR [al-Desoki 
footnote on the Great Explanation] Volume II 346 (publisher Dar Ahya’ al-Ktab al-Arabya’) (1230 
hijri, 1814 C.E.); see also ALI ibn ABDULALSLAM al-TSOLI’, al-BHJAH FE SHARH al-THFAH [The Bhjah 
the explanation of the Thfah] Volume I 489 (1st. ed. 1998); see also ABDUL-AZIZ al-MUBARAK, TBYEN 
al-MSALIK [The clarification of the Msalik] Volume III 112 (2d. ed. 1995). Those three prominent 
Maliki jurists were citied by the court in their decision. 
226 id, For instance if an arbitrator issued an award according to Shafii thought, yet the judge adheres to 
Maliki madhib, the judge is obliged to enforce that judgment. See civil transaction law article 1. 
227 Appeal no. 372/25. 
228 See, al-DESOKI supra note 225 see also al-TSOLI’, supra note 225; see al-MUBARAK, supra note 225. 
Those three prominent Maliki jurists were citied by the court in their decision., see also Appeal No. 
372/25. 
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the relatives of the disputing parties, and further that the court is obliged to recognized 
and enforce the decision of the arbitrators. The court is essentially explaining Article 
118 regarding personal status, which states:  
judgment appointing two arbitrators from among their parents, if possible, after 
asking each of the spouses to nominate, in the next hearing at most, his arbitrator 
from among his parents, if possible, otherwise from those who have the 
experience and ability to reconcile.229 
 
 This Article shows the influence of the Maliki Madhab on the legislature and on 
personal status law, which was formalized by extracting and selecting solutions from 
all four schools of Islamic Fiqh thought. The influence of the Maliki Madhab is 
visible in this instance, given that the drafters of the personal status law chose the 
solution given by Maliki Jurists. This case demonstrates that the supreme court cited 
Maliki jurists in its decision to appoint an arbitrator from outside the families of the 
disputing parties. By doing so, the court also explained Article 118 regarding personal 
status. The explanation given by the court indicates the existence of an exception to 
the rule for appointing arbitrators, even though the Quran says that arbitrators need to 
be related to the disputing parties. The jurists argued for an exception to that rule in 
the event the relatives of the disputing parties are not competent to serve as 
arbitrators. 
Therefore, with respect to the first question noted above, the requirements 
regarding the arbitrators were fulfilled according to the Maliki Madhab and the 
legislature. Regarding the second question, it can be inferred from the facts of the case 
that this is indeed an arbitration proceeding with roots in the Islamic Shari’a and 
related to a verse in the Quran.230 Moreover, the personal status involved in the case is 
codified the rules of the Islamic Shari’a. 
																																																								
229 Article 118/1 personal status. 
230 See general; supra note 185 verse 35 of Surah of the Women. 
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This case also demonstrates how the UAE courts favor arbitration that is based on 
Shari’a, which is shown by the court’s understanding an obligation to enforce the 
award, even if the judge interprets the facts of the case differently, or if the decision of 
the arbitrator conflicts with the judge’s Madhab.231  
Moreover, once arbitrators have been appointed and have determined an award, 
according to the Maliki madhab, not only is that award considered to be binding 
and final, but the court is also obliged to confirm and enforce the award, even if it 
conflicts with the judge’s madhab or one of the parties dispute the award.232  
 
The courts rationalize the situation as such because arbitrators derive their power 
not only from statutory law, but also from the Shari’a-based arbitration agreement in 
general. This power is further emphasized by the personal status law that codified the 
agreement to arbitrate.233 By extension, arbitrators derive their power from the 
primary source of Shari’a—the Quran—which is itself a primary source of law in the 
UAE.234 The case also suggests that UAE courts do not view family law arbitration to 
be an exceptional means of resolving disputes, despite its exceptionality versus other 
forms of arbitration within Shari’a-based arbitration. Family law arbitration is viewed 
as a form of adhesive arbitration. 
The case raises at least two issues: one regarding the appointment of arbitrators, 
and the other about the Shari’a’s perspective on family law in the UAE. The case also 
																																																								
231 The interpretation differ from one madhab to the other, and consequently the different interpretation 
would result in a differing in the opinion and the judgment, the Maliki Jurists have established a rule of 
enforcing the decision of the arbitrator even if it is in conflict to the judges Madhab, See, al-DESOKI 
supra note 225 see also al-TSOLI’, supra note 225; see al-MUBARAK, supra note 225. See general El-
ahdab and El-ahdab supra note 37 at 14, were they discuss the Maliki Madhab, Al-Manjid supra note 
96 at 48-49.  
232 For instance if an arbitrator issued an award according to Shafii thought, yet the judge adheres to 
Maliki madhib, the judge is obliged to enforce that judgment.  See appeal no. 372/25. 
233 Articles 118-123 of the Personal Status Law. 
234 See general UAE Constitution Article 7, and 2.2.1 The Legal System in the UAE page 11. See also 
Al-muhairi supra note 24 at 220.  
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refers to certain concepts of Shari’a law—namely, ta’h235, khal’a236, mahr237, and 
thraar238—which differ slightly in form, depending on the madhab. 
Finally, family law arbitration receives favor in the courts and illuminates their 
mentality regarding Shari’a-based arbitration; namely, that it is susceptible to 
enforceability. As such, family law arbitration reveals a crack in the courts’ general 
resistance to the use of arbitration that may be used to induce courts to reconsider 
their views on other kinds of arbitration. 
 
ii. Appeal No. 149/24 to the Federal Supreme Court of the UAE239 
This case raises the question of whether the husband’s consent is required when 
arbitrators decide to divorce the parties according to the principle of Kha’l.240 It also 
raises questions of international private law and the law that governs disputes—
should it be the law of the UAE or Egyptian law? 
 Since the disputing parties are foreigners that are starting proceedings within 
the UAE, and one of the parties has argued for the implementation of the Egyptian 
																																																								
235 This literally means obedience this term or concept in Shari’a would result in the continuing of the 
marriage and the dismissal of the request to divorce. See general, ABO-RKHAYH & AL-JBORI, supra note 
222, at 105-108, which explains the rights of the husband. 
236 Which is essentially a form of a mutual agreement between the two parties to terminate their 
marriage, Article 110 states that:” 1- Divorce for consideration is a contract between the spouses 
whereby they agree to terminate the contract of marriage against consideration to be paid by the wife or 
by another person. 2- the amount to be paid as a consideration shall be governed by the same rules as 
dowry but it is not allowed to agree on forfeiture of the children’s alimony or their fostering. 3- should 
the consideration to be paid in case of divorce by agreement be not validly determined, divorce shall 
occur and the husband shall be entitled to the dowry. 4- Khul’ is rescission. 5- by exception to the 
provisions of clause 1 of this Article, where the husband is unduly obstinate in his rejection and it was 
feared not to observe God’s will, the judge shall decide the “ Mukhala’a ” (divorce) against an 
adequate consideration.” 
237 Which translates to dowry, the husband in the marriage requires to pay a dowry to the wife this is 
either paid in full before hand or in a two installment first in the commencement of the marriage and 
later in the event of a divorce. See ABO-RKHAYH & AL-JBORI supra note 222 at 57. 
238 ABO-RKHAYH & AL-JBORI supra note 222 at 176-181, thee author states that the personal status 
law discusses this issue in articles 117 to 123. 
239 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, Appeal no. 149/24 issued on the 31st of May 2003. 
240 Kha’l supra note 236. 
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law on the dispute,241 the court responded to this by stating that Article 21 of the Civil 
Transaction law states that: 
The rules of jurisdictions and all procedural matters shall be governed by the law of 
the State where the case is filed or where procedures take place.”242 However, the 
Personal Status law has limited the power of this Article by stating the following:” 
1 - The present Law shall apply to all facts occurring subsequent to the coming into 
force of its provisions. It shall retrospectively apply to divorce attestations and 
divorce lawsuits that have not received final settlement. 2 -The provisions of this 
Law shall apply on citizens of the United Arab Emirates State unless non-Muslims 
among them have special provisions applicable to their community or confession. 
They shall equally apply to non citizens unless one of them asks for the application 
of his law.243  
Therefore, the facts of this case would have differed if the personal status law has 
been enacted at the time of the dispute. That is why the appellant argued based on the 
Civil Transaction Law, which states the process for the application of the law in 
general.244 The appellant argued that nothing should have prevented the application of 
Egyptian Law unless it contradicts with Article 27,245 and in this decision, Egyptian 
law was actually one resource on which the court based its decision, although in the 
end, it did not apply the provisions of the Egyptian law. The court responded that the 
procedural aspect of the case would fall under UAE law, and that the appellant’s 
argument had no merit.246 
The Supreme Court dismissed these arguments, since the appeals court’s decision had 
been based on two grounds: (1) the arbitrators’ decision—which alone was enough to 
enforce the court’s decision—and (2) that the court is free to interpret the content of 
Egyptian law. Further, Article 21 of the Civil Transactions Code247 forces the court to 
abide by UAE laws, which do not require the involvement of the prosecution, the 
swearing in of the arbitrators, the mediation of the parties, or any requirement that 																																																								
241 The disputing parties in this case both hold an Egyptian nationality. Khal is governed in Egyptian 
law no. 1/2000, concerning Personal Status law, chapter three section one Articles 16-25; Article 20 
addresses the issue of Khal. 
242 Civil Transaction law Article 21. 
243 Personal Status law Article 1. 
244 Civil Transactions Law Articles 10-28,  
245 Civil Transactions Law Article 27 
246 Civil Transactions Law Article 21. 
247 Civil Transactions Law Article 21 states: “The rules of jurisdictions and all procedural matters shall 
be governed by the law of the State where the case is filed or where procedures take place.” 
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Khal248 decisions are not subject to appeal. Therefore, the court decided to dismiss the 
appeal.249 
 This emphasizes the role of Shari’a law at a time in which arbitration rules were 
not yet codified,250 and it shows how judges implemented an unwritten rule of law by 
essentially applying doctrinal writing and the teachings of Islamic Scholars and 
Madhabs.251 All of this, then, helps to explain how a situation involving conflicting 
laws252 was dealt with in the UAE and how the situation affected the use and 
enforcement of arbitration.  
 According to Malik’s Madheb, the consent of the parties of the arbitration to 
the arbitrator’s decision is not required, and the arbitrator’s decision is enforceable 
even if the parties disagree with the outcome of the arbitration. Further, the judge is 
obliged to enforce an award even if he does not agree with the outcome.253  
The Supreme Court dismissed these grounds, stating that according to the 
Maliki Madhab, the Court was obliged to stand behind and enforce the 
decisions of arbitrators and did not have the right to change or amend an 
arbitrator’s decision, even if the court disagreed with the decision.254 
UAE courts used this argument to respond to the claims of the appellant, thus 
establishing that the husband’s consent is not required to enforce the arbitrator’s 
decision. The court yet again cited Maliki Scholars such as al-DARDIRI,255 al-
DESOKI’, and al-TSOLI’256, which amplifies the importance of the Maliki Madhab in 
the court’s jurisprudence, especially in this form of arbitration.  																																																								
248 Kha’l supra note 236. 
249 See appeal no. 149/24. 
250 The Personal Status law was issued on 19/11/2005 and was published in the office gazette in 
30/11/2005, Federal Law no.28 on personal status. 
251 Civil transaction law Article 1 set forth the process of finding a solution from the Islamic Shari’a 
and the hierarchy between the different Islamic Schools, which is further emphasized in the second 
Article of the personal status law. 
252 In this instance laws of different nations (Egypt and the UAE). 
253 Supra note 190.  
254 See AHMAD IBN MOHAMMAD al-DARDIRI, al-SHARH al-SAGEER ala AQRAB al-MSALIK ale MADHAB 
al-IMAM MALIK [The little explanation to the nearest route into Imam Malik Madhab] Volume II 514, 
see also al-DESOKI’ supra note 225 at 346, also al-TSOLI’ Supra note 225 at 491. See appeal no. 149/24. 
255 al-DARDIRI supra note 254 at 514. 
256 al-DESOKI’ supra note 225 at 346, also al-TSOLI’ Supra note 225 at 491. 
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This case encapsulates UAE court policy regarding Shari’a-based arbitration: to 
enforce awards by all possible means.257 Most importantly, in this case, the court 
outlined pro-arbitration reasoning that may be called upon to advance arbitration in 
other areas in the UAE, especially since UAE courts emphasize the procedural 
grounds of appeals. 
However, despite the positive attitude toward arbitration shown by the court in the 
way that it enforced the arbitrators’ decision, affirming and enforcing an arbitral 
award remains a lengthy process. This process may conflict with the basic principles 
of arbitration, as a court’s pursuit of justice may ultimately lengthen the dispute 
process, such as in a case in which the courts become involved in a dispute that was 
already arbitrated and decided on by the arbitrators. Even a form of arbitration that is 
highly favored by the courts may be burdened by lengthy court proceedings that cost 
the disputing parties time and resources. 
iii. Appeal No. 264/24 to the Federal Supreme Court of the UAE258 
The issue raised in this case is whether an arbitration proceeding can be requested 
through an interlocutory request or must be requested through a separate claim that 
should follow the normal course of filing a dispute through the court. Also, did the 
court fail to uphold the Islamic Shari’a by divorcing the parties based on thraar ?  
The arbitrators issued an award that granted the divorce based on thraar,259 which 																																																								
257 Suggesting that UAE courts are not interested in the procedures by which arbitrators decide awards, 
or in any aspect of the arbitration other than the award itself—a stance shared by most modern 
practices of arbitration. Even though the appellant disputed some procedural issues that might have 
been cause to annul the decision, those issues proved to be of no concern in the court’s view. In its 
view, the decision was based on the arbitral award, which alone was sufficient to oblige the court to 
defend the decision and enforce the award, as well as to dismiss any appeal seeking to amend or nullify 
that decision. The court’s stance in this case may be attributed to the Maliki School that helped shape 
the court’s jurisprudence and doctrine in this matter. The personal status law came into play only to 
affirm and codify the already existing court practice. The court recognized a moral obligation to 
enforce the award, which it expressed in its decision and in the way it decided to enforce the arbitral 
award; this obligation derives both from the rule of law and from religion. See general al-DESOKI’ 
supra note 225 at 346, also al-TSOLI’ Supra note 225 at 491. See general Al-Manjid supra note 96 at 58-
59. 
258 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 264/24 issued on 26th of June 2004 
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the first instance court decided to confirm and enforce by divorcing them260 
 
In responding to the question raised by the appellant, the court relied again on the 
teachings of the Maliki Madhab and on the civil procedures law,261 thus maintaining 
the separate identity of family law arbitration or, more precisely, Shari’a-based 
arbitration in the UAE. The appellant argued that the defendant lacked the right to 
request the court to divorce them in a case that the appellant initiated by requesting 
ta’h262. The argument given by the appellant may be attributed to either his (or his 
counsel’s) unfamiliarity with family disputes proceedings under the Islamic Shari’a, 
or it could have been a delay tactic used by the consul. Likely, it was ignorance and 
unfamiliarity on the part of both the appellant and his consul with Shari’a law in 
general, and not a delay tactic, the court responded by stating that: 
the courts reserved the right to understand the facts of the case and to evaluate the 
evidence. Since Article 97 of the Civil Procedures Code263 allows both parties of 
a dispute to submit interlocutory requests, and since, according to the Maliki 
Madhab, a husband’s desertion of his wife is not allowed under Shari’a law,264 
the request for divorce had occurred. Furthermore, it argued that the arbitrator’s 
decision was enforceable, even if the parties disagreed with the decision, as well 
as that the court was bound by the arbitrator’s decision; hence, the appeal was 
dismissed.265 
 																																																																																																																																																														
259 In here the court mentions the award as a report by the arbitrators although they look at it as a 
binding report, which is enforceable to them. Even in books that address the Islamic Shari’a they tend 
to distinguish between these concepts, e.g. Al-Jahni supra note 96 at 45. 
260 Appeal no.264/23. 
261 Since the Personal status law did not enter into force, the court relied on what was available at that 
time. 
262 Ta’h supra note 235. Which was the case No.665/2002. See general, ABO-RKHAYH & AL-JBORI, 
supra note 222, at 105-108, which explains the rights of the husband. 
263 Article 97 of the civil procedures Law states:” 1 - The prosecutor and the prosecuted may submit 
any of the interlocutory requests which are relevant to the original request in a way that shall help the 
progression of justice if both shall be examined together. 2 - Such requests shall be submitted to the 
court through the usual procedures of the action’s prosecution, or with a request presented verbally at 
the session, in the presence of the litigant party, and shall be recorded in its minutes.” 
264 For Imam Abi Dawud narrated in his Sunan the following Hadith:” Mu'awiyah asked: Messenger of 
Allah, what is the right of the wife of one of us over him? He replied: That you should give her food 
when you eat, clothe her when you clothe yourself, do not strike her on the face, do not revile her or 
separate yourself from her except in the house. Abu Dawud said: The meaning of "do not revile her" is, 
as you say: "May Allah revile you".”  IMAM ABU DAWUD SULYMAN as-SIJISTANI, SUNAN ABI DAWUD, 
Book 12 Hadith 97. http://sunnah.com/abudawud/12 it was also narrated by Imam Ahmad Bin Hanbal, 
and citied by the court in this decision. 
265 Appeal no. 264/24. 
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The Civil Procedures Law has many tools that allow the willing party the 
opportunity to appeal, and judges in both the Supreme court and the Cassation courts 
in the UAE are generally willing to accept cases that preserve their notion of justice, 
including the legitimate right of any party to seek a reexamination of a case, even 
though this particular case should have ended through arbitration and not been subject 
to appeal. Thus, even if the appellant was trying to use a delay tactic to stymie the 
arbitration, the court was willing to accept the appeal, because it fit the formal 
requirements set forth in the civil procedures law.266  
Nevertheless, this decision also follows the general trend that the Federal 
Supreme Court of the UAE supports Shari’a-based arbitration. Here, its support can 
be inferred from its decision to enforce the arbitral award. Though the court has 
expressed its obligation to enforce arbitral awards, the finality of an award remains a 
general concern.267  
Another concern relates to the court’s wording when referring to an award. Here, 
for example, the court described the award as an expert report, despite its stating that 
the award was issued by an arbitrator and admitting its obligation to enforce the award 
according to the Maliki madhab. Though possibly of little concern—after all, UAE 
courts generally back this form of arbitration—this circumstance raises concerns for 
other forms of arbitration. 
The court in this case dealt with an issue related to thraar, which was resolved by 																																																								
266 Which is being addressed in book one title twelve of the Civil Procedures Law Articles 150-188. 
Which deals with the issue of challenges against judgments of the court, which is filled with recourse 
means that is highly favored by the court as they see it as a way of upholding justice. 
267 Despite clear rulings in the first instance and appellate courts that awards are binding and final. In 
this case, for example, the appellate court’s ruling failed to deter the appellant from appealing to the 
Supreme Court, which meant additional time and cost for the litigants. Thus, these procedures need to 
evolve in order to resolve such issues. See Khor Fakkan Federal Court of First Instance case no.3/2002, 
and Fujairah Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no. 14/2002 Shari’a Circuit issued on 19/6/2002. 
Furthermore, The facts of this case were mentioned in an earlier decision of this court dated 6/5/2004. 
Therefore most of the facts were not repeated in here and were referred back to that earlier decision. 
Moreover the parties got divorced twice before in 1986 and 1994.  
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the arbitrators and confirmed as justification for their ruling to divorce the parties. 
However, the court did not need to elaborate and to expand on this issue, since the 
court established that according to the Maliki madhab, it should enforce the 
arbitrator’s award. The court has been seen to have difficulty giving up part of its 
power to arbitration, and in this case, it found a reason to intervene and answer a 
question that essentially constituted a review of the arbitrators’ decision. The court 
ended up confirming that decision in the end; yet it should have adhered to the 
teaching of the Maliki madhab in ensuring that the award was not subject to appeal.268 
Had the court done so, the appeal would not have reached the supreme court, nor 
should it have entered the halls of the first instance court. 
 
iv. Appeal No. 307/26 to the Federal Supreme Court of the UAE269 
The appellant raised the question of whether there is a Shari’a requirement of 
repetition of the claim in order to appoint arbitrators and initiate the arbitration 
proceeding. The other issue at stake in this case is whether the arbitrators are required 
under Shari’a Law to mediate and conciliate before rendering a decision on a case. 
 The appellant’s second argument is based on the Quran, which is the main 
source of the Shari’a, and on the same verse of the Quran that gives arbitration a 
Shari’a connection and a foothold in Islamic jurisprudence.270 The question then 
becomes why the UAE court would ignore such an argument, even though as it has 
been established in previous cases that it favors and support the rules of the Islamic 
Shari’a. 
																																																								
268 Moreover, in this case the court also reaffirmed this concept by stating that the Arbitral award is 
enforceable between the parties of the dispute and the judge should uphold it and be bound by it. See 
general al-DESOKI’ supra note 225 at 346, also al-TSOLI’ supra note 225 at 491. See general Al-Manjid 
supra note 96 at 58-59 
269 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE Judgment 307/26 issued on 2nd of May 2005. 
270 Which is Mentioned in Surat AlNisa’ verse 35, supra note 185. 
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 The answer lies in the interpretation of the court and again comes back to the 
Maliki Madhab and its significant influence on the court.: 
According to the Maliki madhab, the judge stated that he was bound by the 
arbitrator’s decision and obliged to enforce the arbitral award.271 
 
Here, the court cited a number of Maliki Jurists, which is a common method used 
to interpret Quranic text. The court did not respond to the argument given by the 
appellant that there is a requirement under Shari’a law for arbitrators to try to mediate 
before rendering a decision. The court simply stated that according to the Islamic 
Shari’a, the decision of the arbitrators is final and binding. It seems from this dispute 
that the court assumed that the arbitrators tried to mediate. The significance of this 
appeal rests in the importance of this form of arbitration in Islamic Shari’a, and in the 
fact of the requirement that mediation and conciliation be a step that should be 
fulfilled either by the arbitrators or another party. This requirement is fulfilled in all 
cases that fall under the Personal Status law,272 which requires that prior to submitting 
a dispute to the court, the parties to a dispute undergo a mandatory conciliation 
process within the court. Thus, the legislature has resolved this issue in the personal 
status law by making an attempt to reconcile a formal requirement.  
Yet the issue remains of concern in the event of ad hoc arbitration. If the 
arbitrators do not fulfill the conciliation requirement and render an award, are the 
parties able to contest such an award? According to the Maliki Madhab, it seems that 																																																								
271 The court based their claim on a couple of Maliki Jurists opinion and citied them in their opinion. 
See, al-DESOKI’ supra note 225 at 228, see al-TSOLI’ supra note 225 at 491, see also appeal no. 
397/26. 
272 Article 16/1 of the personal status law state: ” The lawsuit concerning personal status matters shall 
not be admitted before the court unless it has previously been submitted to the Family Orientation 
Committee. Are excepted from this provision, matters concerning wills, inheritance and like matters, 
summary and provisional lawsuits concerning alimony, fostering, guardianship as well as cases that 
cannot be settled by conciliation such as evidence of marriage or divorce.”. This emphasizes the 
importance of the appellant’s argument, which acknowledges that Shari’a aims to preserve the sanctity 
of the family and thus requires that reconciliation be attempted before a dispute is arbitrated with a 
binding and a final resolution. 
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such an argument would not have merit, since the Maliki support the award. 
The appellant’s first argument regarding the appointment of arbitrators held that a 
complaint must be repeated in front of the court before the other party can request that 
the court appoint an arbitrator, the Supreme Court responded by stating: 
as the appellant had agreed to arbitrate in front of the court; moreover, the 
appellant and the defendant both named their arbitrators. The appellant’s lawyer 
delegated to the court the selection of the arbitrators after the failure of the 
original arbitrators to fulfill their roles and duties. The court ultimately agreed to 
this request, which led to the appointment of arbitrators that decided to divorce 
the parties.273 
 
The court’s dismissal thus upheld the parties’ freedom of contract—namely, the 
freedom to opt for arbitration—which suggests that once arbitration is agreed upon, 
both parties are bound by the arbitral award.274 If this reasoning may be generalized to 
other forms of arbitration in the UAE, this would—at least in theory—solve numerous 
problems faced by arbitration in the UAE. The Supreme Court also ruled that 
arbitrators were not obliged to mediate prior to issuing an arbitral award. For this, the 
court again cited the Maliki madhab, which binds the court to enforce the award.275  
This decision again shows the courts’ undeniable support for family arbitration 
and also demonstrates the influence of the Maliki Madhab on the courts’ decisions.276 
The Supreme Court’s consistency regarding this form of arbitration is of great 
importance; if this idea were generalized to other forms of arbitration, it would 
improve arbitration’s status in the UAE as a form of dispute resolution equal to 
litigation. Lastly, note once more that the court relied on doctrinal writing from 
Maliki scholars in writing its opinion in the case. 
																																																								
273 See appeal no. 307/26. 
274 See Al-jahni supra note 96 at 44, in which the author confirms the freedom of contract concept in 
Islamic Arbitration 
275 See general al-DESOKI’ supra note 225 at 346, also al-TSOLI’ Supra note 225 at 491. See general Al-
Manjid supra note 96 at 58-59. 
276 id. as well as article 1 of the civil transaction law. 
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v. Appeal No. 349/26 to the Federal Supreme Court of the UAE277 
The first question raised by the appellant is whether a case must be submitted to 
the family orientation committee prior to the initiation of the proceeding. The second 
question is whether there is a requirement to repeat the claim in order to appoint an 
arbitrator?278 
The appellant’s first argument was that the dispute should have been mediated 
before being submitted to the court and ultimately to arbitration. This argument 
relates in part to the previous case,279 for in both instances, the issue goes back to the 
requirement of mediation before the dispute may go to arbitration. In response, the 
court stated that there is no requirement to submit the claim to the family orientation 
committee within the court to conciliate between the parties, and that such act is an 
administrative procedure: 
The Supreme Court responded by dismissing the claim, since referring the 
dispute to mediation is an administrative procedure that the Court is not required 
to perform. Furthermore, the appellate court’s decision only concerned divorce 
and did not refer to child support, which is related to the custody of children, who 
had not been brought to the court. Regarding the court’s failure to submit the 
dispute to the prosecution office, it was decided that the prosecution was not 
obliged to interfere in divorce cases. As such, the argument was found to lack a 
legal basis.280 
 
This issue was put to rest once the Personal Status law came into force, because 
this law made submitting the claim to the Family Orientation committee mandatory, 
particularly in article 117:281 
Each of the two spouses is entitled to ask for divorce due to prejudice that 
would make the continuity of the friendly companionship between them 																																																								
277 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no.349/26 issued on 19th of September 2005. 
278 Which has already been answered in the previous dispute, see appeal no. 307/26. Supra note 269. 
279 id. 
280 Which is governed under Book one, Title four of the civil procedures articles 60-69, appeal no. 
394/26. 
281 Personal Status Law Article 117. 
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impossible. The right of each of the spouses thereto shall not be forfeited 
unless their reconciliation is established. 2. In accordance with Article 16 
of this Law, the Family Orientation Committee shall endeavor [to 
achieve] the reconciliation of the two spouses and, in the case of failure, 
the judge shall propose reconciliation to the spouses. If this reconciliation 
is not possible and the prejudice is established, the judge shall order 
divorce.282 
Article 16: 
1 - The lawsuit concerning personal status matters shall not be admitted 
before the court unless it has previously been submitted to the Family 
Orientation Committee. Excepted from this provision are matters 
concerning wills, inheritance and like matters, summary and provisional 
lawsuits concerning alimony, fostering, guardianship as well as cases 
that cannot be settled by conciliation such as evidence of marriage or 
divorce.283 
 
Here, Article 117 describes the process of mediation within the courts in front of 
the Family Orientation Committee. However, courts are not obligated to force parties 
to seek reconciliation through the Committee. The other solution provided by the law 
is the appointment of arbitrators to settle the case, and they would have the obligation 
to try to reconcile the parties before rendering a decision on the dispute.  
The appellant’s argument that arbitrators must try to reconcile the spouses before 
rendering a decision is supported by the Quran,284 yet despite this, the court supported 
and enforced the arbitral award in this case, which illustrates the court’s undeniable 
support for this form of arbitration. Moreover, it shows that the court presumed that 
the arbitrators tried to reconcile between the parties, and that any claim against this 
assumption would not have merit. 
The appellant’s second argument was also mentioned in the previous case;285 
namely, the requirement that the case must be repeated in order for an arbitrator to be 
appointed. In response, the court stated: 
the disputing parties agreed in front of the court to arbitrate their dispute, and 																																																								
282 Personal Status Law Article 117-123 discusses this issue in length. 
283 Personal Status Law Article 16. 
284 Verse 35 Surat Ni’sa, supra note 185. 
285 Appeal no. 307/26, supra note 269. 
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that they named their arbitrators. As such, it was determined that they were 
bound by the arbitrator’s decision.286 
 
This argument would probably continue to be an issue even after the enactment 
of the personal status law, given that Article 118 states the following:  
In the case that prejudice is not established, that discordance continues 
between the spouses, and that both the Family Orientation Committee 
and the judge were unsuccessful in reconciling them, the judge shall 
issue a judgment appointing two arbitrators.287  
 
Therefore, it seems that such an argument would continue even after the 
enactment of the personal status law due to the wording of Article 118/1, which 
supports this view. However, it seems that such a claim would have a minimal effect 
if the dispute were already submitted to arbitration, and the arbitrators had rendered 
an award, based on the jurisprudence of the court and the teachings of the Maliki 
Madhab that the court observes.288 
In any case, the court dismissed the appellant’s claim in this case, which did have 
the result of protecting and upholding the freedom of the contract principle. 
 
vi. Appeal No. 248/24 to the Federal Supreme Court of the UAE289 
The appellant questioned whether the arbitration agreement needed to be 
rendered in writing, and he also challenged the neutrality of the chosen arbitrator.  
 Regarding the arbitrator’s neutrality, the facts of this case show that one party 
chose a relative (i.e., father) as an arbitrator. The other party seconded the nomination, 
which complicated the situation and raised the question of the arbitrator’s neutrality, 
especially considering the relationship between the plaintiff and the arbitrator; 
typically, some balance is afforded by having two distinct arbitrators. Nevertheless, 																																																								
286 appeal no. 349/26. Supra note 277 
287 Personal status law article 118/1., supra note 229. 
288 al-DESOKI’ supra note 225 at 346, also al-TSOLI’ Supra note 225 at 491. See general Al-Manjid supra 
note 96 at 58-59. 
289 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE Appeal no. 248/24 issued on 5th of June 2004. 
	 76	
the Court upheld the parties’ freedom to contract, and it also followed Shari’a law in 
accordance with the teaching of the Maliki Madhab. From the Court’s reasoning: 
that for the appealed decision to breach the law, the arbitrator must have 
exceeded the powers of the agreement or the scope of his or her power, which 
in this case had not occurred. Furthermore, the court claimed that, according to 
Maliki Madhab, the arbitrator’s award must be enforced without any 
reservations, regardless of any bias on the arbitrator’s part.290 
 
 It can be deduced that the parties’ freedom to contract overrules even the 
arbitrator’s neutrality, despite the unambiguous conflict of interest the occurred in this 
arbitration. By analogy, if this case had been litigated in court, such a clear conflict of 
interest in a judge would have been cause to request his recusal or dismissal.291 
However, arbitration is governed by a different set of rules than litigation and, it is 
generally viewed by the courts as “an exceptional means of resolving disputes.”292 
That said, and even given that this case to Shari’a-based arbitration, which the courts 
view in an exceptional light as compared with other forms of arbitration, the court’s 
protection of the arbitral process here is uncharacteristic. Allowing Shari’a-based 
arbitration to exist in a separate universe with its own set of governing rules suggests 
that there may be exceptions to exceptions; this may be attributed to the influence of 
the Maliki Madhab on the court, which cited many Maliki authors293 when writing its 
decision. 
With regard to the appellant’s argument that there was no arbitration agreement 
that established the arbitrator’s authority, the court simply responded that the 
appellant agreed to arbitrate in front of the court. The agreement to arbitrate, even 
																																																								
290 See al-DESOKI’, supra note 225 at 346, also al-Mubarak Supra note 225 at 112. 
291 Civil Procedures Law Article 114, this Article names the circumstances that under which the 
dismissal of the judge can be requested. 
292 This was discussed above when defining arbitration according to the view of the UAE courts, see 
supra 2.6.5 page 32. 
293 Such as al-DESOKI’ supra note 225 and al-Mubarak Supra note 225, al-TSOLI’ Supra note 225. 
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though it was not in writing, is found in the Quran294.  
Regarding the appellant’s second argument, the Court explained that personal 
status matters in relation to public order and policy. This implies that the courts have 
the right to rule on certain matters without the parties’ approval of the dispute. Here, 
all that binds the courts is the existence of a relationship between the decision being 
appealed and the issue at hand. In this case, legislation states that matters of personal 
status shall be considered to be public policy,295 despite the fact that public policy 
remains a controversial issue, because it adds to the courts’ capacity to block 
arbitration. To date, in addressing issues related to Shari’a-based arbitration, the 
courts have responded in an uncharacteristic way; namely, they have supported 
arbitration and enforced arbitral awards, signifying that judges favor this form of 
arbitration. 
The general terminology of the legislation that may be used to generalize all 
issues falling within public policy creates a different set of problems. Since the 
legislation considers all issues that are related to personal status to be part of public 
policy, the courts may legally interfere and rule on matters about which the plaintiffs 
did not request a ruling. Legislators may have made such issues matters of public 
policy upon which they may act without the parties’ permission, because certain 
issues are highly valued by legislators, and the courts believe they must exert their 
utmost protection to preserve them. 
This author suggests that some provisions should be rewritten to narrow their 
effect and preclude exceptions that can be used to hinder the arbitral process. 
 
 																																																								
294 Also, it is similar to adhesive arbitration in this regard, by having the arbitration agreement set forth 
in the Quran. Surah of the women verse 35 supra note 185.  
295 Civil transaction supra note 165, Article 3. 
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3.4.2 Conclusion 
UAE courts greatly favor Shari’a-based arbitration in Family Law, as a solution 
for family disputes and urge litigants to arbitrate their issues. With few reservations, 
UAE courts stand by arbitral decisions and enforce arbitral awards, and the 
scholarship of the Maliki Madhab296 has been shown to greatly influence the court’s 
decisions. This influence has helped to shape court doctrine, which has cloaked 
arbitration with a religious mantle and fully endorsed its use. This has given family 
law an almost parallel existence as its own system, not simply an exception to the 
courts’ authority. Arbitration as practiced in matters of family law has been relatively 
free from the courts’ scrutiny; few arbitral awards have been reversed or nullified. 
Yet, despite the courts’ endorsement of this form of arbitration, it still encounters 
complications: 
i. The terminology used by the Supreme Court regarding this form of arbitration 
suggests that the courts view arbitral awards as expert reports written by arbitrators; 
however, UAE courts do generally view awards as binding and requiring 
enforcement. This again is in accordance with the guidance of the Maliki Madhab297. 
The reliance on the courts to enforce arbitral awards also means that arbitration 
remains partly dependent on the courts for a legal identity, which tends to reinforce 
the courts’ view of arbitration as being an exception to litigation. The deference to 
the courts may also be attributed to the requirements set forth by the Shari’a; namely, 
that prior to arbitrators rendering a decision, they should try to mediate between the 
disputing parties. This mediation is often conducted as a matter of the Personal status 
law in light of the requirement that family disputes should be submitted to a family 
																																																								
296 al-DESOKI’ supra note 225 and al-Mubarak Supra note 225, al-TSOLI’ Supra note 225. 
297 i.d.  
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conciliation committee prior to going to court298. 
ii. The previous point raises the question of how the requirement of conciliation in ad 
hoc arbitration may be fulfilled? Arbitration in the courts fulfills this requirement 
through a conciliation committee. However, in ad hoc arbitration, the fulfillment of 
such a requirement would fall to one of the relatives of the disputing parties, who 
may be chosen as arbitrators in the dispute. This requirement is not unique to 
Shari’a-based arbitration; on the contrary, some arbitration agreements require a 
similar requirement of mediation before arbitration proceedings may begin.299 In this 
case, the requirement is derived from the Shari’a and should be fulfilled. 
iii. The arbitration agreement was an issue in several of the previous cases, particularly 
when there was an attempt to identify the rights and obligations of the arbitrator. 
There was no written arbitration agreement in most of the cases discussed; most of 
the agreements to arbitrate were verbal; this is unique to Shari’a-based arbitration in 
family disputes. Thus, given this unique characteristic that accompanies this form of 
arbitration, the issue of identifying the obligations of the arbitrator arises. It must be 
determined whether the arbitrator breached the arbitration agreement or have 
exceeded his or her authority. Despite this positive aspect, the parties’ failure to 
																																																								
298 Personal Status Law articles 16, 117, and 118/1. 
299 An example of such a requirement is provided in the Yearbook for commercial arbitrations, which 
state: “On 27 April 2011, Global Gold and its subsidiaries concluded a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) 
with Consolidated. The JVA superseded the Formation Agreement and stated, inter alia, that 
Consolidated had supplied a funding advance of US$ 500,000 under the Formation Agreement and that 
it would supply a further US$ 4.5 million working capital. The JVA further provided that the parties 
would form a joint venture company and would enter into a Shareholders Agreement to govern it. The 
JVA was governed by the substantive laws of the State of New York. It provided for the settlement of 
disputes arising out the JVA, or relating to any non-contractual obligations arising in connection with 
the JVA, by consultation, followed by mediation and, if mediation was unsuccessful, by arbitration in 
New York City under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA).” UK No. 2017-1, Consolidated Resources Armenia B. Global Consolidated Resources Limited 
et al., Jersey Court of Appeal, 27 March 2015 In Albert van den Berg (ed), , Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration, Volume 42, 1 (Kluwer Law International 2017) available at 
http://retro.kluwerarbitration.com.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/CommonUI/document.aspx?id=kli-ka-
icca-yb-xlii-211-n. 
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record their agreement to arbitrate in writing can become a cause for the continuation 
of the dispute. This occurs in some cases due to the parties’ unfamiliarity with the 
arbitration process in general, or it may be used by one party or the other as a delay 
tactic. However, this would not occur if the court and its current procedures did not 
allow such an appeal process. Currently, the door is open for anyone to appeal an 
arbitral award.  
iv. Arbitrator neutrality is another concern. The court’s tendency to uphold the freedom 
of the parties to contract allows an arbitrator to be chosen from the parties’ relatives, 
thus calling his or her neutrality into question.300 However, given the fact that an 
arbitrator is an expert in his or her field chosen for his or her expertise, an arbitrator 
in this form of arbitration would need to know the specific cause of the dispute 
between the parties. This would require prior knowledge about the parties’ private 
lives, which—given the nature of the family in Islamic society—would not be 
accessible to the public. Thus, even when the neutrality of the arbitrator may be in 
question, it is necessary to choose an arbitrator in this manner. Moreover, the issue of 
neutrality may be countered by allowing both parties to choose an arbitrator from 
among their relatives. This is a unique attribute of arbitration in the UAE, and helps 
disputants resolve family disputes. 
v. The legislature’s view of family law as part of public policy and order derives from 
the UAE’s being an Arabic Islamic nation that emphasizes unified families and 
social status. However, generalizing public policy would invite a higher level of 
scrutiny and protection from the court, which in turn would emphasize the need to 
revise the legislation that allows for a number of methods of appeal. More 
importantly, it might push judges to revise and amend their positions about 																																																								
300 which can be attributed to the teaching of the Maliki school that allows such, see appeal no. 372/25, 
supra note 223. 
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arbitration. While judges favor family law-related arbitration, they also support the 
idea of allowing the parties a second chance to look into the case in the form of an 
appeal. The appeals process in the eyes of judges and UAE public policy is a form of 
preserving justice by allowing the parties the opportunity to appeal. 
Overall, the courts have shown uncharacteristic behavior in supporting arbitration 
in family law cases. This may be seen in their expression of the obligation to stand by 
arbitrators’ decisions, as well as in their not attempting to assume jurisdiction over the 
arbitration process. This attitude may be attributed to the influence of the Maliki 
Madhab and the Islamic Shari’a, and it should be exploited to encourage the UAE 
courts to treat all arbitration not as an exception to the law, but rather as its equal. 
3.4.3 Riba (usury) 
The reason for discussing an issue concerning finance—namely, riba, or 
interest—in a section that deals with Shari’a arbitration stems from two cases: Appeal 
no. 831/25 and 67/26301 to the Federal Supreme Court of the UAE and Appeal no. 
146/2008302 to the Dubai Court of Cassation. Given that Shari’a law governs all 
aspects of a Muslim’s life,303 it is necessary to examine how the court addresses issues 
that conflict with the rules of Shari’a. The way the court addresses riba differs from 
how it addresses family law arbitration. In the latter case, the courts have seemed very 
willing to uphold the rules of the Islamic Shari’a. However, judges seem to have a 
different view when it comes to commercial transactions. The following cases 
demonstrate this, and they also highlight the role that judges play in the UAE and how 
their role affects the process of arbitration. 
Before investigating cases in detail, this section introduces the Islamic notion of 
riba to clarify the arguments used by UAE courts, which are discussed in subsequent 																																																								
301 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 831/25 and 67/26, issued on 23rd of May 2004. 
302 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no. 146/2008 
303 See supra, 3.1.1 defining Shari’a page 49.  
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subsections. It also briefly explains Islamic jurisprudence and UAE courts’ stance on 
the matter. 
 
3.4.4. What Is Riba? 
By understanding the concept of riba, one can understand the reasoning and 
views of UAE courts on the issue. Mahmoud A. El-Gamal defined riba as “trading 
two goods of the same kind in different quantities, where the increase is not a proper 
compensation,”304 which suggests that riba concerns the sale of goods and, more 
generally, of contracts. The rationale for prohibiting riba is that doing so would 
promote equity through equality.305  
The Quran on multiple occasions mentions riba and the Shari’a’s view of it. The 
first instance states:  
“That which ye lay out for increase through the property of (other) people, will 
have no increase with Allah. But that which ye lay out for charity, seeking the 
countenance of Allah, (will increase): it is these who will get a recompense 
multiplied306 
 
 This line of reasoning characterizes pre-Islamic practices in Arabia, in which 
interest was charged on debts.307 Another, more succinct, verse from the Quran states 
 
: “O ye who believe! Devour not usury, doubled and multiplied; but fear Allah. 
That ye may (really) prosper.”308 
 
There are two forms of riba: riba al-nasi’a and riba al-fadl. While riba al-nasi’a 
covers all loans that accrue interest, riba al-fadl addresses the trading of goods of the 
																																																								
304 MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, ISLAMIC FINANCE LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PRACTICE 49, (1st ed. 2009). 
305 MAHA-HANAAN BLALALA, ISLAMIC FINANCE AND LAW THEORY AND PRACTICE IN A GLOBALIZED 
WORLD 62, (2011). 
306 Surah Al Rum (The Romans) verse 39, Ali supra note 210 at 240. 
307 El-Gamal, supra note 304, at 50. 
308 Id, at 50. 
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same kind in different quantities.309 
How then, from this simple definition that makes no mention of interest, does 
interest relate to the doctrine of riba? 
3.4.5. Does Interest Fall under the Doctrine of Riba?310 
The answer to this question may determine whether interest infringes upon or is 
consistent with public policy doctrine in the UAE. This subsection will investigate 
how the riba question has been answered in other jurisdictions with Shari’a-based 
legislation, as well as how Islamic Jurists deal with this issue. Comparing these cases 
should help illuminate the UAE’s view on riba. 
Contemporary Islamic jurists have debated this issue on a number of occasions. 
Al-Hussayen311 explained in his article how this issue came into existence in the 
Islamic legal system, noting that al-Sanhury312 had three theories that excepted 
interest/usury from the doctrine of riba. One is the Professor Maroof al-Dwaleibi 
theory, which was the subject of his paper at the 1951 Islamic law conference in Paris. 
This theory holds that riba is limited to consumption loans (i.e. personal loans) and 
does not apply to production loans (i.e. commercial and business loans).313 A second 
is the theory of al-Sheikh Mohammad Rasheed Rida, which states that riba is limited 
																																																								
309 El-Gamal, supra note 304, at 50.  See also Surah Al ‘Imran (The Family of  ‘Imran) verse 130, Ali 
supra note 210 at 36. 
310 For a complete understanding on the Islamic Jurists discussion on interest or usury and whether it is 
Haram or not, see, general, SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN, [Commentary on the difference between the Banks 
Interest Rate and Riba], Islamic Research Magazine, Issue 31, 123 (1991), SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN, [The 
response of Sheikh Saleh Al-Hussayen on Ibrahim Al-Nasser Article on the stand of the Islamic Shari’a 
in regard to the banking transactions], Islamic Research Magazine, Issue 23, 121 (1988), SALEH AL- 
FOZAN, [The Difference between selling and riba in the Islamic shari’a, on contrast to the customs of 
al-jahlya Islamic Research Magazine], Issue 10, 86 (1983), ABDUL AZIZ BIN BAZ, [The  response of 
Sheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Baz on Ibrahim Al-Nasser Article on the stand of the Islamic Shari’a in regard 
to the banking transactions] Islamic Research Magazine, Issue 18, 121 (1986-87). In these Articles by 
prominent authorities in Islamic Shari’a, which is published from the Presidency of Islamic Researches 
and Ifta in Saudi Arabia, which the authors of these Articles are all members of the council of senior 
scholars in Saudi Arabia and highly respected authorities in Islamic Shari’a, they concluded that 
Interest falls under the doctrine of Riba and therefore it is Haram. 
311Id AL-HUSSAYEN at, 121 (1988.). 
312 See general Bechor, supra note 17. 
313 AL-HUSSAYEN, supra note 310 at 123 (1991). 
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to one form; namely, the one mentioned in the , which is riba al-Jhalh (Ignorance).314 
The third is al-Sanhury’s own theory, which holds that riba in all of its forms is 
considered haram or unlawful under the Shari’a. He further explains that  compound 
interest falls under the doctrine of riba, and that simple interest, while unlawful under 
the Islamic Shari’a, is allowed because there is a need for it. This need is general and 
should be exemplified and only allowed in case of need. Further, the legislature 
should regulate simple interest to limit its power, and when the need for simple 
interest goes away, it should once again be deemed unlawful.315 Al-Hussayen 
discusses all three theories, and explains that al-Sanhury concluded that riba in the 
first two theories is unlawful in the eyes of the Shari’a.316 With regard to the third 
theory (Sanhury’s own theory) al-Hussayen argues that this theory might have been 
plausible and have a merit in a time when there were two banking systems: the 
communist and the capitalist system. However, times have changed significantly since 
the Islamic banking system came into existence. Therefore, al-Sanhury’s theory, 
which relies on the economic necessity for simple interest, no longer has merit.317 
Two examples of two Islamic jurisdictions and how they address this issue, 
would help in highlighting the different solutions that can be adopted to resolve this 
issue. 
When faced with the possible unconstitutionality of Article 226 of the Civil 
Code318 concerning interest, the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court stated that 
Article 2 of the Constitution afforded no retroactive power. Moreover, it stated that 
Article 226 of the Civil Code addressed interest as part of a specific field of private 																																																								
314 id at 124. 
315 id at 124-126. 
316 Id at 126. 
317 id at 127. 
318 This Article deals with simple interest in personal laws, Egyptian Law no. 131 for the year of 1948 
in regards to civil law, Article 226.The Supreme Court of the UAE would adopt this same method of 
reasoning, as it shall be noted when analyzing the next case. 
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law.319 In this stance, the Egyptian court followed the viewpoint of the creator of its 
civil law. 
By contrast, the Pakistani Supreme Court ruled in December 1999 that interest as 
used in banking procedures infringes upon and is contrary to the Shari’a—a ruling 
that effectively nullified 22 interest-related provisions in Pakistani statutes.320  
The contrast between these two decisions is significant, particularly from the 
perspective of practicality. On the one hand, although the Egyptian court preferred a 
practical solution to the problem—even if that solution proved to be 
unconstitutional—the Egyptian court’s decision fell short of addressing the real issue: 
the unconstitutionality of Article 226. This demonstrates that the Egyptian courts are 
still influenced by the teachings of Prof. Sanhury, and that they do not note that his 
views on simple interest were bound to the circumstances of his time and are unlawful 
in the eyes of the Islamic Shari’a.321  
On the other hand, the Pakistani solution nullified provisions by deeming them 
unconstitutional to eliminate the problem at the root. Though the Pakistani Supreme 
Court’s decision complied with the provisions of its Constitution, it conflicted with 
global standards and banking practices essential to modern commerce. This would 
affect arbitration, especially foreign arbitral awards seeking recognition in Pakistan, 
and more specifically, any awards that involve interest.322 
The problem therefore becomes upholding constitutional/Islamic principles while 
not hindering international trade and commerce. This problem will be examined in 
detail after an analysis of case law in the UAE that touches on riba. 
 																																																								
319 Tetley, supra note 15 at 701. 
320 Howard L. Stovall, Doubts persist Arab Commercial Law into the Future, in ARAB COMMERCIAL 
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PERSPECTIVE 9 (Willam M. Ballamtyne & Howard L.Stovall ed., 2002). 
321 AL-HUSSAYEN supra note 260 at 127. 
322 Stovall supra note 320 at 9-10. 
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3.4.6. Disputes Relating to Riba (Usury/Interest) 
i. Appeal No. 831/25 and 67/26323 
This case underscores numerous issues concerning the practice of arbitration in 
the UAE. One primary issue concerns how the court answers questions about the 
Constitutional legality of interest or riba, which was implicitly answered by the Court 
during this case addressing the relationship between interest and arbitration in the 
UAE: 
The Court’s jurisprudence regarding interest is that interest, either compound or 
simple, is considered by Shari’a law to be haram. However, the Constitutional 
panel of the Supreme Court in its explanation for decision no. 14/19 allowed 
simple interest in banking transactions, although compound interest continued to 
be considered haram. The court also examined interest in arrears as a form of 
compensation for the delayed payment of debt and argued that interest as a form 
of compensation on delayed payment is compliant with the rules of the Shari’a. In 
order for the court to rule on interest, it must fulfill one more requirement related 
to the debt itself: the debt must be identified and should be due at the time of the 
claim, unlike compensation, which is subject to the court’s estimation.324 
 
This raises a question concerning the hierarchy of laws. In the previous section, 
we saw how the court stood by and enforced Shari’a rules, and this is the same court 
that refuted those rules that they had been upholding. What changed the court’s 
attitude from complete support of the provisions of the Islamic Shari’a to ruling 
against it? 
The decisions of the court in cases involving family arbitration were influenced 
by the Islamic Schools of thought, in particular the Maliki Madhab. This can be 
attributed to the fact that the cases discussed earlier were submitted to the Shari’a 
circuit325. The commercial case on the other hand would fall under the jurisdiction of 
the Civil or Commercial Circuit, given the nature of the dispute.326 Therefore, 																																																								
323 Supra note 301. 
324 Appeal no. 831/25 and 67/26. 
325 3.4.1 cases involving family law disputes at 59. 
326 See general Turki supra note 11 at 389, were the author explains how the different circuits in the 
UAE courts function. 
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different influences were at play in the commercial case, which can be attributed to 
the backgrounds of the judges and their education in general.327 It also can be traced 
to Prof. al-Sanhury, the father of much of the Civil Law in the Arabian world. The 
court adopted the reasoning and rationale that was given by Prof. al-Sanhury.  
In general, riba in the UAE conflicts with Shari’a law, which implies that interest 
in all forms is unconstitutional. The appellant sought to nullify the compensation 
awarded by the arbitrators by arguing that compensation containing riba is unlawful 
and should be dismissed. The Court’s jurisprudence indicates that such an argument 
on its own would have been sufficient reason for the Court to justify nullifying the 
award, for the Court’s policy regarding Shari’a-related issues is to uphold the Shari’a. 
As such, the natural course of events would have been the nullification of the award in 
order to fulfill Shari’a law. However, the Court dismissed this claim, despite 
admitting in clear language that interest, either compound or simple, is haram as per 
the Shari’a. The Court made this determination according to the constitutional panel’s 
tolerance of simple interest in banking transactions and of the idea that interest in 
arrears is a form of compensation for the delayed payment of a debt: 
in contrast to what the appellant argued in front of the first instance court (that the 
dispute does not relate to a banking transaction and thus there was no room for 
issuing interest), the case fell outside the scope of Article 216328, which is the 
Article that contains the conditions of annulment. Regarding the argument that 
the court’s decision about the award constituted a breach of public policy, the 
court said this argument had no merit because the dispute fell under the 
provisions of the commercial law,329 and according to that law, creditors have the 
right to ask for interest and are not required to prove damages in order to ask for 
it.330 Thus, the arbitral award did not breach public policy by involving simple 																																																								
327 Turki explains that the reason behind having specialized circuits within the court, is to accelerate the 
rate in which cases are decided within the court, by having jurists specialized in certain fields, which in 
turn would make them gain experience in certain disputes, and in theory enhance their ability to resolve 
these disputes. Turki Supra 11 at 388. 
328 Civil Procedures Law Article 216. 
329 This is identified in the Federal law no. 18 on Commercial Transaction issued on 7/9/1993, 
hereinafter commercial law, in Articles 4-10. 
330 Id, Article 90 state that: “Interests on arrears for delay of payment of commercial debts are due upon 
maturity, unless otherwise provided in the law or in an agreement.” Moreover, Article 88 of the same 
law states the following: “Unless otherwise agreed, where the commercial obligation is a sum of 
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interest.331 
 
 Thus, these two forms of interest were deemed lawful and in accordance with 
Shari’a law, which thereafter allowed the awarding of interest for identified debts 
only. 
Despite the Court’s reasoning, the Shari’a views interest in all forms as 
unlawful,332 a fact that has not changed, despite the Court’s accommodation of 
interest in commercial practices and its redefinition of interest as a form of 
compensation. The Court’s reasoning does not resolve the problem of interest, nor 
does its justification change the fact that interest conflicts with Shari’a law, which 
implies that the Court has defied a constitutional provision and that its justification is 
an attempt to justify their practice. The Court’s justification mirrors the Egyptian 
Constitutional Court’s opinion on interest, which the Federal Supreme Court of the 
UAE has adopted. 
In essence, the Supreme Court has compromised a constitutional rule in order to 
facilitate and promote commerce, which prompts concerns regarding to what extent 
riba will be permitted across other kinds of cases. From another angle, one might ask 
whether compromising a constitutional principle is the only answer available. Though 
constitutional principles should be preserved and upheld by the court, if doing so 
requires that charging interest not be permitted, then the UAE courts and legislators 
may choose to amend the constitution or the court’s practice regarding interest. In 
many ways, amending the constitution—thereby changing a principle essential to the 																																																																																																																																																														
money, the amount of which was known when the obligation arose, and the debtor delays payment 
thereof, he shall be held liable to pay to the creditors, as compensation for the delay, the interest fixed 
in Articles (76) and (77).” 
331 The other ground of appeals does not relate to the issue at hand, they relate to the appointment of the 
arbitrator and the arbitrators fee, which would be discussed later on. 
332 The Islamic Jurists Ijma on this matter is that interest in all of its forms considered as Haram, see 
general, 3.1.2 sources of Shari’a at 50, see also AL-HUSSAYEN Supra note 310 at 123 (1991), See AL-
HUSSAYEN Supra note 310 at 121 (1988), See AL- FOZAN, supra note 310 at 86, See BIN BAZ, supra 
note 310 at 121. 
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nation—is not as practical a solution as amending the court’s practice and the 
legislation that conflicts with constitutional principles333. Nevertheless, this latter 
solution would give rise to a new set of problems, starting with finding an alternative 
to interest when ruling on compensation and changing banking and other practices 
that award interest.  
How can a solution be realized that does not hinder established commercial and 
civil practice in the UAE? Would such a solution not interfere with the international 
practices? Furthermore, how would the change affect certain arbitral awards that 
require enforcement in the UAE? 
The bottom line is that the UAE’s provisions involving interest and the decisions 
of its Supreme Court contradict the UAE constitution. In addition, they breach the 
hierarchy of laws by dismissing the rule of Shari’a. This position can be traced to the 
Egyptian courts rulings on this matter334; Egyptian legislation and legal practices have 
been a form of foreign influence on the UAE courts for many years.335 The UAE 
constitution could be amended to accommodate commercial practices, though doing 
so would favor a commercial practice over a fundamental constitutional principle.336 
Another solution would be to require commercial practices in the UAE to meet 
constitutional principles, which would also require the prohibition of all forms of 
interest in the UAE and the introduction of a substitute system of compensation and 
legislative remedies. However, altering such widely recognized practices may pose 
diverse problems, and it may fail to preserve the fundamental constitutional 																																																								
333 Which is article 7 of the constitution, see general Al-muhairi supra note 24. 
334 Tetley, supra note 15 at 701, also to Prof. al-sanhury teachings, see AL-HUSSAYEN supra note 260 at 
127. 
335 Tamimi supra note 12 at 6. 
336 Stovall added a quote by Professor William Ballantyne that explains this situation, which states: 
“The Problem is that the Arabs have, to greater or less degree, in whishing to adopt the existing 
international world of commence, come face to face with the classic situation: an irresistible force 
against an irremovable object. As is not uncommon in these circumstances (not by any means only in 
the Arab world) the question has been begged on all sides. It will be, to say the least, interesting to see 
for how long and to what extent this apparent anomaly continue.” Stovall supra note 320 at 9. 
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principles. A line should thus be drawn when it comes to preserving Constitutional 
principles.337  
 
ii. Appeal no. 146/2008338 
 
 The issue raised in this case is similar to one raised in the previous case: the 
First Instance court was the one that dismissed an award, while the appeal and the 
Federal Supreme court both upheld the award for the reasons that were discussed 
previously. In this case, the First Instance and the Appeal Court both dismissed the 
claim, while the Cassation Court decided to recognize and enforce the award. These 
cases share elements such as the conflict among of laws, insurance policies, and 
inheritance. By combining elements of civil and commercial transactions in addition 
to Shari’a law, the analysis in this section focuses on the Shari’a aspect of this appeal. 
Though the decision to nullify the award was annulled by the Dubai Court of 
Cassation, which in part seems to support arbitration, the decision nevertheless 
contradicted a constitutional provision, which therefore raises issues of public policy. 
The courts view interest as unlawful and haram, since interest falls under the doctrine 
of riba. As part of public policy and order, the courts must address this issue when 
deciding whether to recognize an arbitral award that involves interest: 
the rules regarding inheritance—according to both certain provisions in Shari’a 
law and UAE public policy constitute riba and are therefore haram, despite being 
part of public policy to which the court should adhere when deciding to recognize 
or nullify an award. Moreover, the appealed decision failed to uphold due process 																																																								
337 Ballantyne gave an explanation of why the Egyptian courts allows interest, which illustrates the 
difficulty of answering this question, he states: Had the court agreed, it would have thrown all of the 
Egyptian banking and economic system into chaos. Faced with this agonizing decision, the court 
decided that the change was, as the court put it, not to have retroactive effect so as to affect existing 
laws, but that in the future, such laws should be adapted as far as possible to come into line with the 
Shari’a, and that future legislation must similarly conform. To ne, this reasoning is suspect; but there it 
is.” Willam M. Ballamtyne, The challenge of Islamic commercial Law in the Middle East, in ARAB 
COMMERCIAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PERSPECTIVE 16 (Willam M. Ballamtyne & Howard L.Stovall 
ed., 2002). 
338 Supra note 302. 
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and reasoning in nullifying the award and should itself have been annulled.339 
 
Interest/usury is grounds for nullifying an award, and the court is obliged to 
uphold this principle and to rule on the matter, as demonstrated by the decision in this 
case.340 Nevertheless, the Court of Cassation decided to annul the decision to nullify 
the award, despite having stated that interest violates public policy. 
Unlike the ruling of the Supreme Court, the Court of Cassation did not in its 
decision distinguish between compound interest and simple interest, or identify the 
nature of the transaction at hand, which the Supreme Court did do, and it also 
elaborated upon in detail on this decision.341 These circumstances suggest that the 
outcome of the decision would have changed if the Supreme Court had held 
jurisdiction over this case, since the decision concerned a civil matter and thus did not 
fall under the commercial exceptions articulated by the Supreme Court342. In this 
context, the Supreme Court would likely have upheld the appellate court’s decision to 
nullify the award, or at the very least to partially nullify the clause in the award 
involving interest. By contrast, the Court of Cassation, while admitting that the 
interest in arrears would fall under the doctrine of riba, upheld the award and did not 
try to nullify the clause involving interest in arrears. By doing so, the Cassation Court 
went beyond the teaching of al-Sanhury, which requires that interest should be subject 
to strict rules and regulations in order to be applied.343 
The Cassation Court’s decision in this case is peculiar. On the one hand, the 
Court stated that interest violates public policy; on the other, it decided to annul the 																																																								
339 Appeal no. 146/2008. 
340 See appeal no. 831/25 supra note 301, were the court states clearly state that this is considered riba 
and is thereby haram. 
341 Federal appeal no. 831/25 supra note 301. 
342 See Stovall supra note 320 at 10, were the author confirms that this is the practice in most Arab 
countries: “most Arab legal systems draw a distinction which permits interest charges in commercial 
(but not civil) transactions….” 
343 AL-HUSSAYEN supra note 260 at 127. See general Ballantyne supra note 337 at 17, were the author 
confirms that “the majority of Islamic jurists are of the opinion that riba includes all interest on 
money.” 
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Court of Cassation’s decision to nullify the award, based on the reasoning discussed 
above. Here, the Cassation Court contradicts its own jurisprudence; according to the 
reasoning of the Court, it must be concluded that interest is forbidden in such 
transactions, and therefore the Court should have at least nullified the clause 
involving interest. 
In sum, it seems that the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Court both agreed 
that interest is part of riba, yet they differ in their reasoning and predicted outcomes. 
The Supreme Court upheld an exception to the rule based on the explanation of its 
constitutional panel, while the Court of Cassation stated that interest is unlawful 
without addressing it. In one sense, both cases ultimately arrive at the same outcome. 
However, since the Court of Cassation’s decision contradicts and violates the 
Constitution, the Court failed to uphold UAE public policy. As such, the question 
becomes whether solving the issue requires enacting new laws or falls into the hands 
of judges. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Shari’a-based arbitration in the UAE is a practice highly favored by the courts, 
which regard enforcing arbitral awards as a moral obligation in accordance with the 
provisions of Shari’a law. However, such practices and attitudes seem to change when 
it comes to applying Shari’a law to the issue of interest/usury. The courts admit that 
interest contradicts the provisions of Shari’a law, yet they allow interest to be charged 
in order to accommodate contemporary commercial practices. This approach can be 
traced back to the theory of Prof. al-Sanhury, who allowed the application of interest 
transactions in accordance with a strict set of rules. 
Two points can be concluded from the courts’ actions. First, the UAE’s practice 
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of arbitration has been subject to foreign influence for many years, as demonstrated 
by the Supreme court’s explanation of its ruling on a case involving interest. The 
ruling in question mirrors that of the Egyptian Constitutional Court. Second, the 
unconstitutionality of interest in the UAE requires a legislative remedy. Such a 
remedy will invariably require major reforms in multiple sectors in order to 
accommodate commercial necessities. The solution will also ultimately need to 
consider enforcing foreign awards in the UAE, since such awards likely will create an 
entirely different set of problems.  
However, no legislative remedy will succeed without the backing of the judges, 
as civil law judges tend to make laws, they have an active role to play in interpreting 
laws, and it is they who implement the laws. 
Despite concerns related to Shari’a arbitration, the courts’ seemingly enthusiastic 
support of family arbitration may be the key to persuading them to embrace 
arbitration more generally and incorporate it within the UAE court system. Upon 
exploring these family arbitration cases, we find that the courts’ support for this form 
greatly enhances its effectiveness, because the courts are not viewing arbitration as a 
competitor or an exception. 
If the UAE’s courts viewed all forms of arbitration they way they view family 
law-related arbitration, the productivity of arbitration in the UAE would be greatly 
enhanced.  
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Chapter Four 
The Civil Circuit  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In its basic form, the study of law is no different than the study of any social 
science.344 It requires an examination of its practice and the effect this practice creates 
in order to establish the impact of the law on society. Arbitration is no exception to 
this idea. The previous chapter of this study established that the court views 
arbitration as an exception to the adjudication process in the UAE. However, there is 
an exception to that exception, which is Shari’a-based arbitration, although it is 
limited to family law arbitration. An examination of other forms of arbitration is 
required to better understand the impact of this idea345 on arbitration. 
This chapter will focus on one of those other forms of arbitration—disputes 
that are of a civil nature brought in front of the civil circuit chamber of the UAE’s 
high courts. These disputes can be divided into lease disputes and general civil 
disputes. Lease disputes have further complications and require examining them on 
their own. Therefore, this chapter will be limited to examining seventy general civil 
																																																								
344 See general, John E. Drotning & Bruce Fortado, Arbitral Decisions; a Social Science Analog, 1984 
Mo. J. Disp. Resol. 77-86, in which they examine the similarity between arbitral decision making and 
social science research; also K.W. Wedderburn, Law as a Social Science, 9 J. Soc’y Pub. Tchrs. L. n.s. 
335-342 1966, in which the author is trying to explain a new approach of teaching law that includes 
social science, also David Nelken Can Law Learn From Social Science? 35 Isr. L. Rev. 205-224 2001, 
the author is trying to brig the gap between law and social science.  
345 Which is the courts attitude towards arbitration, Dr. Ibrahim Al-mulla examined the Jurisprudence 
of the Federal court in arbitration, he recommended that the hostile tendancies of the court should be 
limited, see Ibrahim Al-Mulla, Qth’a al-Tahkeam fe ejtha’dat al-Mhkam’ah al-etihadyah al-aly’ah[The 
Jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court of the UAE], 13-45, at 42 (2013), this article was 
published by the federal supreme court in a jorunal that examined the role of the Supreme court in 
developing the UAE courts. 
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decisions. A brief introduction to the provisions that address arbitration in the civil 
procedures law is required. The chapter is structured as follows: 
• Introduction to the Civil Procedures law  
• Forms of Arbitration examined by the Civil Circuit 
o Lease disputes 
o Civil disputes 
 
 
4.2 Introduction to the UAE Civil Procedures Law346  
 
  For a civilized society to function, it requires laws that regulate the conduct 
and transactions of individuals. For individuals to protect these rights, they must have 
the opportunity to present their cases to a higher authority. This process of 
adjudicating requires procedures to guide individuals and shape the legal protections 
they seek.347 
The drafters of the civil procedures law in the UAE devoted an entire chapter 
to regulating the process of arbitration in the UAE.348 Fifteen articles in this chapter 
regulate the entire process of arbitration, in addition to regulating the court’s 
interpretation of arbitration agreements.349 Recognizing and enforcing arbitral awards 
																																																								
346 see the appendix for a detailed account of the civil procedures law provisions on arbitration, infra 
civil procedures law. 
347 Turki, supra note 11 at 7, (1st ed. 2009).  
348 Chapter three of book two addresses this issue in articles 203-218, see the appendix for a detailed 
account of those articles, including an analysis of these articles. 
349 Which can be found in article 203, see the appendix. 
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is subject to the general provisions of enforcement350 that govern all forms of 
enforcement, including arbitration.351  
However, a strict application of these procedures may actually result in a loss 
of rights; for example, in the event that individuals fail to uphold the proper 
procedural requirements, making justice costly and slow.352 However, legislation 
provides a solution to this problem in article 13353 of the law, which accepts the 
validity of a legal procedure if its goal has been met.354 A combination of several 
factors may cause a delay in justice: the limited number of judges, the large number of 
cases, the use of delay tactics employed by the disputing parties or their lawyers, and 
(in some cases) judges’ lack of experience with the law.355 
 The provisions in article 13356 that may resolve conflicts between the law and 
the use of arbitration raises question of why they are not employed more often in 
cases involving arbitration. If the court interpreted arbitration agreements and awards 
according to the principles of article 13 (that an arbitration procedure should stand if it 
achieved the goals of the disputing parties), then no conflict would exist between the 
courts and the use of arbitration.  
However, arbitration is currently treated as an inferior method of adjudication, 
as exemplified by the courts’ practices and their definition of arbitration.357 This 
																																																								
350 The process of enforcement are regulated in 45 articles (articles 219-246 of the civil procedures 
law). 
351 The enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is addressed in book three, chapter four that regulates 
the enforcement of foreign judgments, bills and orders procedure, civil procedures law articles 235-
238. 
352 See Turki, suprea note 11 at 19. 
353 Civil procedures law article 13 state; “The procedure shall be null if the law has stipulated expressly 
its nullity or if it has been impaired with a defect or an essential imperfection because of which the 
procedure purpose has not been fulfilled. In case the procedure purpose has been proved, the nullity 
shall not be decided in spite of the stipulation thereon.”. 
354 See Turki, supra note 11 at 20. 
355 Id at 20. 
356 This solution is contained in article 13, supra note 353. 
357 Which has already been examined in this study, supra 2.6.5 UAE Courts view of the Definition at 
32. 
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suggests that the court considers arbitration to be merely an exercise in the rendering 
of expert opinion, and not as a separate and equal adjudicatory process.358 
This means that the number of procedural disputes concerning arbitration that 
may arise, as well as the possibility of appeals, is infinite; the system that the 
legislature created seems to encourage appeals, and this amounts to holding 
arbitration to the same, or even higher standards, as those that the courts must meet359. 
The legislation as it stands supports the courts’ views on arbitration, and this, along 
with the possibility for a proliferation of appeals, often extends the length of the 
dispute. If a party were informed about how the law works, he or she could easily 
extend the length of the dispute or disrupt the arbitral process. Or, the party may be 
dissuaded altogether from opting-out into arbitration360.   
However, despite the flaws embedded in the civil procedures law regarding 
arbitration, its popularity as a dispute resolution method has not been affected. 
Therefore, there is an increasing need to improve legislation in order to better serve 
the individuals who choose to opt-out into arbitration361. In particular, the appeals 
process in the civil procedures law must be revised. If left unchecked, the current 
situation will increase the load on the court, as an examination of the courts’ current 
practices and decisions in arbitration cases, which is the subject of the next section, 
will exemplify. 
																																																								
358 see supra 2.7 Examples of the Courts View of Arbitration at 36. 
359 When trying to find a balance between personal justice in the form of arbitration and the law, 
Paulsson explained what attract parties to arbitration by stating:” Parties are attracted to arbitration 
because it promises a resolution of their dispute.” Paulsson supra note 106 at 17, at the end of the day 
this is what the parties entering opting-into arbitration are seeking. 
360 Quoting Paulsson again he states:” Parties, like Janus, are two-faced. When arbitraiton favours 
them, they delight in their escape from judicial formalism and delays; but when they lose they speak 
ardently of judges as the last bastion of justice. The grousing of unsuccessful arbitrants is always 
suspect; they are not different than losers in any system of adjudication-no matter how accountable the 
judges, how elevated the ultimate appellate recourse.”, Paulssoan supra note 106 at 17. 
361 “Arbitration that ignores law would be retrograde, based on the fiction of an agreement among 
perfect equals to entrust an arbitrator to find a unique solution to an isolated problem…” Pauslsson 
supra note 106 at 17. 
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4.3 Forms of Arbitration examined by the Civil Circuit 
 
The court classifies cases based on the nature of the dispute.362 Based on this 
categorization, the case is then presented to the different circuits within the court.363 
Specialized judges in their respective fields of law head each circuit. No circuit is 
fully dedicated to arbitration, which means that arbitration disputes are categorized 
based on the nature of the dispute that the court believes is most appropriate.364 
Most judges that are presented with disputes related to arbitration, in any stage 
of the arbitration process except enforcement,365 examine the dispute and the claims 
of the litigants as a whole. They are not limited to the arbitral claims.366 To study the 
courts’ views on arbitration, one must divide the forms of arbitration based on the 
way the court have categorized them.367 This will allow us to identify any 
distinguishing factors among the different forms of arbitration, and help to determine 
whether judges’ nationality and background have any effect on their decisions. It also 
may help to discover whether appeals are a de facto part of the litigation of arbitration 
disputes. Finally, we should ask whether arbitration that is appropriated by a court 																																																								
362 Thus, in the case of arbitration this would usually fall to one of three circuits: civil, commercial or 
labor, article 19 of the civil procedures, see general Turki supra note 11 at 389-391. 
363 Therefore, if a dispute rises in any stage of the arbitration and was submitted to the court, or if it was 
in regards to an arbitral award, the suit would first have to be categorized in order for it to be filed to 
the different circuits of the court, if a dispute was categorized as a civil dispute then it would be 
submitted to the civil circuit, see general Al-Tamimi supra note 12 at 10-17, Turki supra note 11 at 
389-391. 
364 For instance, a request to recognize an award might be submitted to a civil circuit and later on 
appealed to a commercial circuit, implying that their is a possibility that a judge, who specialize in civil 
law might be presented with a commercial arbitration dispute or an award. See general Turki supra note 
11 at 388. 
365 Which in most instances should be brought directly in front of an enforcement judge, unless one of 
the parties disputed the award by filing a suit in front of the court, see articles 219-224 of the civil 
procedures law, and a detailed account of this in the appendix. See general Turki supra note 11 at 393, 
and Tamimi supra note 12 at 97, were the author explains the execution procedures. 
366 Which increases the chances of having this dispute appealed. 
367 As was the case when the court addressed Shari’a based arbitration, were it was established in this 
study that the courts view and attitude changed when faced with Shari’a arbitration, especially in 
family law disputes, see supra 2.6.2 Shari’a View and 3.4.1 cases involving family law disputes. 
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receive favorable treatment368. Such questions require an examination of the courts’ 
decisions against the background of a complete understanding of civil arbitration. 
 
4.3.1 Civil Arbitration  
What is meant by civil arbitration? This study will be limited to the courts’ 
classification of their cases, as found in their decisions and publications. Currently, 
courts tend to exclude other kinds of disputes from the jurisdiction of the civil circuit, 
such as commercial disputes, which fall under the commercial transaction law.369 
However, earlier decisions have classified commercial and labor disputes under the 
civil circuit, since during the early days of the court system, there was no need for 
specialized circuits.370 However, as the court system grew and the number of cases 
grew with it, the need for more circuits also increased. Now, a dispute submitted to 
the civil circuit must be of a civil nature and fall under one of the provisions of the 
civil transaction law.371 Thus, in the UAE, a civil arbitration would constitute an 
arbitration that deals with a dispute arising from a civil transaction according to the 
civil transaction law. Such a case would exclude any transaction of any other nature 
that would fall under another circuit, such as a commercial transaction.372 
																																																								
368 In other words, do the court favor court-annexed arbitration? 
369 Article 1 of the commercial law states that:” The provisions of this Law shall apply to merchants, as 
well as to all acts of commerce carried out by any person even though he is not a trader” It went on to 
identify those acts in article 2 of the same law. 
370 Dr. Turki explained this idea in detail and referred to the Federal law no. 3/1983 concerning the 
federal judicial authority, issued on 30/5/1983, stating that “the purpose behind this division is to 
increase the courts activity, in a way that they are able to hear a number of cases at the same time in the 
different circuits. See Turki, supra note 11 at 389-391. 
371 This is not to say that all the disputes that get the label civil are purely of a civil nature. 
372 Last thing to note about the courts view, is their view of the parties of the dispute, in particular they 
tend to view the individuals that fall under the civil law as weaker individuals and require the 
protections of the law, which influence their decision making process. Al-Bndari distinguished between 
traders or in other words people and entities that fall under the spectrum of the commercial law, and 
stated the importance of identifying each one by stating that: “the law gives them certain obligations 
and rights….” MOSTAFA AL-BANDARI, MBAD’A QANON AL-MAMALAAT AL-TJARYAH L DWALT AL-
EMARAT AL-ARABYAH –AL-MTHADAH, (The principles of commercial transaction law in the United Arab 
Emirates), 198-199(1st ed. 2006). 
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 This section examines two forms of disputes that fall under the jurisdiction of the 
civil circuit: civil disputes in general, and lease and land disputes. The latter category 
is subject to judicial committees that have jurisdiction over such disputes.  
 
4.3.2 Lease and Land Disputes373 
Lease and land disputes are related. Most of the disputes examined in this section 
fall under the jurisdiction of the lease committees, which have jurisdiction over 
disputes that arise from the leasing of non-transferable goods.374 Naturally, this would 
put disputes over lands and properties under the jurisdiction of lease committees, 
excluding the leases of transferable goods. This division affects arbitration.    
The idea behind having lease committees375 is to relieve the pressure on the 
courts.376 They are meant to create a buffer that decreases the number of lease 
disputes that appear in front of the courts. The decisions of lease committees are final 
and binding and not subject to appeals.377 
																																																								
373 Due to the major economic boost that the UAE have experienced in recent years, and the increased 
number of foreigners that seek jobs in the UAE and foreign businesses that choose the UAE as a base 
of their operation, which resulted in an increase in the number of residence in the UAE and the 
flourishing of the real-estate market; what followed is an increase number of lease and land related 
disputes. See general al-tamimi supra note 12 at 25-26, were he discusses the ret disputes. 
374 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no.47/2007, issued on the 29th of April 2007, the court in this 
decisions refereed to the explanatory note in defining the disputes that fall under the jurisdiction of this 
committee “the explanatory note published by the office of the ruler , which defines the term “any 
dispute” to mean any dispute rising from renting the non-transferable goods only…” The Explanatory 
decree no. 1/1999 in regard to the jurisdiction of the rent committee, article 1. 
375 Such is the case in Dubai, Sharjah, Abu Dhabi, and most emirates nowadays, which followed in 
their footsteps. See Al-tamimi supra note 12 at 25-26. 
376 This committee usually located in the municipality or the land department of the Emirate and in 
some cases headed by a judge. 
377 The court in more than one decisions stated this fact, see Dubai Court of Cassation appeal 
no.47/2007, in which they stated “and that the ruling of this committee is final and binding and un-
appealable..” citing article 4 of the Emirate of Dubai Emir Decree no. 2/1993, in regard to forming a 
special tribunal to determine disputes between landlords and tents. Moreover, there are two other laws 
regulating the relationship between landlords and tenants in Dubai, which are law no.26/2007, and law 
no.15/2009 concerning hearing rent disputes in the free zone. 
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 This is in essence a hybrid system, modeled after institutional arbitration, and it 
has the attributes of court-annexed arbitration and adhesive arbitration.378 The lease 
committees have the support of the courts and the Emirates that created them.  
However, not all lease disputes fall under the jurisdiction of these committees, 
which can be noted from the cases examined in this section. What, then, is the 
jurisdiction of these committees? Do their decisions constitute a form of court-
annexed arbitration379? Are they a form of institutional arbitration or another form of 
arbitration altogether? Or do they represent a separate judicial authority that has the 
same legal powers as the court? Finally, what does the study of these committees add 
to the discussion of arbitration? 
Sixteen cases are addressed in this section, from three high courts: the Dubai 
Cassation Court, the Abu Dhabi Cassation Court, and the Federal Supreme Court of 
the UAE.  
 
4.3.3 Dubai Court of Cassation 
The court of cassation in Dubai identified the jurisdiction of lease committees in 
three separate decisions,380 in which they came to the conclusion that: 
Articles 1 and 4 of the decree381 that established this committee gives it the power 
and the right to resolve leasing disputes and that their decisions are final and 
binding, moreover it is not subject to appeal. This fact is not affected by article 
																																																								
378 Since the parties are obliged to submit to this committee before seeking the court. See general, 
Levin supra note 141 at 538. Those committees are also similar to how Levin define court-annexed 
arbitration: “it is mandatory rather than voluntary; the arbitrators are typically assigned by a third party 
rather than chosen by the parties; and the award is not binding. Typically the procedure is imposed 
upon litigants by statue and by rule. Moreover, court-annexed arbitration is a method of dealing with 
civil litigants subsequent to the filing of the case while traditional arbitration occurs prior to the 
institution of the lawsuit.” 
379 id. 
380 Dubai Court of Cassation Appeal no.193/2002, issued on the 23rd of June 2002, Dubai Court of 
Cassation appeal no.47/2007, issued on the 29th of April 2007 and Dubai Court of cassation (civil 
circuit), appeal no. 133/2007, issued on the 23rd of September 2007. 
381 Decree no. 2/1993, supra note 377. 
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213382, which established the jurisdiction of recognizing arbitral awards to the 
court; since the dispute between the parties concern a leasing agreement, which is 
regulated under the rules of the civil transaction law383 and the decree384, both of 
which gives the committee the jurisdiction to rule on all lease disputes, even those 
that concerning the recognition of arbitral awards, this fact is not overruled nor 
changed by the appeal court’s decision, which establishes the jurisdiction to the 
court.385 
The court in this decision established that the lease dispute committee has power 
equal to that of the court with regard to recognizing arbitral awards that arise from 
lease disputes. It also has the same supervisory powers that the court enjoys. The 
importance of these decisions is that the court gave up part of its supervisory power 
over arbitration to another entity. This outcome may be the result of the lease 
committee having been established by an Emir’s decree that delegated all aspects of 
lease disputes to the committee. Thus, the lease committee is viewed not as a 
competitor to the court, but rather as an equal judicial authority that is an extension of 
the court’s own jurisdiction. However, despite this structure, as created by the court, 
and (more importantly) legislative support for this structure, some arbitration cases 
still come through to the cassation court.386 
This decision imply that parties in lease disputes are able to opt-out into arbitration 
outside the scope of the lease committee, only to have the committee act in the court’s 
place to recognize and enforce the award. In another decision, which involved a 
question from one of the litigants about the option to submit to arbitration based on 
the existence of an arbitration clause in the contract, the court answered as follows: 
																																																								
382 Civil Procedures law article 213 supra note 139. 
383 civil transaction law articles 742-848, regulates this issue. 
384 Supra note 380. 
385 Appeal no. 193/2002, supra note 380. This decisions concerns an arbitral award, which was issued 
by an arbitrator appointed by the chamber of commerce and later on recognized by the lease 
committee. 
386 It took thirteen months of litigation only to establish yet again that the committee has the authority 
to decide on all aspects that rises from a lease agreement, including recognizing an arbitral award. 
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The court responded to this by stating that article of the civil procedure law 
allows the emirate that have opted-out into establishing their local courts 
system the right to establish specialized legal committees387, and given the fact 
that the ruler of Dubai established in a decree388 a specialized legal committee, 
which states that the establishment of a specialized judicial committee that 
have jurisdiction over dispute raising between the tenants and their landlords 
whatever the nature of this dispute be389, and that the ruling of this committee 
is final and binding and un-appealable390. In addition, to the explanatory note 
published by the office of the ruler, which defines the term “any dispute” to 
mean any dispute rising from renting the non-transferable goods only391. Thus, 
excluding it from the general principles of the court jurisdiction, emphasizing 
the fact that the court has no jurisdiction over lease disputes, and the parties 
has no right to opt-out by submitting their dispute to the court, or to agree to 
submit their dispute to arbitration. Furthermore, articles 742392, 745393 and 
770394 of the civil transaction law, implies that the dispute in this instance rises 
from a lease agreement, which gives the jurisdiction to settle this dispute to the 
rent committee, even if the parties of the contract agreed to submit their 
dispute to arbitration. Furthermore, article 85 of the civil procedures395 allow 
jurisdictional pleas to be heard at any stage in front of the court, in addition the 
court can decide on its own without a request of one of the parties, and since 
pleas on the existence of an arbitration clause fall under this category, and the 
appeal court dismissal of the appellant argument to dismiss the claim based on 
the existence of an arbitration clause is an indication that the court has the 
jurisdiction to hear the dispute. This decision is subject to appeal on its own 
before rendering the final decision in the dispute.396 Furthermore, based on the 
facts of this dispute, which have risen from a lease agreement between the 
parties and as such the jurisdiction to hear this dispute falls to the rent 
committee, and since the appeal court failed to uphold this fact.397 
This decision differs from what was established by the same court in the previous 
decision. The court’s justification for this decision may be deduced from the above 
quote, which implies that it interpreted the legislature’s intent to give the committee 																																																								
387 Article 1 of the civil procedures. 
388 supra note 377. 
389 Decree Article 1. Supra note 377. 
390 Decree Article 4. Supra note 377. 
391 The Explanatory decree no. 1/1999 article 1 supra note 374. 
392 Civil transaction law article 742 of states: “A lease is granting ownership of the use of a specific 
thing to the lessee for a certain time in return for a fixed rent.” 
393  id. article 745 states: “The object of the contract of lease is the enjoyment of the right to use the 
leased premises which takes effect by delivery thereof.” 
394 Which explains the warranty over the leased property. 
395 Civil procedures Article 85, states: “1- The plea against the court's jurisdiction for lack of its 
authority or because of the action's type, or its value may be exhibited in any of the action's 
circumstances, and the court shall automatically decide it. 2- If the court has judged its lack of 
jurisdiction it should give orders to forward the action, as is, to the authorized court, and the court's 
clerk office should notify the litigant parties with the decision.” 
396 id article 151 state: “…deciding the lack of jurisdiction…” which gives the parties the right to 
appeal such decisions. 
397 appeal no.47/2007, supra note 380. 
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general jurisdiction over all lease disputes. This implies that disputing parties may not 
submit to the court or to arbitration, and are obliged to submit a dispute that arises 
from a lease contract to the lease committee.398 
What then is the nature of the lease committee and the status of arbitration in 
lease disputes according to the court in Dubai? It can be inferred from the previous 
discussion that two contrasting views exist within the same court.399 Those two 
interpretations given by the same court leave disputing parties at a crossroads, 
asking themselves which of these decisions and interpretations to follow. 
Individuals are faced with two options in this situation: (1) both parties willingly 
uphold their contractual obligation to resort to arbitration, in which case they 
would claim their award through the lease committee400; (2) the parties resort to the 
lease dispute committee to settle their dispute, in the event that they do not 
willingly submit to arbitration. Having both options open at the same time is 
unproductive for individuals seeking to utilize arbitration. The court should adopt 
the first option of allowing arbitration in lease disputes to exist under the 
supervision of the lease committee. 
The jurisdiction of the lease committee is challenged even further when the 
nature of the dispute comes into question; if the parties do not agree about the 
nature of the dispute or the nature of the contract that contains the arbitration 
																																																								
398 See general Al-tamimi supra note 12 at 25-26. 
399 First off the court accepted the existence of arbitration in lease dispute outside the confines of the 
lease committee, the only condition that they gave is to shift the courts supervisory role to the 
committees, thus, the committee would be responsible of recognizing the award and ensuring that 
nothing affects the enforcement of such awards. However, the same court shifted and changed their 
own opinion on this matter, and interpreted the legislators intent to include all lease disputes under the 
scope of this committee, thereby the parties would be unable to opt-out into arbitration. 
400 See appeal no. 193/2002, supra note 380. 
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clause, the case would fall to the court to determine what entity has jurisdiction 
over the dispute: 
The appellant’s claim that based on the documents presented in this case the 
relationship between the parties is in fact a lease agreement, since the appellants 
have lease land no.1013 from the defendant, as such it is in fact a lease agreement 
and not a company’s contract, which falls under the jurisdiction of the lease 
committee and not the court. The court dismissed this argument, stating that lease 
committee401 which regulates the leasing of un-transferable goods402 is limited to 
the disputes that rise from the lease of those goods. Furthermore, the Court has the 
right to interpret the will of the parties and define the clauses of the contract, which 
the court has the right to deduce from the documents presented to it, as such the 
parties intent in this dispute were to have the appellants invest in the defendant 
property for ten years. Therefore, the dispute between the parties doesn’t rise from 
a relationship between a tenant and a landlord, but a dispute rising from an 
investment contract, which makes the appeal court’s decision to dismiss the 
appellant’s plea that the court lacks jurisdiction justifiable.403 
The court’s power of interpretation over contracts is extensive and not limited 
to what the parties submit or to what has been written in the contract. The court is 
more than capable of, and willing to, interpret contracts and determine the 
competent authority that has jurisdiction over a dispute. In the event that it views 
the leasing contract as an investment contract, it would then fall outside the scope 
of the leasing committee and under the court’s jurisdiction. However, in the 
previous decision, which involves a contract that could also be identified as an 
investment contract,404 the court decided to identify the dispute as arising from a 
lease contract and thereby confirmed that it should fall under the jurisdiction of the 
lease committee. 
																																																								
401 decree no. 2/1993, supra note 377. 
402 explanatory decree no.1/1999, supra note 374. 
403 Dubai Court of cassation (civil circuit), appeal no. 133/2007, issued on the 23rd of September 2007. 
404 Appeal no.47/2007, supra note 380, which revolves around the leasing of a pavilion in a project 
called the global village for a certain period of time (usually no more than six months) the tenant would 
then be allowed to construct a pavilion over this land and lease the shops under the supervision of the 
global village. 
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This decision raises another question that concerns arbitration in general; 
namely, how does the court handle a case in which the parties question the legality 
of the contract. May the parties arbitrate their dispute if the legality of the contract 
is in question? In other words, does the court accept the separability doctrine?405 
The appellants second ground of appeal argues that the appeal court by deciding 
that the first instance decision to appoint an arbitrator is not subject to appeal, have 
failed to apply the law, they argue that arbitration clause state that the arbitrator 
have the right to hear all dispute that arise from this contract, which implies that 
the arbitrator jurisdiction is limited to those disputes, and since the defendant 
claimed that the appellants have misguided and deceived the defendant, thereby 
removing this dispute from the arbitrators jurisdiction by falling outside the scope 
of the arbitration clause, moreover the defendant should have requested to nullify 
the contract instead of asking the court to appoint an arbitrator. The court agreed 
with the appellants argument, stating that according to articles 203406 and 204407 
supports their claim, both articles implies that in order accept a request to appoint 
an arbitrator by the court, the parties are required to agree in writing to their intent 
to submit the dispute into arbitration, and if they identified the scope of the 
arbitration, then the arbitrators power is limited to what the parties have agreed 
upon in the contract without extending to other disputes, and according to the 
jurisprudence of this court, arbitration is an exceptional means of resolving dispute 
in which the individual waiver his right to submit his dispute to their natural judge, 
which requires the court to limit their interpretation of the arbitration clause to 
what has been explicitly agreed upon by the parties.408 
 
The court’s ability to interpret such cases is aided by the arguments and requests 
that the litigants submit to the court. The defendant asked the court to appoint an 
arbitrator, instead of asking the lease committee to do so; by this action, the defendant 
invited the court into the dispute. He argued that the appellants misguided him in the 																																																								
405 See general, Carbonneau supra note 70 at 18. Were the author discusses the separability and 
kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine. See general Carbonneau supra note 74 at 30-31. 
406 Civil procedures law article 203/2 state “The agreement shall not be recorded except in writing”, see 
infra civil procedures law. 
407 Civil Procedures law article 204 state: “1- If the litigation has occurred and the litigant parties 
haven't agreed on the arbitrators, or one or more arbitrators, who was agreed on, has abstained from the 
work, has retired there from, has been dismissed there from, or his refusal has been decided, or a 
hindrance has prevented his undertaking therein, and there were not an agreement between the litigant 
parties concerning that, the court which is principally authorized to examine that litigation shall appoint 
whoever shall be needed of the arbitrators, and that on the grounds of a request from one of the litigant 
parties, through the usual procedures of the action prosecution. The number of those appointed by the 
court should be equal to the number agreed on between the litigant parties or completing thereto. 2- It 
shall not be possible to appeal against the decision issued in that through any of the proceedings of 
appeal.” See infra civil procedures law. 
408 appeal no. 133/2007, supra note 403. 
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signing the contract, which may have compromised the legality of the contract. As the 
court is not generally eager to extend the powers of the arbitrators, the separability 
and kompetenz-kompetenz doctrines409 would have no application in this dispute—
otherwise, the cassation court would have agreed with the defendant’s request to 
appoint an arbitrator. Instead, they stated that such arguments about the validity of the 
main contract do not entitle the court to appoint an arbitrator. This decision suggests 
that the court is required to first decide upon the validity of the main contract before 
appointing an arbitrator. 
 This entire dispute could have been avoided if the court applied two rules. 
First, the civil procedure rule that decisions about the appointment of the arbitrators is 
not subject to appeal.410 Had this rule been applied, then the first instance decision to 
appoint an arbitrator in the dispute would have been final. The second rule relates to 
the separability and kompetenz-kompetenz doctrines. In applying these doctrines, the 
parties would agree to submit challenges to the arbitrators instead of to the court, 
which in turn would “reinforce the autonomy of the arbitral process.”411 Therefore, 
applying both of these rules would help to enforce the arbitrator’s autonomy and 
power over the arbitral process, which in turn would help to preserve the parties’ 
freedom of contract and the sanctity of the arbitral process. 
The fourth decision that would be examined in here is one that involves a dispute 
over a land, in which the appellant tried to set-aside two arbitral awards, one of those 
argued that the arbitration agreement is null and subsequently the arbitral award is 
void, claiming that since the dispute was already being heard by the court the parties 
																																																								
409 See general, Carbonneau supra note 70 at 18, see Carbonneau supra note 74 at 30-31. 
410 Article 204 supra note 407, see also infra civil procedures law page. 
411 Carbonneau supra note 70 at 18. 
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don’t have the right to agree to arbitrate, the court response was based on article 
210/1412 stating that: 
article 210/1413 of the civil procedures implies that even if a dispute was brought 
to the court this doesn’t mean that the parties are unable to opt-out into arbitration, 
the only requirement is that the court hasn’t decided the dispute. Therefore, 
opting-out into arbitration at the time of hearing the dispute in front of the court 
doesn’t constitute a ground for setting-aside the award nor is it a parallel 
proceeding.414 
 
The appellant also argued that the arbitrator lacks the legal capacity to rule 
over the dispute, which was based on article 207/4415that addresses conditions for 
dismissing arbitrators. The court responded by stating:  
the arbitrator capacity to rule is one of the grounds for setting aside the award 
under article 216416. However, the grounds mentioned in this article have been 
explicitly identified, and in regards to article 207/4417 which determines the 
conditions under which dismissing the arbitrator is possible, have set a time 
limit in which this request can be made to the court, the request should be 
made to the court within five days and this requirement applies to both ad-hoc 
and court-annexed arbitration. Therefore, in order for the award to be set-aside 
it needs to meet those requirements that have been explicitly stated in the law. 
418 
 In essence, the appellant wanted to apply the same conditions for dismissing 
the arbitrators in court-annexed arbitration in this dispute in order to use it as a ground 
for setting-aside the arbitral award, the court interpreted the application of this article 
to be limited to court-annexed arbitration.  
																																																								
412 Civil procedures law article 210 state: “1 - If the litigant parties haven't set, as a condition in the 
agreement, a date for the arbitration the arbitrator should arbitrate within six month from the date of the 
session of the first arbitration, otherwise anyone who wanted of the litigant parties may prosecute the 
litigation to the court or may continue therein before the court if it was prosecuted before that.” See 
infra civil procedures law. 
413 id. 
414 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 10/1995, issued on the 8th of October 1995. 
415 Supra note 139, see appendix Civil procedures law. 
416 Civil procedures law article 216/1 subsection A states: ““If it has been delivered without an 
arbitration report or delivered according to a void document or a document that has been extinguished 
by the failure to observe the date or if the arbitrator has gone beyond the document's limits.” This is the 
translation provided by the ministry of justice, the document in here refers to the arbitration agreement. 
See infra the appendix civil procedures law. 
417 Supra note 139.. 
418 Appeal no. 10/1995. 
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The appellant tried to contest the statement that was given under oath by 
contesting the procedure in which it was taken. In essence, the appellant was 
attempting to apply one of the conditions for setting aside the award according to 
article 216419, which was dismissed by the court after examining and discussing this 
ground in detail.420 
The last attempt by the appellant was to argue that the partially nullifying the 
award implies that the entire award is null since both parts of the award cannot be 
separated, the trial court reasoning for this partial nullification was that the arbitrator 
have exceeded the scope of the arbitration agreement in this point. The court finally 
accepted this attempt, by stating that: 
if part of the award was nullified based on the arbitrator exceeding the scope of 
the arbitration agreement, which constitute nullifying the other half of the award 
that relates to the first part, which falls under the consideration of the trial court 
once they have based their decision on sound reasoning, and since the appealed 
decision responded to this argument by stating that the appellant has no right nor 
interest to appeal, which is a void decision since it failed to uphold due process.421 
 
However, do both parts of the award relate to each other? Why did the first 
instance decide to nullify the first half of the award? The first half of the award relates 
to registering a foreign property located outside the UAE, and the second to order him 
to pay compensation to the defendant.422 The reason behind the first instance decision, 
can be explained by examining the UAE civil procedures law, which according to 
article 220/4 section C423, which requires the judge to refer the dispute that concerns 
properties to the judge or court that the property is located in, the theory behind this is 																																																								
419 Supra note 416. 
420 See appeal no.10/1995. 
421 See Appeal no. 10/1995 
422 See Dubai Court of First instance, case no. 225/1993, issued on 27/4/1994. 
423 Which addresses the jurisdiction of the execution judge on enforcing decisions over properties, civil 
procedures law article 220/4 section C, states: “If the execution included:.. C-Sequestered real estates 
located in another court's area or several courts' circuits……By then , the authorized execution judge 
should forward the matter to an execution judge in any of the areas mentioned above in order to deliver 
such item or to sell such sequestered items.” 
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since the properties are an unmovable objects and are most likely has special 
legislation that governs the transfer of property it is best suited to refer such disputes 
to the court that the property is located in their jurisdiction, since they are better suited 
to address  the issues that relate to enforcing any order or award over that property. 
Furthermore, article 32424 of the civil procedures that addresses the jurisdiction of the 
court in property disputes confirms this principle, in addition to article 20425 that 
addresses the courts international jurisdiction and puts an exception over the courts 
jurisdiction when the dispute relates to a property that is located abroad. In essence, 
the civil procedures law complies the court to refer disputes that concern properties to 
the court that the property is located in, the property in this dispute is located in 
Jordan, as such the court when deciding to recognize an award that concerns a 
property located outside the jurisdiction of the court would refer the dispute to that 
court. Thus, after understanding all of those regulations that govern disputes over 
property, it wouldn’t come as a surprise that the court would decide to set-aside the 
first part of the award. 
In conclusion, the court is trying to apply the same rules that govern litigation to 
arbitration, which results in conflict of principles and rules, on one hand they state 
that the arbitrator is not subject to the same standards that the judges are excepted to 
meet, on the other they accept appeals even though the arbitration agreement clearly 
state that the arbitral award is not subject to appeal; those traits and contradictory 
																																																								
424 Civil procedures law article 32 state: “1- In the real estate actions and the possession actions, the 
jurisdiction should be given to the court in which circuit the real property, or one of its parts in case it 
exists in more than one court's circuit. 2- In the personal real estate actions the jurisdiction should be 
given to the courts in which circuit the real property or the residence of the prosecuted exists.” 
425 Civil procedures law article 20 state: “With the exception of the real actions related to a real estate 
abroad, the courts shall have the jurisdiction to examine the actions prosecuted against the citizen and 
the actions prosecuted against the foreigner who has residence or domicile in the state.” 
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practice by the court is clearly noted from the early days of enacting the civil 
procedures law426. 
4.3.4 Abu Dhabi Cassation Court 
The five decisions examined in this section are more diverse in nature than those 
of the Dubai courts, and they do not explicitly discuss Abu Dhabi’s lease committee. 
Instead, they provide more examples of how the court handles land disputes that 
involve arbitration. 
The court in Abu Dhabi (AD) came to the same conclusion as that of the court in 
Dubai427 regarding the limited application of the separability and kompetenz-
kompetenz doctrines, as exemplified by this statement: 
The appellant argues that the appeal court by upholding the arbitral clause has 
misapplied the law according to article 203428, since the appellant upheld the 
argument that the clause is void since the main contract that contained the clause 
is void, subsequently the arbitrator has no jurisdiction over the dispute according 
to article 209/2429. Moreover, the appealed decision by stating that the arbitral 
clause still is valid even if the agreement in which it was contained were to be 
void and that the arbitrator is the one that has to determine the validity of the 
arbitral clause. However, the determination of whether or not the agreement is 
valid is a preliminary issue that falls outside the scope of the arbitrators power, 
since the nullification of the main contract would subsequently nullify the arbitral 
clause, as such the court should take back its jurisdiction. The cassation court 
accepted this argument, stating that the nullification of the main contract entails 
the nullification of the clause and the determination of the validity of the arbitral 
clause falls to the court according to article 209/2.430 In addition, the documents 
presented by the appellant shows that they have upheld this argument in front of 
the court and that the contract in question431 is null and that the appealed decision 
did not answer this by deciding to refer the dispute to arbitration, which renders 																																																								
426 Which in turn wont help arbitration to reach its goal of “alleviating court congestion” as Rayner puts 
it:” In an effort to alleviate court congestion, several American jurisdictions attempted to channel small 
claim disputes into arbitration, either voluntary or compulsory.” Rayner supra note 5 at 37.  
427 See appeal no. 133/2007 supra note 403. See general Carbonneau supra note 74 at 30-31. 
428Civil procedures law article 203/3 states “The scope of the arbitration should be established in the 
arbitration agreement or during the examination of the suit, even if the arbitrators were authorized to 
reconcile, otherwise the arbitration shall be void.”. 
429 Civil procedures law article 209/2 state: “2- If a priority matter which is not related to the 
arbitrator's authority, or an appeal against a paper falsification, or a criminal procedures have been 
taken in its falsification, or in another criminal incident has been exposed during the arbitration, the 
arbitrator shall stop his work until a final decision shall be issued therein, and the arbitrator shall also 
stop his work in order to refer to the authorized court's president to proceed…” 
430 id. 
431 Which was concluded on the 17/1/1999 and contained the arbitration clause. 
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the decision unlawful for it gave the power to the arbitrators to determine their 
own jurisdiction.432 
  
With this decision, the AD court mirrors the decision of the Dubai court and then 
goes further, shutting down any attempt by the lower court to introduce those 
principles. This is highlighted by the way in which the court sided with the appellant 
and disregarded the findings of the first instance court. The court’s view can be 
explained by how the court defines arbitration and the way courts and jurists in the 
UAE explain and view arbitration.433 When interpreting contracts, the AD court refers 
back to the general principles of interpretation, which are codified in the civil 
transaction law.434 These principles provide insight into how the court functions, and 
most importantly how the courts apply rules to interpret contracts and clauses. In this 
instance, the court used came to the conclusion that the separability doctrine has no 
application.435 
The above decision is also similar to how the Dubai court came to decide to 
exclude investment contracts from the jurisdiction of the lease committees.436  
However, in another dispute, the court included disputes that arise from 
investment contracts under the jurisdiction of the lease committee: 
The appellant argues in the first ground of appeal that the court has no jurisdiction 
over the dispute, which should fall under the jurisdiction of the lease committee 																																																								
432 Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation (civil circuit) appeal no. 58/2007, issued on the 30th of October 2007. 
433 See supra 2.6.5 at 32, UAE Courts’ View of the Definition. 
434 Those principles determine the interpretation of contact are mentioned in articles 29-70 of the civil 
transaction law; such as the ones mentioned in articles 53-57, article 53 Accessory is appurtenant and 
may not be individualized independently. Article 54 where the principal is forfeited, the ancillary 
follows. Article 55 that is forfeited, alike the inexistent, shall not come back to existence. Article 56 
voidance shall extend to the thing and its contents. Article 57 where the principal is void the substitute 
shall be sought. 
435 Even though the Abu Dhabi court is considered to be in its early years and was established in this 
new era, it is still applying the same principles and have the same view as that of the other courts in the 
UAE. Therefore, the Abu Dhabi court by trying to establish its own jurisprudence on arbitration is in 
reality mirroring the jurisprudence of other courts in the UAE. Which, emphasize the importance of 
minimizing the courts power of interpretation when it comes to arbitration, in order to develop a 
functioning arbitration system. 
436 See general Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no.133/2007, which is due to the fact that the contract 
in question is an investment contract over a land, supra note 403. 
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according to law no.20/2006437. Moreover, this dispute doesn’t fall under the 
provisions of the civil transaction law that addresses the lease contracts in general, 
rather it falls under the provisions of the lease law no.20/2006. The court agreed 
with this ground stating that article 2, 24 and 25 of that law no. 20/2006 in regard 
to regulating the lease transaction between the tenants and the landlords in the 
emirate of Abu Dhabi, delegates all lease disputes in Abu Dhabi to this 
committee, including interim measures, which falls under article 31 of that law, 
and since the request in this situation is an interim one, in the form of a request to 
vacate the property, which falls under the lease committee jurisdiction, this idea is 
further supported by article 25 of that law. A general arbitration clause doesn’t 
deter the appellant from presenting his request to the lase committee and 
consequently doesn’t deter the committee from hearing the case. Therefore, the 
jurisdiction in this dispute doesn’t fall to the court nor to arbitration, rather to the 
lease committee based on article 25 of law no.20/2006.438  
  
 In this decision, the court appears uncertain as to how to determine the 
jurisdiction of the lease committee.439 In one instance, the court determined that 
investment contracts are excluded from the jurisdiction of the lease committee, and in 
another, it states that such contracts do fall under the jurisdiction of this committee. 
This uncertainty produces confusion and conflict within the court itself. 
 This dispute also demonstrates how the court addressed the matter of interim 
measures, which the court requires to be explicitly stated in the arbitral clause in order 
for the case to fall under the arbitrators’ jurisdiction, even if the interim measure is 
raised by an issue that directly relates to the contract in question, such as the case in 
this dispute: 
[t]he appellant argues in the second ground of the appeal that the court’s 
decision to dismiss their request of referring the dispute to arbitration, was 
based on the fact that the clause is a general one and didn’t specify interim 
measures to fall under the scope of the arbitration clause, as such interim 
measures would fall under the court jurisdiction. The appellant argues that this 
interpretation of the clause is flawed, for it is limiting the application of the 
arbitral clause, given that the parties have agreed to refer all disputes to 
arbitration, which include interim measures. The court dismissed this 
argument stating that interim measures need to be mentioned explicitly in the 
clause, in order for it fall under the arbitrators power, implying that such 																																																								
437 Abu Dhabi law no.20/2006, in regard to regulating the lease transactions between the tenants and 
the landlords. 
438 Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation, civil circuit appeal no.136/2009, issued 31/3/2009. 
439 Which is similar to the situation in Dubai. 
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measures falls outside the scope of arbitral clause, and subsequently outside of 
the scope of the arbitrators power. Moreover, it doesn’t prohibit the parties 
from referring such disputes to the court.440 
 
The probability of having an arbitral award vacated may arise due to this decision, 
since the court is adding a further requirement to the arbitral clause, because the 
interim measures that arise from a lease agreement fall under the jurisdiction of the 
lease committee. In the event that an arbitral clause does not explicitly include such 
measures, the court would set aside the award, because, in its view, arbitrators lack 
the jurisdictional authority to rule on interim measures. Also, the court tends to favor 
supporting the lease committee, because it views it as an extension of the court’s own 
authority.441 Taking all of this into consideration, it is crucial that the arbitral clause 
explicitly states the existence of the interim measures. 
 
The ability to invoke the arbitral clause in land/lease disputes would still be 
governed by the same rules that govern arbitration in the UAE, which was in fact the 
case when one disputing party tried to refer the dispute to arbitration in front of the 
court:  
The appellant appealed this decision to the cassation court, arguing that the 
arbitration clause is void since the defendants failed to uphold this argument in the 
first hearing, which according to article 203/5442 constitute a waiver of their right 
to uphold this clause. The cassation court agreed with this argument, stating that 
article 203 requires the party seeking to uphold the arbitration clause to take a 
positive action in the first hearing and that the failure to do so would result in a 
waiver of this clause, and based on the facts of the case the defendant request to 																																																								
440 Appeal no.136/2009 supra note 438. 
441 Which can be attributed to the fact that they are established through an Emir decree, which makes 
them into a specialized judicial authority that is headed in some emirates by judges, as such they are 
viewed as a branch of the court, a specialized independent branch but a branch nonetheless. Thus, the 
court would not treat it as an exception to litigation rather it would be viewed as the main source of 
judicial relief when it comes to lease disputes. See general Law no. 20/2006 supra note 437, and law no 
2/1993 and law no. 26/2007 and 15/2009 supra note 377. 
442 Civil procedures law article 203/5 state “If the litigant parties have agreed on the arbitration in some 
litigation, it shall not be possible to prosecute an action therewith before the judiciary, however, if one 
of the two litigant parties has resorted to prosecute the action without taking into consideration the 
arbitration condition and the other party hasn't objected at the first sessions, the action should be 
examined and the arbitration agreement shall be void.” 
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refer the dispute into arbitration were done in the second hearing and not the first, 
implying that they have waivered their right to arbitrate, subsequently nullifies 
this clause. Thus, the court decided to vacate the appeal decision and refer the 
dispute back to the court.443 
 
 This dispute is a prime example of the application of the court’s own views on 
arbitration. In this instance, these views favor an interpretation of arbitration as an 
exception to the individual’s right to seek their natural judge444, as well as an 
application of the rules of article 203/5. Also, upon attempting to take a pro-
arbitration stand,445 the appeals court was shut down by the cassation court.  
The point of conflict between the courts is the determination of what is meant 
by the first hearing. It can be inferred that the appeals court’s definition of the first 
hearing differs slightly from the cassation court, and it expanded the meaning of the 
first hearing beyond what the cassation court was willing to accept. The appeals court 
is taking a pro-arbitration stance in expanding the meaning of the first hearing. In 
doing so, it is favoring a practical interpretation of this article, given the fact that in 
most cases, the first hearing usually is considered to have occurred when the parties 
appear in the court either on their own or through their legal representatives. In most 
instances, the participants in the first hearing would ask the court to postpone the 
hearing in order to prepare their answers and defense, which makes the second 
hearing the one in which the litigants present these answers and defenses. Thus, the 
appeals court is viewing the first hearing as the one in which the parties start 
																																																								
443 Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation civil circuit, appeal no. 72/2007, issued on the 11th of December 
2007. 
444 This term refer to the judge that has the original authority to settle the dispute. see general Turki 
supra note 11 at 404-411. 
445 The appeal court reversed the decision of the first instance court, which in turn mirrored that of the 
cassation court. 
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presenting their arguments to the court; this interpretation takes a more practical 
interpretation of this article.446 
 The court also examined the ability of a minor to enter into an arbitration 
agreement either on his or her own or through a guardian or legal representative, 
which also applies to disputes that relate to the ownership of land, and to whether or 
not the transaction in question is a sales or an investment contract. In the case cited 
below, the argument presented by the defendant involved whether the court should 
dismiss the dispute based on the existence of an arbitration clause in the sales 
contract: 
[t]he appellant argues that they have upheld their request to dismiss the dispute 
based on the existence of the arbitration clause. However, the court dismissed their 
request, basing their refusal on article 159 of the civil transactions law.447Which, 
implies that the minor has the right to allow certain acts once he become of age, 
and the defendant after coming of age didn’t agree to be bound by the arbitration 
clause. However, this article is limited to the acts in which the minor have entered 
on his own and not agreements that were concluded through his agent, in this case 
through his guardian. The court dismissed this argument stating that the appealed 
decision dismissed the claim to uphold the arbitration clause based upon the fact 
that dispute doesn’t fall within the scope of the arbitration clause. Moreover, article 
159/2448 of the civil transaction law state that the acts that fall between profitable or 
detrimental requires the consent of the minors guardian or the minors own consent 
after he become of age, this fact doesn’t change whether he concluded the contract 
on his own or through his guardian, making the appellants argument in this regard 
void and without basis.449 
Some rules that may be inferred from this discussion are requirements for 
parties that have entered into a contract with a minor or a guardian: 
																																																								
446 This approach by the appeal court exemplify the important role that the judges are able to play in 
promoting arbitration. 
447 Civil transaction law article 159 which state: “1-Pecuniary dispositions of the discerning minor are 
valid, if totally beneficial to him, and void if entirely detrimental. 2 - All acts of disposition that may 
vary between being profitable or detrimental depend of the ratification of the tutor, within the limits he 
initially is allowed to dispose of, or of the minor after attaining legal age. 3 - The age of discernment is 
seven full Hegira years.” 
448 id. 
449 Abu Dhabi court of cassation civil circuit, appeal no. 66 and 71/2007, issued on 15th January 2008 
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First, this rule require the parties to understand that arbitration agreements are 
considered to be acts that “vary between profitable or detrimental,”450 and 
furthermore they require the recognition of both the guardian and the minor 
after he or she reaches the legal age. 
Second, this case shows that despite the fact that the guardian agreed to enter 
into this contract, the court still felt that such action requires the consent and 
ratification of a minor after he or she comes of age451. This implies that 
arbitration falls outside the limits of the guardian’s capacity to enter into a 
contract, in addition to determining that this dispute falls outside the scope of 
the arbitration clause, which is sufficient to send the jurisdiction back to the 
court.  
In essence, the court is insuring a minor’s right to review the arbitration 
agreement once he or she reaches the legal age452. It also is granting the minor the 
legal right to withdraw from the agreement once he or she comes of age, which 
represents the court’s view of the dangers that are incurred by opting-out of the 
court’s jurisdiction, and by deciding to substitute the natural judge with an arbitrator.  
This decision creates a dilemma for parties seeking to enter into an arbitration 
agreement, in the event that one of the parties is a minor. An arbitration agreement 
that involves a minor, or his/her guardian, as a party, has a higher chance of being 
appealed to the court and to subsequently be nullified by the court. This is a result of 
the court’s view of arbitration, combined with having a minor as a party to the 
arbitration agreement. Both factors are taken into consideration by the court when 
addressing pleas of this nature, the result of which would most likely favor the minor. 																																																								
450 Civil Transaction law article 159/1 and 2, supra note 447. See general, MOUSA RAZEEQ, AL-MADKL 
ELA DRAST AL-QANOON, (The Introduction to the Study of Law), 197 (2nd ed. 2006).  
451 Razeeq supra note 450 at 199-200. 
452 id at 199. 
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It would be discussed at length by the court, given that arbitration is an act that falls 
between “profitable and detrimental,453” and as such it is the court’s obligation to 
protect the minor’s rights by ensuring that entering into an arbitration agreement 
would be profitable and beneficial to the minor. 
  Because AD recently opted-out of the federal courts system, it is expected 
that some disputes would begin under the federal courts and end in the AD cassation 
court, and the following case, in which an arbitral award was contested and set aside 
serves as an illustration of this transition period: 
The appellant appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the 
UAE454, the court decided to dismiss the appeal455…… 
This decision was appealed to the cassation court; the appellant argues 
that the court decided to nullify the award based on article 206/2456. 
However, the appointment of the arbitrators was done according to 
clause 22 of the contract, which was done according to the law since it 
allows the parties the freedom to opt-out into arbitration. Moreover, 
article 216457 states specific conditions for setting-aside arbitral 
awards, which don’t apply to this dispute. Furthermore, article 217458 
states that the arbitral award is not subject to appeal. In addition, the 
defendant waivered their right to appeal since they have agreed to 
arbitrate according to the arbitration agreement of 5/6/2006, which was 
drafted according to the requirements of article 203459 and 204.460 The 
cassation court dismissed this argument, stating that article 206/2461 
explicitly requires that the number of arbitrators should be an odd one, 
which is a rule that concerns public policy, as such the parties has no 																																																								
453 id. at 197. 
454 This was before the emirate of Abu Dhabi withdrew from the federal court system, and established 
their own Cassation Court. 
455 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 25/308, issued on 21/3/2005. 
456 Civil Procedures Law article 206/2 states: “2- If there were many arbitrators their numbers, in all 
circumstances, should be odd.” 
457 Supra note 416. 
458 Civil Procedures Law article 217/1 states: “The arbitrators' decisions shall not accept the appeal 
therein through any of the appeal proceedings.” This is the ministry of justice translation, which 
essentially means that arbitral awards are not subject to appeal. 
459 Article 203/2 supra note 406, article 203/3 supra note 428. Article 203/4 state “It shall not be 
possible to arbitrate in the matters in which the reconciliation is not possible, and it shall not be valid to 
agree on the arbitration unless by those who have the capacity of disposition in the litigated right.” 
Article 203/5 state “If the litigant parties have agreed on the arbitration in some litigation, it shall not 
be possible to prosecute an action therewith before the judiciary, however, if one of the two litigant 
parties has resorted to prosecute the action without taking into consideration the arbitration condition 
and the other party hasn't objected at the first sessions, the action should be examined and the 
arbitration agreement shall be void.” 
460 Supra note 407. 
461 Supra note 456. 
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right to waiver this rule. Moreover, the waiver of this requirement in 
the contract doesn’t entitle that the act itself is lawful in the eyes of the 
court. Thus, arguing in front of the court that the parties have agreed to 
waive their right to appeal or their right to contest the arbitration 
agreement, has no merit according to article 216462. In addition, article 
166463 state that if the appeal court vacated the first instance decision it 
is required to render a decision in the dispute, the appeal court failed to 
do so and as such the dispute is referred back to the appeal court to 
render a decision in the dispute.464 
 
Are the parties allowed to appoint an even number of arbitrators? The court’s 
answer to this is noted in this decision. However, the legislation is subject to a number 
of interpretations. If the courts were to interpret these articles in a way that favors 
arbitration, it would be saying that article 206 does not relate to public policy, and that 
the purpose of article 206 is to ensure that the parties do not deadlock. It would also 
essentially limit the application of this article to disputes that arise before the issuing 
of an arbitral award, since an arbitral award issued by an even number of arbitrators is  
issued in consensus, in which case there can be no deadlock that would justify 
nullifying the arbitration agreement.  
This rule does not apply to family arbitration, which is governed by the rules 
of Shari’a, which allows the existence of an even number of arbitrators; indeed, it is 
the norm in family law cases to have an even number of arbitrators. Why, then, is an 
even number of arbitrators a factor that leads to awards being set aside in other forms 
of arbitration? The simple answer goes to the fact that the court’s hands are tied when 
																																																								
462 Supra note 416. 
463 civil procedures law article 166 states: “If the court of first instance decided in the matter and the 
appellate court found that there has been a nullity in the decision or a nullity in the procedures affecting 
the decision, it shall decide its cancellation and judge in the action. But if the court of first instance has 
judged the lack of jurisdiction or the acceptance of a subsidiary plea that has had as a consequent the 
hindrance of the action progression, and the appellate court has decided the cancellation of the decision 
and the jurisdiction of the court or the rejection of the subsidiary plea and decided to examine the 
action, it should return the case to the court of first instance to decide in its matter.” 
464 Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation (civil circuit), appeal no.186/2008, issued on 8th of June 2008. 
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it comes to arbitration that is based on the rules of the Shari’a,465 and they have more 
room for maneuver and interpretation in other forms of arbitration.  
 
4.3.5 Federal Supreme Court of The UAE 
The seven decisions examined in this section shed light on the federal court’s 
views on the subject of lease/land disputes and the lease committee. They also explore 
this court’s attitudes toward lease disputes over transferable goods such as ships and 
airplanes. 
The federal court supports of the lease committee is highlighted by the 
following decision: 
the emir decree no.92/77466, which gave this tribunal the authority to settle 
lease disputes, which implies that the tribunal decisions are of a judicial 
nature, this fact doesn’t change if the members of those tribunal are part of the 
judicial authority or not, moreover in order to enforce the award issued from 
this tribunal it doesn’t require a judge to issue this award.467 
 
Moreover, the court explained the nature of the committee in the emirate of 
Sharjah: 
arbitration tribunal of the municipality of Sharjah, is an administrative 
tribunal, which can be emphasized from the way it was established and the 
nature of the members of the tribunal. However, the legislator in the Emirate 
of Sharjah added to this tribunal the responsibility to settle disputes between 
the tenants and the owners under the law no. 92/77 and its amendments 7/86, 
4/88, furthermore article five of that law has stated on the conditions in which 
the tenants fail to fulfill his obligation, which is the base of the complain that 
the defendant stated in their plea in front of the tribunal. Moreover, based on 
article nine of that law the tribunal has the jurisdiction to settle the dispute 
between the parties, it also gives the party that want to object on the tribunals 
award the right to do so in front of the court, within fifteen days from them 
being notified by the issuing of the award, otherwise the decision would be 
binding and enforceable in front of the execution judge, furthermore, the only 
decisions that are enforceable in front of the execution judge are judicial 
decisions and as such the tribunal awards has judicial power equal to that of a 
courts decision. This fact isn’t affected by the federal law no.6/78 in regard to 
establishing the federal courts, which didn’t govern those tribunals for the 																																																								
465 See supra chapter three of this study at 48-93.  
466 Sharjah’s Law no. 92/1977 and its amendments laws no.7/1986 and no.4/1988. 
467 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 181/15, issued on the 19th of March 1995. 
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legislators intent in here is to leave the power of governing those tribunals to 
the local authorities.468 
 
Which in the case of Sharjah, the debate is settled to the nature of this 
committee, based on this decision they are an administrative tribunal that have 
jurisdiction over lease disputes. Implying, that arbitration in Sharjah in regard to lease 
disputes would be examined by this committee, which raises concern when it comes 
to arbitration, since the decisions of the committee are subject to appeal to the court, 
thereby the litigants would have to go through three different forms of adjudication in 
order to resolve their disputes. 
Another decision that highlights the examined the ability to appeal the 
decisions of the committee, is one that concerns the lease committee in Ajman: 
even though article 16 of the decree469 state that the committees decisions are 
not subject to appeal, however, article 18/7 of the same decree allows the 
parties to set-aside the award on grounds that matches those of article 216470, 
and since the civil procedures law didn’t state on a reason that relates to the 
subject matter of the dispute as a ground for setting-aside the award, as such 
the courts authority doesn’t extend to examine those arguments that relates to 
the subject matter of the dispute, such as the ones presented by the 
appellant.471 
 
The hybrid nature of lease disputes should have helped in bolstering the status 
of this form of arbitration, in essence it should have meant that such awards would be 
enforceable, and the way to do that is by not subjugating them to appeals. However, 
the nature of the dispute had a minimal effect on the courts practice when it comes to 
appeals and accepting them. The court by allowing the appeals are simply flooding 
their own desks with never ending suits, in disputes that have already been settled by 
a final and binding decision. In essence, the court is upholding the individuals right to 
appeal over their right to arbitrate. Since both of those rights have been regulated 																																																								
468 id. 
469 Ajman Emir decree no. 6/2005 in regard to regulating lease transaction in Ajman. 
470 Supra note 416. 
471 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 5/2009, issued on the 17th of February 2010. 
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under the civil procedures law and the Emir decree, as such the court is able to justify 
which ever view or right they wish to support, and based on the courts practice and 
jurisprudence it is more likely that they would support the individual right to appeal, 
which is also supported by the courts view on arbitration and their view on the 
necessity of allowing appeals in order to preserve justice.  
In another decision the court managed to limit the jurisdiction of the 
committee in Sharjah, by stating: 
this committee’s jurisdiction is limited to the disputes that rises from lease 
agreements between the landlord and the tent in regard to the execution of that 
agreement only, and that the parties in this dispute don’t fall under that 
category, since in this instance the dispute is between the owners in which 
case the court has the jurisdiction to hear the dispute.472 
 
The benefits of extending the jurisdiction of those committee outweigh the 
ones gained from limiting their jurisdiction473, however, in order for those benefits to 
be gained the court would have to give up there practice of accepting all appeals, for 
even if the court were to stand by and uphold the jurisdiction of those committees, 
without deterring the parties from appeals, then there is no use from trying to extend 
the jurisdiction of those committees, for the purpose of having them and in extension 
any arbitration agreement of that sort would be defeated, since one of the purpose of 
establishing such committees is to ease the courts case load. Nevertheless, despite 
having all of the necessary tools available for the court to support this form of 
arbitration that already has the support of the legislator. However, the court is still 																																																								
472 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 116/17, issued on the 31st of October 1995. 
473 By extending their jurisdiction over all disputes that concerns lease agreements, these committees 
would be able to fulfill their goals of easing the caseload from the court, furthermore it would help to 
eradicate any confusion that the parties have in regard to were the parties should submit their disputes. 
See general Turki supra note 11 at 391, the author in here explains the reason behind establishing 
specialized courts, which also extends to the committees. See Also, ALI SHAHTAH AL-HADIDI, AL-QD’A 
W AL-TQADI, (The judiciary and litigation with regard to the civil procedures law of the United Arab 
Emirates) 257-259 (Part one 2007). The author in here discuss these committees and discuss the ones in 
Dubai. 
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unwilling to forsake their jurisdiction. Implying, that once given the opportunity the 
court would always are more than willing to retake their jurisdiction. 
The following case involves a lease dispute of a mixed nature, which revolved 
around the lease of a maritime vessel that combined both civil and commercial legal 
transactions.474 This act was excluded from the jurisdiction of the lease committee.475 
It is thus crucial to understand how arbitration fits into such a case, and to determine 
whether the nature of the dispute affected the court’s decision. The court’s tone in this 
case changed and abandoned its practice of contesting the jurisdiction of arbitration, 
even when the appellant tried to dispose of the arbitral jurisdiction by invoking the 
provisions of force majeure476. Interim measures were examined as well: 
The appellant first ground of appeal, argues that the decision failed to uphold 
the provisions of the law and more specifically the requirements of article 
212/2477, which requires that the arbitrator to uphold the law when deciding on 
the dispute, which implies that the arbitrator is required to follow the 
requirements of article 245 of the commercial maritime law478, thus the 
arbitrator is forced to apply the rules of force majeure that exclude the 																																																								
474 The general rules that govern lease disputes are mentioned in the civil transaction law; the lease of 
maritime vessels is regulates under the commercial maritime law, Federal Law no.26/1981, Concerning 
Commercial Maritime law, (hereinafter maritime law) articles 216-255 regulates the lease of maritime 
vessels. 
475 Given the fact that these committees regulate lease transactions over non-transferable goods. See 
general Dubai decree no. 2/1993 supra note 377, Ajman decree no. 6/2005 supra note 469, Sharjah law 
no. 92/77 and 7/1986 and 4/1988 supra note 466, AD law no. 2006 supra note 437. 
476 Civil Transaction article 273: “1- In bilateral contracts, if a force majeure arises that makes the 
performance of the obligation impossible, the corresponding obligation shall , be extinguished and the 
contract ipso facto rescinded . 2 - If the impossibility is partial, the consideration for the impossible part 
shall be extinguished. This shall also apply on the provisional impossibility in continuous contracts. In 
both instances the creditor may rescind the contract provided the debtor has knowledge thereof.” 
477 Civil Procedures article 212/2 state: “The arbitrator's decision shall be according to the rules of the 
law unless if it were authorized with the reconciliation, then it shall not be obliged with such rules 
except with those related to the public order.” See also ALI NAJIDAH, AL-NTHRYAH AL-AMAH 
LL’LTZAM (AL-KTAB AL-AWAL MSADR AL-ALTZAM), (The general theory of obligation, book one the 
sources of obligation) 436-442 (1st ed. 1993). See general CAROLE MURRAY ET AL., SCHMITTHOFF 
EXPORT TRADE: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTRATNIONAL TRADE 138 (11th ed. 2007). See general 
Ingeborg Schwenzer, Force Majeure and Hardship in international sales contract, 39 Victoria U. 
Wellington L. Rev. 709 (2008). See general Catherine Kessedjian, Competing Approaches to Force 
Majeure and Hardship, 25 Inter. Rev. & Econ. 641 (2005). Both articles examine the affect of force 
majeure in international trade. 
478Commercial Maritime article 245 state:” The freighter must place the specified vessel, in seaworthy 
condition and properly equipped to carry out the operations specified in the charter party, at the 
disposal of the charterer at the agreed time and place. Furthermore he must keep the vessel in such 
condition throughout the period of the contract.” 
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appellants from their obligation to pay the lease amount. The appellant 
continued their argument by stating that the appeal court at first agreed with 
this argument and referred the award back to the arbitrator to answer the 
appellants concerns in this regard. However, they retracted their decision after 
being informed that the arbitrator passed away, stating that they have the right 
to retract their decision since it is a matter relating to the law of evidence and 
according to article 5/1479, the court has the right to retract their decision. The 
appellant argues that interim measure doesn’t fall under this article and the 
court issued the interim measure according to article 214 of the civil 
procedures480, which the court has no right to retract and the passing of the 
arbitrator doesn’t affect this matter, the court should have appointed a new 
arbitrator or answered the dispute on their own. The appellant continued their 
argument stating that the interim measure renders the arbitral award null, in 
addition to the fact that the award has been issued in contrast to articles 245481 
and 249482 of the maritime law, moreover the arbitrator have failed to taken 
into account the ships captains statement that confirms that the failure of the 
ships engines was due to force majeure.483 
 
The court’s response to the appellant’s argument implies that the nature of the 
disputes affected their decision, even though the court defines arbitration as an 
exception that requires the strict supervision of the court in order to protect the 
parties’ rights. This protection is limited when the parties’ transaction is of a 
commercial nature,484 which implies that the parties are well-informed and 
																																																								
479 Federal Law no.10/1992 On Evidence In Civil and Commercial Transactions, article 5/1 state:” 1- 
The Court may, by virtue of a decision recorded in the minutes of the session, go back on what it has 
ordered to be taken as evidence procedures, provided it mentions in the minutes the reasons for 
changing its mind, unless such change was decided by the court without a request from the parties to 
the litigation.” 
480 Civil Procedures article 214 state: “The court may, during the examination of the authentication 
request of the arbitrators' decision, return it to them in order to examine what they have failed to 
arbitrate in the arbitration matters therein or to clarify the decision if it were not definite in a way that 
makes it impossible to execute, and the arbitrators should, in both cases, deliver their decision within 
three months from the date of their notification with the decision unless the law shall decide otherwise. 
It is not possible to appeal against its decision except with the final sentence delivered with the 
authentication of the sentence or its invalidation.” 
481Supra note 477. 
482 Commercial Maritime article 249 states:” 1-The rent shall begin to run from the day on which the 
vessel is placed at the disposal of the charterer but nevertheless the rent is not due if the vessel is lost or 
if it is stopped by force majeure or act of the freighter. It is not allowed to agree that the same shall be 
paid under all circumstances. 2 - If news about the vessel cease and it is then established that it is lost, 
the rent shall be payable in full up to the date of the last news about the vessel.” 
483 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no.32/23, issued on the 6th of August 2003. 
484 The reason why the parties are considered to fall under the provisions of the commercial law related 
to the article 1 of the commercial transaction law, which identifies the jurisdiction of the commercial 
law over merchants and all commercial acts. supra note 329. To better understand the UAE stand on 
lease of maritime vessels, see General FAYEZ NAEM RDWAN, QANON AL-BAHI FE DWALT AL-
EMARAT AL-ARABYAH AL-MTHADH, (Maritime Law in the United Arab Emirates) 236-242 (3rd ed. 
2008).  
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consequently do not require the court’s protection, as noted in their response to this 
argument: 
The court dismissed this claim stating that article 214485, implies that the court 
has the right to clarify some of the provisions within the award that the 
arbitrator failed to explain in the award, this clarification is considered to be an 
interim measure that doesn’t bind the court when deciding the subject of the 
dispute, unless the clarification by the arbitrator have managed to decide or 
change part of the award, only then would the court be bound. Moreover, 
according to the jurisprudence of this court the appellant need to specify the 
grounds of appeal, for example if the appeal was based on the fact that the 
arbitrator have failed to rule on one of the subjects of the dispute that the 
parties have agreed to include in the arbitration agreement, then the appellant 
need to identify those issues in his appeal. Furthermore, according to the 
jurisprudence of this court article 212 sections 1 and 2 of the civil 
procedures486 shows the requirements needed in an arbitral award, and that the 
award is not required to meet the same requirements of a court’s decision. 
Therefore, the court when deciding whether to recognize an award or not they 
are not required to examine the subject of the dispute only to ensure that 
public policy hasn’t been breached. However, the court is required to examine 
the procedures within the arbitration process, to ensure that the arbitrators 
have met the requirements of articles 212487 and 216488. The courts supervision 
over the arbitral award is limited and the purpose of having such a supervision 
is to ensure that the award is enforceable within the UAE, the courts 
supervision should not extend to revising the subject of the award, for an 
award that have met the procedural requirements is considered to be a binding 
and enforceable award that receives res judicata status. Consequently, the 
appeal court decided to implement article 214489, which grants the court the 
right to seek explanation from the arbitrator and since the arbitrator have 
passed away the court is unable to get such clarification from the arbitrator. 
Therefore, the request to set-aside the award by the appellant should be limited 
to the award as being a legal act and should be on the procedural aspects of the 
award according to article 216490 and not on what the arbitrator decided to 
grant in the award. Since the appealed decision came to the conclusion that the 
arbitrator upheld due process and rendered an award within the scope of the 
arbitration agreement and issued an enforceable award, in addition the 
appellant didn’t identify the aspects that the arbitrator have failed to rule upon 
in the arbitration, which renders their plea ungrounded.491 
 																																																								
485 Supra note 479. 
486 Civil Procedures article 212/1 state: “The arbitrator shall deliver his decision without being bound to 
the civil procedures except to what has been mentioned in this chapter and the procedures concerning 
the litigant parties' action and hearing their defense's aspects, and enabling them to submit their 
documents, however, the parties may agree on certain procedures according to which the arbitrator 
should proceed.” See article 212/2 supra note 476. 
487 Id.  
488 Supra note 416. 
489 Supra note 480. 
490 Supra note 416. 
491 Appeal no.32/23, supra note 483. 
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The court’s dismissal of the appellant’s argument is of great significance, since it 
highlights the change in the court’s views. Namely, the court in this dispute did not 
employ its power to set aside the arbitral award, which it could have done for a 
number of reasons. First, the court could have used the passing of the arbitrator as an 
excuse to amend or set-aside the award. Second, it could have accepted the 
appellant’s argument to exempt liability based on force majeure492. However, the 
court uncharacteristically stated, “The court’s supervision over the arbitral award is 
limited and the purpose of having such a supervision is to ensure that the award is 
enforceable within the UAE, the courts supervision should not extend to revising the 
subject of the award.”493 The only distinctive feature in this dispute that may explain 
the court’s leniency is the nature of the parties and the dispute; the commercial 
element in the dispute works in favor of arbitration in this instance. 
Leasing disputes are not limited to properties and maritime vessels. Another form 
of lease dispute, which is similar to leasing a maritime vessel (since both kinds of 
transportation fulfill the same purpose of transferring goods between ports), is leasing 
airplanes]. This emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between the different 
types of lease contracts and identifying their nature. As is the case in leasing a 
maritime vessel, this dispute would not fall under the jurisdiction of the rent 
committee; the commercial nature of the dispute is the common feature, and it 
affected how the dispute was handled. In this dispute, the defendant initiated the 
proceedings and later amended his request to refer the dispute to arbitration. 
Normally, this would constitute a waiver of the right to arbitrate according to the 
																																																								
492 Najidah supra note 477 at 436-442, Kessedjian supra note 477 at 138, Murray supra note 477, 
Schwenzer Supra note 477 
493 Appeal no.32/23 supra note 483. 
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court’s jurisprudence and article 203494, which is exemplified by how the court 
responded to the appellant’s argument in this regard: 
The appellant argues in the first part of the first ground and on the second 
ground that the appealed decision failed to apply the law; for the appeal court 
upheld the first instance decision to refer the dispute into arbitration, which is 
an amendment of the original request to order the payment of the amount of 
the claim. Thus, the court should not accept this request and given the fact that 
the parties have agreed before the start of the dispute to arbitrate, as such the 
defendant doesn’t have the right to request the court to refer the dispute into 
arbitration and appoint arbitrators. Moreover, the court should have accepted 
the appellant request to dismiss the dispute due to the existence of an 
arbitration clause.  
The cassation court dismissed this plea, stating that according to article 98 of 
the civil procedure495, which addresses the counter claims and request and the 
amendment of the original claim, which allows for such action to be made in 
front of the first instance court. Therefore, the defendant has the right to 
amend their original request any time before the closing argument.496 
 
Instead of having the court contest the jurisdiction of the arbitration and use the 
provisions of article 203 as a basis to claim jurisdiction over the dispute,497 the court 
used the same civil procedure law to counter the argument presented by the defendant. 
This in turn exemplifies the important role that the nature of the dispute plays in 
influencing the court’s position. The shift in the court’s interpretation of the law can 
only be explained by the commercial nature of the dispute. 
 Furthermore, this decision highlights the court’s practice when it comes to 
disputes regarding the appointment of arbitrators: 
																																																								
494 Supra notes 406, 428, 442 and 459. 
495 Civil procedures article 98 state: “The claimant may submit any of the interlocutory requests: 1-
Which include the amendment of the original request or the amendment of its facts in order to cope 
with the circumstances which have emerged or have been observed after the claim has been submitted. 
2-Which are complementary to the original request, consequent, or indivisibly connected thereto. 3-
Which includes addition or change to the reason of the action provided that the request's facts shall 
remain as they are. 4-Requesting an order with a precautionary procedure .5 - Which the court shall 
allow to be submitted and connected to the original request.” 
496 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE civil circuit, appeal no. 732/24, issued on 26th of February 2005. 
497 Which was the case in the AD courts decision see supra AD court decision appeal no.72/2007 supra 
note 443. 
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The appellant argues in the second, third and fourth part of the second ground 
of the appeal that the appointment of the arbitrators occurred contrary to the 
requirement of the arbitration clause. 
The court dismissed this argument stating that article 204 of the civil 
procedures498, allows the court to appointment the arbitrators based on a 
request by the parties in the event of a dispute on the appointment or in the 
event that the arbitration clause didn’t state a process of an appointment or if 
one of the parties refused to appointment an arbitrator. Thus, the court 
intervention in the appointment of the arbitrator is regulated by the conditions 
stated in this article, in addition to having the jurisdiction to hear the subject 
matter of the dispute. Since the contract shows that the parties have chosen 
arbitration as a method of resolving their dispute and by failing to appoint an 
arbitrator at the start of the proceeding, which implies that the appellant 
waivered his right to appoint an arbitrator and consequently cannot dispute the 
court’s decision to appoint an arbitrator in their place.499 
 
This is a straightforward answer by the court, and resolves any issues related to the 
appointment of the arbitrators. By establishing that when the parties waive their right 
to appoint an arbitrator, which occurs if the parties fail to agree on the arbitrator, then 
it is the court’s duty to step in to resolve this issue. Thus, it is crucial to have the 
arbitration clause resolve such issues relating to the appointment of arbitrators, in 
order to minimize the court’s intervention in arbitral disputes. 
 After examining all of these disputes, and the court’s responses to them, 
especially those that relate to lease contracts, it seems that most lease disputes may be 
subject to arbitration. Is this true? The dispute examined next contradicts this 
statement, and shows that if the court sees fit, it may intervene and extend jurisdiction 
over the dispute: 
The appellant appealed this decision on three grounds; the first ground argues that the 
appellant have pleaded in front of the first instance court that the court lacks the 
proper jurisdiction, since the dispute falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipality of 
Sharjah committee of arbitration and settlement500. However, the court stated that this 
dispute doesn’t fall under the jurisdiction of that committee since the dispute doesn’t 
rise from the lease agreement between the parties, since the dispute is in regard to 																																																								
498 Supra note 407. 
499 Appeal no. 732/24 supra note 496. 
500 According to article 1 of law no.4/1988 in regards to regulating the relationship between the tenants 
and the landlords in the emirate of Sharjah, Emirate of Sharjah Law no. 92/1977 and its amendments 
laws no.7/1986 and no.4/1988, see supra note 466. 
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identifying the damages that occurred due to the appellant negligence. The appellant 
argues that on the contrary it is a result of the appellant’s obligation to safeguard the 
leased property, subsequently it makes this dispute rise from the lease contract and as 
such falls under the jurisdiction of that committee. The court dismissed this argument, 
stating that based on the jurisprudence of this court the Municipality of Sharjah’s 
Arbitration committee jurisdiction501 is limited to disputes that rises from the lease 
agreement and in regard to the application of this agreement. The defendant in this 
dispute rented the warehouse to the appellant to use it as a car repair shop, and based 
his claim on the fact that the appellant was found guilty of negligence in another 
claim502 that led to this warehouse destruction. Therefore, this dispute is governed by 
the general rule that every act that results in damages needs to be compensated503, 
even though that this act occurred as a result of leasing the property between the 
litigants, however the dispute is not in regards to the application of the contract, it is a 
dispute regarding the appellants unlawful act, which falls outside the scope of the 
committee.504 
 
This is a prime example that even when the court acknowledges the 
jurisdiction of the committee, and is willing to defend and support the committee, 
there remain certain disputes that the court will not relinquish from its jurisdiction.505 
In essence, the court excludes the determination of the amount of the damages from 
the committee’s jurisdiction and from arbitration, since the court believes both of 
those bodies lack the legal capability to hear disputes that involve the damages 
themselves.506 Even if the fire (the subject of the case cited above) was directly 
related to the application of the lease contract, it can be argued that the appellant’s 
responsibility to safeguard the warehouse was also a direct result of this contract. As 
such, it should fall to the committee to determine the amount of damages. It is 																																																								
501 id. 
502 Sharjah Federal court of first instance (criminal circuit) case no. 3301/1998. 
503 Civil transaction law article 282 states:” The author of any tort, even if not discerning, shall be 
bound to repair the prejudice.” This is the translation of the ministry of justice, which roughly 
translates to any action resulting in damages (tort), the one responsible of that action would be bound to 
fix or compensate. 
504 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, civil circuit appeal no. 546/24, issued on the 3rd of July 2005. 
505 See general al-hadidi supra note 473 at 257-258. Al-hadidi advocate that these committees should be 
composed from one or more judges, and that the decisions of these committees should be subject to 
appeal in front of the appeal court, he argues that “the way these committees are being administered 
either in Dubai or other emirates by having members that are hold no law degrees affect the quality of 
justice and due process…., moreover the finality of awards issued by these committees also affects due 
process.”  
506 Again this can be explained by the quote stated above by al-hadidi, id., which gives insight into the 
courts view on this subject. 
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peculiar that the court would deny the jurisdiction of the committee—given that the 
committee is a branch of the court’s own jurisdiction and is specialized in lease 
disputes—only to refer the dispute back to an expert to calculate the amount of the 
damages507. In this case, the court simply went back to its practice of reasserting its 
jurisdiction, only to appoint an expert to calculate the amount of the damages, which 
could have been done by the committee. 
The benefits of upholding the jurisdiction of the arbitration committee would 
have been to shorten the length of the proceedings, which in turn would have saved 
the litigants time and expenses, assuming that the award issued by the committee 
would not be appealed (which is a questionable assumption, given the court’s support 
of appeals.) 
This decision illustrates that even a dispute which has been codified by the 
legislature and delegated to a specialized committee is not safe from the court’s 
intervention. 
Another decision that revolves around the relationship between the courts and the 
committee occurred in the emirate of Sharjah, which has a committee similar to those 
in Dubai508 and Abu Dhabi509 that is governed by its own legislation.510 However, 
unlike the laws of Dubai and AD, Sharjah’s law allows parties the ability to appeal to 
the court an award issued by the committee. By doing this, the legislature in Sharjah 
																																																								
507 id. at 258, al-hadidi argues that the awards issued by these committees are equal to the decisions 
issued by the court.  
508 Which is regulated under a new law, which is the Emirate of Dubai Decree no. 26/2013, in regard to 
establishing the lease dispute settlement committee of the emirate of Dubai. 
509 Abu Dhabi law no.20/2006 supra note 437, see also Abu Dhabi law no. 11/79 and the decree no. 
33/1996. 
510 Sharjah law no. 92/1977, which is amended at the time of the dispute by two laws no.7/ 1986 and 
law no. 4/1988, supra note 466. This law saw a number of amendments in recent years; the recent 
edition was law no.2/2007. However, the process of appealing the committees award is still will and 
alive, it is being governed in this law in articles 23-30, the contrast between those laws is that instead of 
appealing the award to the court the law established an appeal tribunal within the committee, this 
tribunal is constructed from three judges. Furthermore not all awards by the committee are subject to 
appeal. 
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is undermining the power of these awards511, rendering them essentially no different 
from an expert’s opinion or report512. In such a situation, the role of the committee 
becomes an advisory role rather than a body empowered to render a binding decision 
to the parties: 
The appellant appealed this decision to the Supreme Court in this appeal on one 
ground513, the appellant argues that the appealed decision ordered the appellant to 
vacate the property despite the fact that the arbitration committee ordered the increase 
of the rent from five thousand to ten thousand, which was recognized in front of the 
municipality of Sharjah’s. The appellant managed to pay to the defendant and in 
doing so he managed to fulfill his obligation according to article 5 of law no. 92/1977 
amended by laws no.7/1986 and 4/1988 for the emirate of Sharjah, which identify the 
conditions in which the owner of the property could request the tent to vacate, in this 
case it would have been the failure to pay the rent. However, the appellant managed to 
pay the rent in here and as such this article doesn’t apply. The court dismissed this 
argument, stating that article 5514, implies that the legislator in here added a new 
requirement to those mentioned in the civil transaction law regarding the lease 
agreement515, which state that the lease agreement ends by the end of the term of the 
lease, the Sharjah’s law state that the owner of the property has no right to request to 
vacate the property unless three years have passed from the start of the lease or if one 
of the condition mentioned in the law can be applies516. Thus, it limits the request to 
vacate the property to the passing of three years or if one of the conditions in the law 
has been met. Moreover, based on the arbitral award in case no. 676/1998 dated 
31/1/2000 the defendant became the owner of the property on the 23/1/1995 and the 
lease have continued for more than three years. Thus, the defendant request to vacate 
the property on the 21/6/1998 is lawful.517 
 
The legislature in Sharjah, by codifying the process of appeals made to the court, is 
answering the court’s concerns when it comes to arbitration and ADR518, which 
relates to the ability to review the award. It can be inferred that in the Sharjah court’s 																																																								
511 Sharjah law no. 2/2007 articles 23-30. 
512 Given that the court is not bound to accept the expert report, which is similar to how the court is 
treating the awards issued by these committees once they are appealed, or having an appeal system put 
in place, for in this instance the court would start reviewing these awards and in turn have supervisory 
role over such committees, see al-hadidi supra note 473 at 219-220, Turki supra note 11 at 317-321.  
513 The defendant argued that the appeal should be dismissed based on the fact that the appeal was 
signed by the appellant representative that doesn’t relate to the appellant. The court dismissed this 
argument stating that the law allows for the appeal request to be submitted by any individual in place of 
the appellant, and the only requirement is having the appeal signed by the appellant or his 
representative. Federal Supreme Court of the UAE civil circuit, appeal no. 851/25 issued on the 30th of 
May 2004. 
514 Sharjah law no. 92/77 and 7/1986 and 4/1988 article 5 supra note466. 
515 Which is regulated in the civil transaction law articles 742-848. 
516 Sharjah’s law no.2/2007 supra note 510, confirms those same requirements in article 13. 
517 Appeal no. 851/25 supra note 513. 
518 Alternative dispute resolution. 
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view, one of the requirements of upholding justice is giving individuals the right to 
contest any decision for a second time519. In the adjudicatory process, this would 
include the ability to appeal these decisions or awards. However, this does not change 
the fact that in this decision, the court treated the award issued by the committee as an 
expert opinion or report, rather than as an award issued by an equal authority.520 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The sixteen cases examined in this chapter express a sample of arbitration as 
used in lease/land disputes; they range in nature from disputes over leasing 
apartments, to planes and maritime vessels, to distinguishing between lease 
agreements and investment contracts. In general, lease disputes are subject to 
arbitration; moreover, each emirate has its own way of regulating lease disputes 
that arise from lease contracts when the subject of the lease is a non-movable 
object, such an apartment. In those cases, the legislature has delegated the 
responsibility of settling the dispute to specialized committees, which combine the 
attributes of a court and a dispute settlement institution. In most cases, the 
committee is headed by a judge assigned by the court, and is was established 
through the decree of an Emir. The similarity between those committees and 
arbitral institutions is that they employ experts, and that in some instances their 
decisions are not subject to appeal.  
This brings us back to the question that was mentioned at the beginning of this 
section: what is the nature of these committees? Are they court-appropriated 
arbitration or institutional arbitration? Or are they a specialized judicial authority 
that has the same legal powers as the court?  																																																								
519 see general al-hadidi supra note 473 at 219-220, Turki supra note 11 at 317-321. 
520 id. 
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Examining the above decisions, we may conclude that these committees are 
closer to being a specialized judicial authority, which implies that they are a branch 
of the courts521. This statement is supported by the fact that these committees were 
established by the decree of an Emir and include as members one or more judges 
assigned to them by the court. Furthermore, the legislature in Sharjah has taken a 
further step to solidify this idea by creating an appeals process within those 
committees.522 This appeals process implies that the committee’s decisions may be 
appealed to the court.523 
Even though the cases that were examined here comprise a relatively small 
number, they still give an indication of the average time for a dispute of this nature 
to be settled by the court--three years.524 While three years may be acceptable for a 
dispute to be settled by litigation, if a dispute were to viewed as falling under the 
jurisdiction of arbitration, this could add three more years to the process, which 
would be onerous for the parties and the court.  
Delays may be attributed to a number of factors, including the number of 
procedures governing lease disputes within the UAE. These procedures are one of 
the main causes of delays, and are also the main factor behind the court’s ability to 
freely interpret lease contracts and arbitral clauses, which ultimately leads to more 
appeals.  
The complexity involved in lease/land disputes in the UAE relates to a number 
of issues; some are specific to a case, while others are general concerns, such as the 
number of legislations that govern lease disputes and the way in which the court 
interprets the law. The jurisdiction of the lease committees is another source of 																																																								
521 see general al-hadidi supra note 473 at 257-258. 
522 See SHJ law no. 2/2007 supra note 510. 
523 Which is conformity to what al-hadid was advocating, see al-hadidi supra note 473 at 258. 
524 The average time of the Dubai courts were five years; the AD court three years; and the Federal 
Supreme court are seven years. 
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concern. It can be inferred that such committees have sole jurisdiction in resolving 
lease disputes that rise from lease contracts. Based on this interpretation, the parties 
would not be able to opt-out into arbitration. If a committee is seen to have the 
jurisdiction to recognize and enforce arbitral awards, as well as to resolve lease 
disputes, individuals would be able to opt-out into arbitration, and the court would 
have to accept the arbitration agreements. Both interpretations can be deduced 
from the legislation, and the court has in fact used both interpretations.  
The ease with which the court accepts an appeal implies that the courts either 
do not trust the decision of the lease committees or the arbitrators, which relates to 
the court’s general view of arbitration as an exception to litigation. Or, it may 
relate to the fact that the court is trying to preserve the individual’s right to appeal. 
It can be concluded from the twelve cases examined in this chapter that the court’s 
willingness to hear appeals is a combination of both factors. 
The examination of lease disputes gives an indication of how a system of 
arbitration that falls under the direct supervision of the court would function. In 
essence, these committees were created to server as a buffer for the courts that 
would ease the court’s caseload; the emirates that chose this system did so with this 
clear goal in mind. However, despite clear legislative intent, such a system will not 
function properly without clear and complete cooperation from the court. While the 
courts seem to perceive arbitration in general as an exception to their authority, 
when it comes to lease committees, they seem to view them as an extension of the 
court’s authority. This attitude can be seen from the way the courts allow appeals 
to go through. If courts had faith in the committees and in their ability to serve and 
preserve the individual’s needs and rights, then the court likely would limit the 
appeals allowed of judgments handed down by the committees.  
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The situation created by having an arbitral clause in an investment contract 
that relates to a land transaction is another source of concern. The courts seem 
unable to agree on a correct answer to this situation, which adds to the complexity 
facing the parties and the process of arbitration in general. The confusion created 
by this situation discourages parties from opting-out into arbitration and in 
promotes the courts as the sole avenue of justice. 
In conclusion, it seems that even a dispute resolution module that is backed by 
the state is incapable of escaping the courts’ appeals mechanism, and by extension 
increases the courts’ jurisdiction over disputes. It highlights the idea that in order 
for any system of dispute resolution to function, especially when it comes to 
arbitration, cooperation must exist between the legislative and judicial branches. 
Most importantly, the courts must work with these branches and not compete with 
them. 
 
Court 
Name 
Case No. Date of the first instance 
decision 
Date of the end of the 
litigation 
Number of 
years 
    
Dubai   10/1995  27/4/1994  8/10/1995  1     
Dubai 193/2002 26/5/2001 23/1/2002 1     
Dubai 47/2002 18/10/2006 29/4/2007 1 Average 
length 
2.98
6 
Dubai 
 
133/2007 28/1/2003 23/9/2007 4  Average 
Dubai 
2  
AD 58/2007 29/5/2005 30/10/2007 2  Average AD  2.8 
AD 72/2007 29/11/2005 11/12/2007. 2  Average 
Federal 
 4.1
6 
AD 66&71/20
07 
2005 15/1/2008 3     
AD 186/2008 2002 8/6/2008. 6     
AD 136/2009 21/12/2008 31/3/2009 1     
Federal 32/23 28/3/2000 6/8/2003. 3     
Federal 732/24 2001 26/2/2005. 4     
Federal 546/24 1999 3/7/2005. 6     
Federal 181/15 - 19/3/1995 -   
Federal 5/2009 2007 17/2/2010 3   
Federal 116/17 1990 31/10/1995 5   
Federal 851/25 31/1/2000 30/5/2004 4     
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4.5 Civil Transaction Disputes 
This section examines arbitration disputes that fall under the spectrum of the 
civil transactions law. It addresses disputes submitted to the civil circuit court—
specifically, to the Dubai cassation court and the Federal Supreme Court—
excluding those that relate to lease/land and Shari’a, which are examined in a 
different chapter of this study. These disputes stem from contracts of a civil 
nature, although not all are of a purely civil nature.525 
4.5.1 Dubai Court of Cassation 
																																																								
525 Which can be attributed to the fact that at the early stages of the life of the high courts in the UAE, 
the classification of the disputes would fall under one of two categorize in most instances, either 
criminal or civil, later on more circuits were added, as the court continued to grow. See general Turki 
supra note 11 at 524, were the author start discussing what is meant by civil and commercial suits in 
accord to the civil procedures law, see general Turki supra note 11 at 462, were the author start 
discussing the jurisdiction rules and the classification of the circuits and courts in the UAE. See general 
Al-hadidi supra note 473 at 310. 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Dubai AD Federal 
no. of cases 5 5 7 
average years 2 2.8 4.166 
average 2.98886 
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The thirty-one disputes examined in this section represent a continuation of 
the discussion526 begun earlier and provide an understanding of the Dubai court’s 
philosophy on arbitration. Most deal with appeals that relate to the recognition of 
arbitral awards, or contest the appointment of arbitrators. These cases address 
nineteen years of decisions made by the Dubai court. I categorize these disputes based 
on the nature of the contract that contained the arbitration clause or the agreement, 
and I also arrange them by date, in order to note any change in the court’s philosophy 
on arbitration. 
 The cases are arranged as follows:  
• Disputes before the enactment of the civil procedures 
• Checks 
• Construction Disputes 
• Insurance 
• Companies  
• Agent’s Authority  
We begin with the era before the enactment of the civil procedures law. 
4.5.1.1	Disputes	before	the	enactment	of	the	civil	procedures	law	
This dispute involves a liquidation request and a court-annexed arbitration,527 
and it shows that the court was free to invent its own rules on arbitration without 
being bound by any procedural law: 
The appellant argues that the award should be dismissed based on the fact that 
it was issued after the agreed upon time. The appellant claims that the court 
decided to recognize the award by stating that the parties agreed to extend the 
arbitration time. However, the appellant claims that he did not agree to the 
extension, and that, in addition, any extension of the arbitration period requires 																																																								
526 They continue the discussion started earlier in the previous chapters. 
527 The defendant in this dispute started the proceedings in order to ask the court to appoint an 
accounting expert to examine the records between the parties, in order to liquidate the company, see 
Dubai Court of First Instance case no. 1172/1990. 
	 138	
the court’s recognition. Neither the parties nor the arbitrators has the right to 
grant this extension on their own, which is only reserved to the court since it 
has the authority to supervise the arbitration procedure. The fact that the 
arbitrators have requested the amendment from the court is not sufficient 
unless the court renders a decision in this request, and that for these reasons 
the award should be set-aside. 
 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that one of the attributes of 
arbitration is the fact that it is a voluntary process, implying that the parties 
have the right to agree in the arbitration clause to a certain time for the arbitral 
award to be issued or to extend it, either by providing a process for extension 
in the arbitration clause or delegating that authority to the arbitrators. This 
delegation of authority can either be explicit by being stated in the arbitration 
agreement, or implicit by the parties’ appearing in the arbitration hearing after 
the extension and presenting their argument. Furthermore, the appeals court 
established that the appellant representative agreed in the arbitral hearing 
dated 4/6/1991 to authorize the arbitrators to extend the arbitration time, which 
the arbitrators used to extend the arbitration from 15/6/1991 to 4/8/1991. This 
procedure is not affected by the arbitrators informing the first instance court of 
the extension, since as proven from the facts of this dispute, the arbitrators 
have the authority to extend the arbitration on their own. 
The second ground of the appeal argues that the appellant upheld the argument 
that the award is void, claiming that the arbitrators did not uphold due process 
by dismissing his request to refer the dispute back to the court to examine the 
evidence. The appeals court answered this request by stating that the arbitral 
tribunal had given him the opportunity to present his defense and that the 
purpose of his request was to extend the period of the dispute. 
The court dismissed this argument, confirming that the arbitrators upheld due 
process in this dispute.528 
 
Here, the court upheld the parties’ freedom of contract and their contractual 
obligations529 without a procedural law to dictate their practice. Instead, they relied on 
the parties’ agreement and allowed the parties the freedom to dictate their own actions 
as they saw fit, dismissing any argument that contradicted their agreement. This 
approach by the court relates directly to the absence of a legal code at the time of the 
dispute.530 At this stage, the code did not define the arbitration agreement531, which 
																																																								
528 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no. 346/1991, issued on the 23rd of May 1992. 
529 See general Najidah supra note 477 at 20-23, Bechor supra note 17 at 147-149, Hindi supra note 103 
at 2-3 these authors examine this concept from the point view of an Arabian scholar, see Carbonneau 
supra note 73 at 24-25, for a western interpretation of freedom of contract. It can be noted that both the 
west and Arabian scholars tend to agree on what is meant to be “freedom of contract”. 
530 Which is the absence of Federal Law no.11 of 1992, see supra note 8.  
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may relate in part to the fact that the case was a court-annexed arbitration532. 
Nevertheless, this shows how the court used to reason and view arbitration, as an 
independent system and not as an exception to litigation. This decision also 
emphasizes the important role that the court could play in promoting the arbitral 
process in the UAE. 
Another decision by the court that highlights this period relates to a 
construction dispute: 
The appeal was based on three grounds. The first and second argue that the 
decision was appealed upon a decision to dismiss the dispute based on the 
existence of an arbitration clause. However,  this dispute does not fall under 
the scope of the arbitration clause, since it relates to a debt claim that is not 
based on the contract in which the arbitration clause was stated. Furthermore, 
the arbitration clause is invalid and void since it lacks sufficient information to 
make it a valid clause, such as the determination of the number of arbitrators 
or the method of choosing them, as well as the place of the arbitration, the law 
that governs the arbitration process and the contract, and the time of the 
arbitration. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that article 17 of the contract 
between the parties stated that: “the disputes shall be settled through 
arbitration,” and since the dispute in this litigation involves the remainder of 
the payment of the construction contract. This payment arises from the 
construction contract that contains the arbitration clause, which renders this 
argument void. Furthermore, according to the jurisprudence of the court, all 
that is required for the validity of the arbitration clause is the parties’ 
agreement. Therefore, no agreement on the details of the dispute is required at 
the time of the drafting of the clause.  
The third ground of the appeal argues that the appealed decision failed to 
uphold due process, since the appealed decision did not answer the appellant’s 
defense. 
The court dismissed this ground, stating that the appeal court based its 
decision on sound grounds; moreover, the court has no obligation to answer all 
the litigants’ claims.533 
 
This case is another example of the court’s attitude toward arbitration before 
the introduction of the civil procedures law.534 The similarity between these two cases 
																																																																																																																																																														
531 Nor did the laws of that time try to define arbitration, neither the court views arbitration as an 
exception. See general supra 2.6.4 UAE legislators’ view and 2.6.5 UAE courts view of the Definition. 
532  See general, Levin supra note 141 at 538. 
533 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no.91/1992, issued 21st of November 1992 
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is the absence of a civil procedures law. Thus, the court relies on the parties’ 
agreement and the general principles of contract. The parties’ freedom to contract535 is 
held as most important, and the court in this case binds the parties to what they have 
agreed upon. The lack of a civil procedures law at the time of this case benefitted the 
use and acceptance of arbitration. The court was free to shape its own doctrine 
regarding an arbitral case, without being bound by any external factor. Therefore, it 
set a simple test that looked at the arbitration clause only to determine the parties’ 
obligations in the dispute. This led the court to dismiss the appellants’ argument that 
the “arbitration clause lacked sufficient information.” Such an argument might have 
been accepted under the civil procedural law, since the court would interpret the 
arbitration clause as infringing on the litigant’s right to due process, especially given 
the loose terminology of the arbitration clause, which leaves room for interpretation 
by the court536. However, in this decision, the court determined that the parties did not 
need to agree on all aspects of the arbitration at the moment the contract was drafted 
in order for the contract to be binding. 
Another decision that highlights the court’s position on arbitration in this 
period relates to appointment of the arbitrators and a request to arbitrate under the 
supervision of the court: 
The appellant argues in the first ground that the court’s decision that the parties are 
not willing to submit their dispute to arbitration is flawed, basing their decision on 
their representative counter-claim to deny the defendant’s claim after amending their 
request to the court. However, this counter-claim did not touch upon the subject 
matter of the dispute in order for the court to consider it as a waiver of the parties’ 
right to arbitrate. 																																																																																																																																																														
534 Even though the parties entered into a lengthy litigation before the start of the arbitration, which is 
an issue that transcends arbitration and a general attribute of the courts in the UAE to encourage 
appeals, nevertheless the court in its early years kept on upholding the arbitration clause. 
535 See general Najidah supra note 477 at 20-23, Bechor supra note 17 at 147-149, Hindi supra note 103 
at 2-3 these authors examine this concept from the point view of an Arabian scholar, see Carbonneau 
supra note 73 at 24-25, for a western interpretation of freedom of contract. It can be noted that both the 
west and Arabian scholars tend to agree on what is meant to be “freedom of contract”. 
536 Which can be inferred from article 203/3 of the civil procedures, supra note 428, since the legislator 
requires in that article that the scope of arbitration should be defined in the arbitration clause.  
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The court dismissed this argument, stating that the arbitration is an agreement to grant 
the arbitrator the right to settle the dispute in place of the court and the natural judge. 
The nature of this agreement does not relate to public policy and thus the parties can 
waive this agreement and their right to arbitrate either explicitly or implicitly. 
Therefore, when the defendant amended the request, the appellant counterclaimed by 
denying the defendant’s claim, which constitutes an implicit waiver of the right to 
arbitrate.537 
 
Here the court develops an idea of arbitration, which can be noted from the 
court’s definition of arbitration and subsequent explanation as to why it denied the 
request to arbitrate. The court explained that the arbitration clause can be waived 
either explicitly or implicitly—which essentially infringes the parties’ right to 
freedom of contract and right to arbitrate—by claiming that the arbitration agreement 
does not relate to public policy538. The court stated that any party trying to uphold 
arbitration agreements needs to explicitly identify his position539; this gives the 
defendant the right to amend a request stemming from the appointment of an 
arbitrator and to ask the court to settle the dispute directly. If the appellant wanted to 
uphold the arbitration agreement, he should have taken a positive action.  
Even though the court did not base its decision on the civil procedures law, it 
came to a conclusion that is opposite what was determined in the previous case 
study540, even though neither party denied the existence of the arbitration agreement, 
nor did the court dispute the fact that the dispute fell under the scope of the arbitration 
agreement. Despite all of these circumstances, the court interpreted this action as a 
waiver of the parties’ right to arbitrate, which highlights the power of the court’s 
interpretation. This case and the one presented just before it also show that even 
																																																								
537 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no.337/1991, issued on the 7th of March 1992. 
538 This view mirror that of the courts after the enactment of the civil procedures law, see general supra 
2.6.4 UAE legislators’ view and 2.6.5 UAE courts view of the Definition.  
539 Which in turn mirrors the requirement of article 203/3 supra note 428, and article 204 supra note 
407. 
540 See appeal no. 91/1992, supra note 533. 
	 142	
before the enactment of the civil procedures law, the court sometimes ruled in a way 
that upheld the arbitral process, and sometimes did not. 
 
The next several cases shed the light on the transition period between non-
codified arbitration rules and those that were codified under the civil procedures law; 
the codification was a process that began before the enactment of the civil procedures 
law: 
The appellant argues that the court recognized the arbitral award, which was 
issued based on an agreement that was nullified by the parties, and that the 
arbitrators had added interests and claimed compensation without any basis. 
Therefore, the appealed decision contradicted the first instance decision by 
allowing the first instance decision to be appealed, by stating that the 
arbitrators had the right to add interests to the amount of the claim, and by not 
answering the appellants plea in regard to the delay penalties [which were in 
the amount of two million Australian pounds], which should been limited to 
the amount that the parties agreed to. Lastly, the appealed decision failed to 
uphold the parties’ freedom of contract when the arbitrators decided to 
compensate based on a percentage of the agreed amount. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that once the parties have agreed in 
the arbitration clause that the arbitral award is final, then they should not argue 
on the subject matter of the dispute in front of the cassation court, even if the 
dispute occurred before the enactment of the civil procedures law; furthermore 
there is no contradiction between the first instance and the appeals court 
decision.541 
 
In the previous cases, the court’s interpretation and decision were guided by 
the parties’ agreement and the general rules of contract542. The codifying of the 
arbitration rules in the civil procedures law changed the court’s perspective on 
arbitration. True, the court’s decision in this instance upheld the arbitral award. 
Nevertheless, its response to the defendant’s plea to dismiss the appeal is important. It 
shows the change that occurred after the enactment of the law. The defendant argued 																																																								
541 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no. 171/1992, issued on the 22nd of November 1992. 
542 In general the court confirms the parties right to arbitrate, not based on a provision in the law but on 
the parties right to freedom of contract. See appeal no. 346/1991 supra note 528 and appeal no. 91/1992 
supra note 533. See general Najidah supra note 477 at 20-23, Bechor supra note 17 at 147-149, Hindi 
supra note 103 at 2-3 these authors examine this concept from the point view of an Arabian scholar, see 
Carbonneau supra note 73 at 24-25, for a western interpretation of freedom of contract. It can be noted 
that both the west and Arabian scholars tend to agree on what is meant to be “freedom of contract”. 
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in front of the court that the decision should not be appealable, since the parties 
agreed to authorize the arbitrators to mediate, which is not subject to appeal under the 
civil procedures law. Thus, the defendant argued that the court should therefore 
dismiss the appeal: 
[T]he defendant’s representative pleaded to the court to dismiss the appeal, since the 
appeal did not contain the defendant’s address, furthermore this decision is not subject 
to appeal according to article 217543, which does not allow appeals of arbitral awards 
in the event that the arbitrators were authorized to mediate the dispute or if the parties 
have given up their right to appeal, which is the case in this dispute since the parties 
have agreed to waive their right to appeal. 
The court also dismissed the defendant’s plea that was based on article 217,544 
explaining that this article states that the arbitral award was not subject to appeal if the 
parties agreed to authorize the arbitrators to mediate, or if they explicitly waived their 
right to appeal in the agreement, which is an exception to the general principle of 
adjudication mentioned in article 158,545 which allows the individuals to appeal the 
decision of the trial court to the appeals court. However, this does not apply to appeals 
to the cassation court that fall under article 173,546 which states that once a decision 
has been issued by the appeals court and has met the requirements of this article, the 
parties would be able to appeal it to the court of cassation. Also, since the appeal 
decision in question was issued on 21/6/1992, which occurred after the civil 
procedures law came into power on 9/6/1992, the appeal is granted even if it was in 
regard to recognizing an arbitral award, or it has been agreed to authorize the 
arbitrators to mediate, or if the parties agreed in the arbitration agreement that the 
award is final and not subject to appeal, which is limited to appeals from the first 
instance court to the appeal court. Therefore, the court allows the appeal to the 
cassation court.547 
 
 The court’s response to the defendant’s plea is peculiar; on the one hand, it 
admits that article 217548 applies to this situation. However, at the same time, it 																																																								
543 Civil Procedures Law article 217 states: “1-The arbitrators' decisions shall not accept the appeal 
therein through any of the appeal proceedings. 2-As for the decision delivered for the authentication of 
the arbitrators' decision or by its nullity, it shall be possible to appeal against it by the appropriate 
appeal proceeding. 3- With the exception of the preceding clause terms, the decision shall not be 
subject to the appeal if the arbitrators were authorized for reconciliation or the litigant parties have 
expressly relinquished the right to appeal, or the litigation value were not exceeding ten thousand 
Dirham.” 
544 id. 
545 Civil Procedures Law Article 158 states: “The litigant parties, in other than the circumstances 
excepted by the law stipulation, may appeal the decisions of the courts of first instances before the 
authorized court of appeal…..”, this article was amended by the federal law no. 30 on the 30/11/2005. 
546 Civil Procedures Law Article 173 states:” The opposing parties may appeal with a cassation in the 
decisions issued from the appellate courts if the action value was more than two hundred thousand 
Dirham or was not valuated and that in the following circumstances….”, this article was also amended 
by the federal law no. 30. 
547 Appeal no. 171/1992 supra note 541. 
548 Supra note 543. 
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decides to limit the application of this article to the decisions of the first instance 
court. This eliminates the application of article 217549, given that there is no 
mechanism to stop the parties from appealing the decisions of the court, as 
exemplified by this decision itself and the court’s response that undermine article 
217550. 
 The cases and decisions examined in this section, especially those that were 
issued before the enactment of the civil procedures law, suggests that the absence of 
regulation does not necessarily endanger the use of arbitration. Despite the pro-
arbitration outcome of two551 of the three decisions that occurred before the enactment 
of the law, the third case552 shows that not all disputes that occurred before the 
enactment of the law favored arbitration. These cases highlight the court’s theories 
and views on arbitration, and how these views evolved through the years. The fourth 
case exemplifies the differences between the periods and how the civil procedures law 
began to bind the court’s powers553. It seems that the freedom that the court held 
before the enactment of the civil procedures law worked in favor of arbitration. 
4.5.1.2 Checks 
The following case examines whether the use of a check as payment has any 
effect on arbitration; this case involves the criminal element of having issued a check 
without sufficient funds to cover it554. In addition, this dispute shows the court’s 
																																																								
549 id.  
550 id 
551 Which are appeal no. 346/1991 supra note 528, and appeal no. 91/1992 supra note 533. 
552 Appeal no. 337/1991 supra note 537. 
553 Appeal no. 171/1992 supra note 541. 
554 Which is considered a criminal offense under the Federal Law no. 3/1987, issued on 8/12/1987, 
article 401, which state:” “Shall be sentenced to detention or to a fine, whoever draws in bad faith a 
cheque without sufficient funds or who, after giving the cheque withdraws all or part of the funds , so 
that the remaining balance is insufficient to cover the amount of the cheque , or gives order to the 
drawee to stop payment , or if he deliberately writes or signs the cheque in such a manner as to make it 
non payable. Shall be sentenced to the same penalty whoever endorses to another or delivers to him a 
bearer draft knowing that it has no available sufficient funds in consideration thereof or that it is not 
drawable. The penal action shall be precluded in case of payment or its withdrawal subsequent to the 
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change in behavior toward arbitration after the introduction of the civil procedures 
law: 
[T]he appellant argues that the appealed decision failed to uphold the law, claiming 
that the appealed decision recognized an award, which decided that the check was 
issued as an insurance to fulfill the obligation of the company towards the appellant. 
However, this decision was based on speculation and even the arbitrator admitted that 
he was not sure in regard to this issue. Furthermore, the arbitrator exceeded the scope 
of the arbitration by investigating the purpose of the check and adding the amount of 
200000 dhs. from the appellant’s account in the company. Secondly, he ordered the 
defendant to pay the amount of 100000 dhs., which the appealed decision did not 
recognize. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that arbitration is an exception to the 
individual’s right to seek their natural judge, thus it is limited to what the parties have 
agreed to submit to the arbitration tribunal. As such, it is not sufficient to say that the 
arbitrator has jurisdiction over the dispute since it’s an exception and the arbitrators 
do not have the right to decide over disputes that relate to the main issue that the 
parties agreed to arbitrate. As such, arguing that the issues raised after the submitting 
of the main dispute should be submitted to the court and not the arbitrator has no 
basis. Moreover, the court upon recognizing an arbitral award does not look at the 
subject of the award. The appellant started the dispute against the defendant to request 
the payment of 30000 dhs., for which the defendant submitted a check without 
sufficient funds, and the defendant claimed the check was submitted to the appellant 
as insurance to fulfilling their obligation. Then the parties agreed to submit the dispute 
to arbitration, and the arbitrator issued an award that the check in question was in fact 
issued as a guarantee and had no affect and was void. The arbitrator ordered the 
payment of the amount of 125000 dhs. and the amount of 7500000 dhs. to the 
appellant from the accounts of the company, and that the defendant should pay the 
amount of 100000 dhs. to the appellant. Thus, the appealed decision has a legal basis, 
and as such the court decided to dismiss the appeal.555 
 
It is interesting to find the court stand by the arbitrator’s conclusion in regard 
to the purpose of the check. The court in this case did not try to contest the arbitrator’s 
																																																																																																																																																														
perpetration of the crime but prior to the settlement of the case by a decisive judgment otherwise stay 
of execution shall be ordered. In case the court orders the withdrawal of the checkbook from the 
condemned person and the prohibition to give him new checkbooks, according to the provisions of 
Article 643 of the Commercial Transactions Law, the public prosecution shall notify this order to the 
Central Bank in order to generalize it on all banks. Should any bank violate this order , it shall be liable 
to pay a fine amounting to one hundred thousand Dirhams. Shall be liable to the same penalty whoever 
endorses to another or deliver a bearer draft knowing that against the deed there are no available 
sufficient funds to pay its amount or that it is not drawable.” As amended by federal law no. 34/2005. 
This is the exact translation of the ministry of justice of this article; see GANAM MOHAMMAD GANAM 
& FATIHA MOHAMMAD QWARIRI, SHARH QANON AL-OQOBAT AL-ITHADI L DWALT AL-EMARAT AL-
ARABYAH AL-MTHADAH, (The Explanation of the Federal Penal Code of the United Arab Emirates) 2`4-
249 (2006). The authors in here examine and explain this criminal offence under the rules of the federal 
penal code. 
555 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no. 165/1992, issued on the 28th of November 1992. 
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right to determine such a thing, especially when issuing a check without sufficient 
funds to cover it would usually constitute a criminal offense556. This implies that the 
court in its early days was more liberal and understanding of arbitration and did not 
seem threatened by this newcomer in the ranks of dispute resolution methods.   
  
4.5.1.3 Construction Disputes557 
This section examines the decisions of the court that relate to arbitration in 
construction contracts and is arranged by the date the decisions were issued. 
The first decision relates to how the court interprets the arbitration clause: 
[T]he first ground argues that the appealed decision dismissed the request to submit 
the dispute into arbitration. The court’s reasoning was that there is no dispute between 
the parties in regard to the execution of the contraction contract, which makes this 
dispute fall outside the scope of the arbitration clause. Since the construction was 
already completed, the court based the argument on the meeting dated 2/5/1991 
between the parties and concluded that the construction was completed between the 
parties. The appellant argued that this dispute falls under the scope of the arbitration 
clause, since the parties agreed in the clause to refer all disputes that arise from the 
execution of this contract into arbitration, which includes disputes that occur during 
the construction period and before the ending of the contract or after the fulfillment of 
the contract. As such, the defendant claimed that the payments arising from the 
contract fall under the scope of the arbitration clause. Furthermore, the appellants’ 
claim that they agreed on the date of 7/3/1991 to complete the payments, which is 
before the defendant’s delivery of the property to the appellants that should have 
occurred on 7/4/1991. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that the trial court has the authority to 
interpret the agreement and the will of the parties without the supervision of the 
cassation court, once they based their interpretation on sound legal basis. The trial 
court’s reasoning was that: “… the tenth clause of the construction contract dated 
21/12/1989, states that any dispute that arises between the parties in connection to this 
agreement, regarding the contract or its execution, should be referred to an 
engineering expert in order to settle the dispute…” and this dispute relates to the final 
payments and the final finishing’s of the construction, making this dispute fall outside 
the scope of the arbitration clause, which is supported by the litigants’ meeting on 
2/5/1991 that confirmed the fulfillment of the construction contract.558 
 																																																								
556 See Ganam & Qwariri supra note 554 at 250-254, and article 401 of the penal code supra note 554. 
557 This section should have examined seventeen decisions of the cassation court. However, three of 
those decisions have already been examined in the previous section, which are appeals nos. 337/1991 
supra note 537, 91/1992 supra note 533, and 171/1992 supra note 541. 
558 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 295/1993, issued on the 30th of January 1994. 
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Here, the court limits the scope of articles 203/5559, which state that if the parties 
agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration, they have waived their right to litigate the 
dispute in front the court. The only exception to this would be if the parties waived 
the right to arbitrate in front of the court once the dispute arose. However, this 
decision adds a new test for drafting arbitration clauses or agreements; parties are 
required by the court to draft a specific and detailed arbitration clause, since drafting a 
general clause such as the one in this dispute risks limiting the scope of the arbitral 
clause, which could eventually lead to the dismissal of the arbitral clause. 
 
Another dispute that highlights the court’s power to interpret contracts and clauses 
involves a dispute with similar circumstances to the first construction case 
described.560 However, the court in this dispute decided to uphold the interpretation of 
the first instance court and extend the scope of the arbitration clause, which 
emphasizes that the court’s interpretation is relative and does not follow certain set of 
rules: 
The second and third part of the first ground of appeal argues that the appellant 
continued to uphold the argument that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of the 
arbitration agreement, claiming that the clause was general and did not define the 
scope of the arbitration. There were two construction contracts between the parties, 
and the arbitrator decided to include both contracts under his jurisdiction. Moreover, 
the arbitration clause did not stipulate whether the dispute falls under the scope of the 
arbitration, implying that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of the arbitration, which is 
ground for setting-aside the award.  
The court dismissed this argument, stating that the trial court has the right to interpret 
and explain the contract. The only requirement is that the interpretation is done 
according to the law. Since the appealed decision came to the conclusion that the 																																																								
559 Civil procedures law article 203/5 supra note 442. 
560 This dispute relates to a construction contract dated 10/4/1988 the appellant asked the defendant 
company to decorate their villa in exchange for 6500000 dhs. the appellant also requested on the 
12/9/1989 to decorate his Majlis in the same villa in exchange for 550000 dhs. a dispute rose between 
the parties and on the 11/5/1991 they agreed to refer the dispute to a sole arbitrator and that his decision 
is final and binding and is not subject to appeal, the arbitrator issued an award on the 3/7/1993 and 
delivered a copy of the award to both parties. The court decided to recognize the award. See Dubai 
court of First Instance Case no. 158/1993, issued on 11/1/1994 and Dubai Court of Appeals, appeal no. 
133/1994, issued on 15/5/1994. 
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scope of the arbitration agreement contained both contracts, it is implied that the 
arbitrator did not exceed the scope of the arbitration agreement.561 
The court’s aversion to arbitration is highlighted in this case by the fact that the court 
states that the trial court has the right to interpret. Nevertheless, their decision was 
subject to appeal. One must then ask why the trial court’s decisions are subject to 
appeal if it has the right to interpret contracts and agreements? The only rational 
answer is that the court is trying to uphold the individual’s right to appeal, which the 
court views as an essential right that cannot be waived.562 
 
Another dispute concerns the appointment of the arbitrator and the procedure that the 
parties should follow. It also establishes a rule with regard to the defendant’s plea to 
dismiss the appeal based on article 204/2,563 which states that decisions about 
appointing an arbitrator are unappealable: 
[T]he appellant argues that there is no dispute between them in regards to submitting 
the dispute into arbitration, and that the appellant tried to initiate the arbitration 
proceedings but the defendant and the arbitrator ignored the appellant’s notice.   
The court dismissed this claim, stating that there is no evidence supporting this claim 
since there is no record that shows that the defendant or the arbitrator received the 
notice, and that the recorded message that the appellant presented is not sufficient to 
be considered a notification.564  
The court dismissed this argument; stating that in the event that the parties agreed to 
appointing an arbitrator and to arbitrate their dispute, then the arbitration clause has 
been invoked, and the parties are bound to submit their dispute to the arbitrator they 
have chosen.  
In this instance, the parties have waived their right to submit their dispute to the court 
to appoint a new arbitrator, except if the arbitrator refused to do his job, is dismissed 
by the parties, or the court decided to dismiss him. It seems there is no agreement 
between the parties that regulates this process. In this instance, they have the right to 
ask the court to appoint an arbitrator according to article 204,565 and the obligation to 
prove that one of those conditions has been fulfilled falls to the party requesting the 																																																								
561 Dubai Court of cassation appeal no.260 and 261/1994, issued on the 16th of October 1994. 
562 The rest of the grounds of appeals are available in the appendix. 
563 Supra note 407. 
564 Id. In essence, the court’s decision to refuse the appointment implies that the court has waived the 
appellant’s right to request an appointment from the court according to article 204. 
565 Id. 
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court to appoint the arbitrator. Furthermore, according to the jurisprudence of this 
court, the examination of the evidence falls to the determination of the trial court, 
without supervision from the cassation court, if the claim has been properly submitted 
and if the trial court based its decision on sound legal reasoning. As such, the 
appealed decision was found to be based on both sound evidence and legal 
reasoning.566 
The court’s response to this plea was that it is an exception to the general 
principle that arbitral decisions are appealable. This limits appeals to the requirements 
stated in article 204/1567. Here, the court limits the application of paragraph 2 of 
article 204568, which addresses the procedure of appointing an arbitrator, by stating 
that the court’s decision to refuse an appointment does not fall under the exception of 
this law. This in turn creates a never-ending cycle of appeals for the litigants. 
This never ending-cycle of appeals remains, even for traditional, formulated contracts, 
which in the case of construction contracts would be the FIDIC contract569: 
The appellant argues that the appealed decision failed to uphold what the parties 
agreed upon in the contract, since articles 5-8 of the construction contract state that 
the rules of the FDIC are a reference for any disputes that occur during the time of 
construction and maintenance. The court came to the conclusion that this dispute is 
outside the scope of the arbitration clause, which is in contrast to clause 67/3 of the 
FDIC570, which states that any dispute between the parties shall be resolved through 
the rule of the international chamber of commerce arbitration571. This implies that the 
rule of arbitration apply to any dispute that arises between the parties and is not 
limited to disputes that concern the construction and maintenance of the property.  
 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that the court has the authority to 
understand and interpret the contract as they see fit, and that this interpretation does 
not fall under the supervision of the cassation court. Furthermore, the jurisprudence of 
this court establishes that arbitration is an exception to the individual’s right to seek 
his natural judge. Thus, every interpretation should be limited to what the parties have 																																																								
566 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no. 167/1994, issued on the 13th of November 1994. 
567 Supra note 407. 
568 id. 
569 Which is the contract issued by the International Federation of Consulting Engineers are the 
“authors the works of civil engineering construction (often known as the Red Book)…”, see Gillard & 
Savage supra note 65 at 17-18, were the authors introduce the rules of FIDIC. 
570 Gillard & Savage describe this article as: “Article 67 of the FIDIC conditions provides for a fairly 
complex two-tier procedures for settling disputes arising between the owner and the contractor.” id at 
18. 
571 id at 17, the authors state that: “by informing the engineer and the owner of its decision to resort to 
ICC arbitration.” 
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intended. The appealed decision stated that the scope of the arbitration clause does not 
cover this dispute, based on an examination of the construction contract dated 
15/2/1999 that shows in article 5/8 that the parties agreed to submit disputes relating 
to construction and maintenance into arbitration. This shows that the parties agreed to 
limit the scope of the arbitration to those disputes, and that moreover the defendant 
submitted evidence of the completion of the construction of the villa by submitting 
the certificate of completion issued from the municipality of Dubai on the 14/5/2001. 
The appellant did not dispute this, and thus his argument regarding the application of 
the arbitration clause had no basis. Therefore, the court decided not to implement the 
arbitration clause in this dispute. Also, the rules of the FDIC contract did not relate to 
public policy, which implies that the parties have the right to amend the rules of a 
contract in regard to submitting all disputes into arbitration. Since the parties in this 
dispute agreed to limit the scope of the arbitration to issues raised in the construction 
period, the arbitration clause does not apply to this dispute.572  
 
This dispute exemplifies the mixed nature of construction contracts in the UAE. The 
litigants submitted their dispute to the commercial circuit in the first instance court, 
even though the dispute was governed by the civil transaction law573. This circuit 
decided to uphold the arbitration clause, as they viewed payments as an extension of 
the contract, which placed it (the contract) under the scope of the arbitration clause. 
The first instance interpretation takes into account both the arbitration clause in the 
contract and the FDIC contract. In doing so, it interpreted the parties’ will in this 
contract as incorporating all disputes arising from this contract, including payments. 
This extends the scope of the arbitration clause.574 Naturally, this decision was subject 
to appeal and another review in order to determine the scope of the arbitration clause. 																																																								
572 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 261/2002 issued on the 2nd of November 2002. 
573 Turki supra note 11 at 551-553, the author in here explains what is meant by article 36 of the civil 
procedures law, which state: “The jurisdiction in the litigations related to supplies and contracting 
works and the lease of houses and wages of workmen and artisans and wageworkers should be given to 
the court of the residence of the prosecuted or to the court in which circuit the agreement has been 
concluded or executed”, it can be deduced from this article and from the discussion that Turki provided 
that the jurisdiction to here such dispute should have been brought in front of the civil circuit, since in 
this instance this is considered to be a civil, which can be deduced from Turki’s explanation and from 
article 31/3 of the civil procedures, which state:” The jurisdiction should be in the commercial matters 
of the court in which circuit the prosecuted residence exists or be given to the court in which circuit the 
agreement has been concluded , totally or partially executed or to the court in which circuit the 
agreement should be executed.” See Turki supra note 11 at 548-551. From both of these articles it can 
be deduced that Construction disputes, even though it might have a commercial element are considered 
to be a civil suit based on article 36 of the civil procedures law.  
574 Dubai Court of first instance (commercial circuit) case no. 881/2001, dated 16/1/2002. 
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The appeals court came to a different conclusion and excluded the dispute from the 
arbitration clause.575  The cassation court confirmed the action of the appeal by 
explaining that the rules of the FDIC do not relate to public policy, and thus the court 
limited the scope of the arbitration clause. 
The following case illustrates the court’s double standard regarding the trial court’s 
right to interpret contracts. The court in this case ruled that the appeal/first instance 
court’s interpretation power is limited when it comes to upholding arbitral awards or 
arbitration agreements, and it also limited the arbitrators’ authority, which ultimately 
affected the recognition of the arbitral award: 
[T]he appellant argues that the appealed decision failed to uphold the law by deciding 
to recognize the arbitral award, arguing that the court recognized the award even 
though the arbitrator decided to award the defendant more than what he asked for in 
regard to the interest, which is against articles 173/1576 and 216/1577; the arbitrator 
awarded the defendant more than he requested and awarded the interest from 8/9/1995 
and not from the start of the arbitration proceedings on 8/9/1999, as per the 
defendant’s request. The appellant claims that they upheld this argument; however, 
the court decided that the arbitrator has the authority to order the interest rate from 
that date, justifying the decision on the fact that this request can be interpreted in this 
way. However, the arbitrator does not have the right to order that amount. The 
appellant requested that this decision be referred back to the arbitrator according to 
article 214578 in order to and amend the decision in regard to this point. 
The court accepted this argument, stating that article 216/1579 allows the parties to 
request the arbitral award to be set-aside on this ground. Moreover, the court has the 
authority to supervise the arbitral award to ensure that the arbitrator issued the award 
within the scope of the parties’ agreement and within the scope of what the parties 																																																								
575 Dubai Court of appeals, appeal no.151/2002, dated 27/4/2002. 
576 Civil Procedures Law article 173/1 states:” 1 - The opposing parties may appeal with a cassation in 
the decisions issued from the appellate courts if the action value was more than two hundred thousand 
Dirham or was not valuated and that in the following circumstances: a. If the appealed decision was 
based on breaching the law or a mistake in its application or its interpretation. b. If a nullity in the 
decision or in the procedures affecting the decision has occurred. c. If the appealed decision was issued 
contrary to the rules of the jurisdiction. d. If the litigation was sentenced with contradiction to another, 
which was issued in the same matter among the same opposing parties and acquired the power of the 
order decided thereto. e. The decision's lack of reasons, inadequacy or its ambiguity. f. If the decision 
has been issued with what the opposing parties haven't requested or with more than what they have 
requested.” 
577 Supra note 416. 
578 id. 
579 id. 
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requested and to ensure that the arbitrator did not decide more than what the parties 
requested.580 
This decision shows that the court/s acceptance of the arbitrator’s authority over the 
dispute does not necessarily means that it would also allow the arbitrator the authority 
to interpret the award or the clause, even if such might seem the most practical 
outcome in this situation. However, this situation could have been avoided if the court 
had implemented the provisions of the law that states that the award is subject neither 
to review nor appeal. Also, article 215 gives the courts a guideline when deciding to 
recognize arbitral awards, which revolves around ensuring that nothing will stop the 
enforcement of the award.581 Therefore, if the court were not sure about a provision in 
the award, it should refer such provision to the arbitrator for clarification.582 However, 
the court contradicts all of these provisions, as well as the rule that the trial court has 
the authority to interpret the facts of the dispute and the contracts submitted to it 
without the supervision of the cassation court. Had the court applied this rule, it would 
have upheld the first instance decision to recognize the arbitral award. However, since 
the law codifies the procedure for appealing the court’s decision to recognize arbitral 
awards,583 such decision and re-examination of the award would continue. 
The next case illustrates how the court plays an active role in promoting the 
arbitration process. In this dispute, the court reaffirms its definition of  the arbitration 
agreement according to article 203584 and the court’s authority to interpret contracts. 
The court also establishes what is required from the parties to argue about the 																																																								
580 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 307/2002, issued on the 30th of November 2002. 
581 Civil Procedures Law article 215 state: “1- The arbitrators' decision shall not be executed except if 
the court in which clerk's office the decision was deposited, has authenticated it, and that after looking 
into the decision and the arbitration document and verifying that there is no prohibition to execute it, 
and such court shall be authorized to amend the material errors in the arbitrators' decision according to 
the request of the concerned persons through the proceedings set for amending the arbitrations. 2- The 
execution judge shall be authorized with all that concerns the execution of the arbitrators' decision.” 
582 civil procedures law article 214 supra note 480. 
583 Id. 
584 supra notes 406, 428, 459. 
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existence of the arbitration clause; as such, this decision is an example of the court 
upholding the arbitration clause: 
[The] appeal [had] two grounds, claiming that the dispute should be dismissed based 
on the existence of an arbitration clause in the contract between the parties, which 
states: “the agreement to arbitrate in this contract refers to a dispute about the 
construction contract, and the documents referred to in index two of this agreement, 
[state that] the contract includes all aspects of payment and conclusion of the contract 
and submits it to the owner, and the second index includes the description of the 
advisors …” This implies that the arbitration clause interpretation includes all the 
disputes arising from the construction agreement from the start and until the 
fulfillment of the contract. The appellant argues that the appealed decision did not 
agree with this interpretation of the clause, which resulted in dismissal of the clause 
by claiming that article no. 18/1 of the agreement, which contains the clause, limits 
the scope of the arbitration between the owner and the contractor in regard to the 
fulfillment of the specification of index two of the contract and does not include the 
sub-construction contract.  
 
The court agreed with this argument, stating that according to article 203585 and the 
jurisprudence of this court, which defines arbitration as an exceptional method of 
dispute resolution that constitutes excluding individuals from their right to seek their 
natural judge and the guarantees that are included from submitting the dispute to 
them, the court should limit the scope of the arbitration to what the parties agree upon 
in the arbitration agreement. Even if the trial court has the right to interpret and 
explain the parties’ contracts and clauses, this interpretation is governed by the 
parties’ intent, and the court is required to base that interpretation on sound reasoning 
and that does not exceed the parties agreement. It is also required to look at the entire 
contract and the nature of the agreement, not to mention the customs that govern the 
transaction. In essence, the construction contract between the parties defined the terms 
of the contract in clause 1 of the contract, and the dispute settlement method in clause 
18 of the contract. By examining both of them, it becomes clear that the sub-
construction contract falls under the arbitration clause. Furthermore, since the 
appellant failed to appear in front of the first instance court, the first hearing in which 
he may argue about the existence of the arbitration clause is considered to be the one 
in front of the appeals court, according to article 203586. 
The court establishing that the first hearing is not necessarily limited to the first 
instance court, but that it is fundamental to the survivability of the arbitral process, 
would seem to allow the parties to dismiss the litigation at any time. However, this is 
not an expression of the requirements of article 203; rather, the court is clarifying that 
the first hearing would apply in a situation in which the parties were unable to attend 																																																								
585 id. 
586 id. Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no.429/2002, issued on the23rd of February 2003. 
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the first hearing587. In this situation, the first hearing would extend to the hearing in 
which they did appear, even if it were the first hearing in front of the appeals court. 
This decision is also significant in that it opines on the necessity of drafting a clear 
arbitration clause that explains in detail the parties’ requirements and the dispute 
scope of the arbitration; this detail must be in place in order for the court’s 
interpretative power to be bound by the will of the parties. 
Another dispute that illustrates the hurdles facing the recognition of arbitral awards; 
this dispute went through multiple rounds of litigation and arbitration before being 
settled, only to be set-aside by the court. It was set aside because the arbitrator failed 
to uphold due process when he failed to notify the parties of the start of the arbitration 
procedure. The appellant tried to argue that the award was not a new award, but rather 
was an extension of a previous award issued in 1997 and that the award in question 
was an explanatory award588. Therefore, the arbitrator was not required to notify the 
parties nor were they required to be present in the hearing: 
[T]he appellant argues in the first ground and the last part of the second ground on the 
following: the decision of the court in case no. 83/98, which decided that this is a new 
award (issued on 24-9-1998) and not an explanatory award for the previous arbitration 
between the parties (which was issued on the 15-6-1997), basing their decision to set-
aside the award on the assumption that the arbitrator failed to uphold due process, 
since the arbitrator failed to notify the parties of the start of the proceedings and the 
submission of their documents. However, the arbitral award that was issued on the 24-
9-1998, which is the one the appellant requested to be recognized, is not a new award 
but rather an explanatory award of the award issued on 15-6-1997, which can be 
noted from the similar outcome of both awards. Since this second award is only an 
explanatory award, the arbitrator is not obliged to uphold the same procedures, such 
as notifying the parties of the hearing dates. The court dismissed this argument, 
stating that the court’s jurisprudence, in addition to article 212,589 imply that if the 
parties did not agree on a certain procedure to be followed in the arbitration, then the 
arbitrator is bound by the procedures mentioned in the civil procedures law, such as 																																																								
587 Civil procedures law article 203/5 supra note 442. 
588 Or rather a correction or an interpretation of their award, see general Redfern & Hunter supra note 
62 at 590-591, see also civil procedures law article 214/1 supra note 480. 
589 Civil procedures law article 212 supra note 486 and 477. 
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the notification of the parties and hearing their defense590, this obligation is required 
from an arbitrator that is authorized to mediate or not, and notifying the parties of the 
hearing does not mean that they need to be present in order to uphold due process. In 
essence, the failure to uphold due process is one of the grounds for setting-aside the 
arbitral award according to article 216,591 which implies that the party whose right to 
due process was infringed has the right to request the setting-aside of the award. 
Moreover, according to article 49 of the evidence law,592 this decision is considered a 
final judgment that received res judicata593. As such, the parties do not have to raise 
the same arguments that were brought in front of the court and were answered by a 
final decision. Also, the determination of whether the two awards relate to the same 
dispute would fall to the trial court, and that court’s decision is not subject to being 
vacated if they base their decision on sound reasoning. As such, the trial court’s 
interpretation that this is a new award is a sound interpretation, since it does not relate 
to the previous award.594 
The challenges facing arbitral awards demonstrated by this case may be attributed to 
the court’s tolerance for and encouragement of appeals, as well as to the legislation 
that allows such appeals.595 This dispute documents an arbitral award issued in 1998 
lingering in the court system from 13-11-2000 when the first instance court decided to 
recognize it, until 13-04-2003 when the cassation court finally set it aside. It reached 
the cassation court twice in appeals no. 387/2001 and 414/2001 and finally in this 
appeal, 21/2003. It would have been more practical for the parties to litigate their 
dispute in front of the court from the start. Then, the court’s decision would have 
received res judicata, and the parties would have received a final and binding 
decision, ending the dispute between them. This situation likely would not have 																																																								
590 Which are mentioned in article 212. 
591 Civil procedure law article 216 supra note 416. 
592 Evidence law article 49 states:” Res Judicata judgments are absolute proof as to the matters finally 
decided of the litigation, and no proof is admitted against the legal presumption resulting therefrom, 
provided that such judgments refer to rights between the parties themselves acting in the same 
capacities and having the same object and the same cause. The court, by its own initiative, shall decide 
the incontestable character of this proof.” 
593 See general El-ahdab & El-ahdab supra note 37 at 47-48. See Redfern & Hunter supra note 62 at 
561-565. Redfern & hunter defines this principle as :” The basic principle of res judicata provides that 
a right or fact specifically put in issue and determined by a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction 
cannot later be put back into question as between the same parties.” They continue to distinguish 
between the application of this principle in common and civil law jurisdictions: “ In common law 
jurisdictions, the estoppel of res judicata broadly falls into two categories: cause of action 
estoppel….and issue estoppel….. Many civil law jurisdictions only apply res judicata as a cause of 
action estoppel….” id at 561. 
594 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no. 21/2003, issued on the 13th of August 2003 
595 Civil procedures law article 217/2 supra note 543. 
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occurred if the court’s interpretative power were limited, since the probability of 
setting-aside the award often increases when the case was revisited more than once. 
The affect of due process on the recognition of an arbitral award is the subject of the 
next dispute, and the affect that binding the arbitrator to article 212596 has on setting-
aside awards. 
The appellant argues that the arbitrator is not bound by the same procedures that bind 
the court, except to the procedures mentioned in article 212,597 which regulates the 
procedures that govern the hearing, the notification of the parties of the hearing dates, 
and the upholding of due process. The appellant claims that the arbitrator upheld those 
requirements, in addition to upholding due process. The defendant claims that the 
arbitrator failed to uphold due process by not giving him the opportunity to respond to 
the appellant. However, the defendant had prior knowledge of the appellant’s request, 
which can be deduced from his deposition in front of the arbitration, in which he 
acknowledged these facts. Moreover, that request that was made in front of the 
arbitrator, and the court should have investigated whether or not the defendant was 
aware of the request, rather than dismissing it based on comparing it with the expert’s 
report. Lastly, the award shows that the defendant was aware of the appellant’s 
request and confirmed this request. However, the court agreed with the defendant’s 
claim without receiving proper proof from the defendant. The court dismissed this 
claim, citing article 212,598 even though it states that the arbitrator is not bound by the 
same procedures of the court. However, the arbitrator is bound by the general 
principles of adjudication and due process, which include giving the parties the 
opportunity to examine the documents presented in the arbitration. The failure to 
uphold these principles would constitute a ground for setting-aside the award. 
Furthermore, it is not sufficient to uphold these principles to claim that the arbitrator 
noted in the award that the documents were presented to the defendant. This cannot be 
amended later on by referring to submitting the award back to the arbitrator or for the 
court to investigate it by asking the arbitrator or the litigants or any of the witnesses 
that were present in the arbitral hearing. Moreover, according to the appealed decision 
and the arbitral award, the arbitrator noted the submission of the document in question 
on 18-10-2001. However, that document was not presented to the defendant until 10-
1-2002, which is after the issuing of the arbitral award. Thus, the arbitrator failed to 
uphold due process in this instance, and the award shall be set-aside in this instance. 
The appealed decision stated that the documents presented do not show that the 
appellant was present on 18-10-2001, and that the arbitrator’s note of the submission 
of this document is not sufficient on its own to prove that it was submitted on that 
date. Therefore, the court came to the right conclusion by deciding to set-aside the 
award, based on the jurisprudence of this court that the deposition was yet to be 
determined beyond doubt. If any doubts were presented, then the deposition would be 
dismissed. Lastly, the appellant’s argument that the defendant’s deposition constitutes 																																																								
596 Civil procedures law article 212 supra notes 486,477. 
597 id. 
598 Id. 
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an acknowledgement of this fact has no legal basis; as such the entire appeal has no 
legal basis. Therefore, the court decided to dismiss the appeal.599 
This is another illustration of the court holding arbitration to the same 
standards and principles that the court is required to uphold. The nature of these 
principles is general600, which gives the court the ability to maneuver and interpret 
them in a way that supports their views on arbitration. Arbitration is an informal 
procedure, but here we see an award was vacated due to failure to uphold due process 
and the principles of adjudication; in this case, the arbitrator did not record the 
minutes of the hearing properly or up to the court’s standards, despite recording the 
document submission date on the face of the document and signing it601. The vacating 
of the award on these grounds can only be justified if viewing arbitration as an 
exception to the court’s jurisdiction that lacks the proper tools to uphold the parties’ 
rights, so the court stepped in to protect and uphold these rights. 
The acceptance of the parties’ freedom of contract602, and the upholding of the 
parties’ contractual obligation, are fundamental elements in developing the arbitral 
process, as exemplified by the next decision: 
The appellant argued that the court dismissed his request to appoint an 
arbitrator on the ground that the appellant did not follow the appointment procedures 
to which the parties has agreed in the contract. These procedures include mediating 
the dispute before initiating an arbitration procedure. However, the appellant claims 																																																								
599 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no. 161/2003, issued on the 14th June 2003. 
600 See Turki supra note 11 at 22-23, the author names the general principles required from the court to 
uphold. 
601id at 22, since in the courts view these principles relate to the public policy and therefore the court is 
obliged to uphold them when it comes to litigation. However, not all of these principles are required to 
be present in arbitration, in fact one of the reasons parties choose to arbitrate is to escape from the 
procedures that govern litigation in front of the court, as Redfern & Hunter puts it: “an arbitration can 
be tailored to meet the specific requirement of the dispute, rather than having to be conducted in 
accordance with fixed rules of civil procedure.” Redfern & Hunter supra note 62 at 33. 
602 The parties right to freedom of contract can be inferred in appeal no. 346/1991 supra note 528 and 
appeal no. 91/1992 supra note 533. See general Najidah supra note 477 at 20-23, Bechor supra note 17 
at 147-149, Hindi supra note 103 at 2-3 these authors examine this concept from the point view of an 
Arabian scholar, see Carbonneau supra note 73 at 24-25, for a western interpretation of freedom of 
contract. It can be noted that both the west and Arabian scholars tend to agree on what is meant to be 
“freedom of contract”. 
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that he submitted a letter from an engineering expert (the mediator) in which he asked 
him to settle the dispute, despite the fact that the obligation of proving the facts falls 
to the defendant. Furthermore, this expert should not be appointed as an arbitrator in 
the dispute between the parties, since he cannot act as an arbitrator and be an 
adversary at the same time, which makes this clause void since it infringes public 
policy rules. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that based on the general principles of 
contracting, arbitration is considered a contract or an agreement between the parties. 
As such, the parties have the right to agree on any condition or procedure that does 
not contradict the rules of public policy.603 Thus, agreeing on certain conditions or 
procedures prior to submitting the dispute to arbitration in the arbitration agreement 
implies that the parties are obliged to fulfill those conditions before referring the 
dispute into arbitration, since they are bound by contract to this condition. 
Furthermore, the obligation to prove that these conditions have been met falls to the 
party that is requesting the submission of the dispute into arbitration. Arguing that the 
clause is void based on the fact that the expert is both an adversary and an arbitrator 
has no grounds, since the parties have agreed by their own free will to submit the 
dispute to the mediator (the engineering expert) before submitting it into arbitration, 
and the expert is not considered as an arbitrator in this instance…604  
 
The principle established in this decision was not invented by the court nor is it 
unique to arbitration. The court is simply applying contractual principles to 
arbitration. In this case, the court recognized the parties’ freedom of contract in 
arbitration, which led to upholding the arbitration agreement. This suggests that the 
court is applying a double standard or at least limiting those principles. This double 
standard is illustrated when one of the parties seeks to resort to the court despite 
having an arbitration clause or agreement, which would be considered waiving the 
right to arbitrate if the other party did not uphold the arbitration clause in the first 
hearing.605 This is a clear limitation of the parties’ right to freedom of contract. The 
affect of these principles in practice are important if not crucial to the promotion of 
arbitration, for the court based its decision to refuse the appointment request on these 
principles. Therefore, the test or the question that the court should answer is whether 																																																								
603 The court is confirming the parties’ freedom of contract in this decision. 
604 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no.140/2007, issued on the 7th of October 2007. 
605 Civil Procedures article 203/5 supra note 442. 
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its decisions would settle the dispute or drop it into a circle of adjudication. A test 
such as this could check the court’s interpretative authority and lead to promoting 
arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution that is functional and equal 
to the court in authority. 
The importance of customs in interpreting the arbitral clause, in addition to the affect 
on arbitration of the nature of the transaction, are at issue in this next dispute, which 
the court used to dismiss the appellant’s ground for appeal: 
The court decided to dismiss this ground, stating that article 204606 implies that if the 
arbitration clause or agreement did not contain a method of appointing an arbitrator or 
the number of arbitrators, the court shall appoint arbitrators upon the request of one of 
the parties. Furthermore, clause 67 of the contract implies that the parties agreed 
before submitting their dispute to arbitration to mediate the dispute607. If the mediator 
failed, then they shall submit their dispute to the arbitration tribunal, and if the parties 
failed to appoint the arbitrators within 15 days, then the parties could request the court 
to appoint arbitrators. The court interpreted the sole arbitrator requirement to be a 
mediator, basing this interpretation on the fact that the clause states that “the arbitrator 
shall mediate the dispute between the parties” and on article 265/2608 and 258609 of the 
civil transactions. This implies that the purpose of the contract should be deduced 
from what has been drafted and the intent of the parties. Therefore, the court should 
search for the parties’ intent by interpreting the contract text and be guided in their 
interpretation by the nature of that transaction and its customs.610 
This decision is a further indication of the enormous power the court holds over 
arbitration, in addition to showing how the proper use of this power can assist 
arbitration. On the other hand, this decision also shows the court ignoring the 
																																																								
606 Civil Procedures article 204 supra note 407. 
607 Gillard & Savage describe this article as: “Article 67 of the FIDIC conditions provides for a fairly 
complex two-tier procedures for settling disputes arising between the owner and the contractor.” 
Gillard & Savage supra note 65 at 18. 
608 Civil transaction law article 265 states: “1- When the wording of a contract is clear, it cannot be 
deviated from in order to ascertain by means of interpretation the intention of the contracting parties. 2 
- Where the contract has to be construed, it is necessary to ascertain the common intention of the 
contracting parties and to go beyond the literal meaning of the words, taking into account the nature of 
the transaction as well as that loyalty and confidence which should exist between the parties in 
accordance with commercial usage.” 
609 Civil Transaction law article 258 states: “1-In contracts, purposes and meanings are decisive, not the 
wording or construction forms. 2-True meaning is the basis of words. A word shall not bear a metaphor 
unless it is impossible to construe them according to their true meaning.” 
610 Dubai Court of cassation, appeal no. 294/2008, issued on the 1st of March 2009 
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provisions of article 204/2611, an article that limits appeals, which defeats the purpose 
of opting-out into arbitration in the first place. 
The requirements of article 203612 are of concern yet again in this next decision in 
which the court establishes that it is essential for the party trying to uphold the 
arbitration agreement to present his request to the court in the first hearing. Otherwise, 
it would be considered a waiver of their right to arbitrate. This adds an additional 
requirement to the party trying to uphold the contractual obligation. This decision also 
exemplifies the importance of having a functioning arbitration system. In this 
instance, the parallel litigations and appeals that resulted in a lengthy litigation 
process could have been avoided if the court had upheld the arbitration clause, as 
illustrated by the court’s response to the appellant’s argument: 
[T]he appellant argues in the first ground that the appeals court decided to dismiss the 
request to dismiss the dispute based on the existence of an arbitration clause, claiming 
that his attorney was present in the first hearing613 and requested an extension to 
present his power of attorney. The appellant argues that the first hearing is the one in 
which he was present or whomever he chose to represent him was present. Since the 
attorney presented the agreement on 2/6/2008 and upheld this clause, then that should 
be considered as the first hearing. The court dismissed this argument, stating that 
articles 50614 and 55615 of the civil procedures law imply that the first hearing is the 
one in which the attorney or the defendant is present, and this fact does not change 
because an extension was requested to present the agreement. Furthermore, article 
203616 of the civil procedures law requires that the party trying to uphold the 
arbitration clause or agreement take a positive action in the first hearing. Doing 
otherwise would be considered a waiver of the right to uphold the arbitration, since it 
is viewed as a waiver of the arbitration clause.617 
																																																								
611 Civil Procedures article 204/2 supra note 497. 
612 Civil Procedures article 203, supra notes 406, 428 and 459. 
613 Which was conducted on 5/5/2008. 
614 Civil Procedures article 50 states: “On the day fixed for examining the action, the opposing parties 
shall appear (attend) by themselves or whoever they brief (authorize - appoint - delegate).” 
615 Civil Procedures article 55 states: “1 - The court shall accept from the parties whoever they shall 
appoint as proxy according to the law. 2 - The proxy must establish his appointment as proxy for his 
client by an official document. 3 - The proxy may be done through a declaration recorded in the 
session's minutes.” 
616 Civil Procedures article 203, supra notes 406, 428 and 459. 
617 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeals no.142/2009 and 146/2009, issued on the 13th of September 2009. 
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Yet again the first hearing comes into play, and this requirement comes into a 
collision course with arbitration and undermines the arbitral process. 
The next case is another decision that examines the first hearing requirement and its 
affect on setting aside arbitral awards, in addition to the affect that determining the 
exact date has on the dispute when an appellant tries to uphold the arbitral award. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that articles 208618 and 212619 of the civil 
procedures law implies that the arbitration hearing and process start by the appearance 
of the parties in front of the tribunal or by notifying them. Moreover, these articles 
require the arbitrators to notify the parties within 30 days of their appointment of the 
date of the first hearing. It is not required for the parties to be present in the arbitration 
hearing; the only requirement is that the arbitrators give the parties the opportunity to 
present their defense. The court states that since confidentiality is the nature of the 
arbitration hearing and the norm when it comes to arbitration, unless the parties agree 
to the contrary, all that is required from the arbitrators is to uphold due process and 
the parties’ right of defense. Therefore, arbitration does not fall under the civil 
procedures law when it comes to notifying the parties or requiring their presence in 
the arbitration hearing. However, the arbitrators are bound by the rules stated in the 
arbitration chapter. As such and according to the jurisprudence of this court, 
deficiencies in the award cannot be amended by asking the arbitrators to explain or 
complete any shortcoming in the award, such as asking the arbitrators to prove the 
first hearing. Therefore, once the arbitrators have agreed and notified the parties of the 
first hearing date, they are unable to change that date, in order for the time period to 
be properly calculated. Determining the first hearing falls to the discretion and 
interpretation of the trial court, according to articles 210620 and 216621 and the court’s 
jurisprudence. This implies that the one of the grounds for setting-aside the award is 																																																								
618 Civil procedures article 208 state:” 1 - The arbitrator shall, within thirty days at most from the 
acceptance of the arbitration, notify the litigant parties with the date of the first session fixed to 
examine the litigation and with its meeting place and that without obligation to the rules settled in that 
law for the notification and he shall fix for them a date to submit their documents, briefs and defense 
aspects .2 - It shall be possible to arbitrate according to what one side shall submit if the other party 
failed to do on the appointed date. 3- If the arbitrators were many they should undertake, together, the 
investigation procedures and each of them should sign on the reports.” 
619 Civil Procedures article 212 supra notes 486 and 476.. 
620 Civil procedures Article 210 state : “1 - If the litigant parties haven't set, as a condition in the 
agreement, a date for the arbitration the arbitrator should arbitrate within six month from the date of the 
session of the first arbitration, otherwise anyone who wanted of the litigant parties may prosecute the 
litigation to the court or may continue therein before the court if it was prosecuted before that. 2 - The 
litigant parties may agree, expressly or implicitly, to extend the appointed date, by agreement or by 
law, and they may authorizing the arbitrator to extend it to a certain date and the court may, according 
to the request of the arbitrator or one of the litigant parties, prolong the time - limits appointed in the 
preceding clause to the period which it shall find adequate for deciding in the litigation. 3 - The date 
shall be suspended as far as the litigation is suspended or severed before the arbitrator and its 
progression shall be resumed from the date of the arbitrator's acknowledgment of the extinguishment of 
the suspension or the severance's reason, and if the rest of the time - limit were a month it shall be 
extended to a month.” 
621 Civil Procedures article 216 supra note 416. 
	 162	
that it was issued after the agreed upon time. Therefore, based on the appealed 
decision, the first hearing date was determined to be 11/9/2007, since postponing the 
hearing on that date would not change the fact that it was the first hearing. As such, 
the court decided to dismiss the appeal for the previous reasons.622 
The cassation court supported the appeals court’s decision and interpretation 
of the award over what the first instance court had decided. This emphasizes the idea 
that recognizing an arbitral award at the first instance court would not necessarily give 
it a res judicata status. It also illustrate the two methods of interpreting the award that 
were employed by the courts. The first method was employed by the first instance 
court, which decided to recognize the award by accepting both the arbitrator’s and the 
appellant’s claim in regard to determining the first hearing date. The appeal court 
decided that the date of the first hearing was the one that the arbitrators decided upon 
at the start and not the postponed date. This decision takes the litigants back to the 
start of their dispute without resolving it. Essentially, the parties’ right to arbitrate has 
been forfeited, and they would have to seek the court again to resolve their dispute. 
This decision also shows the dangers of having a court that tolerates and encourages 
appeals, especially when it comes to recognizing arbitral awards, since the chances for 
setting-aside decisions tend to increase through an appeal. 
The ability to appeal decisions about appointing the arbitrator is another cause 
of concern that is repeated more than once, and is not necessarily unique to 
construction arbitration. This decision exemplifies the idea that there is no boundary 
on appeals, nor any provisions or clauses that limit or deter appeals. 
The third part of the first ground argues that the appellant requested the appointment 
of an arbitrator, which the court accepted, making this decision un-appealable 
according to article 204.623 
																																																								
622 Dubai Court of cassation appeal no.157/2009, issued on the 27th of September 2009. 
623 Civil Procedures article 204 supra note 407. 
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The court dismissed this argument, stating that article 204/2624 of the civil procedures 
law indicates that the decisions that are not subject to appeal are the ones that concern 
the appointment of the arbitrator in accordance with the conditions set in paragraph 
one of the same article, which is an exception to the general principle regarding 
appeals. As such, the court is limited when interpreting and applying this article. 
Therefore, it should be limited to appeals that have to do with the appointment or 
replacement of the arbitrator and does not extend to other preliminary decisions 
regarding the appointment decision—such as interpreting the arbitration clause in 
order to determine if it contained a process of appointment. The first instance court 
decided to appoint an arbitrator without upholding the procedures mentioned in article 
31 of the contract, which states that the arbitrator should be named by one of the 
parties before starting the arbitration procedure. As such, the appeals court has the 
right to accept the appeal and determine if these conditions have been met.625 
This decision by the court exemplifies that even when there is clear and explicit text 
in the law that denies appeals, it may not mean that a decision is un-appealable. The 
court may find a way in which to justify the appeal, such as is the case in this 
decision. By establishing this rule, the court is essentially stating that article 204/2626 
appeal condition cannot be met. In essence, the court is allowing appeals of an 
appointment decision in contrast to an explicit article in the law, which defeats the 
legislature’s intent of drafting this article to deny appeals intended to hinder the 
process of arbitration. 
Another dispute that involves the FDIC627 contract is one in which the arbitral award 
was brought for recognition. Even though the cassation court decided to uphold the 
first instance decision to recognize the arbitral award, there remain certain points that 
are in need of examination. The first is the nature of construction contracts; the mixed 
nature of these contracts, and of the parties involved, makes them favorable for 
arbitration628. The second is the court’s interpretation of the arbitration agreement. 
The court accepts that due to the nature of the transaction, the parties’ acceptance of 																																																								
624 Id.  
625 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no. 131/2009, issued on the 14th of June 2009. 
626 Civil Procedures article 204 supra note 407. 
627 See general Gillard & Savage supra note 65 at 18. 
628 See general Turki supra note 11 at 551-553, were the author discusses construction suits, within the 
confines of the UAE civil procedures law. 
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the arbitration agreement may not occur in the same document that contains the main 
agreement. 
The appellant argues that the appeals court decided that the letter of 
acceptance dated 5-03-2006 did not contain any indication of settling the dispute 
according to the rules of the FDIC629 contract or the arbitration clause, which is 
emphasized by the fact that the parties did not sign the arbitration clause in that 
contract. Furthermore, the letter of acceptance of the FDIC630 is a general acceptance 
that does not involve an acceptance of the arbitration clause of that contract. The 
appellant argues that this is a binding contract between the parties, and the letter of 
acceptance shows that the parties intended to settle any dispute arising from the 
construction contract through arbitration. 
The court accepted this argument, stating that articles 203631 and 216632 of the civil 
procedures law imply that arbitration is “the disputants choosing an impartial 
arbitrator to settle the dispute between them without referring the dispute to the court; 
this could be in relation to a dispute that occurred or will occur and based upon an 
arbitration agreement or a clause. The arbitration focuses on the parties’ intent and 
agreement. This agreement is the main source from which the arbitrator’s authority is 
derived and in which the parties are able to opt-out of the court, which is the reason 
the legislature put extra assurances in place—including: the arbitration agreement 
needs to be in writing, the arbitrator must render an award within the scope of the 
arbitration agreement, the arbitration agreement is not required to be in a single 
document and the acceptance of the agreement can be in another document. 
Moreover, it can be proven in writing or through the parties’ communication and 
letters whether the documents and letters were signed by the sender; this can be 
proven through any form of written communication. Arbitration cannot be initiated 
unless the parties’ intent to arbitrate is proven, which can be proven if the arbitration 
clause was included in the main contract or in a separate arbitration agreement signed 
by the parties.” Accordingly, a construction bidding is considered as a construction 
contract agreement, and the trial court has the right to deduce the parties’ intent to 
arbitrate from the facts of the dispute without the supervision of the cassation court. 
The only requirement is that it is based on factual reasoning. The court explains that 
the reasoning is null if the court’s deduction is not valid from a subjective perspective 
or if the records show that the court did not understand the facts of the case. 
Therefore, and based on these facts, the arbitration agreement is considered valid, and 
the court decided to uphold the first instance rule and dismiss the appeals court.633 
 Despite the positive outcome (for arbitration) in this dispute, one must ask 
why a court’s decision to recognize an arbitral award was subject to appeal. What 
does accepting such appeals achieve? An arbitral award issued in 2006 and later 																																																								
629 See general Gillard & Savage supra note 65 at 17-18. 
630 id. 
631 Civil Procedures article 203, supra notes 406, 459. 
632 Civil Procedures article 216, supra note 416. 
633 Dubai court of cassation appeal no.73/2010, issued on the 9th of May 2010 
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recognized by the first instance court went through a full litigation that examined the 
main contract between the parties to determine whether the dispute would fall under 
the scope of the arbitration agreement. Also, the arbitral award was set-aside by the 
appeals court. This outcome seems to defeat the purpose of opting-out into arbitration. 
Lengthy litigation could have been avoided if the court had been willing to view 
arbitration as an equal solution. 
The next case addresses more than one issue relating to arbitration: the 
appointment of the arbitrators, the first hearing, determining the parties in the dispute, 
the affect of arbitration on third parties, what is considered to be court-annexed, and 
the separability doctrine. 
The court dismissed this claim, stating that the court’s intervention in the appointment 
process is limited to the conditions stated in article 204634. One of those conditions 
states that if the parties have failed to come to an agreement in regard to the 
arbitrators, and one of the parties sought the intervention of the court to resolve this 
issue, the parties do not have the right to appeal once the court has answered their 
request. Based on the facts of the dispute and the sub-construction contract, which 
states that the parties to the dispute agreed to arbitrate any dispute that arising from 
this contract, the appellant company stated that the first defendant did not comply 
when a request was made to appoint an arbitrator to start the arbitration proceedings. 
This is why the first instance court appointed an arbitrator upon the appellant’s 
request. Therefore, the appellant has no right to appeal in this respect since the court 
granted their request.635 
 
This piece of the case relates to determining the scope of the arbitration: 
The appellant argues that the scope of the arbitration clause does not involve 
this request, for the arbitration clause scope involves disputes that concern the 
fulfillment of the construction contract. On the other hand, the appellant is seeking to 
be paid in exchange for the work done in the project. Furthermore, the arbitration 
clause has no affect, since the construction contract ended according to article 892 of 
the civil transaction.636 
 
																																																								
634 Civil Procedures article 204, supra note 407. 
635 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 167/2002, issued on the 2nd of June 2002. 
636 Civil Transaction article 892 states: “The contract for work shall come to an end by completing or 
by rescission of the contract by mutual agreement or by order of the court.” 
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The court dismissed this argument, stating that paragraph five of article 203 of the 
civil procedures law637 implies that if the parties have agreed to arbitrate, then they 
have waived their right to litigate in front of the court. In the event that one of the 
parties disregarded the existence of the arbitration clause and started the proceedings 
in front of the court and no one argued about the existence of the arbitration clause in 
the first hearing, then the parties’ right to argue on the existence of the arbitration 
clause would be waived. According to the jurisprudence of the court, the party 
seeking to uphold the arbitration agreement or clause needs to take a positive action in 
the first hearing by objecting to the proceedings and requesting the dismissal of the 
litigation and referring the dispute into arbitration. This requires that the dispute arose 
between the parties. The court explained what is considered a dispute: if the purpose 
is the protection of a legal right or the legal status of the parties, then it is a dispute. 
The scope of the arbitration needs to be identified clearly in the arbitration agreement; 
otherwise, it would be considered a ground for setting-aside the award according to 
article 203/3,638 which is the legal relationship over which the dispute arose. 
Identifying this relationship on its own is sufficient to consider the arbitration 
agreement valid, even if the agreement did not identify what disputes fall under the 
scope of the arbitration. Even though that arbitration is limited to what the parties 
have agreed to, they still have the right to identify what is considered to fall under the 
scope of the arbitration. The determination of whether a dispute falls under the scope 
of arbitration is the responsibility of the first instance court.639  
The third piece of this case relates to the affect of the arbitration clause on third 
parties:  
The court dismissed this claim stating that article 252 of the civil transaction law 
states that: “The contract does not impose any obligation on third parties, but may 
establish a right in their favor.”640 This implies that the arbitration agreement has no 
effect against third parties, and its effect is limited to the parties to the agreement, i.e., 
the parties that helped create the contract and have the will to be bound by it. 
However, the arbitration clause can extend its effect to third parties in certain 
circumstances, including, for instance, if the contract were transferred to a third party 
in this condition, the arbitration clause would affect this party. Moreover, according to 
article 891 of the civil transaction law,641 the determination of all of these factors is 
part of the subject matter court, and based on the facts of this dispute, the first 
instance court came to the decision by sound reasoning that is supported by evidence, 
and thus the court decided to dismiss this argument.642 
The fourth piece of this case relates to the affect of court-annexed arbitration: 
																																																								
637 Civil Procedures article 203, supra notes 406, 428 and 459. 
638 Civil Procedures article 203/3 supra note 428. 
639 Appeal no. 167/2002 supra note 635. 
640 Civil Transaction law article 252. 
641 Civil Transaction article 891 states: “The subcontractor may not have a claim against the master, as 
regards the dues of the first contractor, unless the latter refers him to the master.” 
642 Appeal no. 167/2002 supra note 635. 
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The fifth and seventh grounds of appeal argue that the court’s decision to refer the 
dispute into arbitration and to stop litigation until the arbitrator rendered an award and 
submitted it to the court for recognition is flawed. There is nothing in the law that 
states that the court should pause litigation until the arbitrator renders an award. By 
referring the dispute to arbitration, the court essentially gave up its jurisdiction over 
the dispute and recognized the award. The court dismissed this argument, stating that 
article 213643 shows that the court’s authority over court-annexed arbitration does not 
end even if it refers the dispute into arbitration; rather, it continues until the arbitrator 
renders an award that is recognized by the court.644 
 The court’s answers in this decision are worth analyzing to determine the 
factor responsible for the court’s change in its language. Regarding the affect on the 
court’s decision of a case being a court-annexed arbitration, it seems that in this 
situation, the court determined appointment of arbitrators in a court-annexed 
arbitration allow the court managed to extend its authority over the dispute. In this 
case, the court established the separability doctrine by dismissing the appellant’s 
argument that the end of the main contract constituted an end of the arbitration clause 
contained in the contract. The court responded to this argument by establishing the 
separability doctrine and stating that this dispute falls under the scope of the 
arbitration clause.  
This dispute raises further questions. Is there a separability doctrine? Do all 
requests for appointment of arbitrators involve a court-annexed arbitration? There is 
no right answer to these questions and all depends to the court and its willingness to 
accept or dismiss arbitration. 
4.5.1.4 Insurance 
The next two decisions show how the court addresses the relationship between 
arbitration and insurance policies. 
The first decision is another illustration of the court’s first hearing rule: 																																																								
643 Civil Procedures article 213 supra note 139. 
644 Appeal no. 167/2002 supra note 635. 
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The appellant claims in the first ground of the appeal that the court mixed up the start 
of the arbitration and the extension of the arbitration by misinterpreting articles 208645 
and 210646 of the civil procedures law in regards to the first hearing. The appellant 
claims that the first hearing was on 3-7-2008, in which he requested the arbitrator to 
hold the proceedings until the court rendered a decision in appeal no…/2008. This 
request was refused, thus making the hearing the first hearing and not a preliminary 
hearing. The appealed decision claims that this was a preliminary hearing and that the 
first hearing was on 10-7-2008. Thus, the arbitrator should have issued the award on 
2-1-2009 and not 1-2-2009. The appellant upheld this argument as a ground for 
setting-aside the award based on article 216647 of the civil procedures law. The 
appeals court dismissed this argument based on article 210,648 claiming that the 
hearing on 3-7-2008 was a preliminary hearing. The appellant argues that there is no 
such thing as a preliminary hearing and that the hearing that comes after the 
appointment of the arbitrators is the first hearing. The court accepted the appellant’s 
argument, stating that article 208649 defines the commencement of the arbitral 
proceedings to be the hearing in which the parties appear in front of the tribunal or are 
notified to appear.650 
Should the determination of the first hearing date be left to the trial court? 
Does the nature of the parties and of their dispute affect the court’s decision? Since 
the court does accept or encourage appeals, these questions require answers. The court 
in a previous decision stated that the trial court has the right to interpret the contract 
and the facts of the case without the supervision of the cassation court. The only 
condition that the court set is that this interpretation must have a legal basis and must 
not violate any public policy or order. As such, the determination of the first hearing 
can be interpreted in two ways—the way that the first instance and appeals courts 
interpret it, or the way in which the cassation court did. Thus, the cassation court 
should have upheld the decision of the appeal and first instance courts and their 
interpretation, in order to limited appeals submitted to them to on questions of law 
and not on re-determining the facts of the case. 
																																																								
645 Civil procedures law article 208 supra note 618. 
646 Civil procedures law article 210 supra note 620. 
647 Civil procedures law article 216 supra note 416. 
648 Civil procedures law article 210 supra note 620. 
649 Civil procedures law article 208 supra note 618. 
650 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 317/2009, issued on the 14th of February 2010. 
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The parties to the dispute should have affected the court’s decision, given that both 
litigants are companies. This should have eased the court’s concerns about arbitration 
being a dangerous process and that the parties require the court’s protection, since the 
nature of commercial parties and commercial transactions almost always have an 
embedded risk factor in them651, and as such they do not require the court’s 
intervention to protect them. This implies that the nature of the parties did not the 
court’s decision and was irrelevant factor in the setting-aside of the award. However, 
the nature of the transaction between the parties may have affected the court’s 
decision. The contract that contained the arbitration clause was an insurance policy, 
suggesting that the nature of the dispute is a mixed one, which is why this dispute was 
submitted to the civil circuit. In essence, this implies that the court’s decision is 
influenced by their view that arbitration is an exception to legitimate jurisprudence 
and that any interpretation or examination of the awards should be limited and guided 
by this view. 
The second appeal raises the question of the scope of the arbitration clause and 
whether it involves tort disputes or not. It also raises a question about the extent of the 
affect of arbitration on third parties such as an insurance company. The appellant (the 
investment company) in appeal no. 41/2010652 tried to uphold the arbitration clause by 
claiming that the dispute arose from the lease contract between itself and the tenant 
(the insurer), and that since they both agreed in the lease agreement that the appellant 
would not be liable for any tort claims, the investment company refused the request to 
refer this dispute into arbitration. The appeals court’s response to this argument is that 
																																																								
651 Qasim explains this by stating that: “profit is the goal of any trader, and the trader upon seeking this 
profit has a chance of suffering a loss, since gaining a profit rests on the status of the market.” See ALI 
SAID QASIM, MBAD’I AL-QANON AL-TJARI FE DWALT AL-EMARAT AL-ARABYAH AL-MTHADAH, (The 
Principles of Commercial Law in the United Arab Emirates) 19 (2nd ed. 2011). 
652 This case had two appeals submitted to the cassation court; see Dubai Court of cassation appeal no. 
41 and 74/2010, issued on the 2nd of June 2010. 
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the defendant’s (the insurance company) claims were based on torts and thus did not 
fall under the arbitration clause. The appellant argues that the insurance company 
replaced the insurer in the claim, and that thus it does not have the right to raise a 
claim based on tort, since the lease agreement contained a clause that exempted the 
appellant from claims of this nature. 
[T]he appellant argues in the first and third grounds that they upheld their 
argument that the court should dismiss the case based on the existence of an 
arbitration clause in the lease contract between them and the tenant (the 
insurer), claiming that the court dismissed this argument by stating that they 
do not have the right to arbitrate. The court also claimed that the defendant 
(the insurance company) initiated this damage claim not based on the lease 
contract that contains the arbitration clause, but based on the principle of torts, 
which makes this dispute fall outside the scope of the arbitration clause. The 
appellant claims that the insurance company does not have the right to ask for 
damages based on tort, since the lease agreement contained a clause that 
exempted them from any suits based on tort. They claim that this agreement 
does not infringe upon public policy or order and as such the court needs to 
uphold it. The court dismissed this argument, even though (as it also stated 
that) its jurisprudence accepts the parties’ agreement to exempt tort claims. 
However, this exemption is limited to the parties’ ability to prove that the tort 
claim accord was due to an act that was a direct result of the other party’s 
action, which exceeds the contractual obligation, and as such they are liable 
either by the contract or not. Furthermore, the court has the right to identify 
the basis of the damages on its own without the request of the parties. The 
agreement between the parties to submit the dispute from a certain agreement 
into arbitration does not affect third parties that are not bound by that 
agreement. Furthermore, article 296 of the civil transaction law states that all 
clauses that exempt the party from tort liability are void.653 The court 
explained that in this dispute, the parties’ liability is based on the principles of 
the tort and not on the lease contract, since the leaking of the pipes that 
resulted in damages to the goods is not a part of the lease agreement. 
Therefore, the appeals court came to the right conclusion in dismissing the 
appellant’s request to arbitrate.654 
This decision indicates the need to implement the Separability and kompetenz-
kompetenz doctrine655, which would help change the court’s view on arbitration and 
																																																								
653 Civil Transaction Law article 296 of the states: “Any condition exonerating from tort liability shall 
be deemed null and void.” 
654 Appeal no. 41 and 74/2010 supra note 652. 
655 See Carbonneau supra note 74 at 31. The author explains the Separability doctrine as:” The 
separability doctrine provides that the agreement to arbitrate is separate from, and independent of, the 
main contract.” and kompetenz-kompetenz as:” The kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine, also known as 
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acceptance of appeals; this may in turn minimize parallel litigation. However, even if 
this doctrine were applied, a mechanism would needed by which to stop parallel 
proceedings and to deter the party contesting the arbitrator’s jurisdiction from 
contesting the arbitrator’s decision656. This mechanism would need to take into 
account the court’s attitude toward appeals in order for such a mechanism to have a 
real affect. 
 
 I found no real difference between arbitration clauses in cases involving 
insurance policies and those involving construction contracts; the court practices the 
same level of scrutiny for both. 
 
4.5.1.5 Companies 
The five arbitration cases657 examined in this section were found in the 
companies’ contracts and presented to the civil circuit court. 
The first decision examines the liquidation of companies’ assets, and here the 
court yet again renders the final and binding arbitral award powerless. The court states 
that the award in itself is not subject to appeal, but the court’s decision to recognize 
the award is subject to appeal. The only exception to this rule occurs in the event that 
the arbitrators were authorized to mediate the dispute. When interpreting such 
agreement, the court tries to limit the powers that it gives to the arbitrators, because 
																																																																																																																																																														
jurisdiction to rule on jurisdictional challenges, provides that the arbitral tribunal has the authority to 
decide on its own authority to rule.” See also Redfern & Hunter supra note 62 at 117-120, were the 
authors discuss separability doctrine. 
656 Since one of the main attributes of arbitration and certainly one of the attractive feature of it is 
having a final and binding award, see general Redfern & Hunter supra note 62 at 31, when explaining 
why parties choose to arbitrate in international arbitration they explained that one of the two main 
reasons is the enforceability of the award, naturally this would entitle that the award should be final in 
order for it to be enforced. See general Tweedale supra note 72 at 38-39. See Born supra note 65 at 5. 
657 Excluding the one that were examined at the first section, which is Dubai Court of cassation, appeal 
no. 346/1991 supra note 528, which should bring the number of cases to six. 
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(the court argues) agreements would fall under the article 217/3658 exception from the 
general rule, and this allows parties to appeal the court’s decision to recognize an 
arbitral award. The court justifies their interpretation and their requirement that such 
power should be explicitly stated in the arbitral clause by saying that arbitration is a 
dangerous method, since the arbitrator, once given the authority to mediate, would 
make his award subject to the exception of article 217/3659. 
[T]he appellant argues on the second ground that the appeals court decided to dismiss 
the appeal on the ground that the arbitrator was authorized to mediate the dispute 
between the parties, which is mentioned in the arbitration agreement between the 
parties that states: “that the arbitral award is final and binding- once the parties agree 
that the arbitrator is authorized to mediate and the dispute did not end up in front of 
him through mediation.” However, they agreed in the arbitration agreement that the 
arbitrator is bound to uphold due process and hear the parties’ arguments, which does 
not imply that the arbitrator is authorized to mediate the dispute. Also, the parties’ 
agreeing that the award is final and binding does not mean that they give up their right 
to appeal the first instance decision to recognize the arbitral award. The cassation 
court agreed with this ground, stating that article 217660 implies that the exceptions to 
appealing the decision to recognize an arbitral award is limited to the situation in 
which the arbitrator is authorized to mediate the dispute. The will of the parties to 
authorize the arbitrator to mediate is not assumed; it needs to be explicitly stated in 
the agreement. Thus, agreeing in the arbitration agreement that the award is not 
subject to the rules of the civil procedures and that the award is final and binding does 
not imply that the parties intended to authorize the arbitrator to mediate the dispute. 
The court justifies its view in this matter by stating that arbitration that includes a 
mediation procedure is a dangerous process, since arbitrators that are authorized to 
mediate are not bound by the law, only to the rules of public policy. What is meant by 
the waiver of the parties’ right to appeal in article 217/3661 is the parties’ explicit 
waiver of the right to appeal the decision to recognize the arbitral award or set it 
aside, not the right to appeal the arbitral award, since the award itself is not subject to 
appeal according to article 217/1.662 Even though the court has the right to interpret 
the parties’ agreement, this right is limited, since the court is required to interpret the 
agreement within the confines of the terms of the agreement. Therefore, the fifth 
clause of the arbitration agreement, which states: “in regard to the mediation between 
the parties” and the seventh clause, which states “with the exception of the above, the 
arbitrator is either authorized to mediate or not, and the award is final and binding for 
both parties, and they are obliged to enforce it, except if it was in contrast to a public 
policy rule or the law.” This implies that the parties did not authorize the arbitrator to 
mediate the dispute, and this is not changed by what may have been written in the 																																																								
658 Civil Procedures Law Article 217 supra note 543. 
659 id. 
660 id. 
661 id. 
662 id. 
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third clause, which states “the arbitrator is not bound by the normal procedures of the 
court.” Therefore, the parties’ agreement does not imply that they have given the 
arbitrator the right to mediate the dispute. And, the phrase “final and binding” in the 
agreement does not mean that they waived their right to appeal the court’s decision of 
recognition. Thus, the court decided to dismiss the appeal and refer the decision to the 
appeal court.663 
Despite having a commercial element, this dispute did not escape the court’s 
views on arbitration664, implying that there is no barrier to repel or stop parties from 
appealing the court’s decision on recognition, even if an exception to appeals existed. 
As is the case in this dispute, the court would find a loophole by using their powers of 
interpretation on the parties’ agreement. 
This dispute involves a request to recognize arbitral awards and contains two 
companies as parties to that dispute, in addition to having a arbitral institute, and here 
the court decided to nullify the award: 
The appellant appealed this decision to the cassation court, arguing that the 
appeal court upheld the first instance decision to dismiss the request to recognize the 
award on the ground that the award lacked a copy of the arbitration agreement, which 
the court claimed is a ground for setting-aside the award. The appellant argues that an 
arbitration institute within the UAE, an institute that is recognized by the UAE, issued 
the award and the court should not undermine the authority of this institute. 
Moreover, the award was issued according to an arbitration agreement between the 
parties dated 6/5/2002, which was presented to the arbitration institute in compliance 
with article 23 of the institute rules. Furthermore, the chamber confirmed sending the 
award to the court containing the arbitration agreement, and it also sent a copy of the 
arbitration agreement to the chief justice in the second circuit of the Dubai First 
instance court. Moreover, the Chamber of commerce testimony that the arbitration 
agreement has been presented at the start of the arbitration proceedings should have 
been taken into account by the court when deciding to recognize the award, since this 
is an institutional arbitration. The court decided to refuse to recognize the award 
despite all of those facts. The legislature’s aim to present an arbitration agreement 
with the award is to avoid having an arbitration award issued without an agreement 
and to prevent the arbitrator from exceeding the scope of the arbitration. For the 
following reasons, the court should nullify the appealed decision and recognize the 
award. The court dismissed this claim, citing article 212/5665 of the civil procedures 																																																								
663 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 294/1994, issued on the 26th of November 1994. 
664 See supra 2.6.5 UAE Courts’ View of the Defintion. 
665 Civil Procedures Law article 212/5 states: “The award shall be in writing and pass in majority and 
accompanied by the dissenting vote, and it shall be accompanied by the arbitration agreement, a 
summary of the parties statement and their documents, the grounds and context of the award, the date 
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law and article 45/3 of the rules of the Dubai chamber of commerce and industry 
arbitration and mediation institute, which states: “the final award of the Tribunal Shall 
be in writing and must include: (a) the arbitration agreement….”666 In addition to the 
jurisprudence of this court, this case shows that the award should contain a copy of 
the arbitration agreement, which is an essential requirement that is required to be 
presented when recognizing the award, otherwise the award would be set aside. This 
rule does not change if the arbitration were to be ad hoc or an institutional, and this 
requirement cannot be fulfilled by presenting a testimony or a certificate from the 
institute that the agreement had been submitted at the start of the proceedings, a 
requirement that cannot be completed by a separate paper or by refereeing in the 
award to the arbitration agreement without presenting it. However, this requirement 
can be fulfilled by presenting the content of the agreement with the award; the 
purpose of this requirement is to allow the court to practice its supervisory role over 
arbitration. Furthermore, the appellant referred to document no.13 as a copy of the 
arbitration agreement, without explaining the content of this document in order for the 
court to recognize the award. Thus, the award is null and this fact is not affected by 
presenting a letter from the arbitration institute, which shows that the agreement had 
been presented at the start of the proceedings.667 
Even though an institute that is recognized by the UAE and is working within 
the confines of the chamber of commerce issued the award, this was not enough for 
the court to recognize the award. The court set aside the award, because it did not 
fulfill the requirement of article 212/5668 of the civil procedures law. The requirement 
designed to ensure that the arbitrator did not exceed the scope of the arbitration 
agreement cannot be amended or corrected later on, according to the court. It needs to 
be presented with the award and a mere referral to a copy of the award does not fulfill 
this requirement. From the court’s perspective, building on the fact that arbitration is 
being treated as an exception669, it will take strict measures to enforce the requirement 
of the law. As such, the court decided that the failure to comply with this requirement 
(outlined above) cannot be remedied by resubmitting the arbitration agreement to the 
court. Therefore, this decision establishes that having a valid arbitral award is not 																																																																																																																																																														
and place and the signature of the arbitrators. If one or more arbitrator refused to sign the award such a 
refusal shall be stated in the award, however the award is still valid if signed by the majority of the 
arbitrators.” 
666 Dubai International Arbitration Center (DIAC) conciliation and arbitration rules of 1994. article 
45/3. 
667 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no.328/2002, issued on the 23rd of November 2002. 
668 Civil Procedures law article 212/5 supra note 665. 
669 See supra 2.6.3 The Arab Jurist View, and Supra 2.6.5 UAE Court View of the Definition. 
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sufficient to recognize the award; it requires submitting the agreement with the award 
to the court in order for the court to recognize it. Again, the purpose of this 
requirement is to confirm that the arbitrator ruled within the scope of the arbitration 
agreement. The court could have fulfilled this result by accepting the resubmission of 
the agreement, or by accepting the letter from the institute as an indicator that the 
award was issued based on an arbitration agreement. The court’s decision in this case 
demonstrates that its hostile view on arbitration greatly impacts its decisions670. The 
court is viewing arbitration as a flawed method of dispute resolution671, even when 
dealing with commercial parties672 or a commercial arbitration, which creates a 
situation in which the parties cannot escape having to submit their dispute for a 
second time in front of the court, which (again) contradicts the purpose of opting-out 
into arbitration in the first place. 
The next dispute addresses the arbitrator’s ability to extend the arbitration: 
The third and fourth ground argues that the decision to accept the request of extending 
the arbitration, which has been granted by the court that heard the dispute in regards 
to appointing the arbitrators, even if it had been rendered by the head judge and 
signed by him alone it is still a lawful act, thus the court has no authority to nullify 
that judge’s decision. The appellant argues that the decision is null since the court 
dismissed the main defendant from the suit, and the court dismissed the request that 
the petition in question not be subject to appeal according to article 204673 of the civil 
procedures, which applies only to appointment decisions and does not extend to the 
arbitration procedure. However, this article state that the court’s decision in regard to 
appointing arbitrators is not subject to appeal, which makes the decision that was 
rendered by the chief justice in regard to extending the arbitration period also not 
subject to appeal. 																																																								
670 The court in this instance is competing with arbitration for the jurisdiction over the disputes, which 
ultimately harms both process and subsequently the litigants, see general Paulsson supra note 106 at 
265. See general Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, 
Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements t o Arbitrate, 2006 J. Disp. Resol. 469 at 473-475 (2006). 
The author in this article discuss the old judicial hostility towards arbitration, in England and the US, 
which is similar in this authors view to how the court is viewing arbitration in the UAE in this century. 
671 For the court is viewing arbitration as an exception to the parties right to seek their natural judges 
and therefore unable to provide the same level of judicial guarantees to the parties, see supra 2.6.3 The 
Arab Jurist View, and Supra 2.6.5 UAE Court View of the Definition. 
672 See general Qasim supra not 651 at 19. 
673 Civil Procedures law article 204 supra note 407. 
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The court dismissed this argument, stating that in regard to appeal no. 311/205—in 
which the court decided to vacate the appeals court decision and submit the dispute 
back to the appeals court again to hear the dispute over extending the arbitration 
period, which implies that the court decided to accept the appeal—the appellant has 
no right to argue in this matter. 
The second ground of appeal argues that the ninth clause of the arbitration agreement 
grants the arbitrators the right to extend the arbitration on their own without 
submitting a request to the court, and they only have to notify the court about the 
extension. However, the appealed decision interpreted this clause to the contrary, 
which resulted in nullifying the extension date. The court dismissed this argument, 
stating that according to article 210674 of the civil procedures law, if the parties did not 
agree on a time period for the arbitration, then it shall be for six months from the start 
of the first hearing, and the parties have the right to extend that period either explicitly 
or implicitly, and they have the right to delegate that right to the arbitrators. The court 
can also grant the extension based on a request of the arbitrators or one of the parties, 
and furthermore the court has the right to understand and interpret the contracts and to 
conclude what the parties have intended to do. Since the appealed decision, the court 
decided to uphold the first instance decision to nullify the petition dated 4/6/2005.675 
Therefore, court based its interpretation of the clause on sound reasoning, which 
makes the appellant’s argument void.676 
It can be deduced from this dispute that the court’s interpretation of the 
arbitration clause requirement to extend the arbitrator’s powers to extend the 
arbitration is guided by its belief that the court is required to protect individuals’ right 
to adjudicate their dispute to the court and their right to appeal. These outweigh the 
parties’ right to freedom of contract677 and their right to arbitrate, which is illustrated 
by the court’s interpretation of the arbitral clause in this instance. This in turn makes 
																																																								
674 Civil Procedures law article 210 supra note 620. 
675 Stating that: “ the arbitration clause that the appellant based his argument, is meant to grant the 
arbitrator the right to seek the court to request the extension in place of the parties, and not as the 
appellant is stating that it grants them the right to extend the period on their own and notify the court of 
that extension, and if the appellants claim were true then why did the clause state that the arbitrators are 
required to notify the court, moreover the court interpreted the clause to grant the arbitrator the right to 
determine the amount needed for the extension and request the court to confirm that amount. The court 
came to the conclusion that the arbitrators have upheld this clause by requesting the court to confirm 
the extension. However, the confirmation was granted from the chief justice on his own which is in 
contrast to the meaning of the court that is stated in article 210/2.” Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 
222/2006, issued on the 25th of February 2007. 
676 id. appeal no. 222/2006  
677 See general appeal no. 346/1991 supra note 528 and appeal no. 91/1992 supra note 533. See general 
Najidah supra note 477 at 20-23, Bechor supra note 17 at 147-149, Hindi supra note 103 at 2-3 these 
authors examine this concept from the point view of an Arabian scholar, see Carbonneau supra note 73 
at 24-25. 
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court-annexed arbitration678 closer to being an expert’s opinion rather than a separate 
and equal method of dispute resolution. The arbitration in this case is considered to be 
a court-annexed arbitration, which should have worked in favor of arbitration. 
The next dispute discussed gives an example of the challenges facing the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in the UAE. In this dispute, the 
appellant managed to prolong the dispute by arguing on the subject matter of the 
dispute, and in particular about the appointment of the arbitrator, which resulted in 
delaying the enforcement of the arbitral award. The court appointed the arbitrator in 
this case, which makes turns this arbitration into a court-annexed and as a result 
should have gained the court’s support. What should have been a straightforward 
decision required almost two years of litigation to receive res judicata status despite 
having the appellant argue on the subject matter of the dispute: 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that according to article 203 of the civil 
procedures law,679 the parties have the right to agree to submit their dispute to a sole 
arbitrator or a tribunal, which establishes the individual’s right to arbitrate and to 
choose the number of arbitrators they see fit. However, if a dispute arose and the 
parties did not agree on a number of arbitrators, then the parties have the right to seek 
the court to appoint an arbitrator.680 This dispute shows that the original contract was 
concluded between the parties on 5/8/2002, and it contained an arbitration clause that 
did not identify the number of arbitrators. In addition, a request was made by the 
defendant to the court to appoint an arbitrator, which the court granted by appointing 
an accounting expert as an arbitrator in the dispute and both parties confirmed and 
accepted this appointment. 
Furthermore, the appellant argues that the arbitrator claimed in the award that he 
asked the Horse Club to submit its records of transactions with the company, which is 
an important document required to identify the parties’ position in this dispute. The 
arbitrator claimed he did not receive any reply from the Club. The appellant argues 
that the arbitrator should have invoked article 209 of the civil procedures law681 and 
requested the court’s assistance in order to receive those documents. The appealed 
decision refused the request to resubmit the dispute back to the arbitrator in order to 
clarify this point. 																																																								
678 See general, Levin supra note 141 at 538. 
679 Civil Procedures law article 203 supra notes 406, 428 and 459. 
680 According to Civil Procedures law article 204 supra note 407. 
681 Civil Procedures law article 209/2 supra note 429. 
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The court dismissed this argument, stating that according to the jurisprudence of this 
court, when recognizing an arbitral award, the court shall not revise the subject of the 
dispute, unless it is in conflict to a public policy rule.682 
Due to the tolerance and encouragement of appeals, which both the legislature 
and the court view as a way of upholding due process and by extension to upholding 
justice, since appeals protect individuals’ right to litigate their dispute in front of their 
natural judge through their right to appeal.683 In essence, the court’s practice is 
changing the nature of the arbitration process from a binding non-appealable award 
into a pre-litigation process or an expert’s report, given that in the event that one of 
the parties is not satisfied with the outcome of an arbitration, which is likely to occur 
given the nature of any adjudication method, they are able to contest the award and 
have it re-examined by the court, which creates a situation in which the parties would 
have to litigate their dispute for a second time in front of the court.  Furthermore, the 
court stating that “when recognizing an arbitral award the court shall not revise the 
subject of the dispute, unless it is in conflict with a public policy rule”684 contradicts 
its action in this dispute and the rest of the dispute examined below. 
This next case involves a recognition request in which the appellant tried to 
set-aside the award: 
The appellant claims in the third part of the third ground and the second 
ground that the award is null since it was issued by a non-authorized party and in 
contrast to what the parties agreed on in the contract, and that the arbitrator failed to 
notify the appellant of the introduction of a third-party in the proceedings. 
The court dismissed this ground, stating that there is nothing in the papers that suggest 
that the parties of the arbitration were not the ones that agreed to arbitrate; therefore, 
the claim that a third party was introduced in the proceeding is null and without basis. 
The appellant’s first ground argues that the arbitrator did not uphold the requirements 
of article 213,685 since the arbitrator did not submit the award and the rest of the 																																																								
682 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 72/2007, issued on the 10th of June 2007. 
683 See supra 2.6.5 UAE Courts View of the Definition.  
684 Appeal no. 72/2007 supra note 682. 
685 Civil Procedures law article 213 supra note 139. 
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arbitration document within 15 days of issuing the award, which infringes the 
requirement of that article. The court dismissed this argument, stating that articles 
213686 and 204687 imply that the request for appointing an arbitrator does not mean 
that it is a court-annexed arbitration, for in this instance the court is simply enabling 
the parties to arbitrate. As such, the arbitrator did not violate article 213688 since he is 
not bound by the procedures in that article. In regard to the remaining grounds of the 
appeal, the appellant argues that the court recognized the award without examining 
his defense in regard to fulfilling their contractual obligation, in contrast to what the 
arbitrator decided in his award. The court dismissed this argument, stating that the 
court when recognizing an arbitral award does not examine the subject of the award; 
furthermore article 216689 limits the conditions of setting-aside the award.690 
The court’s odd behavior when compared to other decisions can be explained 
by the circumstances that surrounded this dispute, which originated in a time in which 
the courts were flooded with cases due to the international financial crises that had a 
major impact on the global financial market and on the UAE. The court’s attitude 
toward arbitration in this dispute has significantly changed, and the circumstances 
mentioned might explain why the court did not label this arbitration as being court-
annexed. They may also explain why the court dismissed the appellant’s argument, 
which under normal circumstances it would have been accepted. 
Furthermore, this dispute highlights the extended life cycle of the arbitral 
award, for instead of ending with the trial court, it evolved into a full-blown litigation, 
despite the circumstances of that time and the court’s needs for another outlet for 
adjudicatory relief for individuals at that time. 
4.5.1.6 An Agent Authority to Bind a Principal to Arbitration691 
																																																								
686 Id. 
687 Civil Procedures law article 204 supra note 407. 
688 Civil Procedures law article 213 supra note 139. 
689 Civil Procedures law article 216 supra note 416. 
690 Dubai Court of cassation appeal no.181/2010, issued on the 26th of September 2010. 
691 This title was taken from an article by Jessica S. Pers, See general Jessica S. Pers, An Agents 
Authority to Bind a Principal to Arbitration, 65 Cal. L. Rev. 355 (1977), the author in here discuss 
Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals case, in which: “The California Supreme Court upheld an 
amendment to a standard health care service which required binding arbitration of medical malpractice 
claims, even though the plaintiff never consented to arbitration nor authorized anyone to consent for 
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Two decisions highlight the court’s practice when it comes to arbitration’s 
relationship with an agents right to conclude arbitral agreements.692 
The first decision illustrates the general difficulties facing the recognition of 
arbitral awards, and it highlights the agent’s right to enter into arbitration: 
The sixth ground of appeal argues that the agency agreement between the inheritor 
and the first defendant only allows the first defendant to agree to arbitrate in regards 
to the properties that the inheritor owns in partnership with his deceased sister. 
However, the appealed decision dismissed this argument stating that the courts 
jurisprudence doesn’t extend to the subject matter of the arbitration. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that the arbitration agreement is being 
conducted by the agent and extends the agency’s contract. The court also stated that 
the agent’s powers as a representative are subject to partial annulment regarding the 
relationship between the agent and his client and not in regard to these parties. 
Therefore, the appellants have no right to request the nullification of the award by 
stating that the agent has exceeded his agency contract.693 
 
 
In essence, the court established that the parties’ waiver of their right to 
arbitrate needs to be explicitly proven in front of the court; in doing so, the court is 
protecting the individual’s right to arbitrate, which is uncharacteristic of the court and 
in turn works in favor of arbitration. 
The second decision involves an international arbitral institute in the form of 
the International chamber of commerce of Paris,694 and the commercial agencies law 
of the UAE: 
[T]he appellant argues that the court’s decision to dismiss the appointment request by 
claiming that the request should have been made to the ICC695 in Paris. However, 
article 18 of the commercial agencies law696 gives the jurisdiction to the UAE courts 																																																																																																																																																														
her. The provision was negotiated by an agent, empowered by the state legislator to act on behalf of 
plaintiff’s behalf”. 
692 See general Redfern & Hunter supra note 62 at 99, were the author examines the affect of third 
parties on the arbitration agreement, and give an example of: “ a principal may find itself bound by an 
arbitration agreement signed by its agent…”.  
693 Dubai Court of cassation, appeal no. 222/2005, issued on the 22nd of November 2006 
694 Despite having a commercial element in this dispute in the form of the parties, this dispute was still 
being submitted to the civil circuit. 
695 Many authors examined and discuss the ICC, see general Redfern and Hunter, supra note 62 at 9, 
were they give a brief overview of the ICC. 
696 Federal law no. 18/1981, in regard to regulating commercial agencies, amended by federal law 
no.14/1988, federal law no.13/2006, federal law no. 2/2010, article 18 states:” Any concerned person is 
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to settle any dispute that rises from the execution of those contracts, which led the 
appellant to raise the dispute in regard to the appointment to the court. Furthermore, 
the defendant did not object in the first hearing to dismiss the case based on the 
existence of an arbitration clause, and they did not reply to the appellant’s notification 
of the appointment dated 17-6-2007, which constitutes a waiver of the right to uphold 
the arbitration clause and the jurisdiction falls back to the UAE courts. 
 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that based on the courts jurisprudence the 
arbitration clause cannot be taken in part and should be taken as a whole, and that 
amending the clause regarding the appointment of the arbitrator should not be 
assumed, and that both parties should consent to this amendment, which falls under 
the discretion of the court to understand the facts of the case and the contract. 
Furthermore, article 204/1697 implies that disputes in regard to appointing the 
arbitrator should be submitted to the court that has the jurisdiction to hear the dispute, 
in the event that the arbitration agreement lacks the process of the appointment. 
However, if the clause or the agreement identified a process of appointment, then the 
court cannot step in. The clause in this instance referred to the ICC, which state in 
articles 8 and 9 that the appointment of the arbitrator shall be concluded through the 
arbitral tribunal after submitting the dispute to the ICC, and they shall appoint the 
arbitrators if one of the parties refused to appoint their arbitrator. 
 
 Therefore, the appellant has no right to submit a dispute to the court after agreeing to 
arbitrate, and the appellant’s plea that the defendant failed to counter claim in the first 
hearing to the existence of the arbitration clause and they did not accept the 
notification to the appointment has no affect, since the appointment process has been 
stated in the clause to be conducted under the rules of the ICC. Thus, the court 
decided to dismiss the appeal.698 
 
Why did the court dismiss this plea? Even though the court uses this plea as a 
ground for taking back its jurisdiction, in this dispute certain aspects have influenced 
the court’s reasoning, most particularly the way the arbitration clause was drafted by 
referring to the rules of the ICC and the nature of the parties of the dispute. Lastly, the 
dispute revolved around appointing an arbitrator, and neither of the parties were in the 
process of inviting the court to take back its jurisdiction. 
 In essence, referring in the arbitral clause to the rules of the ICC is one of the 
main reasons to upholding the sanctity of the arbitration clause and the parties’ 
freedom of contract implies that the court trusts the ICC to uphold the parties’ right 																																																																																																																																																														
allowed to obtain from the competent authority an extract of the registration sheet in the register and 
also he shall obtain a certificate of non–registration.” 
697 Civil Procedures law article 204/1 supra note 407. 
698 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 272/2008, issued on the 25th of January 2009. 
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and freedoms. Is this trust limited to the ICC? In comparison to other domestic 
institutes, it seems that the court is favoring the ICC, based on the fact that the court is 
willing to give up its jurisdiction and interpret the clause in this manner, which is 
similar to how the court is treating lease disputes that fall under the jurisdiction of the 
lease committees. 
 The other notable factor here is the nature of the parties. Despite the court 
categorizing the case as a civil case, the parties in this dispute both are commercial 
companies, and the nature of the dispute relates to the commercial agencies law. 
However, the dispute was given to a civil circuit, yet the nature of the parties in this 
particular dispute had a positive factor in the court’s interpretation and the conclusion 
that the court reached, exemplifying the importance of the nature of the parties and of 
the dispute to the court. 
Lastly, the appellant’s request to appoint an arbitrator was not an attempt to 
contest the arbitration agreement or the jurisdiction. The appellant simply was trying 
to initiate the arbitration procedure. This affected the court’s decision, since both 
parties agreed to settle their dispute through arbitration; as such, the court interpreted 
this fact in favor of the arbitration agreement. 
Both decisions illustrate how the court’s role and interpretation can be used to 
promote arbitration. The court can interpret the agreement or the clause in a way that 
promotes or undermines it. By interpreting the arbitration clause as an exception, the 
likelihood of having the court take its jurisdiction back would be high. The court 
would not prevent individuals from presenting their dispute to their natural judge. The 
court’s interpretation is influenced largely by the way the arbitration clause is drafted 
and the nature of both the parties and the dispute. The court allows commercial parties 
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and disputes to engage in a risky dispute settlements such as arbitration, given that the 
court interprets commercial transactions to have a risk factor embedded within them 
 
4.6 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE 
This section examines twenty-three cases issued by the civil circuit of the 
UAE’s Federal Supreme Court, divided as follows: 
• General: general disputes related to arbitration, such as the 
appointment and recognition of awards and the period before the 
introduction of the federal civil procedures. 
• Construction 
• Insurance 
• Employment 
 
4.6.1 General 
To gain a sense of how the courts interacted with arbitration before the 
introduction of the civil procedures law, I examine three disputes—one related to 
an insurance policy and another that involves a construction contract. 
The first decision demonstrates the affect of an arbitral clause in insurance 
policies in relation to article 1028 of the civil transaction law.699 At issue in this 
case is the question of whether the decision to refer a dispute to arbitration is 
appealable. The court’s decision—again, issued before the enactment of the 
Federal civil procedures—suggests that an arbitral clause in an insurance policy 
																																																								
699 Civil Transaction law article 1028/d states: “The following conditions in a policy of insurance are 
void: …. d- The arbitration condition included in the printed general conditions of the policy and not as 
a special agreement distinct therefrom…”. 
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obligates the parties to prepare a separate document that includes their arbitration 
agreement. 
[T]heir appeal was based on two grounds. First, they claimed that the trial court issued 
a decision on the subject of the dispute by agreeing to refer the dispute into 
arbitration. This implies that they ended the dispute as a result. Regarding whether the 
decision to arbitrate is subject to appeal, the appeals court upheld that decision, in 
contradiction to the requirement of article 1028/d of the civil transition law,700 which 
requires the arbitration clause to be stated in a document that is separate from the 
insurance policy and excluded from the general clauses of that policy.  
The Supreme Court accepted this argument, stating that the defendant made a request 
to the first instance court to register the arbitration clause according to article 95/2 of 
the civil procedures law of 1970.701 By accepting the request to arbitrate and 
dismissing the appellant’s counter claim702, the court ended the dispute over 
identifying which authority was competent (had jurisdiction) to hear the dispute. As 
such, this dispute was subject to appeal.703 
In terms of the relationship between arbitration agreements and insurance 
policies, the significance of article 1028/d is the binding affect that it has on 
arbitration clauses that are included in insurance policies. This significance extends 
beyond the domestic sphere and could certainly have an impact on international 
arbitral awards that is similar to decision no. 713/27,704 in which the court re-
established jurisdiction over the dispute by stating that disputes between commercial 
agencies can only be resolved in the courts. Based on this, the court set aside an 
international arbitral award that had been brought for recognition705. If an 
international arbitral award based on an insurance policy were brought in front of the 
																																																								
700 id. 
701 There is no record of which civil procedures law this refer to, however, it can be assumed that given 
the fact that this dispute was submitted to the AD courts that this would refer to the AD civil 
procedures law. 
702 The appellant counter claim that the arbitration clause is null and that the defendant doesn’t have the 
right to request the submission of the dispute into arbitration. 
703 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 7/14, issued on the 19th of April 1992. 
704 See infra note 732, Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 713/27. 
705 Which undermines the parties faith in arbitration, especially when seeking to recognize awards in 
the UAE, which as Redfern and Hunter puts it:” Once this decision has been made in the form of an 
award, it is san implied term of every arbitration agreement that the parties will carry it out. To put the 
point beyond doubt, this implies term is generally set out in international and institutional rules of 
arbitration.” Redfern & Hunter supra note 62 at 621 
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court in the UAE for recognition, the chances of that award being set aside would be 
high, provided the insurance company and the insurance policy in question were 
subject to the rules of the Federal civil transaction law. A domestic arbitral award that 
meets the same conditions (the inclusion of the arbitral clause in the insurance policy) 
would also have to be set aside. Therefore, while this decision was made before the 
enactment of the Federal civil procedures law, its influence can still be noticed, since 
article 204/2706 of that law states that decisions about the appointment of arbitrators 
are not subject to appeal707. However, this study has noted several examples of the 
court disregarding this article, which indicates the influence of earlier (pre-civil 
procedures law) decisions on the court’s views and policies regarding the acceptance 
of appeals, as well as on their views on arbitration. 
Thus, it seems some of the Federal Court’s views about arbitration were 
established before the enactment of the civil procedures law. The court’s decisions 
about which jurisdiction should hear a dispute emphasizes this idea as well; for 
example, the court established that the decision about which local jurisdiction may 
settle the dispute was not a matter of public policy. They also established that 
upholding the right to identify the competent authority to hear the dispute would be 
waived once a party began to argue about the subject of the dispute. The court 
explained that the parties’ agreement is the essence of an arbitral clause, which it said 
also does not relate to public policy. 
[T]he appellant did not object to this act at the time, and the appealed decision shows 
that the court have indeed responded to the appellant’s argument in this regard. In 																																																								
706 Civil Procedures law article 204/2 supra note 407. 
707 Since the main request in this disputes was to refer the dispute into arbitration, which implies that 
they would also appoint an arbitrator through the court and therefore would fall under the provision of 
article 204/2: “The defendant started the suit in front of the first instance court, by asking the court to 
refer the dispute between them and the appellant into arbitration…” there is no record of the first 
instance decision, see appeal no. 7/14 supra note 703. 
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addition, the local jurisdiction is not a matter of public policy. As such, the litigant’s 
right to object to the court’s jurisdiction is waived once the litigant argues the subject 
of the dispute. Moreover, the objection about the existence of an arbitration clause is 
based on the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, which is also a matter that does not relate 
to public policy and can be waived either explicitly or implicitly by arguing the 
subject of the dispute. The appellant argued the subject of the dispute and started a 
separate litigation with this claim, which implies that the litigant waived the right to 
arbitrate.708 
The reasoning given by the court in this decision mirrors that of their practice after 
the enactment of the federal civil procedures and the codifying this rule in article 
203/5.709 This adds to the understanding of why this rule was codified and why the 
right to arbitrate is considered waived once the parties argue the subject of the 
dispute. The decision discussed above involves the relationship of public policy to the 
parties’ right to arbitrate, as evidenced in how the court explained the nature of the 
arbitral clause. Ruling that the arbitration clause is born out of the will of the parties 
makes it a matter that, in the courts view, does not relate to public policy710. 
Therefore, the parties have the right to waive this right. This seems an understandable 
and a logical interpretation of the nature of the arbitral clause; namely, if you have the 
right to agree to arbitrate because of your own free will711, there should not be a limit 
on your right to withdraw from that agreement. In essence, the court went further than 
simply establishing the parties’ right to withdraw from the arbitration agreement by 
stating that this right can be “implicitly waived.” 712In doing this, the court is ensuring 
that it has the right to interpret the parties’ actions, as it did in the above case. 
																																																								
708 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 5/14, issued on the 20th of May 1992. 
709 Civil Procedures law article 203/5 supra note 442. 
710 In explaining the freedom of contract principle in the UAE, Najidah explained that this principle 
shouldn’t be undermined, and that the legislations that emerged started too put shackles on this 
principle, which can explain this phenomena in arbitration and how the court is treating arbitral clauses, 
see Najidah supra note 477 at 20. See general Carbonneau supra note 74 at 25. 
711See general Najidah supra note 477 at 20-23. 
712 In there explanation of the parties right to waiver the arbitration agreement, Redfern & Hunter gave 
examples from number of jurisdictions that supports the individual right to withdraw from the 
arbitration agreement, however, unlike the courts in the UAE they require the parties to explicitly 
waiver this right. See Redfern & Hunter supra note 62 at 149. 
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The third dispute examines the period in which the courts in Abu Dhabi 
rescinded from the federal court system713. The appeal in this case revolves 
around which authority is competent to hear a request to recognize an arbitral 
award.714 
The court responded by stating that since the emirate of AD decided to rescind from 
the Federal System, then the determination of the jurisdiction between the federal 
courts and the local authority is a matter that relates to public policy, based on articles 
204715 and 213.716 This implies that the award issued by an arbitrator that was 
appointed by the court is a court-annexed arbitration, and as such it would fall under 
the conditions mentioned in those articles. In regard to the procedure of recognizing a 
court-annexed arbitral award, in this instance, it would fall under the jurisdiction of 
the Federal First Instance court of Abu Dhabi.717 
The court reclaimed jurisdiction over the dispute by labeling the arbitration in 
this instance a court-annexed arbitration,718 implying that the arbitrator would have to 
abide by the rules required for issuing a court-annexed award.  
A second set of decisions, examined below, deals with the arbitral award and 
how it is recognized. The first decision examined revolves around the affect of 
translating documents into Arabic and how this can affect the arbitral award.719 
The court decided to dismiss this claim, stating that in order for this ground to be 
enforced, the court should have based its decision on those documents or on the 
documents that were presented without the other party’s knowledge. However, the 																																																								
713 See supra note 55. 
714 The appellant appealed on one ground,” claiming that the court decided that the Federal courts of 
Abu Dhabi has the authority to hear the request of recognizing the arbitral award. However, since this 
is not a court-annexed arbitration as such the parties are not required to present their requests or dispute 
to the federal court, based on the fact that the jurisdiction in this dispute falls to the judicial authority of 
the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. See Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 325/2010, issued on the 
28th of December 2010. 
715 Civil Procedure law article 204 supra note 407. 
716 Civil Procedure law article 213 supra note 139. 
717 Appeal no. 325/2010 supra note 714. 
718 Which is due to the fact that the court was responsible for appointing the arbitrator. See general, 
Levin supra note 141 at 538, also supra note 378. 
719 The appellant second grounds of the appeal states’ argues that the court refused their request to set-
aside the award, they argue that the court should set-aside the award since it was based on a foreign 
document that was not legally translated into Arabic, which constitute a ground for setting-aside the 
award according to the civil procedures law’, see Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 
142/17, issued on the 28th of November 1995. 
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appealed decision was based on facts that were accessible to the appellant and 
were contested by the appellant in the arbitration procedure, and it was not based 
on those papers that were not translated.720 
 
The court dismissed the appellant’s claim, but it still provided a test for 
accepting such claims in cases that involve translating foreign documents. The test 
that the court established is whether the arbitrator’s decision was based on that 
translated document. If so, this may be used as a ground for setting aside the 
award. However, one further condition also must be met: the parties must state a 
procedure in the arbitration clause or agreement that outlines how they will 
present their documents. 
Another decision that addresses the recognition of arbitral awards involves the 
examination of the parties’ right to waive jurisdictional pleas. 
The appellant appealed that decision to the Supreme Court on two grounds. The first 
ground argues that they pleaded in front of the first instance court in case 315/94721 
that the contract between the parties had ended. However, the court decided to dismiss 
this plea, stating that this plea concerns the execution of the contract, and since the 
parties agreed in that contract to resolve their dispute through arbitration, this plea 
falls under the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. The appellant claims that he upheld that 
argument in front of the arbitrators and in front of the first instance and appeal courts, 
and that despite this, the appeals court stated that the appellant did not uphold that 
argument in front of the arbitration tribunal, and that the appellants right to argue on 
this jurisdictional issue had been waivered. 
The court agreed with this argument, stating that the waiver of the right should be 
proven without any doubt, and that the court’s decision to refer the dispute to 
arbitration does not imply that the appellant has waived his right to this argument.722 
This dispute began as a request to the court to recognize an arbitral award. 
However, it turned into an argument over the parties’ right to contest the arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction. The court established certain rules in this dispute. The first rule states that 
the court does not presume that the parties have waived their right to jurisdictional 																																																								
720 Id. 
721 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 315/94. 
722 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 95/18, issued on the 23rd of June 1996 
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pleas; subsequently, the courts decision to refer the dispute into arbitration and 
relinquish jurisdiction does not imply that the parties have waived their right to 
jurisdictional pleas723. Also, the appellant’s appearance in front of the arbitration 
tribunal to argue the subject of the dispute does not constitute a waiver of the 
appellant’s right to jurisdictional pleas in front of the court724, nor is it an indication 
that the appellant has agreed to arbitrate. In the event that the appellant upheld this 
request in front of the arbitration tribunal and in front of the court, then the court will 
shift the burden of proof to the party trying to uphold the arbitration agreement, be it 
the party seeking to recognize an award or the court deciding to dismiss an attempt to 
set aside an award. In doing so, the court is ensuring that such decisions are appealed, 
which often creates a never-ending cycle of appeals. 
The court’s policy on appeals and its affect on arbitral awards is illustrated by 
the appeal no. 157/19,725 which emphasizes the harmful affect on the arbitration 
policy as a whole in the UAE of the court’s policy of supporting appeals of arbitral 
awards. This case illustrates the ease with which the same dispute reached the 
Supreme Court three times,726 emphasizing the idea that nothing deters parties from 
appealing any decision made by the court, even those that receive res judicata 
status.727 Therefore, this policy affects arbitration twice as much as it affects normal 																																																								
723 Which is in turn an extension to how the courts view arbitration as an exception to the individual 
right to seek their natural judge, and in turn the court would minimize the affect of this right as they see 
fit, see supra 2.6.5 UAE Courts View of the Definition. 
724 See general Redfern & Hunter supra note 62 at 149. See general Najidah supra note 477 at 20-21. 
725 Essentially this next decision is a continuation of the previous one, which is appeal no. 95/18. 
726 After the Supreme Court vacated the appealed decision they referred the dispute back to the appeal 
court, which decided to recognize the arbitral award that decision was appealed to the Supreme Court 
in appeal no. 157/19, which decided to vacate the appealed decision and refer the dispute back to the 
appeal court, which decided to recognize the award, which meant that it was appealed for a third time 
to the Supreme Court. 
727 The appellant based their appeal on two grounds, the first argues that the arbitrators didn’t define the 
scope of the arbitration and that one of the parties to the arbitration agreement didn’t have the capacity 
nor the authority to conclude the arbitration agreement, for the agency agreement doesn’t allow him to 
enter into an arbitration agreement. The appellant second ground of appeal argues that the first instance 
decision no. 315/94 supra note 721, which decided to accept the defendant’s request of referring the 
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disputes. The same dispute has been brought to the court for a third time, even though 
it was already settled through arbitration and recognized more than once. The civil 
procedures law prohibits such appeals,728 which is why the court came to the same 
result and supported it with the same reasoning; this never-ending circle of appeals 
delays the enforcement of arbitral awards. 
 Below is another decision that addresses the recognition of arbitral awards. It 
explores the affect of the commercial agencies law on arbitration—more precisely, its 
affect on a foreign arbitral award being recognized in the UAE. The case illustrates 
the court’s view on arbitration even when faced with a commercial arbitral award.729 
The court responded to the appellant’s request to recognize the award by dismissing 
the appellant’s argument. 
The court dismissed this argument stating that article 235730, which addresses the 
issue of recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitral awards, allows the enforcement of 
those foreign awards by the court after the court examines them and decide whether it 
has jurisdiction over the dispute. Moreover, article 6 of law no. 18/81 in regard to 
																																																																																																																																																														
dispute into arbitration didn’t answer the appellant’s plea, which argued that the arbitration clause has 
ended. See, Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 605/21, issued on the 24th of May 2000. 
728 Civil Procedures law Article 187, states: “It is not possible to appeal against the cassation decisions 
through any of the appeal manners, and that with the exception of what has been issued there from in 
the litigation source where it shall be possible to appeal therein through the petition of reexamining the 
cases stipulated in clauses 1,2 and 3 of article 169.” 
729 One thing to note about this decision it occurred before the UAE acceded to the NY convention. See 
supra note 6. 
730 Civil procedures law article 235 states: “1-The execution of the decisions and orders delivered in a 
foreign country may be mandated in the state of the United Arab Emirates under the same conditions 
decided in the law of that country for executing the decisions and the orders delivered. 2-The execution 
order shall be requested before the court of first instance in which area the execution is required, 
through the usual procedures of the action prosecution, and it shall not be possible to order the 
execution before the verification of the following: a-That the state's courts are not authorized to 
examine the litigation in which the decision or the order has been delivered and that the foreign courts 
which have delivered it are authorized therewith according to the international rules of the judicial 
jurisdiction decided in their law. b-That the decision or the order has been delivered from an authorized 
court according to the law of the country in which it has been issued. c-That the litigant parties, in the 
action in which the foreign decision has been delivered, have been assigned to attend and have been 
properly represented. d-That the decision or the order has acquired the power of the decided order 
according to the law of the court which delivered it. e-That it does not conflict with a decision or an 
order delivered previously from a court in the state nor does it include what breaches the morals or the 
public order therein.” 
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regulating commercial agencies, and its amendment in law no. 14/88,731 imply that an 
arbitral clause that refers to a foreign arbitral tribunal in the contract is a void clause, 
and if one of the parties to that contract seeks a foreign arbitral tribunal and requests 
the courts in the UAE to recognize an award, then the court is obliged to refuse to 
recognize the award and to dismiss the request. As such, their decision is valid given 
that it is based on the law. Thus, the court decided to dismiss the appeal.732 
The affect of this decision on international commerce is significant, as is its 
affect on international commercial arbitration and the arbitral awards that are issued 
from those arbitration hearings733. This decision emphasizes the need for the court to 
accept arbitration as an equal method of dispute resolution, since the courts may find 
legal loopholes to reclaim jurisdiction over disputes. Which is also emphasized the 
courts decision in appeal no. 267 and 297/20734, which illustrates of the challenges 
facing the recognition of arbitral award in the UAE, for this particular dispute reached 
the steps of the Supreme Court twice first in appeal no. 404/18735 and the second in 
appeals 267 and 297/20 
 The next decision736 illustrates the court’s doctrine when it comes to extending 
the arbitration period. It also establishes the affect that interim measures have on the 
arbitral award737. Regarding the ability to extend the arbitration period, the court 
established what is required for arbitration extension requests, as well as whether such 
an extension can be explicitly or implicitly made by the parties. For example, are they 																																																								
731 Commercial agencies law article 6 states that: “The commercial agency contract shall be deemed for 
the mutual interest of the contractors, the States courts shall be competent to adjudicate any dispute 
arises from its execution between the principal and the agent, any agreement to the contrary shall be 
annulled.” 
732 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 713/27, issued on the 6th of May 2009. 
733 Redfern & Hunter states that: “most States are broadly content to restrict the challenge of arbitral 
awards to excess of jurisdiction and lack of due process… Other States are prepared to offer a limited 
measure of judicial review on questions of law, if this is what the parties wish; but the possibility of the 
review of an award on issues of fact is truly rare.” Redfern & Hunter supra note 62 at 616-617. (on the 
contrary it seems that the UAE courts are more than willing to extend the measures of judicial review, 
which in turn would have harmful affects on arbitration and arbitral awards, especially international 
one). 
734 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeals no.267 & no.297/20, issued on the 14th of May 2000. 
735 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no.404/18. 
736 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 266/2009, issued on the 21st of October 2009. 
737 See general Redfern & Hunter supra note 62 at 520-522. 
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able to explicitly state an extension procedure in the arbitration agreement, or to 
explicitly express the desire to extend by submitting an extension request to the court? 
The court also established that such a request may be deduced from the parties’ 
actions. The court provides an example of an implicit extension, which would be 
considered to have occurred if a party appeared after the end of the arbitration period 
and argued the subject of the dispute. The court would view this as an implicit 
acceptance by that party of the extension of the arbitration period.738 
The second thing the court explored in this dispute is the affect of a court 
issuing interim measures to the arbitrators, and whether such measures would have 
any binding affect on the arbitrators. The court established that an interim measure 
given by the court does not establish any affect on the arbitrators, and that the purpose 
of having interim measures would be to ensure that rights are not affected and do not 
cease to exist before a final decision is made. Interim measures (if given) would be 
put in place to protect the existence of rights and the parties’ ability to act on them.739 
																																																								
738 The court stated “according to the court jurisprudence that the determination of a date for the end of 
the arbitration procedures doesn’t mean that it cannot be extended either explicitly or implicitly or by 
authorizing the tribunal, as well as the court ability to extend this time based on the parties request or of 
that of the tribunal, the only requirement is that this extension should be connected and not interpreted” 
see appeal no. 266/2009 supra note 736. 
739 Stating that “article 68 of the civil and commercial evidence law, implies that the purpose of such 
claims are to proof a certain legal status, which they are in fear of being changed, as such it doesn’t 
concern the establishment of individuals rights and doesn’t mean that the parties are not able to seek 
the court to settle their dispute. Furthermore, the decisions issued based on a summary ruling does not 
bind the court, it is a temporary ruling in which the judge views it is necessary to establish and confirm 
the existence of a certain legal status or condition; as such the court has the right to over rule this 
decision; the appealed decision upheld this rule, which renders this argument void.” Appeal no. 
266/2009 supra note 736. Article 68 of the evidence law states: “ 1- Whoever apprehends the loss of 
the features of a fact that may constitute an object of dispute before the courts, may request, in the 
presence of those concerned and in the usual manner, from the judge of summary matters to proceed 
with the survey and in this case, the preceding provisions shall be observed. 2 - In the foregoing case, 
the judge of summary matters may delegate an expert to move, survey and hear witnesses without oath; 
the judge then shall fix a hearing to take knowledge of the observations made by the parties to the 
litigation on the expert’s report and acts. The rules provided for in the Title concerning Expertise shall 
be followed.” 
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The last dispute discussed in this section740 that deals with the recognition of 
awards is a case that highlights how the court supports arbitration. In this instance, the 
court dismissed the appellant’s three arguments. The court’s explanation for rejecting 
the appellant’s argument is essential to understanding how the courts function741.  
The appellant’s second argument—directed against the arbitral award and the 
fact that it lacked a draft and the arbitrator’s signature on each page of the award—
implies that the appellant views the requirements for an arbitral award to be similar to 
those of the court. This further implies two things about the appellant and his 
attorney: (1) the parties to a dispute may have little knowledge about the practice of 
arbitration and of the requirements of the civil procedures law; and (2) a request for 
an extension may be an attempt by one of the parties to delay the recognition of the 
award. Given that the UAE’s court system that is still wary of arbitration and does not 
view it as an equal form of dispute resolution, the likelihood of an arbitral award 
																																																								
740 See Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 427/2009, issued on the 29th of October 2009 in 
the appendix. 
741 The appellant’s first argument—which revolved around the participation of the public prosecution 
office in civil suits, which is required if a minor were to be present in the civil suit (Just being named as 
a party is sufficient to invoke this rule)—the court clarified that the participation of the prosecution 
office can be fulfilled by a letter that explains the office’s opinion about the dispute. The appellant’s 
argument was based on article 61 of the civil procedures law, which states: “With the exception of the 
summary actions, the public prosecution should intervene in the following circumstances, otherwise the 
decision shall be null: 1-The actions which it has been allowed to prosecute by itself. 2-The appeals 
and the requests submitted before the supreme federal court, with the exception of the appeals of 
cassation in the civil matters. 3-The actions related to the incapacitated, those whose capacity is 
defective, the absentees and the missing persons. 4-The actions related to the charitable endowments, 
donations, wills devoted to benefaction. 5-The actions for the recusals of judges and the prosecution 
members and for litigating them. 6-Any other circumstance in which the law stipulates the necessity of 
the public prosecution intervention.” which requires the presence of the prosecution office in civil suits 
that involve a minor. The court’s response was guided by article 64 of the civil procedures, which 
state:”  1-The public prosecution shall be considered representative in the action when it submits a 
pleading with its opinion therein and it shall not be bound to attend unless the law stipulates that. 2 - 
And in all circumstances, the public prosecution shall not be bound to attend the judgment's delivery.” 
See general Turki supra note 11 at 242-267. 
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being set aside is high. Therefore, requesting an extension from a court as a tactic to 
have an arbitral award dismissed would likely succeed.742 
The appellant’s third ground of appeal argued about the signature on the sales 
contract: 
[The argument] maintains that the appellant did not sign the sales contract, and that 
his wife was not his agent at the time of the sale. Moreover, he argues that the sales 
contract is void, claiming that his wife entered into the contract when she was ill and 
on her deathbed, which can be proven by doctors’ reports. As such, this act conducted 
on her deathbed is void, and the sale of the farm contradicts the Emirates Ruler’s 
decree that such farms are not subject to sale. The court dismissed this ground, 
establishing that a plea to set aside an arbitral award is subject to the requirements of 
article 216.743 Those grounds addressed the arbitral award as being an act of a law, 
and as such they were concerned about a flaw in the procedures and not a flaw in the 
determination of the facts of the dispute...744 
It can be inferred from this dispute that the court is not reinventing the process 
of setting-aside the award; it is simply applying the law. While all the court levels 
were in agreement about dismissing the appellant’s request, because of how the civil 
procedures law is constructed, the appellant was able to contest the award. This is a 
reoccurring phenomenon in nearly all of the decisions explored in this thesis; namely, 
that the tolerance of appeals overshadows what is established in actual court 
decisions. Even though the court establishes various rules in various decisions, the 
proper application of these rules in practice remains in question because of the ability 
to appeal decisions—even decisions like arbitral awards that have received res-
judicata status. By allowing these appeals, the court is essentially rendering powerless 
																																																								
742 The court dismissed this argument, stating that “based on the jurisprudence of the court and on 
article 212, which grants the arbitral award the same status as a courts decision. However, the fact 
remains that it is not a decision issued by the court and since the civil procedures states that the 
arbitrator is not bound by the courts procedures in issuing the award, except in regard to upholding the 
rules mentioned in the arbitration chapter and since those rules do not require the arbitrators to sign 
every page and include a draft this argument is void”. See appeal no. 427/2009 supra note 740. 
743 Civil Procedures law article 216 supra note 416. 
744 See appeal no. 427/2009 supra note 740. 
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the rules that it establishes in its own decisions, since its practice contradicts those 
rules. 
The last two decisions examined in this section relate to how the court 
addresses appointment disputes in general, and how it rules on the first hearing. 
Starting with the appointment dispute, it is crucial to understand that this decision 
occurred shortly before the introduction of the civil procedures law; therefore, it helps 
us understand the Federal court’s stance on this subject. Here, the appellant argued 
that the because the court decided to appoint the arbitrators, this ended the dispute, to 
which the court responded: 
[T]he decisions of the appointment do indeed end the dispute, and as such are subject 
to appeal. Therefore, the court decided to nullify the appealed decision and refer the 
dispute back to the appeals court to render a decision.745 
This decision highlights the court’s practice when it comes to interpreting 
article 204.746 It also illustrates that the court’s practice in this regard was not changed 
by the introduction of the Federal law; it was carried on and implemented after the 
enactment of the law. It exemplifies that this view is influenced by the court’s intent 
to preserve the individual’s right to seek his or her natural judge and his or her right to 
appeal, and it also illustrates the court’s view on arbitration in general.  
The second decision concerns the court’s rule on objections submitted in the 
first hearing. The court’s application of this rule mirrors its action in the other 
decision, as highlighted by this statement:  
[A]rticle 210/1747 allows the parties to agree to arbitrate their dispute, even if the 
dispute has already been submitted to the court, with the condition that the court has 																																																								
745 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 194/13, issued on the 28th of April 1992. 
746 Civil Procedures law article 204 supra note 407. 
747 Civil Procedures law article 210 supra note 412. 
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not issued a decision in the dispute. However, it also requires the party upholding that 
agreement to express his or her will to arbitrate through a positive action by 
submitting the request to arbitrate in the first hearing. Otherwise, it would constitute a 
waiver of the right to arbitrate and the vacating of the clause under article 203/5.748As 
such, the parties in this dispute agreed to a later date, after the dispute had been 
submitted to the court, to refer the dispute into arbitration. Accordingly, they drafted 
an arbitration agreement on 21/2/2007. The defendant’s attorney appeared in front of 
the court on 18/6/2007 after the parties agreed to arbitrate, however, their attorney 
failed to make the request to refer the dispute into arbitration in that hearing, which is 
considered to be the first hearing in this instance. As such, their right to arbitrate has 
been waived.749 
  Should this rule not act as a buffer against the individual abusing the right to 
arbitrate? Should it not be employed to stop parallel litigation? Indeed, this seems to 
be the intent from how this rule was applied in this case. This would mean that article 
203/5750 is not the issue here; rather, the application of this article by the court is what 
is at issue. The court must strike a balance between the party’s right to arbitrate and 
ensuring that this right is not abused. 
 
4.6.2 Employment 
The next dispute highlights the relationship between labor law751 and 
arbitration. In this dispute, the court upheld the arbitration clause between the 
parties, and the appellant’s attempts to establish the court’s jurisdiction were 
turned down, indicating that the court was interpreted the arbitral clause and the 
civil procedures law in a way that supports arbitration. This is illustrated by how 
the court responded to the appellant’s plea. 
[The appellant] argued that the court dismissed the suit based on the existence of an 
arbitration clause, and this implies that the jurisdiction in this dispute fell under that 
arbitral clause. The appellant argued that at the time of the dispute, the arbitrator (the 
Indian ambassador) was outside the country. Furthermore, the appellant claimed that 																																																								
748 Civil Procedures law article 203/5 supra note 442. 
749 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no.357/2009, issued on the 18th of November 2009. 
750 Civil Procedures law article 203/5 supra note 442. 
751 Federal Law no. 8/1980 Concerning the Regulation of Labor Relations. 
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he had already presented the dispute to the previous ambassador; however, he failed 
to initiate the arbitration proceedings. 
The court dismissed this claim, stating that as the appealed decision explained, the 
reason for dismissing the claim was “the will of both parties to resolve their disputes 
through arbitration; this will has been manifested through clause fifteen of the 
school’s constitution, which states that in the event of a dispute between board 
members, this dispute shall be resolved through arbitration, that the arbitrator shall be 
the school’s owner, and that his decision shall be final and binding on the parties. 
Therefore, this clause prohibits the parties from asking the court to resolve the 
disputes. Moreover, the appellants disregarded this clause and the rules of article 
203,752 both of which prohibit the parties from asking the court to resolve the dispute 
in the presence of an arbitration agreement.” This interpretation by the appeals court 
has a basis both in the agreement and in the law, and as such falls under the court’s 
power of interpretation, which makes the appellant’s argument void.753 
 This dispute falls under the spectrum of the labor law in the UAE, due to the 
nature of the dispute and the parties involved, and also because the drafters of the 
labor law intended to balance power between the employer and the employees by 
protecting the weaker party—in this instance, the employee754. This emphasizes 
the importance of this decision, especially for understanding how the court views 
arbitration as an exception to the court’s jurisprudence and a dangerous process. 
When this view is combined with the nature of the parties—in this instance, an 
employee trying to contest the arbitration jurisdiction and seek to be heard in the 
court—it seems uncharacteristic and in contract to the court’s typical behavior to 
dismiss the request. However, at the same time it is an indication of the extent of 
the power that the court has and how this power can be harnessed to promote and 
enforce arbitration agreements.755 																																																								
752 Civil procedures law article 203 supra notes 406, 428 and 459. 
753 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 62/17, issued on the 20th of June 1995. 
754 Which is also one of the flaws that the freedom of contracts creates, Carbonneau explains this as: 
“Freedom of contract, therefore, can be rendered ineffectual where power relationships are uneven.” 
Carbonneau supra note 74 at 25. see general Carbonneau supra note 74 at 499-503, (were the author 
discuss some challenges that faces employment arbitration in the U.S.) 
755 Despite having this positive outcome of supporting the arbitration agreement in this dispute, the 
court on the other hand wasn’t willing to forsake their practice of accepting appeals, which can be 
noted from the ease in which the parties are able to reach the Supreme Court, another factor that need 
to be taken into account is the arbitrators identity, being the owner of the school and at the same 
representing the government of India could be viewed as a contributing factor in the courts decision, 
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4.6.3 Insurance 
Two decisions highlight how the federal court addresses arbitration clauses in 
insurance policies.756 The first case examined began before the enactment of the civil 
procedures law and ended after the enactment of the law.757 This dispute is unique in 
that the court labeled the policy as a commercial policy that was excluded from the 
rules of civil transaction law article 1028-d758 that requires arbitration clauses or 
agreements to be written in a separate document and not included in the insurance 
policy. The appeals court viewed this transaction from a commercial perspective, and 
thus came to the conclusion that it was allowed for an insurance company to include 
arbitral clauses in its policy, as if it were a commercial insurance policy. However, the 
supreme court had a different interpretation:  
[s]tating that law no. 1/1987759 made an exception when it came to a commercial 
transaction being governed under the civil transaction law. However, based on the 
general rules of adjudication and article 1028-d,760 which implies that any arbitral 
clause that is included in an insurance policy is null unless the parties agreed to 
arbitrate in a separate document, the court stated that this rule was put in place due to 
the importance of this clause and the need to protect the insurer. Furthermore, the 
court stated that this is a general rule that applies to both commercial and civil 
insurance policies, and as such, this arbitral clause is null, because it was included in 
the insurance policy and not in a separate agreement.761 
Thus, the court views insurance policies as falling under the requirements of 
the civil transaction law. 																																																																																																																																																														
for having the participation of a representative of a foreign government as an arbitrator would ease the 
courts concerns when it comes to arbitration. 
756 A third case has already been discussed at the start of this section, which is appeal no. 7/14 supra 
note 703, which also occurred before the enactment of the civil procedures. 
757 The case started in front of the first instance court in 1990; see Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First 
Instance, case no. 635/1990, issued on the 13/5/1992 and ended in 1995.  
758 Civil transaction law article 1028-d supra note 692.. 
759 which is the civil transaction law. 
760 Civil transaction law article 1028-d supra note 692, states:” The following conditions in a policy of 
insurance are void: …… d- the arbitration condition included in the printed general conditions of the 
policy and not as a special agreement distinct therefrom.” 
761 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 249/15, issued on the 26th of March 1995. 
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The second dispute considered here indicates the affect of the time period in 
upholding an arbitration agreement and in recognizing an arbitral award. In terms 
of extending the arbitration period, the court stated that this could be done in 
theory either explicitly or implicitly. However, this dispute indicates that the court 
holds the determination of this kind of extension to a high standard, exemplified 
by the court’s reexamination of the trial court’s decision. This indicates that the 
trial court’s ability to interpret the facts of the case falls under the supervision of 
the supreme court, contrary to what the court stated. 
Furthermore, the parties have the right to explicitly or implicitly extend the 
arbitration period or to authorize the arbitrator to extend that period. Also, the 
court has the right to extend the arbitration period upon the request of the parties. 
This indicates that the law obliges the arbitrator to issue a decision within the 
agreed period and did not authorize the arbitrator to extend that period on his own 
unless the parties agreed to this extension either explicitly or implicitly or by a 
court order. Furthermore, the court has the right to interpret the facts of the dispute 
and to determine whether the parties agreed to extend that period or not. 
Therefore, it can be deduced from the facts of the case that the arbitrator issued 
the award after the passing of the time period.762 
 
With this decision, the supreme court is turning to another form of appeal or a 
trial court and not to a court of law, since the parties were given the ability to litigate 
their dispute in front of the court for a third time. The results were that the dispute 
received res judicata763 status only at the level of the supreme court, which is a 
significant concern when it comes to arbitration. It also applies another requirement to 
the parties; they are required to explicitly agree on the extension period or to authorize 
the arbitrator to determine the extension period on his own. Otherwise, a similar 
dispute would result that would end with a decision that would be determined based 
on the parties’ ability to explicitly establish this extension. For this decision to have 
reached a different outcome, the trial court would have needed unfettered authority to 																																																								
762 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no.42/23, issued on the 13th of April 2004. 
763 See general Redfern & Hunter supra note 62 at 561-562. 
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interpret the facts of the case (i.e., the supreme court would have had to remain 
uninvolved). Had this principle of interpretation been applied, the court would not 
have came to this conclusion in their decision. Therefore, this decision exemplifies the 
court’s double standards when applying its own principles. 
4.6.4 Construction 
The last case to be examined in here relates to the construction contract and 
how the court addresses arbitration that relate to construction contracts. Eight 
disputes are examined here.764 The first decision shows the relationship among 
translating evidence, the need for proper delegation, and the need for the 
arbitrator’s signature, on the recognition of arbitral awards. It also provides insight 
into the origin of these doctrines in the courts, especially since this decision was 
issued before the enactment of the federal law. 
Furthermore, according to article 12 of law no.8/81 in regard to regulating the 
translation profession765—which dismisses any document that is not translated by 
a certified legal translator, which is a rule that relates to public policy—the arbitral 
tribunal is not at liberty to breach this rule. Therefore, the court is required to 
supervise the arbitration proceeding. In order to fulfill this role, the court is 
required to ensure that the arbitral award is issued according to the requirement of 
law no. 3/1970766, which can only be achieved if the court ensures that the arbitral 
award fulfills all of these requirements by ensuring that the arbitral award is 
supported by the documents presented in front of them. Subsequently, the arbitral 
tribunal should have dismissed any document that was not legally translated into 
Arabic. By basing its decision on documents that were not officially translated, the 
tribunal is basing its decision on its own knowledge, which is not admissible in 
the court or in the arbitral tribunal. Therefore, having the arbitrator correct the 
translation submitted to him by a legal translator is a breach of this rule.767 
The court issued this decision despite agreeing in the same decision that 
arbitrators are not bound by the normal procedures of the court. 																																																								
764 Excluding appeal no.5/14 supra note 708, which has been examined earlier. 
765 This author was unable to find this law, which was mentioned in the courts decision. 
766 Which is the Civil Procedures law for the emirate of Abu Dhabi. However, this author was unable to 
have a copy of that law. 
767 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 121/14, issued on the 27th of December 1992. 
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[T]he court accepts the fact that the arbitral tribunal is not bound by the normal 
procedures of the court in order to ease and accelerate the decision making 
process, in addition to the fact that in some cases, the arbitrators are not lawyers. 
However, this rule is bound by the principles of justice and by the rules that relate 
to public policy and to preserving due process. This includes delegating the facts 
of the case before rendering a decision, which needs to be proven through the 
documents and the facts of the case.768 
The above decision also leads the court to request the presence of a draft and the 
signature of all the arbitrators when recognition of the award is requested. 
Therefore, based on the established principles in the law and within the court’s 
doctrine, the arbitral award is required to have a draft. The purpose of having a 
draft is to prove that due process has been followed and that the tribunal delegated 
the dispute before issuing the award. Moreover a signature from all of the 
members of the tribunal is required according to law no. 3/1970. This requirement 
does not breach the confidentiality principle in arbitration.769 
This decision emphasizes the idea that the court’s theories on arbitration were 
formulated well before the enactment of the federal law; traces of these theories 
can be found in the federal law and the court’s decisions. 
The next case discusses whether an individual has the right to appeal the court’s 
decision to recognize an arbitral award. The general rule is that these decisions are 
subject to appeal, which on its own is of concern. The legislature provides an 
exception to this rule in the event that the parties agree to waive their right to 
appeal or if the arbitrators are authorized to mediate the dispute.770 
[T]his article implies that the legislature’s intent was to prohibit appeals of 
decisions that recognize the arbitral award, or appeals that arise in cases in which 
the parties agreed to waive their right to appeal, which is an exception to article 
158.771 Moreover, the appeals court’s decision is subject to appeal according to 
article 173,772 even if article 150/1773 allows the parties to waive their right to 																																																								
768 id 
769 id. 
770 Civil procedures law article 217/3 supra note 543. 
771 Civil procedures law article 158 supra note 545. 
772 Civil procedures law article173 supra note 546 and 578. 
773 Civil procedures law article 150 states: “1- The appeal against the decisions shall not be possible 
unless brought by the convicted, and it shall not be possible to be brought by that who accepted the 
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appeal. However, in order for this waiver to be granted, it should be explicitly 
identified. Since the appeals court decided that the decision was not subject to 
appeal, even if the parties agreed to waive their right in front of the court in the 
hearing dated 13/5/1992. However, the arbitration agreement that was submitted 
to the court shows that it was concluded on a later date, and it does not include 
any limitation or waiver of the parties’ right to appeal. This implies that the parties 
have amended that condition and as such, the court accepted the appeal.774 
This interpretation of the court, whether intentionally or not, undermines or 
limits the powers of arbitration and floods the court’s docket with cases that have 
already been decided through arbitration. 
Another decision that highlights the court’s power of interpretation established 
certain rules: the court’s authority to correct material errors without setting aside an 
award is bound by not affecting the entire award. Also, the appointment of the 
arbitrator by the court requires the request of one of the parties.775 
Appointing the arbitrators is the subject of the next dispute. The court 
responded to the appellant’s attempt to request the appointment of an arbitrator by 
denying this request for the following reason: 
The court has the right to interpret the facts of the case and to weigh the evidence 
presented to them. Furthermore, clause 14 of the sub-construction contract implies 
that the process of appointment should start with an agreement between the parties. If 
they fail to agree on the arbitrator, then the parties have the right to seek the head of 
the chamber of commerce to appoint an arbitrator on their behalf, and if that fails, 
then they have the right to seek the court. Furthermore, the appellant’s claim that he 
fulfilled this procedure is a new claim, which should be presented in front of the trial 
court, and cannot be presented for the first time in front of the Supreme Court.776 
																																																																																																																																																														
sentence expressly or implicitly, or by that whose requests have been judged, unless the law stipulates 
otherwise. 2 -The appellant shall not be harmed with his appeal.” 
774 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 263/18, issued on the 8th of December. 
775 The civil procedures law identifies conditions that must be met in order for the arbitral process to be 
paused. The arbitral award shall be enforced only after it is recognized. The court has the right to 
partially recognize the award; however, only on the condition that such partial recognize will not affect 
the entire award, see Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 9/20, issued on the 13th of February 
2000.  
776 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 49/20, issued on the 14th of May 2000. 
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Does the court’s action here help in extending the time of the dispute or not? 
The first scenario may be that the claim was made as an attempt to persuade the court 
to grant them their request, even if the appellant has not in fact fulfilled the 
requirement of his request, in which case the court would have been right to dismiss 
the appellant’s request. The second scenario may be that the appellant did fulfill the 
requirements of the arbitral clause. Since the court’s decision (above) does not 
definitely answer the fact of whether the appellant fulfilled this request or not, room is 
left for speculation. In such a case, the court denying the appellant the right to a 
decision that would settle his claim may be seen as a form of injustice. To the court, 
this is certainly not the case. The court is more concerned with preserving the 
individual’s right to fair trial and their right to appeal, which includes having the 
opportunity to present a claim in more than one level of the court777. A claim that is 
brought for the first time in front of the supreme court, even if this claim were later to 
be proven to be valid, would still be dismissed by the court, since it are tasked with 
preserving the right to appeal778. The court in both scenarios extends the time required 
for the dispute to be settled by allowing the appellant the opportunity to argue his 
claim more than once. The court, whether intentionally or not, is rendering ineffective 
the party’s choice to arbitrate a dispute, in this instance779, the court upheld the 
arbitral clause, but the parties disputed for four years whether the court had the 
authority to appoint the arbitrators before they were able to move to getting a decision 
that would settle their main dispute.  
Another dispute worth exploring is one that highlights the similarity between 
the federal civil procedures law and the procedural laws in each emirate. This case 																																																								
777 See general Turki supra note 11 at 379-381. 
778 id. 
779 See appeal no. 49/20 supra note 776. 
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indicates the influence that these laws had on the drafters of the federal law, and it 
also indicates that the court’s doctrine was established before the enactment of the 
federal law. Finally, the case illustrates the harmful effects of the court’s policy on 
appeals when applied to arbitration. This dispute originated from an arbitration 
procedure that took nearly sixteen years from the time the arbitrator was appointed to 
the time it reached the stage at which the court became involved. That is, it originated 
before the enactment of the federal law on civil procedures and continued after the 
enactment of that law. In this dispute, the appellant argued that the arbitrator 
withdrew from the arbitration process without grounds, resulting in a long delay that 
inflicted damages on the appellant and the unusually lengthy litigation. The litigation 
began in 1993, and it took nearly a decade for the court to determine whether the 
arbitrator was liable or not. This delay could have been avoided if the court had a 
stricter policy on appeals to the Supreme Court780. Nevertheless, the court’s 
determination of the arbitrator’s liability was governed by article 86/1 of civil 
procedure law no. 3/1970, which requires the arbitrator to present a justifiable reason 
to withdraw from the hearing; this requirement is also listed in article 207/2.781 
Otherwise, the arbitrator would be liable and subject to questioning in the event one 
of the conditions of that article782 was not met.783 The court stated the following: 
[b]ased on article 86/1 of civil procedures law no. 3/1970784, which implies that the 
legislature gives an arbitrator the right to withdraw from an arbitration proceeding if 
one of the conditions was met, the arbitrator is required to provide a justifiable reason 
to withdraw from the arbitration. This complies with what the Federal civil 
procedures law requires in article 207/2.785 Moreover, the determination of whether 																																																								
780 This decision was brought twice to the Supreme Court in this appeal and in appeal no.219/18, see 
Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 219/18, issued on the 26th of October 1997. 
781 Civil Procedures law article 207/2 states: “If the arbitrator has withdrawn, without serious reason, 
from his work after his acceptance of the arbitration, it shall be possible to inflict indemnities on him.” 
782 id.  
783 See Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 503/20, issued on the 15th of October 2000. 
784 Which is the civil procedures law of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. 
785 Article 207/2 supra note 781. 
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the arbitrator’s reason may be considered a justifiable reason falls to the trial court’s 
discretion.786 
The next decision established certain rules: (1) requests to arbitrators are 
considered by the court to be jurisdictional pleas, and as such they are subject to 
appeal to the Supreme Court; and (2) determining the scope of the arbitration is 
necessary in order for the arbitration to be lawful. 
[T]he legislature requires the arbitration agreement to properly identify the scope of 
the arbitration, or the parties should determine the scope in front of the arbitrators if 
the agreement did not contain a determination of scope. However, if the arbitration 
agreement lacked the determination of scope, and the parties failed to agree on the 
scope in front of the arbitrator, then the arbitration shall be null and void.  Moreover, 
if the arbitration agreement between the parties does not contain the scope of the 
arbitration, this fact is not change by delegating that right to the arbitrator. The clause 
involved is a general one that includes all disputes between the parties and does not 
specify the scope of the arbitration or the subject of the dispute. This resulted in the 
parties drafting a term of reference in front of the arbitrator in order to determine the 
scope of the arbitration; had the scope been properly determined in the agreement, the 
parties would not have had to resort to that solution. However, the parties did not 
agree on the scope in front of the arbitrator, which can be inferred from the fact that 
the arbitral hearing occurred without an agreement on scope being reached. This in 
turn nullifies the arbitration agreement, which is not changed by the appellant’s 
request in case no. 390/1998 to determine the scope of the arbitration. The court does 
not have the right to intervene in such a case to determine the scope instead of the 
parties, given the fact that arbitration is based on the will of the parties.787 
These rules are a continuation of the court’s practice of allowing individuals 
the opportunity to appeal disputes.  
The next decision emphasizes the court’s ruling on the subject of the first 
hearing. 
[T]he second ground argues that the first instance court decided to dismiss the 
appellant’s request to dismiss the dispute based on several factors: the existence of an 
arbitration clause, and the fact that it was not presented in the first hearing, even 
though the appellant’s representative pleaded to the existence of the award in the 
postponed hearing dated 3/10/1998. The court dismissed this argument, stating that 
this plea relates to public policy, and it should be presented before arguing on the 																																																								
786 Appeal no. 503/20 supra note 783. 
787 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 620/21, issued on the 19th of December 2000. 
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subject matter of the dispute. Otherwise, it would be considered a waiver of the right 
to arbitrate according to article 84788 of the civil procedures law.789 
 It is clear that the parties are required to submit their request to arbitrate in the 
first hearing, and that a postponed hearing is not sufficient to fulfill this requirement. 
This suggests that the court considers this rule as the highest form of preserving 
justice, since it protects the parties’ from entering into a arbitration that may endanger 
their rights; however, this view disregards the freedom of contract principle.  
The last decision is an example of the court upholding an arbitration 
agreement and the jurisdiction of the ICC790 over the dispute. However, this dispute 
was already decided by the Supreme Court in appeal no. 38/12,791 in which the court 
came to the same conclusion and dismissed the case, stating that it lacked the proper 
jurisdiction to hear it. 
[T]he parties agreed in the arbitration agreement to settle the dispute according to the 
ICC rules, which does not mean that the parties agreed to submit their dispute to be 
administered under the ICC institute. It only means that the parties agreed to apply the 
same rules used by the ICC to the appointment of the arbitrators, and that the courts in 
the UAE should still supervise the dispute. The court dismissed this argument, stating 
that the procedure of registering the arbitration agreement in the court was a 
procedure that was required under AD civil procedures law no. 3/1970, which was 
succeeded by the introduction of the Federal civil procedures law no. 11/1992. As 
such, jurisdiction in regard to the registration of this dispute and the start of the 
proceedings should occur through the ICC.792 
																																																								
788 Civil procedures article 84 states: “1-The plea to local jurisdiction and the plea to forward the action 
to another court for setting the same litigation there before, or for engagement, and the refutation of 
nullity which is not related to the public order, and all of the pleas related to the discontinuing 
procedures, should be revealed together before presenting any other procedural plea, request, defense 
in the action, or disapproval, otherwise the right of what hasn't been revealed thereof shall be 
extinguished, and also the right of the appellant shall be extinguished in such pleas if he hasn't revealed 
them in the appeal initiatory pleading. 2-It shall be imperative to exhibit together all the aspects on 
which the plea, related to the procedures which are not connected to the public order, shall be based, 
otherwise the right to what hasn't been revealed thereof shall be extinguished.” 
789 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 225/23, issued on the 6th of March 2003. 
790 Many authors examined and discuss the ICC, see general Redfern and Hunter, supra note 62 at 9, 
were they give a brief overview of the ICC. 
791 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no.38/12, issued on the 6th of December 1990. 
792 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 304/23, issued on the 24th of March 2003. 
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This dispute exemplifies the harmful effects of having a system that tolerates 
and accepts appeals in cases involving arbitration, and the fact that re-litigation 
defeats the purpose of opting-out into arbitration in the first place. This problem 
cannot be amended by a decision several years later that establishes which entity has 
the jurisdiction to oversee the arbitration. 
4.7 Conclusion 
These fifty-four decisions were issued by different high courts in the UAE and are 
varied in nature, although all are labeled as civil transaction disputes and were 
submitted to the court’s civil circuit chamber. Analysis of these cases highlights many 
of the issues facing the arbitration process in the UAE.793 They do not touch on every 
aspect of arbitration, but they provide an indication of how the system works. They 
also provide an example of the average time a dispute that goes to arbitration would 
take, which in turn emphasizes the need to limit court intervention and demonstrates 
the drawbacks of mixing legal processes; i.e., allowing a case that was arbitrated to be 
moved into the court system. The cases demonstrate how judicial review undermines 
the arbitral process,794 leading to uncertainty and confusion and, more importantly, 
undermining the finality of the arbitral award.795 
Those concerns, which Reuben has raised in regard to the FAA, are clearly 
identified when it comes to the arbitration process in the UAE. The decisions 
																																																								
793 Given the fact that not all of the High Courts decision are published, and most of the lower courts 
decision as well. 
794 See general, Richard C. Reuben, Symposium- Rethinking the federal Arbitration act: an examination 
of whether and how the statute should be amended: article: process purity and innovation: a response 
to professor Stempel, Cole, and Drahozal, 8 Nev. L.J. 271, 271-272 (2007) (The author in here 
discusses the relationship between codifying the judicial review and its affect on the arbitration 
process).  
795 Id at 313, the author also states that in doing so it would: “produce a process that frustrates rather 
than furthers traditional arbitration values…” 
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examined highlight the affect that judges’ interpretations796 have on arbitral decisions, 
and suggests that judges believe arbitration to be incapable of protecting the legal 
rights of individuals. The process that these cases went through—from arbitration into 
the court system—further suggests that the court believes it is necessary in many 
instances to subject the arbitration process to the court’s supervision. Moving an 
arbitration to the court requires judicial review—an appeal—and as the cases show, 
even when the legislature clearly states there is no room for appeals,797 many 
arbitrated awards are still being appealed. The court can be seen in these cases to 
interpret certain provisions very narrowly, in order to facilitate an appeal that would 
bring the case back into the court system for review. In this practice, the court is 
supported by certain articles of the civil procedures law. For example, article 203,798 
which governs the parties’ right to arbitrate, also establishes the automatic waiver of 
this right in the event the parties fail to uphold this right in the first hearing. This is an 
exception to the general rule that addresses the submission of objections, which 
concerns the court’s jurisdiction that is also mentioned in article 85.799 The existence 
of article 203800 is an indication that the drafters of the legislation share the same 
concerns as the judges about arbitration.  
The cases examined in this study suggest that the courts in the UAE are 
creating an environment in which it is difficult for the arbitral process to reach its full 
potential, and in many cases, the work of the arbitrators is undermined almost 
entirely. The appeals process that moves many arbitrated cases into the courts for 																																																								
796 The judge’s interpretation of arbitration has been discussed in the UAE judge’s definition of 
arbitration, in which they defined arbitration as an exception to the individuals right to seek their 
natural judge, supra 2.6.5. UAE Court View of the Definition. 
797 Such as the case in dispute that relates to appointing an arbitrator, see civil procedures law article 
204 supra note 407. 
798 Civil Procedures law article 203 supra notes 406, 428 and 459. 
799 Civil procedures law article 85 supra note 395. 
800 Civil Procedures law article 203 supra notes 406, 428 and 459. 
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multiple rounds of review and appeals means that arbitration is adding to, rather than 
easing, the caseload that floods the courts.801 This then means that the government 
must increase spending on the courts in order to help judges with the overwhelming 
caseload. 
This discussion raises the question of whether it is wise to promote the use of 
civil arbitration. A further dissection of the cases examined in this section will help 
answer this question. Of the 54 cases considered, 23 were decided by the federal 
supreme court of the UAE and 31 by the cassation court of Dubai; the average time 
the cassation court took to reach a decision was two years, while it took nearly three 
and a half for the supreme court to reach a decision, which brings the average time for 
both courts to about three years, which is a normal amount of time for a litigation case 
to take.  
 However, as the case studies show, many parties did not wish to submit their 
disputes to the court802, and forcing those parties to spend years litigating their 
disputes is a clear breach of their contractual obligation and of their freedom of 
contract. Moreover, it undermines the parties’ choice to opt-out into arbitration in the 
first place by raising questions about the practicality of this choice. Instead of 
arbitration being a solution and aid to the court’s problem of an overload of cases, 
arbitration becomes a contributor to this problem.  
																																																								
801 See Justice Philip Talmadge, Alternative dispute resolution comes of age in Washington, 53 Wash. 
St. B. News 23, 23-24 (1999), (the author addresses the necessity of having ADR to combat the issue 
of having “few judges and too many criminal cases”). 
802 Which is evident by the fact that they opted-out into arbitration in the first place, see general 
Carbonneau supra note 74 at 1, see general Redfern & Hunter supra note 62 at 1-2, (both authors when 
asking themselves what is arbitration? came to the conclusion that it’s a process in which the parties 
seek a final and binding decision “without reference to a court of law” see Redfern & Hunter supra 
note 62 at 2).  
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 The other notable factor is the varying nature of the disputes that have been 
examined by these courts; in some instances, there is a commercial element and in 
others a civil, and some are a mix of both. The cases also range from purely ad-hoc 
arbitration to being court-annexed. In some instances, an arbitral institute is present in 
addition to the dispute over the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award—
this variety indicates that the civil circuit is capable of accepting all kinds of disputes 
that involve arbitration, which increases the opportunity for these disputes to evolve 
from arbitration into a normal suit. It also emphasizes the important steps that the 
court should take in order to limit such submissions. 
Despite the variety in the nature of submissions, the constant factor in all of 
the disputes considered in this study is the role that the court’s interpretation plays. 
The court’s interpretation of the arbitral clause and the arbitration agreement 
particularly hinder arbitration and keep it from achieving its purpose. The court’s 
interpretation is influenced by its view of arbitration and its willingness to fight for 
jurisdiction over cases803. The UAE courts are more than capable of sustaining this 
fight through governmental assistance, which is quite similar to what the US court 
system experienced in the early nineteen hundreds, when “America was a rich 
country, full of adventure and could afford a considerable volume of disputes at a 
high cost of settlement.”804  
This quote describes the current status of the UAE judicial institute, which is 
one of the main reasons that the court is in no rush to allow arbitration to ease its case 
load. Many judges believe they hold the original jurisdiction over disputes, and 																																																								
803 See general Carbonneau supra note 74 at 45. (Were the author examined the period of hostility in 
the US and states that: “Arbitration, in their view, was makeshift justice. Courts were reluctant to 
compel parties to arbitrate.” Which is similar to how the courts in the UAE view arbitration.) 
804 Kellor, supra note 58, at 6. 
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currently, the UAE’s courts are well-funded entities willing to seek ways of 
reclaiming jurisdiction. As a result of the struggle for jurisdiction that bogs down the 
arbitral process, arbitration may soon “lose its allure.”805 
This discussion highlights one of the common features presented in the 58 
disputes studied, which is the relative ease with which decision are being appealed. 
This puts individuals seeking to arbitrate at a crossroads—either accept the risk of 
having their arbitration dispute metamorphose into a litigation, or submit their dispute 
from the start to the courts. One of the reasons for opting-out into arbitration in the 
first place is to be granted a final decision without the possibility of appeals,806 but 
this outcome seems insecure at best and unlikely at worst, given the court’s 
willingness to entertain appeals, as illustrated by the decisions examined here. 
 																																																								
805 Paulsson supra note 106 at 51.	
806 See general Kim Karelis, private justice: how civil litigation is becoming a private institution- the 
rise of private dispute centers, 23 Sw. U. L. Rev. 621, (1993-1994), where the author discusses the 
reasons why individuals are frustrated with the courts. 
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This situation raises another concern, which is whether it is necessary for the 
courts to review the arbitral process or the award in the first place? There are two 
foreseeable outcomes for this question. First, the court’s current position and practice, 
which leads to reviewing the arbitral process and the subsequent appeals that usually 
follow from such a judicial review, will become the norm. The court’s continued 
involvement in arbitrated cases would imply that the court favors protecting the 
individual’s right to a fair trial and to appeal over that individual’s freedom of 
contract and right to arbitrate. It also would imply that the court has concerns about 
the ability of arbitration and toward ADR in general to provide the same protections 
that the courts provide to individuals. Ultimately, the court’s continued involvement 
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would suggest that they fear arbitration may create a system of “unequal judicial 
systems; one for the rich and one for the poor.”807 
The other outcome would be for the court to cease its practice of reviewing the 
arbitral process, which would suggest that it favors the individual’s right to freedom 
of contract and freedom to arbitrate over that individual’s right to appeal. It would 
also suggest that the court is accepting the fact that arbitrators are capable of 
preserving the individual’s right to a fair trial. However, the cases examined suggest 
that the court is adopting the first view—the necessity of reviewing the arbitral 
process through appeals—as evidenced by the ease with which a dispute involving 
arbitration is subject to appeal, which essentially transforms an arbitration dispute into 
a litigation. 
Again we must then pose the question of whether it is practical to promote the 
use of civil arbitration in the UAE. While not all of the disputes that were submitted 
to the civil circuit are purely civil, the majority of them are; therefore, examining the 
input and views of the civil circuit courts is key to promoting arbitration. The benefits 
of having a functional arbitration system are immense, especially for the courts, since 
they would be directly affected. Allowing arbitration would help the court achieve 
one of its main goals of providing justice to individuals, and of providing that justice 
without long delays. The advantages of having both systems (courts and arbitration) 
coexist would seem to outweigh allowing one to dominate the other, and thus there is 
“no reason why they cannot work as partners rather than adversaries.”808 
																																																								
807 id at 622. 
808 Id at 623. 
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For this goal to be achieved, the court’s view toward arbitration needs to 
change, and it would need to limit the scope of its reviews. This suggestion is neither 
innovative nor new. A study conducted by Angell and Feulner809 in 1988 examined 
the civil procedures law of the UAE and focused on its arbitration provisions; they 
highlighted the difficulties facing arbitral awards in the UAE, stating: “an arbitration 
award, even one rendered in the UAE, cannot be enforced directly in any UAE court 
but must first be reduced to a court judgment.”810 Today, thirty years later, the same 
issue still exists within the courts, as does the same process: “…this requires 
application to a local court (unless the arbitration is already under the court’s 
supervision) and the opportunity for all parties to submit their objection to the 
award.”811 This is the exact practice and view that the court holds today. 
To promote the use of civil arbitration would require judges to change their 
attitude and practice toward arbitration. Promoting arbitration without providing the 
necessary tools for it to flourish would be a waste of time; rather, it would ultimately 
create a situation in which more disputes would exist because of the increasing 
number of users of this form. The success of this proposal depends on the existence of 
two factors. The first is a successful promotion campaign of arbitration, and the 
second is for the judges and the courts to change their current practice towards 
arbitration. 
 Therefore, succeeding in promoting the use civil arbitration, without 
addressing the shortcomings that currently face the use of arbitration, in particular the 
courts hostility towards arbitration, would create a situation in which arbitration 																																																								
809 Nicholas B. Angell and Gray R. Feulner, Arbitration of Disputes in the UAE, 3 Arab L. Q. 19, 
(1988). 
810 Id at 25. 
811 Id at 25. 
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becomes a funnel of disputes towards the court. However, a successful promotion 
campaign of arbitration could lead to three outcomes: (1) the increased number of 
users of this form could affect the judges and force them to change their views toward 
arbitration and subsequently amend their practice; (2) a counter affect, in which the 
court would feel threatened by a new competitor (arbitration) and would take steps to 
react and counter this new competitor; and (3) a continuation of the current status quo, 
in which the court’s current practice is upheld. 
Naturally, the first outcome is one that favors arbitration and is the goal of any 
scheme trying to promote the use of arbitration. However, based on the way the 
judges are currently addressing issues related to arbitration, it is unlikely that the first 
outcome will occur. Judges’ actions will more likely lead to either the second or third 
outcome, both of which are unfavorable toward arbitration.  
Thus, the promotion civil arbitration requires certain necessary tools—
logistical support in the form of proper legislation and the presence of a judicial 
institute that accepts arbitration and is willing to see it function and succeed. “Judicial 
institute” refers not just to the judges or the court, but to the entire judicial branch of 
government. However, those with the greatest impact on whether arbitration will 
succeed are the judges, as their actions directly affect the arbitration process, and they 
hold important roles in the government’s judicial branch. If the courts were willing to 
accept civil arbitration, their acceptance might translate into decisions that promote 
the practice of this form.   
Finally, the key to answering any question about how to promote the use 
arbitration in the UAE begins and ends with the court and the judges, for their support 
is critical to the success of any scheme that promotes arbitration. 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1 Introduction 
 Arbitration is an essential tool for developing the adjudication process in the 
UAE. For this tool to reach its full potential—namely, to become an effective method 
of dispute resolution—a structure must be put in place that allows arbitration to 
flourish and successfully mediate disputes to acceptable and enforceable resolutions. 
This structure should be tailored to fit the culture of the UAE, as well as the country’s 
needs as a developing society. This requires addressing certain current issues and 
preventing them from reoccurring in the future. In addition, a legislative arbitral 
structure should anticipate potential issues that might arise from implementing 
changes intended to establish arbitration, and it should leave room for improving this 
structure. 
 The cases examined in this research highlight the issues that have delayed the 
acceptance and evolution of arbitration. The most important issue revolves around the 
ease with which disputes may be pulled out of arbitration and brought in front of the 
courts, transforming them into litigation; once subject to the courts’ procedures, these 
cases are subsequently subject to appeal. This occurs in part because of the way the 
courts typically view arbitration: as an exception to the litigation standard and to an 
individual’s right to seek his or her “natural judge.”812 As such, courts in the UAE to 
date have tended to view arbitration as a dependent system that requires court 
supervision. 
																																																								
812 See supra 2.6.5 UAE Court view of the Definition. 
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 When an arbitrated case is remanded to the court system, the time required for 
the dispute to be fully resolved is directly affected. The average time that the court 
takes to resolve the cases examined in this research was nearly four years, which is an 
alarming figure813. Admittedly, the cases examined in this study may represent only a 
small fraction of the total number of arbitrated disputes that are submitted to the 
courts; the small sample size is due to the fact that not all of the high court’s and trial 
courts’ decisions are published. Nevertheless, these disputes provide an example of 
how the courts function and of what happens once the court steps into the process. 
The case studies highlight that court involvement in arbitral proceedings lengthens the 
time of the dispute. 
 
																																																								
813 Due to the fact that in some cases litigants received an arbitral award, which should be a final 
decision and then have to spend time re-litigating their dispute in front of the court, or they agreed to 
arbitrate and then have to defend their decision, without resolving their main dispute. 
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This delay may be attributed at a high level to three factors: 
Ø The legislation 
Ø  The courts 
Ø Conflicting views 
The civil procedures law is the main regulator of the arbitral process in the 
UAE. Upon examining this law, one may conclude that it enables court supervision 
over all aspects of arbitration, and it also gives the court the authority to interpret 
arbitration clauses and agreements. This law allows disputing parties to opt-out of 
their contractual obligation to arbitrate before an arbitral award is made.814 In 
addition, it allows parties to appeal arbitral awards, as well as to question various 
elements of the decision-making process that occurs during the arbitral process. All of 
these elements suggest that legislators lack faith in the arbitral process. 
The existence of legislation that gives individuals and the courts the 
opportunity to opt-out of the arbitral process, either through appeals or by entering 
																																																								
814 Civil Procedure law article 203/5 supra note 442. 
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into a procedure that transforms the parties’ dispute from an arbitration into a 
litigation—or in the best case scenario, into a court-annexed arbitration—undermines 
the arbitral process as a whole and deprives it of meaningful and consistent authority. 
The courts also play a role in evacuating the significance of arbitration. 
However, the courts also hold the key to solving this problem. Their practice in cases 
that involve arbitration stems from their views on arbitration and their adherence to 
the civil procedures law, which they cite to justify their practice of accepting appeals 
of arbitral awards and taking over jurisdiction of arbitral cases. 
Finally, conflicting views about the usefulness and integrity of the arbitral 
process contribute to its tenuous state as a viable method of conflict resolution. Those 
who advocate arbitration are on one side (pro-arbitration, naturally), and the courts 
and legislation are on the other. The case studies presented in this research 
demonstrate that the courts and the legislature share the same views when it comes to 
arbitration, which conflict with the principles of arbitration. For example, one of the 
pillars of arbitration is the finality of the award815; once the parties agree to arbitrate, 
they are supposed to be bound to this procedure and should not be allowed the 
opportunity to present their dispute under any other form in front of the courts. 
Otherwise, arbitration cannot achieve finality nor be seen as an independent 
adjudication procedure.816 
Arbitration requires the guarantee of finality and independence from the courts 
in order to produce what is expected from it. It cannot evolve into an accepted method 
																																																								
815 See general Redfern &Hunter supra note 62 at 31-34 (were the author asks and discuss the reason 
behind the individual opting-out into arbitration). see general Carbonneau supra note 74 at 1. 
816 Redfern & Hunter supra note 62 at 520 and 561, (were the author discusses the final award and the 
effect of awards “Res Judicata”.) 
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of resolving disputes in the UAE while facing resistance from the courts and the 
legislature. 
As it stands now, an arbitral award is treated more like an expert opinion817 or 
report, rather than as a binding legal decision. This may be seen in the way in which 
courts address arbitration. This undermines the arbitral process and its autonomy and 
affects how well the arbitral process works, since the ability to contest an arbitral 
award or indeed the entire arbitral process, undermine the process and render it 
ineffective. 
5.2 Recommendation 
Understanding the challenges facing the arbitral process in the UAE’s civil 
circuit court raises certain important questions: 
Ø How may arbitration be developed into a “one-stop shop818” that limits 
recourse to the courts? 
Ø How may “arbitration [be used] as a solution to crowded court 
dockets”?819 
Ø How may arbitration be made accessible to the public?820 
Any solution must include elements of education, legislative intent, judicial intent, 
and the provisions prescribed in existing legislation. Successfully promoting the use 
																																																								
817 See general, Al Tamimi supra note 12 at 58-59, (the author explains the courts view on experts 
opinions, which is quiet similar to their view on arbitration.) 
818 I have borrowed this term from my conversations with my supervisor Thomas E. Carbonneau when 
he describes what is expected from arbitration and the need for it to be a one stop shop as he puts it. 
819 Rayner supra note 5 at 38. 
820 Kellor supra note 58 at 8, (the author describes the early patterns of the American arbitration scene, 
in which he attributes the lack of accessibility, to the absence of organization.) 
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of arbitration will require considering these four factors, the most important of which 
is education. 
Ø Education 
“ Although arbitration had found a foothold in chambers of commerce 
as early as 1768 in New York, 1794 in New Haven, and 1801 in 
Philadelphia, the examples thus set had not resulted in its general 
acceptance by other chambers of commerce; and even when 
established it was not generally used because little effort was made to 
educate the public in its use….”821 
This statement shows the important role that education plays in developing 
arbitration. The UAE is a relatively new and still developing country, and its legal 
education system is still developing.822 Not all practitioners of law in the UAE are 
UAE nationals, nor are all judges: “Almost 90 per cent of Judges in the UAE courts 
are from Egypt, Syria…”823 Judges with different legal backgrounds and education 
may be influenced by how arbitration is perceived in the jurisdiction from which they 
come (in which they were trained). This may influence junior judges in the court 
system, and it certainly means that jurisprudence in the UAE is affected by multiple 
views on arbitration that derive from a number of different sources.  
Diverse opinions about jurisprudence may be seen as positive; however, 
uncertainty will remain if these disparate sources are not eventually shaped into a 
unified view, or tailored to suit the UAE’s unique judicial needs. This brings us back 
to the importance of education, which has the potential to change the views of the 
public about the utility and authority of arbitration.  
																																																								
821 Id at 7, (al-mulla raised a similar recommendation in regard to the importance of education and the 
participation of law scholars and practitioners in this process), supra note 345 at 42. 
822 Al- Tamimi supra note 12 at 6, (Al-Tamimi highlights this fact and states that the first law school in 
UAE, was only established in 1978.) 
823 Id at 6 
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Educational reform should target judges as well as the practitioners of law in 
general, i.e. lawyers, arbitrators and law students. It should also be addressed to 
individuals that choose arbitration over litigation. Finally, the legislative branch of the 
government should be educated about arbitration toward the following goals: 
• Changing the courts’ views about arbitration from viewing it as competing 
with the courts’ jurisdiction to embracing it as an asset with equal authority 
• Exemplifying the importance of the autonomy of arbitration and the arbitrators 
• Establishing the importance of the finality of arbitral awards 
•  Exemplifying the negative affect that appeals have on arbitration 
• The importance of the courts role in promoting arbitration and limiting (for 
example) the appeals process that undermines it  
Ø Legislative Intent 
Reforming a law requires the backing of the policy makers. If they spearhead 
reform, other parts of the legal system should follow. Consider the U.S. model, in 
which “The court discovered in the FAA a strong federal policy supporting arbitration 
and a congressional command to the courts to enforce it.”824 Moreover, the U.S. 
Supreme Court is tasked to defend the sanctity of arbitration.825  
Without legislative intention to support the use of arbitration, the arbitral 
process may remain be stuck in a loophole.  
Ø Judicial Intent 																																																								
824 See, Carbonneau, supra note 74 at 127. See also, Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A 
Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Justice, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 949 at 989 
(2000), where the author emphasis the need of “Public Policy strongly supports the use of binding 
dispute resolution techniques..” in order to overcome “the legitimacy barrier”.  
825 Based on this federal policy See, Carbonneau, supra note 74 at 127. 
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Judicial intent is also key to reforming and developing a legitimate arbitral 
process in the UAE. If the courts remain hostile toward arbitration, no reform would 
fully succeed. Implementing a policy regarding arbitration similar to that of the 
U.S.826 might only result in more litigation if the courts remained hostile toward 
arbitration. Given the nature of procedural law827 and the vast powers that UAE courts 
hold to interpret laws and engage arbitration agreements, a court that disagrees with a 
pro-arbitration policy might find ways to hinder its implementation; this could create 
dysfunction, increase arbitration-related litigation, and shake people’s faith in the 
arbitral process.  
Ø Legislation 
Arbitration in the UAE needs a law that encompasses all of the principles required 
for it to function properly. The drafters of such a law must consider the following 
factors: 
§ The law would have to be compatible with the principles that underpin 
society in the UAE and be derived from the same sources of law upon 
which the UAE was founded. 
§ The law must erase any judicial hostility toward arbitration, which is 
easier said than done. The success of a law that protects the arbitral 
process will depend on its ability to compel the courts’ cooperation. 
§ To prevent confusion about the use of the law, it would have to be clearly 
drafted. As noted earlier, some of the provisions that regulate arbitration in 
the current civil procedures law contradict each other and create confusion 																																																								
826 id. 
827 Especially in the UAE and the articles relating to arbitration, which allow courts to complicate 
legislation with which they don’t agree. 
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as to their purpose and proper implementation. This gives the courts room 
to interpret them on their own. 
§ The law would have to uphold the finality of arbitral awards and be 
drafted in a way that supports arbitration and the decisions that arbitrators 
render. 
A law regarding arbitration was drafted and published in the UAE in 2010. 
Why it has not been enforced yet, and whether it supports arbitration, remains in 
question.  
This law is modeled after the Egyptian arbitration law. While UAE 
jurisprudence and legal studies owe much to Egyptian jurists,828 the time has come 
for the UAE to create its own laws and not be limited to following or recreating 
the practices of other countries. What may work for one nation may fail in 
another, or at the very least create confusion. The UAE needs arbitration 
legislation created specifically for the UAE. 
Seven years have passed since the 2010 arbitration law was drafted without 
being enforced, which suggests that arbitration is not high on the legislature’s 
agenda and may also indicate that some legislators doubt whether the civil 
procedures law provisions that deal with arbitration have the ability to effectively 
regulate it. 
Whether the 2010 Draft law would support arbitration depends on the final 
draft of this law, and on whether judges accept it. However, having a separate law 																																																								
828 In 2012 I met with Dr. Mustafa Al-Bandary, at the time he was working as an advisor in the Dubai 
Rulers Court, and he provided me with his commentary on the draft law, in our discussion he came to 
the conclusion that this draft law is a copy of the Egyptian Arbitration Law, which is in turn is modeled 
after the UNCITRA model law. See general El-ahdab and El-ahdab supra note 37 at 777-829 (the 
authors in the chapter discussing the UAE examines the new draft law as well.) 
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that governs and regulates arbitration would be a significant, and necessary, step 
forward, even one it is flawed or based on ideas about arbitration that come from 
another country.  
Returning to the two questions posed earlier: 
Ø How may arbitration be developed into a “one-stop shop” that limits 
recourse to the courts? 
Ø How may “arbitration [be used] as a solution to crowded court 
dockets”?829 
Ø How may arbitration be made accessible to the public? 
In order to make arbitration a one-stop shop, it must first gain 
independence from the courts, which will only occur if the following 
conditions: 
§ The courts must step-down from their supervisory role over arbitration, 
which will involve courts changing their views about arbitration. Courts 
would need to  view all forms of arbitration in the same way that they 
view family arbitration—they must feel they have a moral obligation to 
enforce all arbitral awards (not just those that arise in matters of family 
law).830 
§ A proper judicial school must be established in the UAE, and it should 
focus on increasing research and study of law in general and of 
arbitration in particular. Research and findings would ultimately be used 
to encourage the development of arbitration within the UAE. Moreover, 																																																								
829 Rayner supra note 5 at 38. 
830 Which was also mentioned by al-mulla, supra note 345 at 42. 
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such a school would help educate the public about the importance of the 
arbitral process.831 
§ A unified Supreme Court should be established to manage the current 
situation in which there is more than one high court with its own 
jurisprudence, and principles regarding the same subject are not uniform. 
This undermines judicial stability, which is essential for development. 
There have been calls in the past to unify the high courts from dignitaries 
such as a retired judge and the first head of the Federal Supreme Court of 
the UAE, Dr. Abdul-Wahab Abdul.832 Abdul argues that it is necessary 
to unify the courts in order to unify all judicial principles within the 
UAE, which would help erase the contradictions and conflicts that occur 
between local and federal courts.  
These three factors are required for arbitration to become a system that is 
independent of the courts and become truly accessible to the public. This 
might be achieved by means of one of the following solutions: 
§ Accelerating the enactment of the arbitration law, which should 
reinforce the independence of arbitration and ensure people’s faith in the 
arbitral process. However, this solution will not produce results without 
the courts relinquishing their views about arbitration treating it as an equal 
process. Arbitration will always need the courts’ support to enforce arbitral 
awards.833 
																																																								
831 See Kellor, supra note 58 at 8, were he explained that “Education in the knowledge or use of 
arbitration was unheard of, nor was there source material available, nor had teachers though of 
instruction in the subject.” Which exemplifies the important role that education plays in this process. 
See also al-mulla supra note 345 at 42. 
832 Supra note 35. 
833 al-mulla mentioned the need of enacting modern laws on arbitration, supra note 345 at 42.  
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§  Creating specialized circuits within the court, which specialize in 
questions relating to arbitration and produce their own jurisprudence 
regarding arbitration. In order for these circuits to reinforce the arbitral 
process, their procedures would need to fall outside the scope of normal 
litigation. As such, their decisions—unlike those of the other circuits—
would not be subject to appeals. This solution would address the problem 
of arbitration’s overly close relationship with the courts and ultimately 
lead to the creation of a support system within the courts for arbitration. 
However, it would require significant resources, including the selection of 
judges that specialize in arbitration. Arbitration is a specialized field, and 
there are not many specialists in the UAE, thus finding enough judges to 
populate a special arbitration circuit may prove very difficult. As Reuben 
notes:  
ADR processes yields greater return than expanding funding for trial 
processes through the creation of more judgeships, specialty courts and 
other administration devices that merely restructure case management 
rather than reduce the flow of cases by preventing unnecessary conflict 
escalation.834 
The problem of funding can be resolved in part by having the judicial 
institutes in the UAE, which are responsible of training the perspective judges, 
to be ordered to give them courses on arbitration. However, the application of 
this solution implies that the number of disputes relating to arbitration is 
sufficient, to justifies the creation of those circuits and the delectation of those 
																																																								
834 See Reuben, Supra note 824 at 1104, also al-mulla mentioned the same idea, supra note 345 at 41. 
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resources. In addition, to what Reuben states of being a mere restructure of 
case management.835 
Both of those solutions would address certain symptoms, but neither provides 
a complete solution. The first provides a partial solution to the problem, and the 
second looks promising in theory but faces a number of practical problems. 
 
5.2.1 Hybrid Tribunal System 
A more viable solution to the dilemma of how to establish arbitration properly 
in the UAE may be the creation of a hybrid tribunal system, modeled in part after the 
rent dispute committees. Rent committees may provide a useful model for this hybrid 
system, because the courts already view these committees as an extension of the 
courts’ power. They are an established part of legal practice in the UAE, and such a 
tested structure might serve as a solid base for an arbitral system and might also 
garner government support. Rayner proposed that the government support of an 
arbitration scheme would attract public attention and subsequently increase the use of 
arbitration.836  
 The first step in establishing a new system in the UAE revolves around 
changing the courts’ views to the point that they accept a new establishment. 
Therefore, any such system would need to be created through an emirate’s decree in 
order for to have the legal justification needed to ease the courts’ concerns regarding 
the ability of arbitration to protect individuals’ rights. A decree from an emir would 																																																								
835 Id. 
836 See Rayner, supra note 5 at 73, (the author mentioned that the government would have to be 
involved in the training of arbitrators, or assisting in the funding of arbitration schemes, and in creating 
a legislation that support such scheme.) 
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help to ensure the courts acceptance and would overcome, as Reuben called it, the 
“legitimacy barrier”837 
The second step would enforce the independence of the arbitral committees 
(if they were indeed created) by ensuring that the courts were unable to have any 
supervisory role over them. Independence also means that arbitral awards would not 
be subject to appeals in the courts; without this protection, the committees would have 
no power or utility and the opportunity to opt-out into arbitration would also lose its 
meaning. In the worst-case scenario, establishing arbitral committees and not 
protecting the finality of arbitral decisions may in fact increase the number of disputes 
submitted to the courts.838 
The third step may involve following examples from other countries. Many 
similar arbitral structures are already in use around the world. Policy makers in the 
UAE could choose one of these as a model for the UAE’s own system.839 They could 
choose a structure they believe would best suit the needs of the UAE and design a 
structure that is acceptable to all parties that has already been tested in another 
country.  
The fourth step would be characterized by these arbitral committees serving 
as an umbrella over all aspects of arbitration disputes, ranging from concerns 
regarding the scope of the arbitration agreement, to the appointment of the arbitrators, 
to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. These committees would serve 																																																								
837 See Reuben, Supra note 824 at 989. 
838 Rayner supra note 5 at 38, ( the author raised the same concern regarding the scope of appeals, 
stating” it may well be that a new form of appeal will have to be fashioned. Again, the scope of appeal 
may very depending upon whether the parties voluntarily chose arbitration or had arbitration forced 
upon them. Finally the scope of appeal may depend upon the policy underlining the scheme. If the 
purpose of the scheme is to lessen the court’s burden, a broad right of appeal would tend to undermine 
that purpose.”) 
839 Rayner, mentioned a number of such schemes used around the world, id at 39, were he mentioned 
examples of such schemes in the US, UK. 
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as the last resort for any concerns regarding arbitration, help resolve any matters that 
the arbitrator is unable to mediate (and which under the current system would be 
brought in front of the courts). Arbitral committees should have these powers in order 
to satisfy the needs of the courts and of the participants in the arbitral process. A 
committee that oversees all aspects of the arbitral process, and that is sanctioned by 
the government, might erase the courts’ concerns about the ability of arbitration to 
protect the individual right to a fair trial. It might also ensure that individuals would 
be more willing to voluntarily uphold their contractual obligations, be it upholding 
their arbitral agreements or honoring the awards handed down. 
Therefore, having an arbitral structure in the form of a committee, which has 
the same powers as the court and at the same time is separate and independent, is the 
only way to establish an arbitration system in the UAE that functions, that is 
accessible to the public, and that would gain the trust of both the courts and the 
public. Would such a system succeed in functioning “as a solution to crowded court 
dockets”?840 If not, is it then advisable to implement such monumental changes in the 
UAE’s jurisprudential system? The solution proposed in this dissertation (which is 
admittedly theoretical) has the potential to succeed, and the continuous use of the 
arbitral committees outlined above, with the protection and support of the 
government,841 likely would in time cement arbitration’s place as a valid option for 
dispute resolution, working alongside the courts to achieve the common goal of 
providing justice to individuals.842 
																																																								
840 Id at 38. 
841 Rayner theories that the government assistance of such programs is necessary to increasing the use 
of arbitration. Id at 73. 
842 Reuben theorized that in time “the wall between the public and private dispute resolution systems 
will become imperceptibly thin” and his theory of having “a unitary system of dispute resolution will 
begin to align..”, see Reuben supra note 824 at 1104. 
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Appendix 
Civil Procedures Law 
§ Domestic Arbitration843 
1) Article 203- Arbitration concept and requirements844 
This article codifies the use of arbitration, either by contract or an agreement 
between the parties, therefore, this article establishes the parties’ right to freedom of 
contract in arbitration. In addition, to identifying the method of recording the 
arbitration agreement to be exclusively in writing, which raises concerns when it 
comes to verbal and electronic agreements, since according to this article they would 
be dismissed.845 Furthermore, this article requires the proper identification of subject 
of the dispute or the scope of the arbitration, which should be clearly identified in the 
term of reference or during the hearing, this requirement doesn’t change if the 
arbitrator is authorized to reconcile; therefore, the failure to uphold this requirement 
would result in nullifying the arbitration, as a result, the parties have the obligation to 
determine the scope of the arbitration without leaving any room for doubt or 
interpretation by the court. 846 
The article also limits the use of arbitration to matters that can be reconciled, 
moreover, it identifies the party that has the legal right to enter into the arbitration 
agreement, this article raises questions when it comes to the	power of an agent to 
enter into an arbitration agreement, and whether are not his action would be 
permissible.847 																																																								
843 The translation of these articles are provided by the ministry of justice of the UAE. 
844  Federal Law no. 30 dated 30/11/2005 amended this article. 
845 Article 203/2 state “The agreement shall not be recorded except in writing” 
846 Article 203/3 states “The scope of the arbitration should be established in the arbitration agreement 
or during the examination of the suit, even if the arbitrators were authorized to reconcile, otherwise the 
arbitration shall be void.” 
847 Article 203/4 state “It shall not be possible to arbitrate in the matters in which the reconciliation is 
not possible, and it shall not be valid to agree on the arbitration unless by those who have the capacity 
of disposition in the litigated right.” 
	 262	
Lastly, this article establishes that in the event the parties agreed to arbitrate 
they are bound to arbitration, as a result of this they are unable to seek the court for 
relief. However, this right is limited, and is subject to automatic waiver by the parties, 
in the event they failed to uphold their right to arbitrate in the first hearing848 either by 
the parties or through their legal representative, it would be considered, a waiver of 
this right by the court, which is an exception to article 13, which accepts a procedure 
even if it had an error, in the event that the goal of that procedure were achieved, 
implying that the legislator goal from this article is not to preserve the parties right to 
freedom of contract, rather to preserve their right to seek their natural judge, by giving 
them the opportunity to opt-out from their agreement. 
 
2) Article 204- Appointment of the Arbitrators 
This article addresses any issue or dispute relating to the appointment of an 
arbitrator, it requires the parties to submit their dispute through the normal procedures 
of filing a suit; moreover, it establishes that the courts decisions in this regard, are not 
subject to appeal.849  
It can be deduced from this article, that the legislator is trying to solve any 
issue regarding the appointment of arbitrators, by subjecting the parties to the normal 
procedures of filing a suit, which under normal circumstances would in turn subject 																																																								
848 Article 203/5 state “If the litigant parties have agreed on the arbitration in some litigation, it shall 
not be possible to prosecute an action therewith before the judiciary, however, if one of the two litigant 
parties has resorted to prosecute the action without taking into consideration the arbitration condition 
and the other party hasn't objected at the first sessions, the action should be examined and the 
arbitration agreement shall be void.” 
849Article 204 state: “1- If the litigation has occurred and the litigant parties haven't agreed on the 
arbitrators, or one or more arbitrators, who was agreed on, has abstained from the work, has retired 
there from, has been dismissed there from, or his refusal has been decided, or a hindrance has 
prevented his undertaking therein, and there were not an agreement between the litigant parties 
concerning that, the court which is principally authorized to examine that litigation shall appoint 
whoever shall be needed of the arbitrators, and that on the grounds of a request from one of the litigant 
parties, through the usual procedures of the action prosecution. The number of those appointed by the 
court should be equal to the number agreed on between the litigant parties or completing thereto. 
2- It shall not be possible to appeal against the decision issued in that through any of the proceedings of 
appeal.” 
	 263	
the parties to the normal course of appeals, however, the legislator tried to avoid this 
outcome by exempting that those decision from appeals. Despite this statement, there 
is no mechanism that exist in order to deter the parties from appealing those decisions, 
moreover, the court has no obligation to dismiss those appeals, nor are they willing to 
dismiss them without examining it fully. Implying that the second paragraph of this 
article, has no practical affect on the courts nor the parties.850 
3) Article 205- Authorizing the Arbitrators to act as mediators851 
This article addresses the parties right to allow the arbitrators to act as a 
mediator in the dispute; it requires their names to be stated in the arbitration 
agreement or in a subsequent document, and in the event that their names were not 
stated clearly they won’t be granted this power.  
Therefore, in the event that the parties failed to clearly state the names of the 
arbitrator, either, in the arbitration agreement or in a subsequent agreement, this 
would constitute a ground for nullifying the arbitral award if it was based on a 
mediation. In essence, the legislator is stating that agreeing to delegate the power of 
mediation to the arbitrators is insufficient, they should be clearly identified, which 
implies that the legislator is viewing this as an act that contains additional risk to the 
parties, as such it requires further protection through additional regulation.    
4) Article 206- The Arbitrator Requirements852 
This article establishes the arbitrator competence to rule; the arbitrator cannot 
be a minor or legally incapacitated or deprived of his civil rights, the number of 
arbitrators shall be an odd number if the arbitrators were more than one, all of which 																																																								
850 The courts decision that would be examined in this chapter supports the idea that this article has no 
affect on the court. 
851 Article 205 state: “It shall not be possible to authorize the arbitrators for the reconciliation unless 
they were mentioned by their names in the agreement on the arbitration or in a subsequent document.” 
852 Article 206 state:” 1-The arbitrator should not be minor, legally incompetent, deprived from his civil 
rights because of a criminal penalty or bankrupt unless he has been rehabilitated. 2- If there were many 
arbitrators their numbers, in all circumstances, should be odd.” 
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are normal requirement for any arbitrator to have, in order to insure that the parties 
right would be protected, since it is inconceivable to have an individual to preside 
over an adjudication process, without providing a minimum requirement. 
5) Article 207- Accepting and Dismissing the Arbitrators. 
This article requires the arbitrators to accept their appointment by writing, or 
by establishing his acceptance in the arbitration hearing.853 In the event that the 
arbitrator has withdrawn from the arbitration, without providing any proper 
justification, the parties have the right to seek the court to compensate for any 
damages. 854 The dismissal of an arbitrator requires the approval of all parties, except 
if the arbitrator willfully neglected to act according to the arbitration agreement, then 
the court has the right to dismiss the arbitrator based on a request by one of the 
parties.855 This is based on reasons occurring after his appointment, and the grounds 
of dismissal are the same ones that a judge may be dismissed upon or deemed 
incompetent to rule856. Lastly, the legislator provided a time limit for the parties to 
raise those challenges to the court, which are five days.857 
																																																								
853 Article 207/1 state: “The arbitrator's acceptance should be in writing or by proving his acceptance in 
the session minutes.” 
854 Article 207/2 state: ”If the arbitrator has withdrawn, without serious reason, from his work after his 
acceptance of the arbitration, it shall be possible to inflict indemnities on him.” 
855 Article 207/3 state: “He may not be dismissed except with the consent of all the litigant parties, 
however the court which was principally authorized to examine the action, and on the grounds of one 
the litigant parties request, may dismiss the arbitrator and give order to appoint a substitute in his place 
in the manner in which he was appointed in the beginning, and that in the case of proving that the 
arbitrator has intentionally neglected the work according to the agreement of the arbitrators in spite of 
drawing his attention, in writing, thereto.” 
856 Articles 114-124 of the civil procedures, which addresses the circumstance under which a judge is 
incompetent to hear the dispute, such as being related to one of the litigants. Articles 197-202 addresses 
challenges to the Judges and the Members of the Public Prosecution office that deal with fraud and 
flagrant acts or similar circumstances. 
857 Article 207/4 state: “It shall not be possible to refuse him from the arbitration except for reasons 
which would occur or appear after his personal appointment, and the refusal shall be requested for the 
same reasons for which the judge is refused or because of which he shall not be competent to arbitrate. 
The refusal request shall be prosecuted to the court, which is principally authorized to examine the 
action within five days from the litigant party's notification with the arbitrator appointment or from the 
date of the occurrence of the refusal reason or the acknowledgement thereof if it were next to his 
notification with the arbitrator appointment. In all circumstances, the refusal request shall not be 
accepted if the court's decision has been issued and the pleading in the case has been closed.” 
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Therefore, this article clarifies the extent of the power that the legislator has 
given to the court in those disputes, which is a supervisory role over all aspects of 
appointment, and the sole jurisdiction to settle any challenges raised against the 
arbitrator. 
6) Article 208- Arbitrators Obligation858 
This article explain what is required from the arbitrator, for instance the 
maximum time required to notify the parties of the date of the first hearing, and of the 
venue, and fixing a date for the parties to submit their documents, the arbitrator has 
the right to decided based on the submission of one of the parties, in the event that the 
other failed to submit their documents within the agreed upon time period. Lastly, if 
more than one arbitrator were present, then all of them should be present in the 
hearing and sign the minutes of the session. 
In essence, the legislator is allowing the parties the right to dispute the 
arbitrator, in the event that one of those provisions are not met, implying that the 
legislator is viewing the failure to meet those requirements, as a breach of the parties 
right to fair trial. 
 
7) Article 209- The Termination of the Arbitration proceeding 
This article governs the parties right to terminate the arbitration proceedings, 
in the event that one of circumstances mentioned in this provision are met.859 
Furthermore, if a preliminary measure is required, on which is outside the power of 																																																								
858 Article 208 state:” 1 - The arbitrator shall, within thirty days at most from the acceptance of the 
arbitration, notify the litigant parties with the date of the first session fixed to examine the litigation and 
with its meeting place and that without obligation to the rules settled in that law for the notification and 
he shall fix for them a date to submit their documents, briefs and defense aspects .2 - It shall be 
possible to arbitrate according to what one side shall submit if the other party failed to do on the 
appointed date. 3- If the arbitrators were many they should undertake, together, the investigation 
procedures and each of them should sign on the reports.” 
859 Article 209/1 state: “ The litigation shall cease before the court if one of the reasons of the litigation 
severance, set in this law, has emerged, and the severance shall result in its effects which were legally 
set unless the action has been held for judgment.” 
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the arbitrator or a challenge has been filed regarding a counterfeited document or 
criminal proceedings, then the arbitrator shall suspend the proceedings until a final 
judgment has been passed, in addition the arbitrator has the right to suspend the 
proceedings and refer it to the court to issue a decision in three circumstances:860 
• To penalize a witnesses that fail to appear or refuse to give a statement. 861 
• To order the parties to submit necessary documents in their possession.862 
• To order judicial writs.863 
In this article the legislator is giving the legal right to the court or the parties to 
terminate the arbitration proceedings and an obligation on the arbitrator to cease the 
proceedings as well; subject to resolving the preliminary issue that raises, the only 
requirement is that the hearing is still open, and a decision is not yet made. Moreover, 
if one of the circumstances that are present in section two of this article were present, 
then the arbitrator would have to cease any action in the dispute, pending a final 
decision by the court, not only that the legislator mentions three circumstance in 
which the arbitrator is obliged to cease the proceeding, they are also obliged to refer 
the dispute to the court in order to issue a final decision.  
It can be deduced that the legislator is trying to create an environment of 
cooperation, between the judges and the arbitrators by working together to reach a 
common goal. 
 However, is it necessary to postpone the arbitral proceedings pending a courts 
decision? In some circumstances the answer would certainly be yes, in which the 																																																								
860 Article 209/2 state: “2- If a priority matter which is not related to the arbitrator's authority, or an 
appeal against a paper falsification, or a criminal procedures have been taken in its falsification, or in 
another criminal incident has been exposed during the arbitration, the arbitrator shall stop his work 
until a final decision shall be issued therein, and the arbitrator shall also stop his work in order to refer 
to the authorized court's president to proceed…”. 
861 Article 209/2 paragraph A state: “ The sentence with the penalty legally set on the witnesses who 
fail to attend or abstain from answering.” 
862 Article 209/2 paragraph B state: “The decision charging the others to show a documents in his 
possession which is necessary for the decision in the arbitration.” 
863 Article 209/2 paragraph C state: “The decision in the judicial writs.” 
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preliminary matter is essential to issuing of the award, yet in some cases it is not 
essential to cease the proceedings. The legislator is assuming that any of the 
circumstances mentioned in this articles, which deal mostly with issues of a criminal 
nature and some that are outside the arbitrators power requires the suspension of the 
arbitral proceedings. However, isn’t more efficient to leave the determination of 
whether or not the arbitral proceedings should be held or not be left to the arbitrators 
discretion, especially since the arbitrators have a good grasp and understanding of the 
subject of the dispute and whether or not this matter would affect their decision or not. 
 Delegating this power of determination to the arbitrators would in theory, cut 
the amount of litigation and the load on the courts, which in turn help in accelerating 
the arbitral process. On the other hand, even by delegating this power to the arbitrator, 
there is no mechanism that deter the parties from seeking the court. Therefore, even if 
this process were to evolve, without providing the necessary tools to deter the parties 
from seeking the court, it would have a reverse effect on the time the parties spend 
adjudicating their dispute. 
8) Article 210- The Date to issue the Award864 
This article regulate the date that an award should be issued in, if the parties 
were to fail in specifying a date in their agreement, it also gives the parties the right to 
explicitly or implicitly agree to extend the date of the hearing, and to the court to 
order the extension based on the arbitrator or one of the parties request. The period of 																																																								
864 Article 210 state : “1 - If the litigant parties haven't set, as a condition in the agreement, a date for 
the arbitration the arbitrator should arbitrate within six month from the date of the session of the first 
arbitration, otherwise anyone who wanted of the litigant parties may prosecute the litigation to the 
court or may continue therein before the court if it was prosecuted before that. 2 - The litigant parties 
may agree, expressly or implicitly, to extend the appointed date, by agreement or by law, and they may 
authorizing the arbitrator to extend it to a certain date and the court may, according to the request of the 
arbitrator or one of the litigant parties, prolong the time - limits appointed in the preceding clause to the 
period which it shall find adequate for deciding in the litigation. 3 - The date shall be suspended as far 
as the litigation is suspended or severed before the arbitrator and its progression shall be resumed from 
the date of the arbitrator's acknowledgment of the extinguishment of the suspension or the severance's 
reason, and if the rest of the time - limit were a month it shall be extended to a month.” 
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arbitration will cease to run when the arbitration is discontinued or terminated and 
shall recommence once the arbitrators are notified of the removal reason, and if the 
remaining period is less than a month it shall be extended to one full month. 
Therefore, this article is providing a solution, in the event the parties failed to 
mention a time limit for rendering an award, by providing a minimum time for the 
arbitrator to issue their award in, it also implies the importance of determining the 
date of the first hearing, for based on this date an award or a proceeding would be 
deemed lawful or not. 
 
9) Article 211- Taking an Oath865 
This article gives the arbitrators the right to ask the witness to give their 
statements under oath, it also establishes that providing a false statements in front of 
the arbitrators is an act of perjury, and the witness could face criminal charges.  
This provision is essential in order to ensure the success of the arbitration 
process, for having the backing of the courts would ensure the success of the arbitral 
process and bolster its position, by giving the arbitrators the right to call witnesses and 
protecting the statements given in front of the arbitrators. This collaboration between 
the judicial branch of the government and the arbitrators, is what is needed in order to 
develop the arbitral process. 
 
10) Article 212- Arbitral Award 
This article states that the arbitrator is bound when issuing the award with the 
procedures mentioned in this chapter, and to enabling the parties to submit their 																																																								
865 Article 211 state: “The arbitrators should administer an oath on the witnesses and everyone who 
shall perjure before the arbitrators shall be considered a committer of the crime of perjury.” 			
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documents. Nevertheless, the parties have the right to agree on the procedures that the 
arbitrator must follow.866 Therefore, the arbitrators are not bound to the rules of the 
civil procedures law, except to what is mentioned in this chapter, in addition to giving 
the parties the right to design their process. 
It also requires that the award must be issued in conformity with this law, 
unless the arbitrator was authorized to mediate the dispute in which case they are not 
bound to those rules, except in matters relating to the public policy. 867 Implying, that 
an arbitrator who’s authorized to mediate, are not bound to the rules of this law or to 
the parties agreement in regard to issuing the award, in the event that the arbitrator 
managed to end the dispute through mediation and before submitting the dispute into 
arbitration, in which case this provision would apply and the only requirement for the 
award in this instance is to not breach any public policy rule.  
The award shall be enforceable according to the rules of the summary 
execution.868 Which, are the rules in articles (227-234)869, which shows that the 
legislator intent in here is to expedite the process of enforcement. 
This article states that this law applies to the awards issued within the UAE.870 
Otherwise, the rules of enforcing foreign decisions and awards would apply, which is 
mentioned in articles (235-238)871, in addition to the provisions of the New York 
																																																								
866 Article 212/1 state: “The arbitrator shall deliver his decision without being bound to the civil 
procedures except to what has been mentioned in this chapter and the procedures concerning the 
litigant parties' action and hearing their defense's aspects, and enabling them to submit their documents, 
however, the parties may agree on certain procedures according to which the arbitrator should 
proceed.” 
867 Article 212/2 state: “The arbitrator's decision shall be according to the rules of the law unless if it 
were authorized with the reconciliation, then it shall not be obliged with such rules except with those 
related to the public order.” 
868 Article 212/3 states: “The rules related to the summary execution shall be applied on the arbitrator's 
decisions.” 
869See general, articles 227-234 in the civil procedures law for more details, supra note 5. 
870 Article 212/4 state: “The arbitrator's judgment should be delivered in the state of the United Arab 
Emirates, otherwise the rules set for the arbitrators' decisions delivered in a foreign country shall be 
followed therein.” 
871 Article 235-238 of the civil procedures law. 
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convention.872It also establishes the requirements that an award should contain, such 
as having the award in writing and passing it in a majority,873 it also emphasis on the 
importance of having the award issued in Arabic, otherwise it shall be accompanied 
by a legalized translation.874Lastly, it determines the date in which the award is 
considered issued, to be the date in which the arbitrators sign the award.875 
This article exemplifies the number of procedures and requirements that an arbitral 
award is required to meet in order for it to be enforced and recognized, as such the 
arbitrators are bound to follow these rules and take them into consideration when 
drafting their awards and conducting the arbitral process for the failure to comply 
with these rules, would result in setting-aside the award, indicating that this process is 
designed to give the courts a supervisory role over the arbitral process, in order for the 
court to ensure that the arbitrators have upheld the parties rights to fair trial, which in 
turn is an indication that the legislator shares the same fears that arbitration is 
incapable of preserving those rights, in addition to having the same views of that of 
the court, that arbitration is an exception to the individual right to seek their natural 
judge. 
 
11) Article 213- Court-annexed876 and Ad hoc Arbitration 
																																																								
872 1958 New york Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 
873 Article 212/5 state: “The award shall be in writing and pass in majority and accompanied by the 
dissenting vote, and it shall be accompanied by the arbitration agreement, a summary of the parties 
statement and their documents, the grounds and context of the award, the date and place and the 
signature of the arbitrators. If one or more arbitrator refused to sign the award such a refusal shall be 
stated in the award, however the award is still valid if signed by the majority of the arbitrators.” 
874 Article 212/6 state: “The decision shall be compiled in Arabic unless the litigant parties have agreed 
otherwise, in such case, an official translation should be attached thereto when it is deposited.” 
875 Article 212/7 state: “The decision shall be considered delivered from the date of the arbitrators' 
signature thereon after writing it.” 
876 Levin defines court-annexed arbitration as a mandatory arbitration and the arbitrators are typically 
assigned by a third party and the award is not binding and is typically assigned by a statute, and in 
some cases subsequent to filing a case. See, A. Leo Levin, Symposium: reducing court costs and delay: 
court-annexed arbitration, 16 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 537, 538 (1983). 
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This legislator regulates court-annexed arbitration in section one of this 
article.877 Section two states that if arbitration was in connection to an appeal, then the 
submission of the award should be made to the appeal court that has jurisdiction to 
consider the appeal.878 The third section addresses Ad-hoc arbitration, the arbitrator is 
required to provide each party with a copy of their award within five days, and the 
court considers whether the award shall be recognized or not.879 
The first thing to note about this article is the slight leniency shown by the 
legislator when regulating court-annexed arbitration compared to ad-hoc; when it 
comes to court-annexed the legislator gave the arbitrators a fifteen days from issuing 
the award, to submitting it to the court clerk for recognition, the courts clerk would 
then notify the parties, by providing them with a copy of the award within five days 
and the court would schedule a hearing to recognize the award. On the other hand, in 
ad-hoc arbitration the arbitrators have the responsibility to notify the parties of the 
issuing of the award, and providing them with a copy of the award, the party seeking 
to recognize the award would then have to submit the award to the court through the 
normal procedures of filing a suit. 
Therefore, in court-annexed arbitration the legislator limits the procedures on 
the parties and arbitrators, when it comes to submitting the award for recognition; by 
providing a longer time-period for submitting the award to the court and taking on the 
responsibility to provide the parties with a copy of the award, and scheduling a 
hearing on their own without the need for the parties to request it, which in turn would 
limit the opportunities for a procedural error and increase the chances to recognizing 
the award. On the other hand conducting arbitration without the courts supervision, 
such is the case in ad-hoc and institutional arbitration, the procedural burden on the 																																																								
877 Article 213/1. 
878Article 213/2, id. 
879 Article 213/3, id. 
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parties and the arbitrators would increases, the arbitrators would have to deliver a 
copy of the award to each party within five days of issuing the award; then the burden 
of requesting the court to recognize the award would fall to one of the parties.  
To recap, this article indicates that the courts shares the procedural burden 
with the parties in court-annexed arbitration, on the other hand, parties in ad-hoc 
arbitration are left without the court support and with a shorter amount of time to 
submit their awards for recognition. 
 
12) Article 214- Reviewing the Award880 
The legislator gave the court the authority while recognizing the award to refer 
it back to the arbitrators, either to clarify a matter in the award or to decide on 
something that they missed, in the event that those errors would deter the enforcement 
of the award, it also gives the court the right to ask the arbitrators to issue a new 
award with those changes; and it is not subject to appeal on its own, it requires 
appealing it alongside the courts decision of recognizing the arbitral award. 
The authority to clarify arbitral award is a common practice among courts, yet 
in here this simple process does not escape the legislators over regulation, even 
though the legislator have stated that this decision is un-appealable, it requires 
appealing it alongside the decision to recognize the arbitral award. Implying that this 
might be used as a ground for setting-aside the award, or at the very least it is a 
																																																								
880 Article 214 state: “The court may, during the examination of the authentication request of the 
arbitrators' decision, return it to them in order to examine what they have failed to arbitrate in the 
arbitration matters therein or to clarify the decision if it were not definite in a way that makes it 
impossible to execute, and the arbitrators should, in both cases , deliver their decision within three 
months from the date of their notification with the decision unless the law shall decide otherwise. It is 
not possible to appeal against its decision except with the final sentence delivered with the 
authentication of the sentence or its invalidation.” 
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ground for accepting an appeal, suggesting that the outcome of applying this article 
would most certainly be an appeal. 
 
13) Article 215- Enforcing Arbitral Awards881 
This article addresses the process of recognizing and enforcing arbitral 
awards, it requires from the party seeking to enforce the award to file it through a suit 
to the appropriate court, upon which the court will review the award and the 
arbitration agreement, the court also has the right to correct the material errors on 
their own, upon the request of one of the party, the jurisdiction of enforcing the 
arbitral award falls to the execution judge. 
In addition to establishing the process of recognizing an award, there is no 
condition deterring the parties from appealing this decision, since the legislator 
requires the court to not only review the arbitral award but to correct any material 
errors in the award on their own, which in turn increases the chances of appealing the 
award, especially when viewing arbitration as an exception, which implies that the 
court would hold the award to a higher standard.  
Does this article suggest that all arbitral awards are appealable? The legislator 
requires the arbitral award to be recognized by the court, in order to ensure that it 
meets the jurisdiction requirements of enforcement, and to ensure that the arbitrators 
issued their award in compliance with the arbitration agreement, and they upheld the 
parties adjudication rights and due process; which in turn would leave the award open 
for appeal, especially since the legislator didn’t state that those decisions are not final, 																																																								
881 Article 215 state: “1- The arbitrators' decision shall not be executed except if the court in which 
clerk's office the decision was deposited, has authenticated it, and that after looking into the decision 
and the arbitration document and verifying that there is no prohibition to execute it, and such court 
shall be authorized to amend the material errors in the arbitrators' decision according to the request of 
the concerned persons through the proceedings set for amending the arbitrations. 2- The execution 
judge shall be authorized with all that concerns the execution of the arbitrators' decision.” 	
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which leaves those decisions subject to appeal. However, according to this article an 
award, wouldn’t have to only be recognized by the court, the second requirement is to 
submit it to the execution judge in order to enforce it, which leaves the award subject 
to contesting at this stage as well.882 
 
14) Article 216- Grounds for Setting-Aside the Arbitral Award 
This article should be viewed in conjunction to the previous one, since it’s a 
continuation of the previous discussion it addresses the rules for setting-aside the 
arbitral award883 in three grounds: 
First, if the award was issued without an arbitration agreement, or was based 
on invalid reference or an agreement, which has expired through time, or if the 
arbitrator exceeded his authority.884Second, if the arbitral award was issued by an 
arbitrator who is not appointed in compliance with the law, or by an arbitrator who is 
not authorized to issue an award in the absence of the parties, or according to a null 
arbitration agreement that didn’t specify the scope of the arbitration or by an arbitrator 
who doesn’t meet the judicial requirements.885 Third: “If a nullity in the decision or a 
nullity in the procedures which has affected the decision has occurred.”886 Fourth: if 
																																																								
882 A friend of mine mentioned a quote, which describes the enforcement process: “enforcement is the 
graveyard of decisions.” 
883 Article 216/1 state:,” The litigant parties may request the nullity of the arbitrators' decision when the 
court examines its authentication and that shall be in the following circumstances…” 
884 Subsection ‘A’ state: “If it has been delivered without an arbitration report or delivered according to 
a void document or a document that has been extinguished by the failure to observe the date or if the 
arbitrator has gone beyond the document's limits.” 
885 Subsection ‘B’ state: “If the decision has been delivered by arbitrators who were not assigned 
according to the law or it has been delivered by some of them who were not allowed to give the 
decision in the absence of others, or delivered according to an arbitration document in which the 
litigation facts have not been determined, or delivered by a person who had not the capacity of the 
arbitration agreement, or by an arbitrator who did not fulfill the judicial conditions.” 
886 Article 216/1/C. 
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“The acceptance of the nullity shall not be restrained by the litigant party's 
relinquishment of his right therein before the delivery of the arbitrators' decision.”887 
Most legislations contain provisions on setting-aside arbitral award, which are 
similar to those, and act as an insurance to the parties that the arbitrators would 
uphold the highest forms of due process possible in their decision. However, what is 
of concern, is the way in which the courts apply those rules; since the court is capable 
of extending or minimizing the effect of those rules, for a court that extends those 
rules would be viewed as hostile towards arbitration, on the other hand those that 
limits the effect of those rules would be viewed as a court that supports arbitration. 
 However, when viewing this article in connection to the courts own view on 
arbitration, and the other articles mentioned in this law, it can be deduced that it can 
be used as a blueprint to an infinite number of appeals and disputes, which at the very 
least would create a lengthen the time of the dispute. 
15) Article 217- Appealing the Award 
This article establishes that arbitral awards are not subject to appeal by any 
means888. However, in the second section of this article it adds an exception, which 
concerns the courts decision on recognizing arbitral award, which in turn are subject 
to appeal.889 The third section establishes that awards, which have been issued by 
arbitrators that have the authority to mediate, are exempt from the previous section, or 
																																																								
887 Article 216/2. 
888 Article 217/1 states: “The arbitrators' decisions shall not accept the appeal therein through any of the 
appeal proceedings.” This is the ministry of justice translation, which essentially means that arbitral 
awards are not subject to appeal. 
889 Article 217/2 states: “As for the decision delivered for the authentication of the arbitrators' decision 
or by its nullity, it shall be possible to appeal against it by the appropriate appeal proceeding.” 
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if the parties have expressly waived their rights to file an appeal, or if the amount of 
the dispute didn’t exceed ten thousand dirhams.890 
When examining the first section of this article in conjunction to the previous 
requirements of this law, it can be foreseen that this section has no real affect, a fact 
that is supported by the second section of this same article, which exclude recognition 
decisions from the exemption mentioned in the first section, and since arbitral awards 
are required to be recognized by the court, in order for them to be enforced, it is 
unforeseeable then that the first section of this article would have any real practical 
affect, and that the status-quo is that arbitral awards are in fact subject to appeals.  
A fact that becomes more transparent in the third section of this article, which 
requires the arbitrators to have a special authority to mediate, or for the parties to 
explicitly waiver “their right to appeal” in order for the courts decision on recognition 
to not be appealable.  
Therefore, it can be concluded from this article that the legislator intended to 
have the arbitral awards fall under the courts supervision by subjecting them to 
appeals. Suggesting that the right of appeals is the standard, which the courts are 
expected to uphold.  
 
16) Article 218- Arbitrators Fees891 
Concerns the arbitrators fee, and it gives the parties the right to seek the court 
to amend that fee. 
																																																								
890 Article 217/3 states: “With the exception of the preceding clause terms, the decision shall not be 
subject to the appeal if the arbitrators were authorized for reconciliation or the litigant parties have 
expressly relinquished the right to appeal, or the litigation value were not exceeding ten thousand 
Dirham.” 
891 Article 218 state: “The arbitrators shall be allowed to valuate their fees and the arbitration 
expenditures, and they may inflict all or part of them on the losing party , and the court , on the basis of 
the request of one of the litigant parties , may amend that valuation with what shall be adequate to the 
effort done and the litigation nature.” 
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17)  The Execution Judge892 
After recognizing the award the party seeking to enforce the award is required to 
present the courts decision to the execution judge893, to receive a writ of execution894 
in order to enforce the award. 
Even at this stage there is nothing stopping the parties from contesting the 
execution judges decision, the legislator establishes the circumstance in which the 
parties are able to appeal those decisions.895  
 
§ Foreign Arbitral Awards 
The process of enforcing foreign arbitral awards is governed by both the civil 
procedures law and the treaties in which the UAE are part of such as the New 
York convention of 1958896, and other bilateral and regional treaties897. In regard, 
to the civil procedures law the foreign arbitral awards fall under the chapter 
regulating enforcement of foreign decisions, orders and bills898.  
 
§ The recognition of foreign arbitral award 
																																																								
892 This process is being regulated through articles (219-224) of the civil procedures law. 
893 Article 220 states: “1-The execution judge shall be exclusively authorized to execute the executive 
document and to decide in all the temporary litigations of the execution with a summary proceeding. 
Moreover, he shall be authorized to deliver the sentences, decisions and orders related thereto…..” 
894 Articles 225-226 of the civil procedures law regulates this procedure, supra note 5. 
895 Those conditions are mentioned in detail in article 222 of the civil procedures, supra note 402. 
896 supra note 3.  
897 Al-Tamimi, mentioned fourteen treaties, thirteen of which the UAE have acceded to in regard to 
judicial cooperation and the enforcement of judgments, such as the GCC agreement of 1996 and the 
Riyadh convention, supra Al-Tamimi note 9 at 167-171.There are other treaties, which the UAE have 
acceded to in regard to judicial cooperation, such as Arab League Convention of 1952, which the UAE 
acceded to in 1972, which was repealed by the Riyadh convention, see supra note 35 El-Ahdab & El-
Ahdab at 889, the UAE acceded to that convention based on the federal decree no. 93/1972. 
898 Which is regulated through articles 235-238. The execution procedure is regulated in articles 239-
243 and the objection to execution is governed in articles 244-246. 
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Foreign arbitral awards are subject to enforcement in the UAE after they meet 
the requirements of the law 899, moreover, the court is required to supervise and 
verify the presence of those requirements, after receiving a request through the 
normal procedure of filing a suit900, those requirements are as follow:-  
• To ensure that the UAE courts has no jurisdiction over the dispute, and that 
the foreign court or arbitrator has the authority to issue the decision according 
to international rules901 and the law of the country that the decision or the 
award were issued in.902 
• That the parties of the dispute were notified of the start of the process and 
have been properly represented.903 
• That the decision or order received res judicata status according to the law of 
the county in which it was issued.904 
• To ensure that tit doesn’t contradict nor in conflict with a decision or order 
delivered in the UAE, nor breach public order and policy requirements.905 
Even though the main purpose of this article, is to regulate the recognition of 
foreign decisions and orders, it also applies to foreign arbitral awards906, the legislator 
doesn’t distinguish between arbitral awards and court decisions. Therefore, subjecting 
arbitration to the same set of rules and standards that is required from a foreign 
decision, not to mention that the ability to appeal the courts decision is also embedded 
in this article as well, since it states that the request should be submitted to the first 
																																																								
899 Article 235/1. 
900 Article 235/2. 
901 Article 235/2/a. 
902 Article 235/2/b. 
903 Article 235/2/c. 
904 Article 235/2/d. 
905 Article 235/2/e. 
906 Article 236. 
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instance court through the normal course of filing a suit,907 which suggests that such 
decision would fall under the normal requirements of appeal.  
This fact is emphasized by article 236, which specifically states that the 
requirements of recognizing and enforcing foreign decisions apply to arbitration, in 
addition to having the court examine whether the arbitration is allowed under the laws 
of the UAE, as well as ensuring its enforceability according to the foreign jurisdiction 
laws.908 
Therefore, the arbitral award needs to meet both the requirements of article 
235 and 236, in essence, a dispute that cannot be arbitrated in the UAE cannot be 
subject to enforcement according to this article, moreover, it suggests that the court 
when reviewing the arbitral award would subject it to the same test used to recognize 
domestic awards, in addition, to the test used for recognizing foreign awards and 
decisions. Making the chances of failing either tests or one at the very least highly 
probable, and then it would have to be sent to the execution judge909 in order to 
enforce the award. These articles govern the process of recognition, for the awards 
that do not meet the requirements of the NY convention, and for the awards that were 
sought to recognize before the accession to the convention by the UAE.910 
 
 Article 237- Mediation and Reconciliation 
In contrary to the process of recognizing arbitral awards, which is submitted to 
the first instance court, in here the request of recognizing and enforcement is being 
																																																								
907 Article 235/2. 
908 Article 236. 
909 Even then it wont escape the process of appeal after submitting it to the execution judge for 
enforcement, see above The Execution Judge. 
910 See supra note 3. 
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directed to the execution judge, without the need to go through the first instance court, 
thus, shortening the process in compression to arbitration.911 
 
Article 238- Treaties 
The legislator requires that the laws and regulations stated in the above articles 
shall not breach the rules of the treaties between the UAE and any other countries912. 
Which, in turn leads to two outcomes, arbitral awards issued in non-treaty 
States shall fall under the provisions of this law and it’s requirements, or it would fall 
under a treaty then they wont be subject to those requirements. However, in both 
instances they would be have to be presented to the court for recognition, and even if 
the award was recognized it would still need to be enforced and would have to go 
through the execution judge chambers to be legally enforced in the UAE, which in 
turn raises the probability of appeal.913 
 
The Process of Enforcement  
a. Articles 239-243 The Execution Procedures914 
 
Arbitral and courts decisions either domestic or foreign are required to meet 
the procedures mentioned in those articles in order to be enforced in the UAE. The 
procedural requirements that an award is required to meet, increases the possibility of 
appeal since it would increase the possibility of failing to uphold those procedures. 
However, those procedures are being set in order to ensure individuals rights and 
																																																								
911 Article 237. 
912 Article 238, see general note 406, which gives an example to the treaties that the UAE acceded to. 
913 Which is emphasized by the cases that shall be examined in this chapter. 
914 Article 239-243 of the civil procedures, supra note 5. 
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justice, which would naturally require the individuals to present their case in front of 
the court. 
 
b. Article 244-246 Objections to the Execution915 
 Even after the enforcement request has been granted the legislator left the door 
open for the parties to object on this process, in order, to ensure that justice has been 
met. In the event that a temporary procedure is required, the enforcement officer 
would have to halt the process and refer it back to the enforcement judge to issue a 
decision916,  
Although, the legislator intention in here is to clear any errors that happen 
during the enforcement process, they still leave a room for the parties to abuse their 
right given that those decisions are open to appeal.917 In doing so the legislator is 
perpetuating appeals in order to leave no doubt in the minds of the individuals that 
justice is being upheld, at the expense of lengthening the dispute time and flooding 
the court with disputes. 
	
	 	
																																																								
915 Article 244-246 of the civil procedures, supra note 5. 
916 Article 244/1. 
917 Given that the legislator didn’t prohibit such appeals in articles 244-246, implying that the 
enforcement judge is subject to the supervisions of the court. 
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Cases 
 
Family Disputes 
1 Appeal No. 372/25 to the Federal Supreme Court of the UAE918 
The dispute in this case began long before the parties submitted their claim to the 
courts. The proceedings commenced once the claim was submitted to the mediation 
tribunal,919 in front of which the parties agreed to certain conditions, most of which 
had ordered the appellant (i.e., the husband) to abide by certain conditions. The 
defendant (i.e., the wife) began proceedings by requesting that the court divorce them, 
based on the existence of thrar920 and to determine the amount of alimony necessary 
to support their children. The husband appealed to the first instance court to rule on 
the ta’h921 and to dismiss his wife’s requests. The court then learned that the claims 
had previously been submitted in two separate cases,922 as well as that both parties 
had agreed to submit their dispute to two arbitrators.923 In 2003, the agreement to 
arbitrate was established, and according to the arbitral award, the disputing appellant 
and the defendant were already divorced.924 The first instance court confirmed and 
enforced the award that divorced the parties, on the condition that the defendant 
																																																								
918 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, Appeal no. 372/25, issued on the 12th of June 2004. 
919 When it comes to issues involving family law it obligatory for the parties to first submit their 
dispute to mediation, the mediators here are experts in family disputes and work within the court 
consultation department for family disputes, Article 16 of the personal status which puts a condition on 
submitting family disputes to the court that it needs to be submitted to the family conciliation 
department within the court. 
920 ABO-RKHAYH & AL-JBORI, supra note 222, at 176-181. Which is also governed by the personal 
status in Articles 117-123. 
921 This literally means obedience this term or concept in Shari’a would result in the continuing of the 
marriage and the dismissal of the request to divorce. Which was the case No.665/2002. See general, 
ABO-RKHAYH & AL-JBORI, supra note 222, at 105-108, which explains the rights of the husband. 
922 The defendant of the appeal brought proceedings in case no. 88/2001 and the appellant in case 
no.116/2001. 
923 However the case do not show if this agreement has been fulfilled at that time, for the court in 12 
March 2003 agreed to refer the dispute to arbitration based on the previous agreement. 
924 In Islamic Shari’a this form of divorce is called khal’a, the divorce is called Khal’a when the wife 
gives up here right to the reminder of the Mahr. This is governed by federal law no. 28 on personal 
status in book two Articles (110 and 111). 
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surrender her right to claim the remainder of her mahr925 and ordering that the 
appellant should pay a monthly alimony, provide a suitable residence for the 
defendant and the children, confirm the defendant’s custody of the children, and 
dismiss the counter claim (case no. 665/2002.)926 
This decision was appealed,927 however, the appeals court dismissed that appeal, 
and the husband then appealed to the Supreme Court. His claim was centered on four 
grounds, the first three of which stated that the previous decision failed to uphold 
Shari’a law and the rule of law, since it failed to state the amount of damages before 
referring the matter to an arbitrator. The appellant (again, the husband) also stated that 
during the proceedings in front of the arbitrators, he had asked the defendant take an 
oath to certify her claim in the arbitration, which she refused to do. The appellant 
further argued that the arbitrators had ruled in the defendant’s favor without 
examining her claims and had exceeded the bounds of arbitration, failed to examine 
the amount of thraar,928 and did not explain the reason for granting the divorce 
according to khal’a in exchange for the return of the remainder of the mahr. 
Additionally, as became clear, the appellant claimed that the first instance court had 
failed to uphold Shari’a principles in appointing arbitrators, since Shari’a law requires 
that arbitrators for this form of arbitration be related to a disputing party’s family.929 
The Supreme Court dismissed these claims, stating that the courts reserved the 
right to examine the amount of damages and that, in this case, they had decided to 
																																																								
925 Which translates to dowry, the husband in the marriage requires to pay a dowry to the wife this is 
either paid in full before hand or in a two installment first in the commencement of the marriage and 
later in the event of a divorce. 
926 Federal Court of First Instance of Abu Dhabi , Shari’a circuit case no. 655/2002. 
927 Federal Appeal Courts of Abu Dhabi, Shari’a Circuit Appeal no. 95/2003 issued on 14 June 2003. 
928 This means damages or injury. 
929 Articles 118-121 of the personal status law, also this is based on verse 35 of Surat Al Nisa’ (The 
Women) “if ye fear a breach between the twain, appoint (two) arbiters , one from his family, and the 
other from hers; (549) if they wish for peace, Allah will cause their reconciliation: For Allah hath full 
knowledge, and is acquainted with all things.” Supra ALI, note 179 at 44. 
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appoint arbitrators, which constitutes an act within the court’s authority.930 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the defendant reissuing the complaint 
formed reason for the appointment and that, according to Maliki jurists and Madhab, 
the marriage was no longer able to continue with thraar—in this case, it was deemed 
to constitute severe thraar. Ultimately, determining the amount of the damages was 
left to the court’s discretion. 
At the same time, the Supreme Court appealed to an exception of the rule 
requiring that arbitrators be relatives of a disputing party’s family; namely, that in the 
event that no one from among the relatives of the parties can fulfill the role of an 
arbitrator, then the obligation to determine the arbitrator falls to the court.931 
Moreover, once arbitrators have been appointed and have determined an award, 
according to the Maliki madhab, not only is that award considered to be binding and 
final, but the court is also obliged to confirm and enforce the award, even if it 
conflicts with the judge’s madhab932 or one of the parties dispute the award. 
In this case, the appellant did not dispute the appointment of arbitrators when the 
court named them, nor did he request the appointment of different arbitrators. 
																																																								
930 Which is mentioned in Article 118 of the personal status:” 1- in case the prejudice is not established, 
the discordance is still continuing between the spouses and the family orientation committee as well as 
the judge were not successful in reconciling them, the judge shall a judgment appointing two arbitrators 
from among their parents, if possible, after asking each of the spouses to nominate, in the next hearing 
at most, his arbitrator from his parents, if possible, otherwise from those who have the experience and 
ability to reconcile. Should one of the souses procrastinate in nominating his arbitrator or abstain from 
attending this hearing, the judgment shall not be subject to any appeal. 2- The judgment appointing the 
two arbitrators must include the starting and closing dates of their assignment provided it does not 
exceed ninety days extendable by decision of the court. The court shall notify the two arbitrators and 
shall ask each of them to take oath that he will perform his assignment with equity and probity.” In 
addition the civil procedures code have Articles that gives the court authority to appoint arbitrator in 
Article 204. 
931 See, MOHAMMAD ARFAH al-DESOKI’, HASHYAT’ al-DESOKI AL’A al-SHARH al-KABIR [al-Desoki 
footnote on the Great Explanation] Volume II 346 (publisher Dar Ahya’ al-Ktab al-Arabya’) (1230 
hijri, 1814 C.E.); see also ALI ibn ABDULALSLAM al-TSOLI’, al-BHJAH FE SHARH al-THFAH [The Bhjah 
the explanation of the Thfah] Volume I 489 (1st. ed. 1998); see also ABDUL-AZIZ al-MUBARAK, TBYEN 
al-MSALIK [The clarification of the Msalik] Volume III 112 (2d. ed. 1995). Those three prominent 
Maliki jurists were citied by the court in their decision. 
932 id, For instance if an arbitrator issued an award according to Shafii thought, yet the judge adheres to 
Maliki madhib, the judge is obliged to enforce that judgment.  
	 285	
Therefore, the court decided to dismiss his plea based on the aforementioned 
reasoning. 
 
ii. Appeal No. 149/24 to the Federal Supreme Court of the UAE933 
The defendant (i.e., the wife) commenced proceedings against the appellant (i.e., 
the husband) in front of the First Instance Court of Sharjah by requesting that her 
divorce in the form of Khal be recognized by the court,934 which the defendant 
claimed the parties had agreed upon in writing in a document bearing both parties’ 
signatures, and in accordance with Egyptian law no. 1/2000,935 which allowed the 
defendant to request khal’a and to surrender her Shari’a-based rights936 and any other 
rights. In a counter claim, the appellant requested that the same court refuse the 
defendant’s requests. 
Since the first instance court had dismissed the defendant’s claims and ruled that 
the marriage should be continued, the defendant appealed the decision to the appellate 
court,937 which decided to amend the decision by granting the defendant her request of 
khal’a and allow her to divorce her husband. This decision prompted the appellant to 
appeal the decision to the Supreme Court on three grounds, the third of which 
concerned Shari’a-based arbitration. Specifically, the appellant argued that the court 																																																								
933 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, Appeal no. 149/24 issued on the 31st of May 2003. 
934 Which is essentially a form of a mutual agreement between the two parties to terminate their 
marriage, supra note 214, Article 110 states that:” 1- Divorce for consideration is a contract between 
the spouses whereby they agree to terminate the contract of marriage against consideration to be paid 
by the wife or by another person. 2- the amount to be paid as a consideration shall be governed by the 
same rules as dowry but it is not allowed to agree on forfeiture of the children’s alimony or their 
fostering. 3- should the consideration to be paid in case of divorce by agreement be not validly 
determined, divorce shall occur and the husband shall be entitled to the dowry. 4- Khul’ is rescission. 
5- by exception to the provisions of clause 1 of this Article, where the husband is unduly obstinate in 
his rejection and it was feared not to observe God’s will, the judge shall decide the “ Mukhala’a ” 
(divorce) against an adequate consideration.” 
935 The disputing parties in this case both hold an Egyptian nationality. Khal is governed in Egyptian 
law no. 1/2000, concerning Personal Status law, chapter three section one Articles 16-25; Article 20 
addresses the issue of Khal. 
936 Her right to receive the remainder of her dowry for example or any other rights that the Shari’a 
gives her or the law. 
937 Sharjah Federal Court of Appeals,, Shari’a Circuit appeal no.161/2001, issued on 25/11/2001. 
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had not abided by Shari’a law when it accepted the arbitral award handed down by the 
arbitrators appointed by the first instance court. Those arbitrators had issued an award 
involving khal’a, to which the appellant did not agree. He also argued that the court 
did not take into account the third arbitrator’s ruling on this matter; that arbitrator did 
not agree to divorce the parties of the dispute. 
The Supreme Court dismissed these grounds, stating that according to the Maliki 
Madhab, the Court was obliged to stand behind and enforce the decisions of 
arbitrators and did not have the right to change or amend an arbitrator’s decision, even 
if the court disagreed with the decision.938 Furthermore, the court ruled that the parties 
in any arbitration—here, the husband and wife—are bound by the arbitral decision. 
Moreover, the court argued that the appeal court had amended the First Instance 
court’s decision by abiding with the arbitrators’ decision and upholding the rules of 
the Islamic Shari’a. In this case, the third arbitrator’s appointment was found to have 
no legal basis, since the court had appointed only two arbitrators; therefore, his 
decision was deemed to have no legal merit. 
 The appellant also argued that Egyptian law no.1/2000 was one of the bases on 
which the court based its decision, and that by doing so, it contradicted Article 27 of 
the Civil Transaction Law.939 Moreover, he argued that the court failed to fulfill the 
requirements of Egyptian law, which requires the involvement of public prosecution 
in the case and the mediation of the dispute before deciding khal’a. He further argued 
that the arbitrators should have been sworn in by the court and that the defendant 
should have returned what she received from the mahr. 
																																																								
938 See AHMAD IBN MOHAMMAD al-DARDIRI, al-SHARH al-SAGEER la AQRAB al-MSALIK ale MADHAB 
al-IMAM MALIK [The little explanation to the nearest route into Imam Malik Madhab] Volume II 514, 
see also al-DESOKI’ supra note 225 at 346, also al-TSOLI’ Supra note 225 at 491. 
939 which state: “The provisions of the law indicated by the foregoing provisions may not be applied in 
case they are contrary to the Islamic Shari’a, public policy or morals in the United Arab Emirates 
State.” 
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The Supreme Court dismissed these arguments, since the appeals court’s decision 
had been based on two grounds: (1) the arbitrators’ decision—which alone was 
enough to enforce the court’s decision—and (2) that the court is free to interpret the 
content of Egyptian law. Further, Article 21 of the Civil Transactions Code940 forces 
the court to abide by UAE laws, which do not require the involvement of the 
prosecution, the swearing in of the arbitrators, the mediation of the parties, or any 
requirement that Khal decisions are not subject to appeal. Therefore, the court decided 
to dismiss the appeal. 
iii. Appeal No. 264/24 to the Federal Supreme Court of the UAE941 
This case dates to 31 October 2001, when the court refused to divorce two 
disputing parties.942 When the wife refused to continue in the marriage, the appellant 
(i.e., the husband) commenced proceedings in the first instance court on 23 May 
2002.943 The defendant (i.e., the wife) requested that she be divorced from her 
husband, to which the court responded by appointing two arbitrators as agreed upon 
by both parties. The arbitrators issued an award that granted the divorce based on 
thraar,944 which the first instance court decided to confirm and enforce by divorcing 
them. Though the decision was appealed,945 the appellate court decided to dismiss the 
appeal and uphold the rulings of the first instance court. Once the decision reached the 
Supreme Court, the public prosecution946 submitted a plea to both the Court and the 
																																																								
940 Id, which states: “The rules of jurisdictions and all procedural matters shall be governed by the law 
of the State where the case is filed or where procedures take place.” 
941 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 264/24 issued on 26th of June 2004 
942 The facts of this case were mentioned in an earlier decision of this court dated 6/5/2004. Therefore 
most of the facts were not repeated in here and were referred back to that earlier decision. Moreover the 
parties got divorced twice before in 1986 and 1994. 
943 Khor Fakkan Federal Court of First Instance case no.3/2002. 
944 In here the court mentions the award as a report by the arbitrators although they look at it as a 
binding report, which is enforceable to them, this view of the arbitral award as an expert report is 
repeated by the court in other decisions. 
945 Fujairah Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no. 14/2002 Shari’a Circuit issued on 19/6/2002. 
946 The Intervention of the Public prosecution is regulated in title four of the civil procedures law, 
Articles 60-69. 
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respondent to the appeal that the appeal be dismissed. 
The appellant argued that the appealed decision failed to abide by the law and 
Shari’a law, as well as failed to apply due process. He also argued that proceedings 
had commenced with a request for ta’h; since the respondent to the appeal did not 
request the divorce in a counter case, (rather, she did so through an interlocutory 
request), the appellant claimed that the court should have either granted the request or 
dismissed the case. Since the court decided to divorce them without doing either, the 
decision should be nullified. 
The Supreme Court responded by dismissing this claim, stating that the courts 
reserved the right to understand the facts of the case and to evaluate the evidence. 
Since Article 97 of the Civil Procedures Code947 allows both parties of a dispute to 
submit interlocutory requests, and since, according to the Maliki Madhab, a husband’s 
desertion of his wife is not allowed under Shari’a law,948 the request for divorce had 
occurred. Furthermore, it argued that the arbitrator’s decision was enforceable, even if 
the parties disagreed with the decision, as well as that the court was bound by the 
arbitrator’s decision; hence, the appeal was dismissed. 
iv. Appeal No. 307/26 to the Federal Supreme Court of the UAE949 
The proceedings of this case commenced with a request to the First Instance 
																																																								
947 Which state:” 1 - The prosecutor and the prosecuted may submit any of the interlocutory requests 
which are relevant to the original request in a way that shall help the progression of justice if both shall 
be examined together. 2 - Such requests shall be submitted to the court through the usual procedures of 
the action’s prosecution, or with a request presented verbally at the session, in the presence of the 
litigant party, and shall be recorded in its minutes.” 
948 For Imam Abi Dawud narrated in his Sunan the following Hadith:” Mu'awiyah asked: Messenger of 
Allah, what is the right of the wife of one of us over him? He replied: That you should give her food 
when you eat, clothe her when you clothe yourself, do not strike her on the face, do not revile her or 
separate yourself from her except in the house. Abu Dawud said: The meaning of "do not revile her" is, 
as you say: "May Allah revile you".”  IMAM ABU DAWUD SULYMAN as-SIJISTANI, SUNAN ABI DAWUD, 
Book 12 Hadith 97. http://sunnah.com/abudawud/12 it was also narrated by Imam Ahmad Bin Hanbal, 
and citied by the court in this decision. 
949 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE Judgment 307/26 issued on 2nd of May 2005. 
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Court of Abu Dhabi950 from the respondent to an appeal (i.e., the wife) against the 
appellant (i.e., the husband) asking the court to divorce them based on thraar and a 
monthly alimony of AED 12,700. The appellant submitted a counter claim951 in front 
of the same court, requesting that the court grant him taa’h over his wife, provide him 
with their children’s passports and birth certificates, and prevent her from travelling 
with the children abroad. The court issued two interim measures; the first granted a 
temporary alimony of AED 2,500, and the second appointed two arbitrators to settle 
the dispute. When the arbitrators decided to issue an award divorcing the couple, the 
first instance court confirmed and enforced the decision. 
After being appealed in an appellate court952 and dismissed, the decision was 
consequently appealed before the Supreme Court, at which time the prosecution’s 
office953 submitted a note to the Court stating that it would delegate its power to the 
court. 
The appeal was based on three grounds. First, the appellant argued that the first 
instance court did not have the right to appoint arbitrators, since the defendant had 
commenced proceedings there by requesting divorce and complaints are required to 
be repeated before a court may fulfill any request to appoint arbitrators. As such, the 
initial decision made regarding the arbitral award was argued to be null and void.  
The Supreme Court dismissed this argument, as the appellant had agreed to 
arbitrate in front of the court; moreover, the appellant and the defendant both named 
their arbitrators. The appellant’s lawyer delegated to the court the selection of the 
arbitrators after the failure of the original arbitrators to fulfill their roles and duties. 
																																																								950Abu	Dhabi	Federal	Court	of	First	Instance,	Shari’a	Circuit	Case	no.	282/2001.	951Abu	Dhabi	Federal	Court	of	First	Instance,	Shari’a	Circuit	Case	no.	482/2001.	
952Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeal, Shari’a Circuit, Appeal no. 388/2003. 
953 Since this case involve minors the Civil Procedures law obliges the Prosecution office to intervene 
based on Article 61/3 of the civil Procedures Law which state:” 3 - The actions related to the 
incapacitated, those whose capacity is defective, the absentees and the missing persons.”, supra note 5. 
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The court ultimately agreed to this request, which led to the appointment of arbitrators 
that decided to divorce the parties. The court also argued that the case focused on a 
substantive issue, which should not have been brought before it. 
The appellant’s second ground for appeal was that the arbitrators did not mediate 
the issue between the parties and based their decision on the defendant’s claim 
without any proof, making both the award and the first instance court’s decision  null 
and void. 
The Supreme Court also dismissed this argument. According to the Maliki 
madhab, the judge stated that he was bound by the arbitrator’s decision and obliged to 
enforce the arbitral award.954 
The appellant’s third ground of appeal was that the appealed decision failed to 
answer the requests of the appellant, which rendered the decision null and void. 
The court also dismissed this argument, which resulted in the dismissal of the 
appeal and of the appellant’s requests.  
v. Appeal No. 349/26 to the Federal Supreme Court of the UAE955 
The proceedings of this case commenced in front of the First Instance Court of 
Sharjah,956 when the plaintiff  (the wife)957 filed a suit requesting divorce due to 
damages sustained, as well as payment of the remainder of the dowry, alimony 
expenses, and child support. When the first instance court dismissed the claim, the 
plaintiff appealed to the appellate court,958 which nullified the first decision and 
decided to divorce the plaintiff from her husband, as long as the plaintiff surrendered 
																																																								
954 The court based their claim on a couple of Maliki Jurists opinion and citied them in their opinion. 
See, al-DESOKI’ supra note 225 at 228, see al-TSOLI’ supra note 225 at 491 
955 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no.349/26 issued on 19th of September 2005. 
956 Federal First Instance Court of Sharjah Case no. 598/2003 issued on 10/7/2003. 
957 The defendant of the appeal. 
958 Federal Appeal Court of Sharjah Appeal no. 176/2003 issued on 28/4/2003. 
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her suit to obtain the remainder of her dowry.959 
This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court on three grounds, the first of 
which was that the court failed to submit the dispute to mediation960 or the 
prosecution’s office. 
The Supreme Court responded by dismissing the claim, since referring the 
dispute to mediation is an administrative procedure that the Court is not required to 
perform. Furthermore, the appellate court’s decision only concerned divorce and did 
not refer to child support, which is related to the custody of children, who had not 
been brought to the court. Regarding the court’s failure to submit the dispute to the 
prosecution office, it was decided that the prosecution was not obliged to interfere in 
divorce cases. As such, the argument was found to lack a legal basis.961 
The defendant also argued that the court appointed arbitrators to settle the 
dispute, even though the complaint was not repeated to the court. Since divorce was 
decided based on the arbitral award, the decision should be rendered null and void. 
The Supreme Court responded to this claim by stating that the disputing parties 
agreed in front of the court to arbitrate their dispute, and that they named their 
arbitrators. As such, it was determined that they were bound by the arbitrator’s 
decision. 
The final argument was that the arbitrators decided to divorce the couple, though 
the defendant in the appeal was unable to prove any prejudice in front of the court. 
The Supreme Court responded by stating that the appellant admitted to injuring 
the defendant morally by calling her names and accusing her of adultery, which alone 
																																																								
959 The appeal court based their decision on an arbitral award, it was stated in the grounds of the appeal 
to the Supreme Court and not in the case summary. 
960 This is normally done in front of the family orientation committee. See also Article 117 of the 
personal status law.  However, since this case happened before the enactment of the personal status 
law, the court chooses a different source as a base for their decision. 
961 Which is governed under Book one, Title four of the civil procedures law Articles 60-69. 
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are grounds for divorce. Moreover, the court considered itself bound by Shari’a law to 
enforce the arbitrator’s decision, hence its dismissal of the appeal.962 
vi. Appeal No. 248/24 to the Federal Supreme Court of the UAE963 
The plaintiff commenced proceedings in front of the first instance court964 by 
asking the court to divorce her from her husband (i.e., the appellant) on the grounds of 
injuries sustained, and she also requested custody of their children, child support, a 
housing allowance, a maid’s salary, and payment for the children’s school expenses. 
The court permitted the parties to arbitrate the dispute; the plaintiff chose her father as 
an arbitrator, which the appellant seconded. The prosecution office intervened in the 
case.965 
The arbitrator decided to divorce the parties, to give custody of the children to the 
plaintiff, and to fulfill all of the plaintiff’s requests, except payment for the children’s 
school expenses. The first instance court recognized and enforced the arbitral award. 
The decision was appealed.966 The prosecution office submitted its opinion to the 
court, and the appellate court refused the appeal. 
The appellant appealed the decision to the Supreme Court on two grounds. He 
first argued that there was no arbitration agreement to determine the scope of the 
arbitration or the authority of the arbitrator. He also claimed that, since he had been 
unfamiliar with arbitration procedure, he had seconded the plaintiff’s choice that her 
father arbitrate the dispute, even though Shari’a law requires multiple arbitrators for 
this form of arbitration. He noted that based on this fact, the arbitrator’s neutrality is 
important. However, note that Imam al-Qurtubi’s interpretation of the Quran 
																																																								
962The court citied al-TSOLI’ book in here, see al-TSOLI’ supra note 225 at 491. 
963 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE Appeal no. 284/24 issued on 5th of June 2004. 
964 Federal First Instance Court Case no. 95/2001 
965 The prosecution office is allowed to interfere in the case in certain situation mentioned in the law, 
See supra note 275. 
966 Federal Appeal Court Appeal no. 26/2002 
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highlights Verse 35 of Surat al-Nisa’, which states that it is admissible to have a sole 
arbitrator if the parties agree to that.967 
The court responded to this claim by dismissing it, explaining that for the 
appealed decision to breach the law, the arbitrator must have exceeded the powers of 
the agreement or the scope of his or her power, which in this case had not occurred. 
Furthermore, the court claimed that, according to Maliki Madhab, the arbitrator’s 
award must be enforced without any reservations, regardless of any bias on the 
arbitrator’s part.968 
The second grounds for appeal concerned the arbitral award. The appellant 
disputed the merits of the award decision and claimed that he had already paid AED 
70,000 for housing expenses. 
The Court dismissed this argument, since courts reserve the right to review and 
understand the facts of the case. The court also countered that the appellant had no 
proof to substantiate his claim. 
The court also stated that personal status is a matter of public policy and order, as 
per an Article in the Civil Transactions Code stating about personal status that it:  
shall be considered of public policy, provisions relating to personal status, such as 
marriage, inheritance, lineage, provisions relating to systems of governance, freedom 
of trade, circulation of wealth, private ownership and other rules and foundations on 
which the society is based, provided that these provisions are not inconsistent with the 
imperative provisions and fundamental principles of the Islamic Shari’a.969  
Thus according to this Article and to the court’s jurisprudence, the court can rule on 
																																																								
967 MOHAMMAD al-QURTAUBI, Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī : al-jāmiʻ li-aḥkām al-Qur'ān [al-qurtubi explanation 
on the meaning of the Quran], Volume V 116 (1st ed. 2000 DAR al-KATB al-ALAMYAH), al-Qurtaubi is 
an Islamic Jurists and Imam and his book on the explanation of the Quran meaning is widely 
recognized within the Islamic society, moreover the court citied his explanation in their decision. 
968 See al-DESOKI’, supra note 225 at 346, also al-Mubarak Supra note 225 at 112,  
969 see United Arab Emirates Constitution Article 3. 
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matters concerning public policy such as the Islamic Shari’a without requiring the 
disputing parties to raise the issue to the court, if the issue is related to the appealed 
decision and occurred as part of the proceedings of the case. 
Lastly, regarding how many times the parties had divorced, which the appellate 
court did not state, the decision was ordered to be referred back to the appellate court, 
because it was seemed to be related to public policy. Except in this matter, the appeal 
was dismissed. 		
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Riba Disputes 
 
1 Appeal no. 146/2008970 
This case addresses a dispute over inheritance and how it was settled according to 
Shari’a law. The appellant commenced proceedings in front of the first instance 
court971 by asking the court to appoint arbitrators to settle a dispute between the 
appellant and the respondent regarding an insurance policy effective from 16 March 
1981 to 15 March 1982 on the life of the appellant’s wife, who was murdered on 2 
July 1981. 
Since the appellant was the sole beneficiary of the late woman’s insurance policy, 
he filed a request to claim the insurance, which the insurance company declined, 
stating that he instigated her murder and therefore had no right to the insurance claim. 
The appellant consequently commenced proceedings in front of the court972 by asking 
the court to force the insurance company to pay the full amount of the policy. 
The court dismissed the case, citing the existence of an arbitration clause. When 
the case was appealed,973 the appellate court confirmed the decision of the first 
instance court, as the Dubai Court of Cassation also did.974 
Since the respondent to the appeal did not adhere to the request to arbitrate, the 
appellant commenced new proceedings by requesting the court to enforce the 
arbitration clause. The court accepted the appellant’s claim and ordered the 
appointment of an arbitrator, who issued an award stating the amount of the insurance 
policy in addition to an interest rate of 9% beginning on 2 July 1981 and lasting until 
the date that payment was completed.  																																																								
970 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no. 146/2008. 
971 Dubai Court of First Instance, case no. 424/2005. 
972 Dubai Court of First Instance, case no. 30/1997. 
973 Dubai Court of Appeals, appeal no. 31/1998. 
974 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no. 221/1999. 
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When the appellant sought to have the award recognized, the respondent 
counterclaimed on eight grounds, the first of which was that the arbitrator had decided 
in accordance with the Civil Transactions Code. However, the court decided975 that 
the dispute should be decided in accordance with the Dubai Contract Law of 1971. 
The second grounds was that the arbitrator awarded an interest rate exceeding the 
amount of the claim, which violated Chapter 6 of the Dubai Law of 1971, as well as 
Article 6 of the insurance policy. The third grounds was that the arbitrator violated 
Shari’a principles of inheritance when he decided to award the entire sum of the 
insurance claim. Based on these three and five other grounds,976 both the first instance 
and appellate court977 decided to refuse to recognize the arbitral award.  
The appellant consequently appealed the case to the Dubai Court of Cassation, 
claiming that the court had nullified the arbitral award by reasoning that the award 
compromised UAE public policy and conflicted with Shari’a law, since the arbitrator 
had decided to award the appellant the entire sum of the insurance claim, which was 
in excess of the amount of his share in the inheritance. However, as aforementioned, 
the appellant was the sole heir to the inheritance. Moreover, in determining an interest 
rate, the court based its decision on the Commercial Transaction Law, which 
contradicted the Court of Cassation’s earlier decision that the law applicable to the 
insurance policy was the Dubai Contracts Law of 1971, which does not contain any 
provisions addressing interest. Not only was the interest to be awarded in arrears, but 
the grounds upon which the court had decided to nullify the award do not appear in 
Article 216 of the Civil Procedures Code. 
The Court of Cassation responded to this claim by stating that edits 
 																																																								
975 Id. 
976 The rest of the grounds does not relate to riba. 
977 Dubai Court of appeals, appeal no. 305/2007 issued on 30 March 2008. 
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2 Appeal no. 831/25 and 67/26978 
The facts of this case date back to 14 October 1983, when a contract between the 
parties ordered the construction of 50 houses in Wasit and 53 in Dasman in emirate of 
Sharjah.979 The contractors claimed that they fulfilled their part of the contract by 
finishing the project and were thereby entitled to AED 72,294,000.  
Upon the other party’s failure to fulfill its contractual obligation, the contractors 
commenced arbitral proceedings to settle the dispute. The case proceeded with a 
request from the respondent to the court to appeal case no.831/25 of the first instance 
court,980 as well as for the court to allow the appellant to name the second arbitrator 
and the Ministry of Justice to name a third, who would also preside over the 
proceedings.  
Once the appellant and the Ministry of Justice both agreed to arbitrate and named 
their arbitrators, the court referred the dispute to arbitration. The arbitration tribunal 
rendered an award on 26 March 2003, deciding first to dismiss the plea on the 
grounds that the courts had no right to hear the case because the litigation had 
expired981 due to the passing of time. The tribunal also dismissed the respondent’s 
plea to permit a counter claim in case no. 240/2002, yet it accepted the claimant’s plea 
to dismiss the counter claim submitted to the court on 19 November 2002. Regarding 
the housing project in Wasit, the tribunal decided to award the claimant AED 
17,244,172 as compensation for delayed payment, in addition to 10% interest 
calculated from the 1st of May 2003 until the payment was made in full, in addition to 
other payments. 																																																								
978 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 831/25 and 67/26. 
979 The purpose of this housing project is to provide housing for the UAE nationals; therefore one of the 
parties to the contract involves a branch of the government embodied in the Emirate of Sharjah.  
980 Sharjah’s Federal Court of first instance, case no.114/2000. 
981 Which is similar to the concept of statute of limitation in the US. 
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When the arbitral award was submitted for court recognition, the appellant 
requested that the court refuse its recognition. The first instance court not only refused 
to recognize the award but also nullified it. This decision was appealed,982 and the 
appellant appealed that decision.983 The appellate court ruled to dismiss both the first 
and second appeal, to recognize the arbitral award, to force the payment of the 
arbitrators’ fees except the head arbitrator’s fee, which was dismissed, and to forward 
the documents related to the head arbitrator’s claim to certain fees owed to the Federal 
Judicial Council to determine the fee amount. 
This decision was also appealed, in Appeal no. 831/25 to the Supreme Court by 
the Ministry of Public Works, which contested the arbitral award, as well as in Appeal 
no. 67/26 regarding the arbitrator’s fees. 
Appeal no. 831/25 was based on twelve grounds, the first eleven of which argue 
that the appealed decision misapplied the law and breached public order and policy. 
The appellant also argued that the contract was an administrative contract and should 
thus fall under the rule of public laws, that the public interest was considered in the 
contract, and that judicial supervision was necessary to determine the legality of the 
arbitral procedures. The arbitral award shows that the arbitrators decided to award the 
amount of the claim, in addition to 10–12% interest, or in the case of the reserved 
guarantee, 100% interest. The appellant claimed that the arbitrators awarded an 
unjustified compensation based on unidentified debt not yet due and that the damages 
were unidentified; further, the appellant argued that this interest constituted riba, 
which is unlawful, or haram, according to Shari’a law. As such, the arbitrator here 
breached public policy and order by stipulating compound interest in an award. The 
respondent to this appeal admitted to receiving the payment in installments on time 																																																								
982 Sharjah Federal Court of appeals, appeal no. 480/2003. 
983 Sharjah’s Federal Court of appeals, appeal no.500/2003. 
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and without delay. The appellant concluded by stating that the recognition of an 
award containing riba is a matter that breaches public policy and that any such award 
should therefore be nullified. 
The Supreme Court responded by rejecting the claim, referring to the first two 
paragraphs of Article 212 of the Civil Procedures Code,984 which state that the 
arbitrators have the right to render a decision without being bound by the normal 
course of action for rendering decisions. This reasoning implies that, in viewing 
arbitral awards, the Court does not examine the merits of the case, unless the case 
involves an issue of public policy, but scrutinizes only the procedural aspect of the 
award, as per Articles 212 and 216 of the Civil Procedures Code. 
The Court’s jurisprudence regarding interest is that interest, either compound or 
simple, is considered by Shari’a law to be haram. However, the Constitutional panel 
of the Supreme Court in its explanation for decision no. 14/19 allowed simple interest 
in banking transactions, although compound interest continued to be considered 
haram. The court also examined interest in arrears as a form of compensation for the 
delayed payment of debt and argued that interest as a form of compensation on 
delayed payment is compliant with the rules of the Shari’a. In order for the court to 
rule on interest, it must fulfill one more requirement related to the debt itself: the debt 
must be identified and should be due at the time of the claim, unlike compensation, 
which is subject to the court’s estimation. 
Article 216 of the Civil Procedures Code lists a limited number of circumstances 
in which an arbitral award may be annulled: 																																																								
984 Which states the following:” 1 - The arbitrator shall deliver his decision without obligation to the 
pleading procedures except what has been stipulated in this chapter and the procedures concerning the 
litigant parties’ action and hearing their defense’s aspects, and enabling them to submit their 
documents, however, the litigant parties may agree on certain procedures according to which the 
arbitrator should proceed. 2 - The arbitrator’s decision shall be according to the rules of the law unless 
if it were authorized with the reconciliation, then it shall not be obliged with such rules except with 
those related to the public order.” 
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1 - The litigant parties may request the nullity of the arbitrators' decision 
when the court examines its authentication and that shall be in the following 
circumstances: 
a- If it has been delivered without an arbitration report or delivered 
according to a void document or a document that has been extinguished 
by the failure to observe the date or if the arbitrator has gone beyond the 
document's limits. b- If the decision has been delivered by arbitrators 
who were not assigned according to the law or it has been delivered by 
some of them who were not allowed to give the decision in the absence 
of others, or delivered according to an arbitration document in which 
the litigation facts have not been determined, or delivered by a person 
who had not the capacity of the arbitration agreement, or by an 
arbitrator who did not fulfill the judicial condition. c- If a nullity in the 
decision or a nullity in the procedures which has affected the decision 
has occurred. 2- The acceptance of the nullity shall not be restrained by 
the litigant party's relinquishment of his right therein before the delivery 
of the arbitrators' decision.985 
The court went on to explain that in contrast to what the appellant argued in front 
of the first instance court (that the dispute does not relate to a banking transaction and 
thus there was no room for issuing interest), the case fell outside the scope of Article 
216, which is the Article that contains the conditions of annulment. Regarding the 
argument that the court’s decision about the award constituted a breach of public 
policy, the court said this argument had no merit because the dispute fell under the 
provisions of the commercial law,986 and according to that law, creditors have the 
right to ask for interest and are not required to prove damages in order to ask for it.987 
Thus, the arbitral award did not breach public policy by involving simple interest.988  
 																																																								
985 supra note 5, Article 216. 
986 This is identified in the Federal law no. 18 on Commercial Transaction issued on 7/9/1993, 
hereinafter commercial law, in Articles 4-10. 
987 Id, Article 90 state that: “Interests on arrears for delay of payment of commercial debts are due upon 
maturity, unless otherwise provided in the law or in an agreement.” Moreover, Article 88 of the same 
law states the following: “Unless otherwise agreed, where the commercial obligation is a sum of 
money, the amount of which was known when the obligation arose, and the debtor delays payment 
thereof, he shall be held liable to pay to the creditors, as compensation for the delay, the interest fixed 
in Articles (76) and (77).” 
988 The other ground of appeals does not relate to the issue at hand, they relate to the appointment of the 
arbitrator and the arbitrators fee, which would be discussed later on. 
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Lease Disputes 
• Dubai Court of Cassation  
 
1. Appeal no.193/2002 989  
This dispute was initiated by the appellant990, asking the court to render an 
interim order to stop the enforcement of the rent dispute committee’s decision to 
recognize the arbitral award, until the conclusion of this litigation. Furthermore, they 
argue that the committee lacks the jurisdiction to recognize arbitral awards; they also 
claim that the arbitral award is void in regard to awarding the defendant the sum of 
150 thousand dhs. in addition to the legal interest, claiming that on the 1/1/1998 the 
defendant have rented a car racing circuit for one year. However, they stopped paying 
the rent and vacated the property before the end of the lease, the appellant requested 
the payment of the reminder of the rent to which the defendant answered to upholding 
the arbitral clause and submitting the dispute to arbitration.  
An arbitrator was appointed from the chamber of commerce and rendered an 
award against the appellant in the amount of 150 thousand dhs and 10 thousand dhs in 
lawyer fees in addition to 10% legal interest until the fulfillment of the payment, 
which the rent committee decided to recognize. 
The appellant argues that the rent committee was established by a special 
decree. Thus, it jurisdiction is limited and should not be unrestricted, as such it should 
not be able to recognize arbitral award, which falls under the jurisdiction of the court 
based on article 215 and article 217/2, which allows appeals on the decisions 
																																																								
989 Dubai Court of Cassation Appeal no.193/2002, issued on the 23rd of June 2002. 
990 Dubai court of first instance case no. 213/2001 (civil), the appellant is Dubai Formula 1 Company. 
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recognizing arbitral award, on the other hand the committee decisions to recognize the 
award nullifies the power of this article. Furthermore the arbitrator has exceeded the 
scope of the agreement, which is another ground of vacating the award; the first 
instance court decided to dismiss this claim, stating that the court lacks the 
jurisdiction to rule on the dispute991. The decision was appealed to the appeal court992, 
which decided to uphold the appealed decision.  
The appellant appealed that decision to the cassation court993, basing his 
appeal on two grounds, the appellant argues that the court decided that rent disputes 
fall under the jurisdiction of the rent committee, which includes the decisions to 
recognize arbitral awards, basing their reasoning on decree no. 2/1993994. However, 
this decree only establishes a committee in the Dubai municipality with the purpose of 
resolving lease disputes, therefore the parties doesn’t have the right to agree to opt-out 
from the jurisdiction of the committee through contract and seek to arbitrate such 
disputes, nor does the committee have the right to refuse their jurisdiction over the 
dispute. In addition, the court has the sole jurisdiction to recognize arbitral awards 
according to articles 215 and 217/2. Moreover, the appellant referred to the appeal 
courts995 decision between the parties, which established the courts sole jurisdiction 
over recognizing arbitral awards. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that even though the committee is an 
administrative body. However, articles 1 and 4 of the decree996 that established this 																																																								
991 The first instance court rendered their decision on the 26/5/2001. 
992 Dubai court of appeals, appeal no. 873/2001 issued on 14/4/2002. 
993 He appealed that decision on the 4/5/2002. 
994 The Emirate of Dubai Emir Decree no. 2/1993, in regard to forming a special tribunal to determine 
disputes between landlords and tents. There are two other laws regulating the relationship between 
landlords and tenants in Dubai, which are law no.26/2007, and law no.15/2009 concerning hearing rent 
disputes in the free zone. 
995 Dubai Court of Appeals, appeal no. 532/2001. 
996 Supra notes 377 and 389 and 390. 
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committee gives it the power and the right to resolve leasing disputes and that their 
decisions are final and binding, moreover it is not subject to appeal. This fact is not 
affected by article 213, which established the jurisdiction of recognizing arbitral 
awards to the court; since the dispute between the parties concern a leasing 
agreement, which is regulated under the rules of the civil transaction law997 and the 
decree998, both of which gives the committee the jurisdiction to rule on all lease 
disputes, even those that concerning the recognition of arbitral awards, this fact is not 
overruled nor changed by the appeal courts decision, which establishes the 
jurisdiction to the court.  
Thus, the court decides to dismiss the appeal. 
 
2. Appeal no. 47/2007999  
This defendant of the appeal started the dispute against the appellant company1000, 
asking the court to force the defendant to pay the amount of the claim as a 
compensation for his loss, due to the fact that the defendant have rented a pavilion1001 
in the Global Village1002 and agreed to be the legal representative of this pavilion in 
exchange of 66000 dhs1003. The defendant have finished the pavilion construction in 
compliance to the agreed terms between the parties, after five days from the opening 
of the Global Village the electricity was shut by the appellant company for three days, 
and returned it after three days only to shut down for half the pavilion, resulting in the 
																																																								
997 Which is regulated in articles 742-848 of the civil transaction law. 
998 Supra notes 377 and 389 and 390. 
999 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no.47/2007, issued on the 29th of April 2007. 
1000 Dubai First Instance Court, case no. 285/2006, issued on 18/10/2006. 
1001 The disputed pavilion represent the State of Greece. 
1002 Is a shopping/park located in Dubai, that has pavilions representing the countries of the world, each 
pavilion is developed through a separate contract. 
1003 Which is the amount of the lands rent. 
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tenants to refuse to pay their rent, which is a direct result from the appellants action. 
The appellant company counter claimed in front of the first instance court to dismiss 
the suit, due to the fact that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the dispute since it falls 
under the rent committee’s jurisdiction, in addition to the existence of an arbitration 
clause in the agreement between the parties. The first instance court decided to 
dismiss the case based on the existence of the arbitration clause.  
The defendant appealed1004 this decision arguing that the agreement between the 
parties didn’t contain any arbitration clause, the appellant upheld their argument that 
the court lacks the jurisdiction hear the dispute since it fall under the jurisdiction of 
the lease committee, the appeal court decided to vacate the decision stating that the 
rent agreement did not contain an arbitration clause, and ordered the dispute to be sent 
back to the first instance court. 
The appellant company appealed that decision to the cassation court,1005 arguing 
that the court refused to uphold the arbitration clause, in addition to dismissing the 
argument that the court didn’t have jurisdiction to hear the case given the fact that the 
dispute relates to a lease agreement, which falls under the jurisdiction of the rent 
committee that was established by an Emir decree1006, and based on the above 
discussion any dispute of this sort should have been brought in front of the rent 
committee and not in front of the court given the fact that the rent committee have the 
sole jurisdiction on this matter, in addition to having an arbitration clause in this 
dispute. 
The court responded to this by stating that article of the civil procedure law allows 
the emirate that have opted-out into establishing their local courts system the right to 
																																																								
1004 Dubai court of appeals, appeal no. 742/2006 issued on 28/1/2007. 
1005 On the 6th of March 2007. 
1006 Supra notes 377 and 389 and 390. 
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establish specialized legal committees1007, and given the fact that the ruler of Dubai 
established in a decree1008 a specialized legal committee, which states that the 
establishment of a specialized judicial committee that have jurisdiction over dispute 
raising between the tenants and their landlords whatever the nature of this dispute 
be1009, and that the ruling of this committee is final and binding and un-appealable1010. 
In addition, to the explanatory note published by the office of the ruler , which defines 
the term “any dispute” to mean any dispute rising from renting the non-transferable 
goods only1011. Thus, excluding it from the general principles of the court jurisdiction, 
emphasizing the fact that the court has no jurisdiction over lease disputes, and the 
parties has no right to opt-out by submitting their dispute to the court, or to agree to 
submit their dispute to arbitration. Furthermore, articles 7421012, 7451013 and 7701014 of 
the civil transaction law, implies that the dispute in this instance rises from a lease 
agreement, which gives the jurisdiction to settle this dispute to the rent committee, 
even if the parties of the contract agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration. 
Furthermore, article 85 of the civil procedures1015 allow jurisdictional pleas to be 
heard at any stage in front of the court, in addition the court can decide on its own 
without a request of one of the parties, and since pleas on the existence of an 
arbitration clause fall under this category, and the appeal court dismissal of the 
appellant argument to dismiss the claim based on the existence of an arbitration clause 
is an indication that the court has the jurisdiction to hear the dispute. This decision is 																																																								
1007 Article 1 of the civil procedures. 
1008 Supra notes 377 and 389 and 390. 
1009 id Article 1. 
1010 Id Article 4. 
1011 The Explanatory decree no. 1/1999 in regard to the jurisdiction of the rent committee, article 1. 
1012 The civil transaction law article 742 of states: “A lease is granting ownership of the use of a 
specific thing to the lessee for a certain time in return for a fixed rent.” 
1013  Id article 745 states: “The object of the contract of lease is the enjoyment of the right to use the 
leased premises which takes effect by delivery thereof.” 
1014 Which explains the warranty over the leased property. 
1015 Article 85 of the civil procedures.  
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subject to appeal on its own before rendering the final decision in the dispute1016. 
Furthermore, based on the facts of this dispute, which have risen from a lease 
agreement between the parties and as such the jurisdiction to hear this dispute falls to 
the rent committee, and since the appeal court failed to uphold this fact. 
 Therefore, the court decided to nullify the decision in regard to dismiss the 
dispute based on the existence of an arbitration clause, and to rule again that the 
Dubai courts lack the proper jurisdiction to hear the dispute. 
 
 
3. Appeal no.133/2007 1017 
 
The defendant started the litigation1018 against the three appellants asking the 
court to appoint an arbitrator to resolve the dispute between the parties through 
arbitration based on the arbitral clause in the companies contract between the parties, 
the defendant request that the arbitrator should order the termination of the contract 
between the parties and return the property1019 back to the defendant. However, a 
dispute arose between the parties in regards to the execution of the contract, the 
defendant claims that he was deceived by the appellants upon the signing of the 
agreement to lease the land and the properties on it, and since the parties agreed in the 
tenth clause of the contract to settle any dispute that rises between the parties through 
arbitration, the defendant in compliance with this clause notified the appellants on the 
18-6-2006 the need to appoint an arbitrator, the appellants refused to appoint an 
arbitrator forcing the defendant to seek the assistance of the court. 																																																								
1016 Civil procedures article 151. 
1017 Dubai Court of cassation (civil circuit), appeal no. 133/2007, issued on the 23rd of September 2007. 
1018 Dubai Court of First instance (civil circuit), case no. 611/2003, issued on 28/1/2007. 
1019 The defendant claim that based on a contract between the parties dated 1-1-2003; they agreed to 
invest in property number 1013, which is owned by the defendant. 
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 The first instance court decided on the 28th of January 2007, to dismiss the 
plea that the court has no jurisdiction to hear the case, and to appoint an accounting 
expert as an arbitrator to settle the dispute between the parties and to render an award 
within six month of the start of the arbitral proceedings. 
 The decision was appealed1020, the appeal court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
The appellants appealed this decision to the cassation court on the 10/6/2007. In 
addition, the defendant’s attorney submitted a request to dismiss the appeal to the 
cassation court, arguing that a decision to appoint an arbitrator is not subject to appeal 
according to article 204. 
 The cassation court dismissed this plea stating that the parties have the right 
to appeal a decision made by the appeal court according to articles 1731021, and that 
the requirement of article 204 is limited to the decision to appoint the arbitrator, and 
since the appeal court decided to dismiss the appeal by stating that the first instance 
decision to appoint an arbitrator is not subject to appeal, which in turn doesn’t fall 
under the exception of article 204. 
 The appellants based their appeal on two grounds; the first ground argues that 
the court decision to incumbent the dispute under the jurisdiction of the court, by 
stating that the relationship between the litigants is not a lease agreement, as such 
doesn’t fall under the jurisdiction of the lease committee. The appellant’s claim that 
based on the documents presented in this case the relationship between the parties is 
in fact a lease agreement, since the appellants have lease land no.1013 from the 
defendant, as such it is in fact a lease agreement and not a companies contract, which 
falls under the jurisdiction of the lease committee and not the court. 
																																																								
1020 Dubai court of appeals civil circuit, appeal no. 115/2007, issued on 11/4/2007. 
1021 This article shows the general conditions of accepting appeals in front of the cassation court. 
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 The court dismissed this argument, stating that lease committee1022 that 
regulates the leasing of un-transferable goods1023 is limited to the disputes that rise 
from the lease of those goods. Furthermore, the Court has the right to interpret the 
will of the parties and define the clauses of the contract, which the court has the right 
to deduce from the documents presented to it, as such the parties intent in this dispute 
were to have the appellants invest in the defendant property for ten years. Therefore, 
the dispute between the parties doesn’t rise from a relation ship between a tenant and 
a landlord, but a dispute rising from an investment contract, which makes the appeal 
courts decision to dismiss the appellants plea that the court lacks jurisdiction 
justifiable. 
 The appellants second ground of appeal argues that the appeal court by 
deciding that the first instance decision to appoint an arbitrator is not subject to 
appeal, have failed to apply the law, they argue that arbitration clause state that the 
arbitrator have the right to hear all dispute that arise from this contract, which implies 
that the arbitrator jurisdiction is limited to those disputes, and since the defendant 
claimed that the appellants have misguided and deceived the defendant, thereby 
removing this dispute from the arbitrators jurisdiction by falling outside the scope of 
the arbitration clause, moreover the defendant should have requested to nullify the 
contract instead of asking the court to appoint an arbitrator. 
 The court agreed with the appellants argument, stating that according to 
articles 203 and 204 supports their claim, both articles implies that in order accept a 
request to appoint an arbitrator by the court, the parties are required to agree in 
writing to their intent to submit the dispute into arbitration, and if they identified the 
scope of the arbitration, then the arbitrators power is limited to what the parties have 																																																								
1022 Which is established by the Emir decree no. 2/1993. 
1023 According to the explanatory decree No.1/1999. 
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agreed upon in the contract without extending to other disputes, and according to the 
jurisprudence of this court, arbitration is an exceptional means of resolving dispute in 
which the individual waiver his right to submit his dispute to their natural judge, 
which requires the court to limit their interpretation of the arbitration clause to what 
has been explicitly agreed upon by the parties. 
 Therefore, the court in this dispute is unable to appoint an arbitrator except to 
a dispute that falls under the scope of the arbitration clause in question. Therefore, the 
court in this dispute has no right to appoint an arbitrator in a dispute that is not 
governed under the arbitration clause, which is evident by the defendants purpose of 
requesting the appointment of the arbitrator, which is to nullify the contract based on 
fraudulent activities by the appellants a fact that is outside the confines of the 
arbitration clause and subsequently falls outside the arbitrators authority. 
 Thus, the cassation court decided to vacate the appealed decision and refer the 
dispute back to the court. 
 
b. Abu Dhabi Cassation Court 
4. Appeal no. 58/20071024  
The appellant started the litigation1025 against the construction company (the 
first defendant) and the guardian of the second party (the second defendant) asking 
the court to nullify the lease agreement dated 17/1/1999, which stated that the first 
defendant going to invest in the land owned by the appellant. The appellant argues 
																																																								
1024 Abu Dhabi court of cassation civil circuit appeal no. 58/2007, issued on the 30th of October 2007, 
Arbitration according to the jurisprudence of the cassation court at 17-22 (2007). Which is a collection 
of arbitration cases published the Emirate of Abu Dhabi judicial department from 2007-2010. 
1025 Abu Dhabi Court of First instance, civil circuit case no. 123/2005, issued on 29/5/2005. 
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that since the contract was not brought to the land department in AD for ratification, 
which renders it void under the law.1026 
The first defendant asked the court to dismiss the suit, based on the existence 
of an arbitration clause in the contract. The first instance court decided to dismiss the 
case based on the existence of an arbitration clause.1027 This decision was appealed 
and the appeal court decided to uphold the appealed decision.1028 
This decision was appealed to the cassation court of AD on the 14/2/2006, the 
defendant pleaded that the appeal should be dismissed since it is not a decision on the 
subject of the dispute and according to article 173 it is not subject to appeal, secondly 
the court decision was to refer the dispute into arbitration, which according to article 
1501029 is not a ground of appeal. Furthermore, the court should dismiss this claim 
since the appellant has no benefit from this appeal. The court dismissed those pleas 
and decided to hear the appeal. 
The appellant argues that the appeal court by upholding the arbitral clause has 
misapplied the law according to article 203, since the appellant upheld the argument 
that the clause is void since the main contract that contained the clause is void, 
subsequently the arbitrator has no jurisdiction over the dispute according to article 
209/2. Moreover, the appealed decision by stating that the arbitral clause still is valid 
even if the agreement in which it was contained were to be void and that the arbitrator 
is the one that has to determine the validity of the arbitral clause. However, the 
determination of whether or not the agreement is valid is a preliminary issue that falls 
outside the scope of the arbitrators power, since the nullification of the main contract 
																																																								
1026 According to article 6 of law no. 11/79 in regard to registration lands in Abu Dhabi, and the Abu 
Dhabi Emir decree no.33/1996. 
1027 Article 203. 
1028 The appeal case number is missing. However, the date of the decision is mentioned in the decision, 
which is 27/12/2005. 
1029 Which regulates the general requirements of appeals. 
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would subsequently nullify the arbitral clause, as such the court should take back its 
jurisdiction. 
 The cassation court accepted this argument, stating that the nullification of the 
main contract entails the nullification of the clause and the determination of the 
validity of the arbitral clause falls to the court according to article 209/2. In addition, 
the documents presented by the appellant shows that they have upheld this argument 
in front of the court and that the contract in question1030 is null and that the appealed 
decision did not answer this by deciding to refer the dispute to arbitration, which 
renders the decision unlawful for it gave the power to the arbitrators to determine their 
own jurisdiction. 
 Thus, the court decided to vacate the decision and refer it back to the court. 
 
 
5. Appeal no. 72/20071031 
 
The second defendant started the litigation1032 on behalf of himself and the 
inheritors against the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank and…..(The respondent) asking the 
court to nullify the mortgage agreement dated 2/4/2005 on the second defendants 
property, which came to their possession through their inheritance, the second 
defendant argues that the inheritor have given the appellants father authorization to 
act as his agent based on an agency contract dated 14/8/1996, and that the appellant 
have abused their power by entering into a mortgage agreement on the land in 
question after the passing of the inheritor. The appellant initiated a counter 																																																								
1030 Which was concluded on the 17/1/1999 and contained the arbitration clause. 
1031 Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation civil circuit, appeal no. 72/2007, issued on the 11th of December 
2007.  
1032 Abu Dhabi court of First instance, civil circuit case no.194/2005. 
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proceeding1033 against the second defendant as a representative of the rest of the 
inheritors. The second defendant counter claimed in that case to recognize the selling 
of the property in question, and to dismiss the dispute based on the existence of an 
arbitration clause. The court dismissed the request to refer the dispute into arbitration, 
stating that the court has jurisdiction over the dispute. 
The court decided to combine the two cases and on the 29th of November 
2005 issued a decision, first in regards to case no.194/2005 to nullify the mortgage 
agreement and in case no.281/2005 to recognize the selling of the land. 
The first defendant appealed this decision1034 and the second defendant also 
appealed this decision in a separate appeal1035 ,the court decided to combine both 
appeals and to vacate the appealed decision and to refer the dispute into arbitration 
based on the existence of an arbitration clause. 
The appellant appealed this decision to the cassation court, arguing that the 
arbitration clause is void since the defendants failed to uphold this argument in the 
first hearing, which according to article 203/5 constitute a waiver of their right to 
uphold this clause. The cassation court agreed with this argument, stating that article 
203 requires the party seeking to uphold the arbitration clause to take a positive action 
in the first hearing and that the failure to do so would result in a waiver of this clause, 
and based on the facts of the case the defendant request to refer the dispute into 
arbitration were done in the second hearing and not the first, implying that they have 
waivered their right to arbitrate, subsequently nullifies this clause. Thus, the court 
decided to vacate the appeal decision and refer the dispute back to the court. 
 
 																																																								
1033 Abu Dhabi court of First instance, civil circuit case no.281/2005. 
1034 Abu Dhabi court of appeals Shari’a circuit appeal no.489/2005. 
1035 Abu Dhabi court of Appeals Shari’a circuit appeal no.493/2005. 
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6. Appeal no.66 and 71/ 20071036 
 
 The defendant started the litigation1037 requesting the nullification of the sales 
contract1038 between them and the second defendant and the first appellant1039, and to 
erase all the records on the selling of the land in question and to recognize the sales 
contract, moreover to transfer the ownership of the land to them and to recognize the 
agency agreement dated 8/8/1996 that was concluded in Dubai. The defendant claim 
that according to the sales contract of 24/8/1996, they bought the land from the 
second defendant and built a villa on it and the defendant have failed to register the 
land under their name, which they became aware of through the notification of the 
lawsuit1040 that the second defendant started in which they claim that the sales 
contract was in fact an investment contract and requested to appoint an accounting 
expert in order to settle the account between the parties. The defendant was also 
unaware of the existence of another sales contract dated 14/8/2005, in which the 
defendant’s attorney sold half of the land to the appellant sister, which is the same 
property that was sold to the defendant according to the sales contract of 24/8/1996. 
Which, resulted in the initiation of this proceedings, the second defendants 
attorney argued that the case should be dismissed based on the existence of an 
arbitration clause in article 11 of the sales contract and that the contract in question is 
an investment one and not a sales contract, they argue that the ownership of the land 
have transferred to the second defendant. Moreover, the land in question is registered 
under their name and not under the first defendant. 
																																																								
1036 Abu Dhabi court of cassation civil circuit, appeal no. 66 and 71/2007, issued on 15th January 2008. 
1037 Abu Dhabi court of first instance civil circuit case no. 251/2005. 
1038 Which was concluded on the 24/8/1996. 
1039 The appellant in appeal no. 66/2007. 
1040 Abu Dhabi court of first instance civil circuit, case no.162/2005. 
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The first instance court decided to dismiss those pleas and ruled that the sales 
contract of 24/8/1996 is valid and enforceable and nullified the sales contract of 
14/8/2005.This decision was appealed by the first appellant against the first defendant 
and by the second defendant against the first defendant, in two separate appeals1041. 
The appeal court decided on the 22nd of April 2006 to dismiss both appeals. 
This decision was appealed to the cassation court in two separate appeals, 
appeal 66/20071042 and appeal 71/2007. 
 
First: Appeal no.66/2007 
This appeal was based on four grounds, all of which revolves around the sales 
contract and the selling and the ownership of the land, which were dismissed by the 
court. Resulting in the dismissal of this appeal. 
 
Second: Appeal no.71/2007 
This appeal was based on five grounds. Only the first ground of appeal argues on 
the existence of the arbitration clause, the appellant argues that they have upheld their 
request to dismiss the dispute based on the existence of the arbitration clause. 
However, the court dismissed their request, basing their refusal on article 159 of the 
civil transactions law.1043Which, implies that the minor has the right to allow certain 
acts once he become of age, and the defendant after coming of age didn’t agree to be 
bound by the arbitration clause. However, this article is limited to the acts in which 
																																																								
1041 The first appellant appealed this decision to the appeal court of Abu Dhabi in appeal no. 494/2005, 
and the second defendant appealed this decision in appeal no. 497/2005. 
1042 The first appellant appealed that decision against the first and second defendants. 
1043 Which state: “1-Pecuniary dispositions of the discerning minor are valid, if totally beneficial to 
him, and void if entirely detrimental. 2 - All acts of disposition that may vary between being profitable 
or detrimental depend of the ratification of the tutor, within the limits he initially is allowed to dispose 
of, or of the minor after attaining legal age. 3 - The age of discernment is seven full Hegira years.” 
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the minor have entered on his own and not agreements that were concluded through 
his agent, in this case through his guardian. 
The court dismissed this argument stating that the appealed decision dismissed the 
claim to uphold the arbitration clause based upon the fact that dispute doesn’t fall 
within the scope of the arbitration clause. Moreover, article 159/2 of the civil 
transaction law state that the acts that fall between profitable or detrimental requires 
the consent of the minors guardian or the minors own consent after he become of age, 
this fact doesn’t change whether he concluded the contract on his own or through his 
guardian, making the appellants argument in this regard void and without basis. 
 The remainders of the grounds of appeal argue on the ownership of the land, 
which were ultimately dismissed by the court. 
 Thus, the cassation court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
 
7. Appeal no. 186/20081044  
The appellant started the litigation in front of the first instance court of Abu 
Dhabi1045, against the defendant asking the court to terminate the companies 
contract1046 . They later amended their request by asking the court to refer the dispute 
into arbitration and appoint an arbitrator. The first instance court decided to dismiss 
the case based on the existence of an arbitration clause. The appellant on the 
21/4/2003 appealed the decision to the appeal court1047, which decided to nullify the 
appealed decision and refer the decision back to the first instance court to settle the 
dispute. 																																																								
1044 Abu Dhabi Court of cassation, civil circuit appeal no.186/2008, issued on 8th of June 2008. 
1045 Abu Dhabi Court of first instance, case no.295/2002. 
1046 The nature of the company in question is Particular Partnership Company or a joint venture, which 
is addressed in Federal law no.8/1984 concerning commercial companies, amended by Federal law no. 
1/2009, title four of that law addresses this form of companies in articles 56-63. 
1047 Abu Dhabi Court of appeals, appeal no. 24/2003. 
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The appellant appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the UAE1048, the 
court decided to dismiss the appeal1049.                                      
The first instance court after referring the dispute to them decided to appoint 
two arbitrators to settle the dispute; the arbitrators rendered an award that was 
recognized on the 12/11/2006. The defendant appealed this decision on the 25/2/2007 
asking the appeal court to nullify the decision to refer the dispute into arbitration and 
the appointment of the arbitrators and to set-aside the arbitral award, the appeal court 
decided to dismiss the appeal, for failing to appeal within the allowed time period. 
The defendant decided to appeal that decision to the cassation court1050, the 
court decided to refer the dispute back to the appeal court to rule on the subject matter 
of the dispute, stating that the first instance decision to recognize the award is 
appealable, given the fact that the defendant wasn’t notified to the recognition 
hearing, subsequently the time for appeal is still open. The appeal court1051 decided on 
the 2/2/2008 to vacate the appealed decision and the arbitral award. 
This decision was appealed to the cassation court; the appellant argues that the 
court decided to nullify the award based on article 206/2. However, the appointment 
of the arbitrators was done according to clause 22 of the contract, which was done 
according to the law since it allows the parties the freedom to opt-out into arbitration. 
Moreover, article 216 states specific conditions for setting-aside arbitral awards, 
which don’t apply to this dispute. Furthermore, article 217 states that the arbitral 
award is not subject to appeal. In addition, the defendant waivered their right to 
appeal since they have agreed to arbitrate according to the arbitration agreement of 
5/6/2006, which was drafted according to the requirements of article 203 and 204. 																																																								
1048 This was before the emirate of Abu Dhabi withdrew from the federal court system and establish its 
own cassation court. 
1049 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 25/308, issued on 21/3/2005. 
1050 Abu Dhabi Court of cassation, appeal no.15/2007, dated 13/12/2007. 
1051 There is no mention to the appeal number in the decision. 
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The cassation court dismissed this argument, stating that article 206/2 
explicitly requires that the number of arbitrators should be an odd one, which is a rule 
that concerns public policy, as such the parties has no right to waiver this rule. 
Moreover, the waiver of this requirement in the contract doesn’t entitle that the act 
itself is lawful in the eyes of the court. Thus, arguing in front of the court that the 
parties have agreed to waiver their right to appeal or their right to contest the 
arbitration agreement, has no merit according to article 216. In addition, article 
1661052 state that if the appeal court vacated the first instance decision it is required to 
render a decision in the dispute, the appeal court failed to do so and as such the 
dispute is referred back to the appeal court to render a decision in the dispute. 
 
 
8. Appeal no.136/20091053 
The defendant started the litigation1054 against the appellant company asking 
the court to vacate the company from the property no. 19/t west of Abu Dhabi, 
claiming that based on an investment agreement between the parties dated 15/11/2007 
the appellant has the right to invest in the property for one year starting from the 
19/11/2007 and ends on the 18/11/2008 in exchange for an amount of 1605000 dhs. 
on the 16th of June 2008 the defendant sent a written notification to the appellant 
stating that they don’t wish to extend the contract and the appellant should vacate the 
property once the lease is over. The defendant sent an additional notification on the 																																																								
1052 Article 166 of the civil procedures, states: “If the court of first instance decided in the matter and 
the appellate court found that there has been a nullity in the decision or a nullity in the procedures 
affecting the decision, it shall decide its cancellation and judge in the action. But if the court of first 
instance has judged the lack of jurisdiction or the acceptance of a subsidiary plea that has had as a 
consequent the hindrance of the action progression, and the appellate court has decided the cancellation 
of the decision and the jurisdiction of the court or the rejection of the subsidiary plea and decided to 
examine the action, it should return the case to the court of first instance to decide in its matter.” 
1053 Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation, civil circuit appeal no.136/2009, issued 31/3/2009. 
1054 Abu Dhabi Court of First Fist instance case no.112/2008. 
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14th of October of 2008 to ensure that they don’t wish to extend the contract, the 
appellant responded by stating that they don’t wish to vacate the property nor to end 
the contract. 
 On the 21/12/2008, the first instance court decided to dismiss the appellants 
plea to refer the dispute into arbitration based on an arbitration clause. Furthermore, 
the court decided to dismiss the case since it has no jurisdiction. 
The defendant appealed this decision1055 and on the 10th of Feb 2009 the court 
decided to nullify the decision and decided that the appellant company should vacate 
the property, based on the fact that the lease agreement between the parties have 
ended. The appellant company appealed this decision to the cassation court. 
The appeal was based on two grounds, the appellant argues in the second 
ground of the appeal that the courts decision to dismiss their request of referring the 
dispute to arbitration, was based on the fact that the clause is a general one and didn’t 
specify interim measures to fall under the scope of the arbitration clause, as such 
interim measures would fall under the court jurisdiction. The appellant argues that this 
interpretation of the clause is flawed, for it is limiting the application of the arbitral 
clause, given that the parties have agreed to refer all disputes to arbitration, which 
include interim measures. 
The court dismissed this argument stating that interim measures need to be 
mentioned explicitly in the clause, in order for it fall under the arbitrators power, 
implying that such measures falls outside the scope of arbitral clause, and 
subsequently outside of the scope of the arbitrators power. Moreover, it doesn’t 
prohibit the parties from referring such disputes to the court. 
																																																								
1055 Abu Dhabi court of appeals appeal no. 1161/2008. 
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The appellant argues in the first ground of appeal that the court has no 
jurisdiction over the dispute, which should fall under the jurisdiction of the lease 
committee according to law no.20/2006. Moreover, this dispute doesn’t fall under the 
provisions of the civil transaction law that addresses the lease contract in general, 
rather it falls under the provisions of the lease law no.20/2006. 
The court agreed with this ground stating that article 2, 24 and 25 of that law 
no. 20/2006 in regard to regulating the lease transaction between the tenants and the 
landlords in the emirate of Abu Dhabi, delegates all lease disputes in Abu Dhabi to 
this committee, including interim measures, which falls under article 31 of that law, 
and since the request in this situation is an interim one, in the form of a request to 
vacate the property, which falls under the lease committee jurisdiction, this idea is 
further supported by article 25 of that law. A general arbitration clause doesn’t deter 
the appellant from presenting his request to the lase committee and consequently 
doesn’t deter the committee from hearing the case. Therefore, the jurisdiction in this 
dispute doesn’t fall to the court nor to arbitration, rather to the lease committee based 
on article 25 of law no.20/2006.  
Thus, the cassation court decided to nullify the appealed decision and to refer 
the dispute to the lease committee.  
 
c. Federal Supreme Court of the UAE 
9.Appeal no.32/231056 
 
The defendant started the litigation1057 against the appellants, asking the court 
to appoint arbitrators between them according to clause 18 of the naval vessel leasing 
																																																								
1056 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no.32/23, issued on the 6th of August 2003. 
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agreement and to award the defendant the amount of the lease in addition to the legal 
interest. According to the defendant, the appellants leased the naval vessel “Shahd” 
for one month starting from the 5/7/1995 in exchange for 3000 U.S. dollars per day, 
which can be extended for one more month in exchange for the same amount per day, 
the appellants are obliged to deliver the vessel in one of the UAE ports in good 
condition after the end of the leasing period. The defendant claim that they didn’t 
deliver the vessel at the end of the term, which resulted in extending the lease term, 
the appellant also subleased the vessel to two other parties, making those two 
additional parties liable in front of the defendant. On the 30/6/1996 the vessel was 
returned to the defendant making the lease lasting for 270 days, which amounts to 
71000 dollars minus 5000 dollars, which brings the total amount of the claim to 
66000 dollars. The appellants refused to pay this amount in addition to the damages 
that occurred on the vessel, which resulted in these proceedings. 
The first instance court decided on the 15/11/1997 to appoint a maritime 
expert as an arbitrator in the dispute and to refuse to include the sublease parties in the 
dispute. The arbitrator issued an award on the 6/10/1999 granting the claimant what 
they asked for which are the ships rent amount in addition to the damages suffered on 
the ship, in addition to the interest rate of 9%. The court recognized this award on the 
28/3/2000. 
The appellant appealed this decision1058, the appeal court before issuing a 
decision in the dispute issued an interim measure on the 19/8/2000, to refer the 
appellants questions and appeal to the arbitrator to answer those concerns, the court 
was notified of the passing of the arbitrator. Thus, the court decided on the 
27/11/2000 to uphold the first instance decision and recognize the arbitral award. 																																																																																																																																																														
1057 Sharjah’s Court of First instance civil circuit, case no. 94/1996. 
1058 Sharjah’s Court of appeal, appeal no.65/2000, issued on 19/8/2000. 
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The appellant appealed this decision to the Supreme Court on three grounds. 
The appellant first ground of appeal, argues that the decision failed to uphold the 
provisions of the law and more specifically the requirements of article 212/2, which 
requires that the arbitrator to uphold the law when deciding on the dispute, which 
implies that the arbitrator is required to follow the requirements of article 245 of the 
commercial maritime law1059, thus the arbitrator is forced to apply the rules of force 
majeure that exclude the appellants from their obligation to pay the lease amount. The 
appellant continued their argument by stating that the appeal court at first agreed with 
this argument and referred the award back to the arbitrator to answer the appellants 
concerns in this regard. However, they retracted their decision after being informed 
that the arbitrator passed away, stating that they have the right to retract their decision 
since it is a matter relating to the law of evidence and according to article 5/11060, the 
court has the right to retract their decision. The appellant argues that interim measure 
doesn’t fall under this article and the court issued the interim measure according to 
article 214 of the civil procedures, which the court has no right to retract and the 
passing of the arbitrator doesn’t affect this matter, the court should have appointed a 
new arbitrator or answered the dispute on their own. The appellant continued their 
argument stating that the interim measure renders the arbitral award null, in addition 
to the fact that the award has been issued in contrast to articles 2451061 and 2491062 of 
																																																								
1059 Federal Law no.26/1981, Concerning Commercial Maritime law, (hereinafter maritime law), article 
245 state:” The freighter must place the specified vessel, in seaworthy condition and properly equipped 
to carry out the operations specified in the charter party, at the disposal of the charterer at the agreed 
time and place. Furthermore he must keep the vessel in such condition throughout the period of the 
contract.” 
1060 Federal Law no.10/1992 On Evidence In Civil and Commercial Transactions, article 5/1 state:” 1- 
The Court may, by virtue of a decision recorded in the minutes of the session, go back on what it has 
ordered to be taken as evidence procedures, provided it mentions in the minutes the reasons for 
changing its mind, unless such change was decided by the court without a request from the parties to 
the litigation.” 
1061 Supra note 478. 
1062 Article 249 of the commercial maritime law states:” 1-The rent shall begin to run from the day on 
which the vessel is placed at the disposal of the charterer but nevertheless the rent is not due if the 
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the maritime law, moreover the arbitrator have failed to taken into account the ships 
captains statement that confirms that the failure of the ships engines was due to force 
majeure. 
 The court dismissed this claim stating that article 214, implies that the court 
has the right to clarify some of the provisions within the award that the arbitrator 
failed to explain in the award, this clarification is considered to be an interim measure 
that doesn’t bind the court when deciding the subject of the dispute, unless the 
clarification by the arbitrator have managed to decide or change part of the award, 
only then would the court be bound. Moreover, according to the jurisprudence of this 
court the appellant need to specify the grounds of appeal, for example if the appeal 
was based on the fact that the arbitrator have failed to rule on one of the subjects of 
the dispute that the parties have agreed to include in the arbitration agreement, then 
the appellant need to identify those issues in his appeal. 
 Furthermore, according to the jurisprudence of this court article 212 sections 1 
and 2 of the civil procedures shows the requirements needed in an arbitral award, and 
that the award is not required to meet the same requirements of a courts decision. 
Therefore, the court when deciding whether to recognize an award or not they are not 
required to examine the subject of the dispute only to ensure that public policy hasn’t 
been breached. 
 However, the court is required to examine the procedures within the 
arbitration process, to ensure that the arbitrators have met the requirements of articles 
212 and 216. The courts supervision over the arbitral award is limited and the purpose 
of having such a supervision is to ensure that the award is enforceable within the 
UAE, the courts supervision should not extend to revising the subject of the award, 																																																																																																																																																														
vessel is lost or if it is stopped by force majeure or act of the freighter. It is not allowed to agree that the 
same shall be paid under all circumstances. 2 - If news about the vessel cease and it is then established 
that it is lost, the rent shall be payable in full up to the date of the last news about the vessel.” 
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for an award that have met the procedural requirements is considered to be a binding 
and enforceable award that receives res judicata status. Consequently, the appeal court 
decided to implement article 214, which grants the court the right to seek explanation 
from the arbitrator and since the arbitrator have passed away the court is unable to get 
such clarification from the arbitrator. 
 Therefore, the request to set-aside the award by the appellant should be 
limited to the award as being a legal act and should be on the procedural aspects of 
the award according to article 216 and not on what the arbitrator decided to grant in 
the award. Since the appealed decision came to the conclusion that the arbitrator 
upheld due process and rendered an award within the scope of the arbitration 
agreement and issued an enforceable award, in addition the appellant didn’t identify 
the aspects that the arbitrator have failed to rule upon in the arbitration, which renders 
their plea ungrounded.  
Thus, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
 
10. Appeal no.732/241063 
The defendant started the litigation1064 against the appellant asking the court to 
order the payment of 652,511 U.S. dollars or its equivalent in UAE dirhams in 
addition to 12% interest until the fulfillment of the payment, in addition to order the 
provisional seizure on the appellants property, they based their claim on the fact that 
they agreed to rent an airplane from the appellant for one year, in order to transport 
mail between AD and Ishq Abaad airports, the defendant opened three bank accounts 
for the purpose of this agreement in the AD branch of Citi bank, the appellant 
confirmed the fact that they failed to pay the amount that the defendant. However, 																																																								
1063 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE civil circuit, appeal no. 732/24, issued on 26th of February 
2005. 
1064 Abu Dhabi court of first instance, case no. 656/2001. 
	 324	
upon refusing to pay this amount the defendant sought the court to settle their dispute. 
The appellant counter claimed that the court that lack the proper jurisdiction to hear 
the dispute, based on the existence of an arbitration clause in the contract between the 
parties, upon which the defendant amended their request to submit the dispute to 
arbitration and that each party should appoint their own arbitrator and the court would 
appoint the third arbitrator, in addition to the validity of the provisional seizure no. 
82/2001. The first instance court decided to refer the dispute to arbitration. 
The appellant appealed this decision1065, in which the appeal court decided to 
amend the appealed decision by changing the defendants arbitrator and the third 
arbitrator, the court also ordered the arbitrators to confirm their appointment and to 
draft the term of reference. This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court on three 
grounds. 
The appellant argues in the first part of the first ground and on the second 
ground that the appealed decision failed to apply the law; for the appeal court upheld 
the first instance decision to refer the dispute into arbitration, which is an amendment 
of the original request to order the payment of the amount of the claim. Thus, the 
court should not accept this request and given the fact that the parties have agreed 
before the start of the dispute to arbitrate, as such the defendant doesn’t have the right 
to request the court to refer the dispute into arbitration and appoint arbitrators. 
Moreover, the court should have accepted the appellant request to dismiss the dispute 
due to the existence of an arbitration clause.  
The cassation court dismissed this plea, stating that according to article 98 of 
the civil procedure1066, which addresses the counter claims and request and the 																																																								
1065 Abu Dhabi Court of Appeals, appeal no. 178/2002. 
1066 Civil procedures, article 98 state: “The claimant may submit any of the interlocutory requests: 1-
Which include the amendment of the original request or the amendment of its facts in order to cope 
with the circumstances which have emerged or have been observed after the claim has been submitted. 
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amendment of the original claim, which allows for such action to be made in front of 
the first instance court. Therefore, the defendant has the right to amend their original 
request anytime before the closing argument. 
The appellant argues in the second, third and fourth part of the second ground 
of the appeal that the appointment of the arbitrators occurred contrary to the 
requirement of the arbitration clause. 
The court dismissed this argument stating that article 204 of the civil 
procedures, allows the court to appointment the arbitrators based on a request by the 
parties in the event of a dispute on the appointment or in the event that the arbitration 
clause didn’t state a process of an appointment or if one of the parties refused to 
appointment an arbitrator. Thus, the court intervention in the appointment of the 
arbitrator is regulated by the conditions stated in this article, in addition to having the 
jurisdiction to hear the subject matter of the dispute. Since the contract shows that the 
parties have chosen arbitration as a method of resolving their dispute and by failing to 
appoint an arbitrator at the start of the proceeding, which implies that the appellant 
waivered his right to appoint an arbitrator and consequently cannot dispute the courts 
decision to appoint an arbitrator in their place. 
The appellant argues that the original request couldn’t be amended since it was 
based on an arbitration agreement, the court responded by stating that there is nothing 
in the law that restrict the defendant from amending their claim, if the amendment 
occurred before the closing argument. Furthermore, the appellant fourth part of this 
argument state that the defendant didn’t request the start of the arbitral proceedings 
before the start of the litigation, which makes their argument that the appellant failed 																																																																																																																																																														
2-Which are complementary to the original request, consequent, or indivisibly connected thereto. 3-
Which includes addition or change to the reason of the action provided that the request's facts shall 
remain as they are. 4-Requesting an order with a precautionary procedure .5 - Which the court shall 
allow to be submitted and connected to the original request.” 
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to appoint an arbitrator null, the court dismissed this argument as well stating that the 
appellant failed to appoint an arbitrator after they have agreed to submit the dispute to 
arbitration according to article 204, which grants the court the right to appoint an 
arbitrator in this instance. 
The appellant argues in the third ground that the court has no jurisdiction to 
hear the case according to article 31/31067, since the agreement was concluded in 
Turkmenistan and the appellant resides in that country, which is supported by the fact 
that the appellant is an entity of the Turkmenistan government. 
The court dismissed this argument stating that according to articles 201068 and 
211069, which implies that the courts jurisdiction is part of the public policy of the 
court that the parties have no right to agree to disregard it. Furthermore, the appellant 
have taken residence in one of the apartments in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and made 
it into a headquarters for their operations in the UAE, in addition to the agreement 
between the parties that shows that part of the agreement would have to be concluded 
in the UAE according to clause 13/6 of the agreement, moreover the purpose of 
leasing the plane it to export goods from AD’s airport to Ishq Abaad Airport. 
  
 
																																																								
1067Article 31/3 of the civil procedures, supra note 5, state:” 3-The jurisdiction should be in the 
commercial matters of the court in which circuit the prosecuted residence exists or be given to the court 
in which circuit the agreement has been concluded, totally or partially executed or to the court in which 
circuit the agreement should be executed.” 
1068Id Article 20: “With the exception of the real actions related to a real estate abroad, the courts shall 
have the jurisdiction to examine the actions prosecuted against the citizen and the actions prosecuted 
against the foreigner who has residence or domicile in the state.” 
1069Id Article 21/3 which state: “The courts shall have jurisdiction to examine the actions against the 
foreigner who has no residence or domicile in the state in the following cases… If the action is 
concerned with an obligation concluded, executed, or its execution was conditioned in the state or 
related with a contract required to be authenticated therein or with an incident occurred therein or 
bankruptcy declared at one of its courts” 	
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11. Appeal no. 546/241070 
 The defendant started the litigation1071 by requesting the court to order the 
payment of 45,000 dhs. as a compensation to the damages that the defendant suffered 
due to the appellants negligence that resulted in a fire in a warehouse owned by him. 
The defendant claim that the appellant rented a warehouse in order to use it as a car 
repair shop and they certified this contract in front of the municipality of Sharjah on 
the 1/4/1997, a fire broke out in the shop and the damages were estimated to be in the 
amount of the claim. The first instance court appointed an expert that determined the 
amount of 25,440 as a compensation of the damages. The appellant appealed1072 the 
court decided to uphold the appealed decision. 
 The appellant appealed this decision on three grounds; the first ground argues 
that the appellant have pleaded in front of the first instance court that the court lacks 
the proper jurisdiction, since the dispute falls under the jurisdiction of the 
Municipality of Sharjah committee of arbitration and settlement1073. However, the 
court stated that this dispute doesn’t fall under the jurisdiction of that committee since 
the dispute doesn’t rise from the lease agreement between the parties, since the 
dispute is in regard to identifying the damages that occurred due to the appellant 
negligence. The appellant argues that on the contrary it is a result of the appellant’s 
obligation to safeguard the leased property, subsequently it makes this dispute rise 
from the lease contract and as such falls under the jurisdiction of that committee. 
																																																								
1070 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, civil circuit appeal no. 546/24, issued on the 3rd of July 2005.. 
1071 Sharjah’s Court of First Instance, case no. 271/1999. 
1072 Sharjah’s court of appeal’s, appeal no.8/2002, issued on 4/9/2000. 
1073 According to article 1 of law no.4/1988 in regards to regulating the relationship between the tenants 
and the landlords in the emirate of Sharjah. 
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 The court dismissed this argument, stating that based on the jurisprudence of 
this court the Municipality of Sharjah’s Arbitration committee jurisdiction1074 is 
limited to disputes that rises from the lease agreement and in regard to the application 
of this agreement. The defendant in this dispute rented the warehouse to the appellant 
to use it as a car repair shop, and based his claim on the fact that the appellant was 
found guilty of negligence in another dispute1075 that led to this warehouse 
destruction. Therefore, this dispute is governed by the general rule that every act that 
results in damages needs to be compensated1076, even though that this act occurred as 
a result of leasing the property between the litigants, however the dispute is not in 
regards to the application of the contract, it is a dispute regarding the appellants 
unlawful act, which falls outside the scope of the committee. 
 The appellant second ground of appeal argues that his usage of the warehouse 
was lawful, since the fire has occurred not as a result of the appellant’s action but due 
to his normal usage of the warehouse. 
 The court dismissed this ground, stating that a final criminal decision has an 
effect over civil courts; it binds the court in a way that the civil court is unable to 
reexamine what have been decided by the criminal court and is bound by that decision 
when deciding the civil rights of the parties that relate to this criminal decision. The 
defendant based his claim on the criminal decision1077, which decided that the fire 
occurred due to the appellants negligence, thus the court is bound to what have been 
decided in that decision. 
 The third ground of appeal argues that the court failed to answer his plea that 
the owner of the warehouse (the defendant) action have helped in the occurring of the 																																																								
1074 Which were created by the Emirate of Sharjah Law no. 92/1977 and its amendments laws 
no.7/1986 and no.4/1988. 
1075 Sharjah Federal court of First instance, criminal circuit, case no.3301/1998. 
1076 Article 282 of the civil transaction law. 
1077 Supra note 1075. 
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accident, since the warehouse lacks the fire safety equipment, which were not 
installed and as a result helped in the spread of the fire and the damages in the 
warehouse. 
 The court dismissed this argument, stating that the court have decided to base 
their decision on the experts report and is not bound by the litigants requests. 
 
 
12. Appeal no. 851/251078 
The appellant started the litigation1079 in order to resolve a leasing dispute 
against the defendant, in which he protested the Municipality of Sharjah’s Arbitration 
Committee award dated 21/6/1998, the appellant claims that the defendant started the 
proceedings in front of the committee asking them to order the appellant to vacate the 
property that he is leasing from the defendant (a commercial shop), the defendant 
claim that the appellant failed to pay his rent which is the reason for his request, the 
committee ordered the appellant to vacate the property and to pay the reminder of the 
rent. The appellant requested the nullification of this award stating that he fulfilled his 
obligation by paying the rent, the first instance court decided on the 31/1/2000 to 
dismiss the claim. The appellant appealed this decision to the appeal court1080 which 
decided on the 31/10/2000 to nullify the appealed decision and decided that the lease 
contract is still in affect and that the defendant has no right to the rent before 
7/1/1998, the defendant appealed this decision to the supreme court1081, which 
decided to nullify the appealed decision and refer it back to the appeal court, which 
decided to appoint an expert and after submitting his report the court decided on the 																																																								
1078 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE civil circuit, appeal no. 851/25 issued on the 30th of May 2004. 
1079 Sharjah’s Federal court of First Instant, civil circuit case no. 679/1998. 
1080 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeals, civil circuit appeal no. 49/2000. 
1081 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 719/22, issued on the 25th of June 2002. 
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27/9/2003 to amend the committees award in regards to the rent amount and raise it 
from five thousand dhs. to ten thousand dhs. 
The appellant appealed this decision to the Supreme Court in this appeal on 
one ground1082, the appellant argues that the appealed decision ordered the appellant 
to vacate the property despite the fact that the arbitration committee ordered the 
increase of the rent from five thousand to ten thousand, which was recognized in front 
of the municipality of Sharjah’s. The appellant managed to pay to the defendant and 
in doing so he managed to fulfill his obligation according to article 5 of law no. 
92/1977 amended by laws no.7/1986 and 4/1988 for the emirate of Sharjah, which 
identify the conditions in which the owner of the property could request the tent to 
vacate, in this case it would have been the failure to pay the rent. However, the 
appellant managed to pay the rent in here and as such this article doesn’t apply. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that article 5, implies that the 
legislator in here added a new requirement to those mentioned in the civil transaction 
law regarding the lease agreement1083, which state that the lease agreement ends by 
the end of the term of the lease, the Sharjah’s law state that the owner of the property 
has no right to request to vacate the property unless three years have passed from the 
start of the lease or if one of the condition mentioned in the law can be applies1084. 
Thus, it limits the request to vacate the property to the passing of three years or if one 
of the conditions in the law has been met. Moreover, based on the arbitral award in 
case no. 676/1998 dated 31/1/2000 the defendant became the owner of the property on 																																																								
1082 The defendant argued that the appeal should be dismissed based on the fact that the appeal was 
signed by the appellant representative that doesn’t relate to the appellant. The court dismissed this 
argument stating that the law allows for the appeal request to be submitted by any individual in place of 
the appellant, and the only requirement is having the appeal signed by the appellant or his 
representative. 
1083 Which is regulated in the civil transaction law, articles 742-848. 
1084 The emirate of Sharjah’s lease has been amended in 2007, by Sharjah’s law no.2/2007 n regards to 
regulating the relationship between the tenants and the landlords, which confirms those same 
requirements in article 13. 
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the 23/1/1995 and the lease have continued for more than three years. Thus, the 
defendant request to vacate the property on the 21/6/1998 is lawful. 
The appellants second and third part of appeal, argues that the appealed 
decision have confirmed the experts report, which increased the rent amount from five 
thousand to ten thousand dhs. even though the report lacked any evidence to support 
this increased amount. 
The court dismissed this argument as well, stating that article 6 of law no. 
92/1977, implies that in the event of a dispute between the tenant and the landlord can 
be submitted either to the arbitration committee or to the court.  
Thus, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 						 	
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Civil Circuit Disputes 
 
a. Dubai Court of Cassation 
1. Appeal no. 167/20021085 
The appellant company started the proceedings1086, against the two defendants 
asking the court to award the company the amount of 850738.45 dhs., in addition to 
the interest rate of 12% from the start of the proceedings and until the fulfillment of 
the payment, the appellant also asked the court to appoint an arbitrator to settle the 
dispute. The appellant explains that the basis for starting the litigation is an agreement 
between the parties dated 18/6/1998 in which they agreed with the first defendant 
based on a sub-construction contract to supply and install the electrical and 
mechanical equipment in the construction site based on the plans that were supplied 
by the first defendant since they are the main contractors to the project, which is being 
constructed for the second defendant (the owner of the property), resulting in the 
amount of the. Moreover, the appellant claim that when the defendants failed to pay 
their expenses, they requested that the defendant should appoint an arbitrator in order 
to start the arbitration proceeding, which they failed to do so. The first defendant 
counter claimed in front of the court to dismiss the litigation based on the existence of 
an arbitration clause. The court decided on the 8/10/2001, to dismiss the case based on 
the existence of an arbitration clause, and to appoint the engineering expert as an 
arbitrator and should submit an award within six months from the first hearing. 
 The appellant company appealed this decision1087, requesting to nullify the 
decision in regards to referring the dispute into arbitration, instead refereeing the 
dispute back to the first instance court; their reserve request was that the court 																																																								
1085 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 167/2002, issued on the 2nd of June 2002. 
1086 First Instance court of Dubai, commercial circuit case no. 162/2001, issued on 8/10/2001. 
1087 Dubai Court of appeals, appeal no. 1447/2001, issued on 19/3/2002. 
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supervises over the arbitration proceedings according to article 213/1. The appeal 
court decided to uphold the appealed decision. 
 The appellant appealed this decision to the cassation court on the 22/4/2002 
on seven grounds. 
The second and third ground of appeal argue that the appealed decision upheld 
the first instance decision, to dismiss the appellants claim in regard to the payment of 
his expenses, basing their decision on the arbitration clause in the contract. The 
appellant argue that the scope of the arbitration clause doesn’t involve this request, for 
the arbitration clause scope involves disputes that concern the fulfillment of the 
construction contract, on the other hand the appellant is seeking to get paid in 
exchange for the work the he have done in the project. Furthermore, the arbitration 
clause has no affect since the construction contract have ended according to article 
892 of the civil transaction.1088 
The court dismissed this argument stating that paragraph five of article 203 of 
the civil procedures implies that if the parties have agreed to arbitrate then they have 
waivered their right to litigate in front of the court, in the event that one of the parties 
disregarded the existence of the arbitration clause and started the proceedings in front 
of the court and no one argued to the existence of the arbitration clause in the first 
hearing, then the parties right to argue on the existence of the arbitration clause would 
be waivered. According to the jurisprudence of the court the party seeking to uphold 
the arbitration agreement or clause need to take a positive action in the first hearing 
by objecting to the proceedings and requesting the dismissal of the litigation and 
referring the dispute into arbitration. Which requires a dispute to have in fact risen 
between the parties, the court explained what is considered a dispute, according to the 																																																								
1088 Article 892 of the civil transaction law state: “The contract for work shall come to an end by 
completing or by rescission of the contract by mutual agreement or by order of the court.” 
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court it is a dispute that the purpose of which is the protection of a legal right or the 
legal status of the parties, moreover the scope of the arbitration need to be identified 
clearly in the arbitration agreement, otherwise it would be considered a ground of 
setting-aside the award according to article 203/3 of the civil procedures, which is the 
legal relationship that the dispute have risen about and identifying this relationship on 
its own is sufficient to consider the arbitration agreement valid, even if the agreement 
didn’t identify what disputes falls under the scope of the arbitration. Even though that 
arbitration is limited to what the parties have agreed to they still have the right to 
identify what is considered fall under the scope of the arbitration, moreover the 
determination if that dispute falls under the scope of arbitration is the responsibility of 
the first instance court. 
The first ground of appeal argues that the appeal court dismissed their claim in 
regard to appointing the arbitrator, stating that according to article 204/2 the decision 
to appoint the arbitrator is not subject to appeal, the appellant claims that the court 
didn’t appoint an arbitrator, moreover the decision to appoint the arbitrator is not 
subject to appeal only if the parties have agreed to the appointment, which is not the 
case in this instance. 
The court dismissed this claim, stating that the court intervention in the 
appointment process is limited to the conditions stated in article 204, one of those 
conditions is if the parties have failed to come to an agreement in regard to the 
arbitrators, and one of the parties sought the intervention of the court to resolve this 
issue, moreover the parties doesn’t have the right to appeal once the court have 
answered their request. Based on the facts of the dispute and the sub-construction 
contract that the parties to the dispute have agreed to arbitrate any dispute that rises 
from this contract, the appellant company have stated that the first defendant didn’t 
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comply when a request was made to them to appoint an arbitrator to start the 
arbitration proceedings, which is why the first instance court have appointed an 
arbitrator upon the appellants request. Therefore, the appellant has no right to appeal 
in this respect since the court has granted their request. 
The fourth ground of appeal argues that the appeal court upheld the first 
instance decision to dismiss the dispute in regards to the second appellant, the court 
justified this decision by stating that the second defendant is not part of the sub-
construction contract, moreover the arbitration clause has no affect against the second 
defendant. The appellant argues that the second defendant is indeed a part if the sub-
contract and the arbitration clause affects him; moreover the court by deciding to 
dismiss the second defendant from the arbitration clause, should have ordered him to 
pay the amount of the claim that the appellant is asking for in their claim. 
The court dismissed this claim stating that article 252 of the civil transaction 
law state that” The contract does not impose any obligation on third parties, but may 
establish a right in their favor.” implying that the arbitration agreement has no effect 
against third parties and its effect is limited to the parties to the agreement, which are 
the ones that helped in creating the contract and they have the will to be bound by it. 
However, the arbitration clause can extend its effect to third parties in certain 
circumstances, if for instance the contract have transferred to a third party in this 
condition the arbitration clause would have effect to this party. Moreover, according 
to article 891 of the civil transaction1089, which implies that the determination of all of 
this factor is part of the subject matter court, and based on the facts of this dispute the 
first instance court have came to the decision on sound reasoning that is supported by 
evidence, thus the court decided to dismiss this argument. 																																																								
1089Article 891 state: “:” The subcontractor may not have a claim against the master, as regards the dues 
of the first contractor, unless the latter refers him to the master.” 
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The fifth and seventh ground of appeal, argues that the court decision to refer 
the dispute into arbitration and to stop the litigation until the arbitrator render an 
award and submits it to the court for recognition is flawed. Since there is nothing in 
the law that state that the court should pause the litigation until the arbitrator renders 
an award, moreover by referring the dispute to arbitration the court essentially have 
given up their jurisdiction over the dispute and they have given their right to 
recognized the award. 
The court dismissed this argument stating that article 213 of the civil procedures 
shows that the courts authority over court-annexed arbitration, doesn’t stop by 
referring the dispute into arbitration but continues until the arbitrator renders an award 
and is being recognized by the court. 
The appellant sixth ground of appeal argues on the expenses of the case, which was 
also dismissed by the court based on articles 1321090 and 1351091 of the civil 
procedures. 
2. Appeal no. 261/20021092 
 The defendant started litigation in this dispute1093 requesting the payment of 
420211 dhs. Plus the interest, the defendant claims that based on a construction 																																																								
1090 Article 132 state: “1 - The decision's copy according to which the execution is to proceed shall be 
sealed with the court's seal and the clerk shall sign it after subjoining it with the executive wording, and 
it shall not be delivered except to the opposing party who has an interest in the decision execution, 
provided that the decision should be executable. 2 - It shall not permissible to deliver another executive 
copy to the same litigant party unless the first copy has been lost or it has become impossible to use, 
and that shall be by the order of the judge or the circuit manager. 3 - It is possible to give an official 
simple copy of the decision's original copy to whoever of the concerned persons who would request it 
and it shall not be given to other than them unless with a permission from the judge or the circuit 
manager according to the circumstances.” 
1091 Article 135 state: “If both opposing parties have failed in some requests it shall be possible to judge 
that each party bears what he has paid of the expenditures or to decide the division of the expenditures 
between them according to what the court would decide in its judgment, and the court may also impose 
all the expenditures on one of the.” 
1092 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 261/2002 issued on the 2nd of November 2002. 
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contract that was concluded on the 15/2/1999 between the litigants in order to 
construct a residential villa in exchange of an amount of 1986710 dhs. The defendant 
claims that the appellant failed to pay this amount and that is the reason behind this 
litigation, the appellant pleaded to the court to dismiss the case based on the existence 
of an arbitration clause, the court decided to dismiss the case based on the existence of 
an arbitration clause. The case was appealed1094 and the appeal court decided to vacate 
the appealed decision and refer the dispute back to the first instance court. 
 The appellant appealed this decision to the cassation court on the 4/6/2002 
asking the court to nullify the appealed decision and refer the dispute back into 
arbitration, the appellant based his argument on one ground. 
 The appellant argues that the appealed decision failed to uphold what the 
parties have agreed upon in the contract, since articles 5-8 of the construction contract 
state that the rules of the FIDIC is the reference to any disputes that occur in the time 
of construction and maintenance, the court came to the conclusion that this dispute is 
outside the scope of the arbitration clause, which is in contrast to clause 67/3 of the 
FIDIC which state that any dispute between the parties shall be resolved through the 
rule international chamber of commerce arbitration, which implies that the rule of 
arbitration apply to any dispute that rises between the parties, and is not limited to the 
disputes that concern the  construction and maintenance of the property. 
 The court dismissed this argument stating that the court has the authority to 
understand and interpret the contract as they see fit, this interpretation doesn’t fall 
under the supervision of the cassation court. Furthermore, the jurisprudence of this 
																																																																																																																																																														
1093 Dubai Court of first instance, commercial circuit, case no. 881/2001, dated 16/1/2002. 
1094 Dubai Court of appeals, appeal no.151/2002, dated 27/4/2002. 
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court establishes that arbitration is an exception to the individual right to seek their 
natural judge, thus every interpretation should be limited to what the parties have 
intended, the appealed decision decided that the arbitration clause scope doesn’t cover 
this dispute based on an examination of the construction contract dated 15/2/1999 that 
shows in article 5/8 that the parties have agreed to submit the disputes that relates to 
the construction and the maintenance into arbitration. Thus, it shows that the parties 
have agreed to limit the scope of the arbitration to those disputes, moreover the 
defendant have submitted evidence of the completion of the construction of the villa 
by submitting the certificate of completion issued from the municipality of Dubai on 
the 14/5/2001, which the appellant didn’t dispute and thus his argument to the 
application of the arbitration clause has no basis.  
 Therefore, the court decided to not implement the arbitration clause in this 
dispute, moreover the rules of the FIDIC contract doesn’t relate to the public policy, 
which implies that the parties have the right to amend the rules of this contract in 
regard to submitting all disputes into arbitration, and since the parties in this dispute 
have agreed to limit the scope of the arbitration to issues raising in the construction 
period, as such the arbitration clause doesn’t apply to this dispute. 
3. Appeal no. 328/20021095 
The appellant company started the litigation1096 against the defendant 
company, asking the court to recognize an arbitral award. The appellant explained 
their claim stating that based on arbitration agreement between the parties dated 
26/2/2000, the Dubai chamber of commerce and industries appointed a sole arbitrator 
																																																								
1095 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no.328/2002, issued on the 23rd of November 2002. 
1096 Dubai Court of first instance, case no.241/2001  
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in the dispute, the arbitrator rendered an award against the defendant company 
ordering them to pay 365000 U.S. dollars or its equivalent in UAE dhs. and the 
interest rate of 9%, in addition to the expenses of the arbitration, the defendant 
company presented their defense and asked the court to nullify the award. The court 
ruled on the 22/10/2001 to dismiss the claim. The appellant appealed this decision1097 
the court decided to uphold the appealed decision. 
The appellant appealed this decision to the cassation court, arguing that the 
appeal court upheld the first instance decision to dismiss their request to recognize the 
award, on the ground that the award lacked a copy of the arbitration agreement, which 
the court claim is a ground of setting-aside the award. The appellant argues that an 
arbitration institute within the UAE, an institute that is recognized by the UAE, issued 
the award and the court should not undermine the authority of this institute. 
Moreover, the award was issued according to an arbitration agreement between the 
parties dated 6/5/2002, which was presented to the arbitration institute in compliance 
with article 23 of the institute rules, furthermore the chamber have confirmed sending 
the award to the court containing the arbitration agreement, they also sent a copy to 
the sent a copy of the arbitration agreement to the chief justice in the second circuit of 
the Dubai First instance court. Moreover, the Chamber of commerce testimony that 
the arbitration agreement has been presented at the start of the arbitration proceedings 
should have been taken into account by the court when deciding to recognize the 
award, since this is an institutional arbitration. The court decided to refuse to 
recognize the award despite all of those facts, moreover the legislator aim from 
having to present an arbitration agreement with the award is to avoid having an 
arbitration award issued without an agreement or that the arbitrator have exceeded the 																																																								
1097 Dubai Court of appeals, appeal no.1513/2001, issued on 21/4/2001. 
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scope of the arbitration. For the following reason the court should nullify the appealed 
decision and recognize the award. 
The court dismissed this claim, stating that according to article 212/5 of the 
civil procedures and article 45/3 of the rules of the Dubai chamber of commerce and 
industry arbitration and mediation institute, which state:” the final award of the 
Tribunal Shall be in writing and must include: (a) the arbitration agreement….”,1098 in 
addition to the jurisprudence of this court that shows that the award should contain a 
copy of the arbitration agreement, which is an essential requirement that is required to 
be presented when recognizing the award, otherwise the award would be set aside, 
this rule doesn’t change if the arbitration were to be ad hoc or an institutional, and this 
requirement cannot be fulfilled by presenting a testimony or a certificate from the 
institute that the agreement have been submitted at the start of the proceedings, a 
requirement that cannot be completed by a separate paper or by refereeing in the 
award to the arbitration agreement without presenting it. However, this requirement 
can be fulfilled by presenting the content of the agreement with the award, the 
purpose of this requirement is to allow the court to practice its supervisory role over 
arbitration. Furthermore, the appellant have referred to document no.13 as a copy of 
the arbitration agreement, without explaining the content of this document in order for 
the court to recognize the award.  
Thus, the award is null and this fact is not affected by presenting a letter from 
the arbitration institute, which shows that the agreement have been presented at the 
start of the proceedings. 
 																																																								
1098 Dubai International Arbitration Center (DIAC) conciliation and arbitration rules of 1994. 
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5. Appeal no. 222/20051099 
 The defendant started the litigation1100 against the appellant by asking the 
court to recognize an arbitral award issued on the 26/8/2000, claiming that the 
litigants are partners in the inheritance of the deceased and during his life time they 
agreed to divide their inheritance through arbitration, this agreement was signed by 
the first appellants agent and the rest of the inheritors. The appellants counter claimed 
that the award is null since the first appellant agent didn’t have the right to sign the 
arbitration agreement and that they were not notified of the start of the arbitration, 
they also argued that the arbitrator have acceded the scope of the arbitration 
agreement. On the 28/4/2004 the court decided to nullify the arbitral award, this 
decision was appealed1101 and the appeal court decided to uphold the appealed 
decision.  
 This decision was appealed to the cassation court1102, which decided to nullify 
the appealed decision and to refer the dispute back to the appeal court, the court stated 
that even though the first appellant agent acceded his agency contract by agreeing to 
arbitrate, which doesn’t affect the other parties to the agreement and they have no 
right to request the nullification of the award, on the 21/5/2005 the appeal court 
decided to recognize the award.  
 The appellant appealed this decision to the cassation court in this appeal on six 
grounds, the first ground of appeal argues that the cassation court referred the dispute 
to the appeal court and they rendered a decision instead of referring the dispute to the 
first instance court, in doing so the court have wasted the appellants opportunity to 																																																								
1099 Dubai Court of cassation, appeal no. 222/2005, issued on the 22nd of November 2006. 
1100 Dubai Court of First instance, case no.358/2003, issued on 28/4/2004. 
1101 Dubai Court of Appeals, appeal no.246/2004, issued on 12/6/2004. 
1102 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no.209/2004, issued on the 20th of March 2005. 
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argue their case in front of the first instance court, which is one of the general 
principles of litigation to allow the litigants the opportunity to pleaded their case in 
two stages. 
 The court dismissed this argument stating that article 166 of the civil 
procedures implies that if the appeal court decided to nullify the appealed decision its 
not obliged to refer the dispute back to the first instance, unless it decided to nullify 
the first instance decision regarding jurisdictional issues, and since the first instance 
court decisions in this instance is one in regards to the substance of the dispute, ergo 
the appeal court can render a decision without referring the dispute back to the first 
instance court and doesn’t constitute as infringing the appellants right to appeal. 
 The appellant second and third ground of appeals, argue that the decision 
failed to uphold due process, they argue that all of them except for the second 
appellant asked to nullify the award, on the fact that the award was issued based on an 
arbitration agreement that was not signed by the appellants, and that the agency 
agreement between the appellants and the second appellant doesn’t allow him to enter 
into an arbitration agreement on their behalf and be their representative in the 
arbitration. Moreover, the arbitrator failed to notify them of the start of the arbitration 
proceedings, a fact that the appeal court failed to answer and stated that they are parts 
of the arbitration agreement and signed it without proving this fact, and the appealed 
decision came to the conclusion that the second appellant is a representative of the 
appellants and have the authority to be present in the arbitration procedure. However, 
the appellants denied their signature on the arbitration agreement and repudiate the 
agreement which makes it void, furthermore the documents presented by the court 
lacks any evidence that the appellants have given the second appellant any 
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authorization as their agent to enter into an arbitration agreement, and the second 
appellant was present in the arbitration proceedings as an arbitrator and not as a 
representative of the parties, in addition to the fifth clause of the arbitration agreement 
that state that the arbitrator need to notify the parties of the initiation of the arbitration 
proceedings, which they failed to do. 
 The court dismissed this argument stating that according to article 11 of the 
evidence law1103, implies that a customary paper is considered issued from the parties 
that have signed it, unless the parties have explicitly repudiate what has been stated in 
it or argues that it was a forgery. Moreover, the arbitration proceedings is considered 
initiated by conducting any procedures between the parties such as the arbitrator 
informing the parties of the start of the proceedings or the presence of one of the 
parties or their representative in the arbitration proceedings, according to the facts of 
the case and to the arbitration agreement, which the award was based upon that they 
were signed by all of the appellants, and the arbitration agreement state that the 
second appellant is a representative of all the parties of that agreement, the arbitrator 
confirmed the presence of the second appellant as a representative of the rest of the 
parties on the 18/6/2000. 
 The appellants argues in the fourth ground of the appeal that all of them except 
for the second appellant upheld the argument that the defendants right to arbitrate 
have fallen, they also requested the joining of case no. 202/2003 which is initiated by 
the appellants in regards to the inheritance and that the defendants did not uphold their 																																																								
1103 Article 11 state: “1 - An informal document is deemed to emanate from the person who signed it, 
unless he formally contests the writing, the signature , the seal or the finger print alleged to be his . His 
heirs or successors in title are not bound to contest, but may only declare on oath that they do not know 
that the writing, the signature, the seal or the finger print are those of their author .2 - However , the 
one who discussed the subject - matter of the document may neither contest the writing , signature , 
seal or finger print attributed to him nor allege his ignorance that such a thing has been issued from the 
person from whom he received this right.” 
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right to arbitrate in that dispute and a decision was made by the court in that regards, 
and according to article 203 of the civil procedures this constitute an annulment of the 
arbitral award. However, the appealed decision did not answer this argument. 
 The court dismissed this argument stating that the parties should explicitly 
waiver their right to arbitrate, and the burden of proof falls to the party that claim such 
an act have occurred, according to the jurisprudence of this court its obliged to 
respond to substantial defense by the litigants and not to all of the parties requests and 
defense. In regards to the dispute in question in case no.202/2003 the defendants 
attorney have counter claimed to dismiss the dispute based on the fact that an arbitral 
award has been issued in this dispute in cases no.358/2003 and no.202/2003, the court 
decided to appoint an expert in those disputes and to nullify the arbitral award in case 
no.358/2003. Therefore, there is no reason to argue that the defendants right to 
arbitrate and the award have fallen, since they have upheld this decision and didn’t 
show that they have waivered their right. 
 The appellant fifth ground argues that the three inheritors were not represented 
in the arbitration procedures and one of them did not agree to arbitrate and he 
received a courts decision in regard to his share in the inheritance, which makes the 
arbitration procedure void and subject to annulment since the inheritance cannot be 
divided between a court decision and arbitral award. 
 The court dismissed this argument, stating that the appellant have pleaded to 
the appeal court that the inheritors share in question have been bought by the 
appellants and as such they have been excluded from the inheritance, which is beyond 
the scope of the arbitration and given the fact that this plea is considered to be non-
substantial the court has the right to either answer it or not. 
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 The sixth ground of appeal argues that the agency agreement between the 
inheritor and the first defendant only allows the first defendant to agree to arbitrate in 
regards to the properties that the inheritor owns in partnership with his deceased 
sister. However, the appealed decision dismissed this argument stating that the courts 
jurisprudence doesn’t extend to the subject matter of the arbitration. 
 The court dismissed this argument, stating that the arbitration agreement that 
is being conducted by the agent and extend the agency contract and his powers as a 
representative is subject to partial annulment regarding the relationship between the 
agent and his client and not in regard to this parties. Therefore, the appellants have no 
right to request the nullification of the award by stating that the agent has exceeded 
his agency contract. 
6. Appeal no. 273/20061104 
 The appellant started the litigation1105 against the defendants, requesting that 
the court should refuse the appointment of the first and third defendants as arbitrators 
in the dispute, which were appointed based on a decision by the court in case 
no.232/2004, he claim that on the 9/10/2004 the court decided to appoint the first, 
second and third defendants as arbitrators in the dispute between the appellant and the 
fourth defendant, the arbitrators started the proceedings and submitted an award to the 
court on the 29/9/2005, arguing that the award was based on a prior knowledge by the 
arbitrators and was issued without any evidence supporting this award, he argues that 
the first defendant was the guardian over the disputed company based on an order in 
the preliminary dispute no.13/2005 dated 8/5/2008 and appeal no.51/2005 dated 
																																																								
1104 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no.273/2006, issued on the 4th of November 2007. 
1105 Dubai Court of First Instance, case no.702/2005, issued on 26/6/2006. 
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28/6/2005, which made the defendant combine two traits an arbitrator and a guardian 
in addition to having a prior dispute between the appellant and the first and third 
defendants, which makes them unfit to rule over the dispute.  
The court decided to dismiss the claim. This decision was appealed1106 and the 
appeal court decided to dismiss the appeal. The appellant appealed this decision to the 
cassation court; the first and fourth defendants attorney submitted a plea to the court 
requesting the dismissal of the appeal, claiming that article 119 of the civil 
procedures1107, implies that decisions in regard to the dismissal of the arbitrator is not 
subject to appeal. 
 The court dismissed this argument stating that article 173 of the civil 
procedures1108, which allow the appeal courts decision to be appealed to the cassation 
court except were its explicitly stated that certain decisions are unappealable, 
moreover article 119 of this law that concern the dismissal of judges doesn’t apply to 
arbitrators, which is regulated under article 207. The appellant argues that his 
request to dismiss the arbitrators, which was submitted to the appeal court cannot be 
separated from the main dispute in case no. 273/2004 in front of the first instance 
court, for in that dispute the request was made to appoint arbitrators and the court 
have granted them their request and in doing so the courts jurisdiction has been 
waivered, and all that remains to them is to recognize the award once the arbitrators 
submit their award in compliance with article 213/3. Therefore, the request in regard 
to dismissing the arbitrators doesn’t rise from the request to appoint the arbitrators, 
and as such the appeal court has no right to dismiss the appeal and should hear the 
dispute. 																																																								
1106 Dubai Court of Appeals, appeal no. 523/2006, issued on 16/11/2006. 
1107 Which addresses requests made to dismiss judges. 
1108 Which addresses the decisions that are subject to appeal to the cassation court. 
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 The court dismissed this argument stating that article 213 implies that 
arbitration can either be court-annexed or ad hoc or institutional, and in regards to 
court-annexed arbitration it’s based on a decision of the court after the parties 
agreement to arbitrate, and in that instance the court is obliged to follow paragraphs 1 
and 2 of this article; on the other hand paragraph 3 concerns arbitration that happens 
outside the court either ad hoc or institutional, moreover the decisions in regards to 
appeals is a matter of public policy and the court has the right to answer it on its own, 
as such article 1511109 implies that the legislator set forth general requirement for 
appeals that doesn’t allow appeals on preliminary decisions on its own, unless it fell 
under the exception stated in this article. The facts of this case shows that the 
appellant have started the proceedings in this dispute after the arbitrators submitted 
their, which indicates that the appellant’s dispute is directly related to the main 
dispute, as such it falls under the jurisdiction of the court that hears the request to 
recognize the arbitral award. 
 Therefore, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
7. Appeal no. 222/20061110 
 The defendant started the litigation1111 in order to request the appointment of 
an arbitrator, the court decided grant him his request by appointing three arbitrators in 
the dispute one of them is the appellant, the purpose of this appointment is to resolve 
																																																								
1109 Civil procedures law, article 151 state:” It is not possible to appeal against the decisions delivered 
during the progression of the action since the litigation has not been terminated therewith except with 
the delivery of the decision terminating all the litigation, and that with the exception of the temporary 
and summary decisions, the decisions issued for staying the action, the decisions liable to the 
obligatory execution, and the sentences issued deciding the lack of jurisdiction, unless the court had the 
authority to judge in the action.” 
1110 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 222/2006, issued on the 25th of February 2007. 
1111 Dubai Court of First instance case no. 232/2004, issued on 9/10/2004. 
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the dispute between the parties in a companies contract1112, which has a clause that 
refer to arbitration in the event of a dispute, the arbitrators are required to render a 
decision in the dispute within six months from the start of the first hearing; on the 
4/6/2005 the arbitrators requested from the court to extend the arbitration period, the 
court granted decided to grant them their request and extend the arbitration period, the 
plaintiff petitioned to the court to nullify this request in petition no. 76/2005, claiming 
that the extension request was not enforced within 30 days from the courts decision, 
moreover the arbitrators has no right to request this extension from the court given the 
fact that they are not part of the dispute and as such lack the right to request an 
extension from the court, the petitioner also requested the dismissal of the third 
arbitrator, the petitioner also claim that the extension request should have been 
brought to the court in a separate litigation and not as preliminary measure, arguing 
that the chief judge have decided on his own without conferring with the other judges 
on this matter, furthermore the arbitrator has been appointed as a guardian on the 
company, as such he combines two contradicting characteristics an arbitrator and an 
opponent at the same time, lastly the petitioner have requested the dismissal of the 
third arbitrator.  
On the 25/7/2005 the court accepted this petition; this decision was appealed 
by the third arbitrator in appeal no.68/2005 and the second arbitrator also appealed 
this decision, the appeal court decided on the 15/11/2005 to uphold the appealed 
decision, the third arbitrator appealed this decision to the cassation court in appeal no. 
311/2005, the petitioner also appealed this decisions to the cassation court in appeal 
no. 325/2005, the court decided in appeal no. 325/2005 to dismiss it stating that the 
appellant has no interest in appealing this decision, and to accept appeal no. 311/2005 																																																								
1112 Which was concluded on the 12/11/1996. 
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and to vacate the appealed decision and refer the dispute back to the appeal court. The 
court explained that the appeal court did not answer the appellant request in regard to 
the arbitrators right to extend the arbitration, according to article nine of the 
arbitration clause, which state: “the arbitrators shall render an award within six 
months of the start of the arbitration, in the event that the arbitrators required extra 
time to issue their award they would have to agree on a time period and submit it to 
the court”, on the 26/7/2006 the appeal court decided to dismiss the appeal and uphold 
the appealed decision, which was appealed to the cassation court by the third 
arbitrator on the 10/9/2006; the defendant submitted a plea to the court to dismiss this 
appeal, arguing that the dispute is between the defendant and the arbitration 
committee, thus the appeal that is submitted to the court by one of the arbitrators is 
submitted by someone that has no interest in the claim. 
 The court dismissed this plea, stating that articles 1501113 and 1701114 of the 
civil procedures implies that the appeal to the cassation court is not accepted unless it 
is being submitted by the party that has an interest of appealing the decision, therefore 
the appellant has the right to submit the appeal since he has an interest in submitting 
the appeal, given the fact that the decision was not in his favor. 
 The appellant based his appeal on four grounds, the first, third and fourth 
ground argues that the decision to accept the request of extending the arbitration, 																																																								
1113 Civil procedures law, article 150 state:” 1 - The appeal against the decisions shall not be possible 
unless brought by the convicted, and it shall not be possible to be brought by that who accepted the 
sentence expressly or implicitly, or by that whose requests have been judged, unless the law stipulates 
otherwise. 2 - The appellant shall not be harmed with his appeal.” 
1114 Id Article 170 state:” The time - limit of the petition shall be 30 days and it shall not start in the 
cases stipulated in the clauses 1,2 and 3 of the preceding article except from the day on which the fraud 
was disclosed or on which its committer confessed the fraud or on which its verification was sentenced 
or on which the perjury witness was judged, or on which the paper, which had been withheld , appeared 
. The time - limit in the circumstance stipulated in clause 6 shall start from the day on which the fraud, 
collusion or flagrant negligence has come to light and in clause 7 from the day on which the decision 
has been notified to the convicted or to that who represent him a valid representation.” 
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which has been granted by the court that heard the dispute in regards to appointing the 
arbitrators, even if it had been rendered by the head judge and signed by him alone it 
is still a lawful act, thus the court has no authority to nullify that judges decision. The 
appellant argues that since the decision is null since the court dismissed the main 
defendant from the suit, moreover the court dismissed their request that the petition in 
question is not subject to appeal according to article 204 of the civil procedures, 
which applies only to appointment decisions and doesn’t extend to the arbitration 
procedure. However, this article state that the court’s decision in regards to appointing 
arbitrators is not subject to appeal, which makes the decision that was rendered by the 
chief justice in regards to extending the arbitration period in comparison not subject to 
appeal as well. 
 The court dismissed this argument, stating that in regards to appeal no. 
311/205, in which the court decided to vacate the appeal court decision and submit the 
dispute, back to the appeal court again to hear the dispute in regard to extending the 
arbitration period, which implies that the court decided to accept the appeal, as such 
the appellant has no right to argue in this matter. 
The second ground of appeal argues that the ninth clause of the arbitration 
agreement, grants the arbitrators the right to extend the arbitration on their own 
without submitting a request to the court and they only have to notify the court about 
the extension. However, the appealed decision interpreted this clause on the contrary, 
which resulted in nullifying the extension date. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that the according to article 210 of 
the civil procedures, if the parties didn’t agree on a time period for the arbitration then 
it shall be for six months from the start of the first hearing and the parties have the 
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right to extend that period either explicitly or implicitly and they have the right to 
delegate that right to the arbitrators, the court can also grant the extension based on a 
request of the arbitrators or one of the parties, furthermore the court has the right to 
understand and interpret the contracts and to conclude what the parties have intended 
to do, and since the appealed decision decided to uphold the first instance decision to 
nullify the petition dated 4/6/2005, by stating that: “ the arbitration clause that the 
appellant based his argument, is meant to grant the arbitrator the right to seek the 
court to request the extension in place of the parties, and not as the appellant is stating 
that it grants them the right to extend the period on their own and notify the court of 
that extension, and if the appellants claim were true then why did the clause state that 
the arbitrators are required to notify the court, moreover the court interpreted the 
clause to grant the arbitrator the right to determine the amount needed for the 
extension and request the court to confirm that amount. The court came to the 
conclusion that the arbitrators have upheld this clause by requesting the court to 
confirm the extension. However, the confirmation was granted from the chief justice 
on his own which is in contrast to the meaning of the court that is stated in article 
210/2 of the civil procedures”. Therefore, court have based their interpretation of the 
clause on sound reasoning, which makes the appellants argument void. 
 Thus, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
8. Appeal no. 72/20071115 
 The defendant company started the litigation1116 against the appellant 
requesting the recognition of an arbitral award, the defendant claim that the they and 
																																																								
1115 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 72/2007, issued on the 10th of June 2007. 
1116 Dubai Court of First Instance, case no.468/2005. 
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the appellant both are commercial companies entered into an agreement to establish a 
company for the purpose of producing horse nutrition, in order to supply it to horse 
stables and dividing the revenues of this project between them, which forced the 
defendant to litigate the dispute in case no. 71/20041117 in front of the Dubai First 
Instance court, which decided on the 19/4/2004 to appoint an accounting expert as an 
arbitrator to settle the dispute between them, the arbitrator issued an award stating that 
the defendant shall be awarded the sum of 1055796 dhs. which resulted in their 
request to recognize the award, on the 21/12/2005 the court decided to recognize the 
award. The appellant appealed the decision to the appeal court1118 which decided to 
dismiss the appeal, resulting in an appeal to the cassation court1119, which decided to 
nullify the award and refer the dispute back to the appeal court to rule again, the court 
justified their decision by claiming that the appeal court decided to dismissed the 
appeal on the ground that the arbitration clause grant the arbitrator the right to mediate 
the dispute between the parties. However, the arbitration clause doesn’t explicitly 
state that the parties have authorized the arbitrators to mediate the dispute. The appeal 
court after referring the dispute back to them decided on the 7/3/2007 to dismiss the 
appeal and uphold the appealed decision, the appellate company appealed this 
decision again to the cassation court in this appeal. 
 The appellant based their appeal on one ground, the first and second and 
seventh part of the appellant argument claims that the appealed decision decided to 
uphold the decision to recognize the arbitral award, which was issued by an arbitrator 
that was appointed by the court. However, the arbitrator was appointed in contrast to 
the requirement of the law, for the defendant requested in that dispute to appoint an 																																																								
1117 Dubai Court of First instance, case no. 71/2004. 
1118 Dubai Court of appeals, appeal no. 42/2006. 
1119 Dubai Court of Cassations, appeal no. 189/2006, issued on the 26th of November 2006. 
	 353	
accounting expert, the appellant on the other hand counter claimed in front of that 
court to dismiss the claim based on the existence of an arbitration clause the court 
should have dismissed that dispute, instead the court decided to appoint an arbitrator 
and refer the dispute to him, the appellant claim that they pleaded to the court to 
dismiss the arbitral award according to article 216 of the civil procedures , claiming 
that the appointment of the arbitrator is in contrast to the requirements of article 204, 
which requires each party to appoint an arbitrator, instead the court dismissed this 
plea, by claiming that the parties didn’t agree on a certain number of arbitrators in the 
arbitration clause, as such the court would have the right to appoint arbitrators as they 
see fit. 
 The court dismissed this argument, stating that according to article 203 of the 
civil procedures, the parties have the right to agree to submit their dispute to a sole 
arbitrator or a tribunal, which establishes the individuals right to arbitrate and their 
right to choose the number of arbitrators they see fit. However, if a dispute rose and 
the parties did not agree on a number of arbitrators, then the parties have the right to 
seek the court to appoint an arbitrator1120, this dispute shows that the original contract 
was concluded between the parties on the 5/8/2002, which contained an arbitration 
clause that didn’t identify the number of arbitrators, in addition a request was made by 
the defendant to the court to appoint an arbitrator, which the court granted by 
appointing an accounting expert as an arbitrator in the dispute and both parties 
confirmed and accepted this appointment. 
 Furthermore, the appellant argues that the arbitrator claimed in the award the 
he asked the Horse Club to submit their records of transactions with the company, 
																																																								
1120 According to article 204. 
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which is an important document required to identify the parties position in this 
dispute, the arbitrator claim that he didn’t receive any reply from the Club; the 
appellant argues that the arbitrator should have invoked article 209 of the civil 
procedures and requested the courts assistance in order to receive those documents, 
moreover the appealed decision refused the request to resubmit the dispute back to the 
arbitrator in order to clarify this point. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that according to the jurisprudence 
of this court when recognizing an arbitral award the court shall not revise the subject 
of the dispute, unless it is in conflict to a public policy rule. 
 Therefore, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
9. Appeal no. 32/20091121 
The defendants started the dispute1122 against the appellant, asking the court to 
appoint an expert in order to determine their share in the revenues from renting their 
property, the defendant stated that they agreed with the appellant and one more party 
(their sister)1123 to buy a land in which the property was later on constructed in order 
to later to lease that property, they agreed that the appellant should manage this 
project and to register the land under their name. However, the appellant registered 
the land under his name and after finishing the construction, he took all the revenues 
from renting the property without dividing the shares with the defendants, the 
appellant counter claimed by requesting that the court should dismiss the case since it 
has already been settled through arbitration, in addition he requested that the court 
																																																								
1121 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 32/2009, issued on the 29th of March 2009. 
1122 Dubai Court of First instance case no.186/2008. 
1123 The litigants in this dispute are siblings. 
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should recognize the arbitral award that was issued in regard to this dispute, claiming 
that he and the defendants and their father have bought the land in question, and after 
the construction of the property, he continued to pay their shares from the revenues 
and once the dispute have risen between the parties they agreed to submit this dispute 
into arbitration. 
The first instance court decided to dismiss the claim based on the fact that the 
dispute have already been settled through arbitration and to dismiss the defendants 
request to set-aside the arbitral award, moreover the court decided to recognize the 
award. The defendants appealed this decision1124, which decided to nullify the 
appealed decision and the arbitral award and refer the dispute back to the first instance 
court. The appellant appealed this decision to the cassation court on the 21/1/2009, the 
defendants submitted a plea to the court to dismiss the appeal, and the court decided 
to hear the appeal and dismissed the defendant’s plea. 
The appellant based his appeal on one ground, arguing that the appeal court 
should nullify the appeal courts decision, claiming that the court’s based their 
decision on the arbitrator failed to uphold the procedures mentioned in articles 208, 
212 and 216 of the civil procedures, which discuss the arbitrator obligation of 
upholding due process in their hearing. However, the parties have agreed to 
authorized the arbitrator to conduct the arbitration process as he sees fit, as such the 
arbitrator is not bound by the requirements of those articles only when it concerns 
public policy, as such the arbitrator in this dispute have upheld due process. 
Furthermore, article 208 doesn’t require a certain procedure for notifying the parties 
																																																								
1124 Dubai court of Appeals, appeal no. 600/2008, issued on 15/12/2006. 
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or that the arbitrator need to keep a record of the proceedings. Therefore, none of the 
grounds for setting-aside the arbitral award1125 applies to this award. 
The court agreed with the appellants argument, stating that the conditions for 
setting aside the award in article 216 have been explicitly mentioned in that article, 
and they relate to the arbitration agreement or the arbitral process; as such in order to 
set-aside the award it is required to be issued without an arbitration agreement, or if 
the arbitrator exceeded the scope of the arbitration or violated a public policy rule. On 
the other hand, the arbitral process conditions for setting aside the award, relates to 
issuing an arbitral award by arbitrators that weren’t appointed according to the law or 
were not authorized to issue an award in the absence of the parties, or if they issued an 
award according to a arbitration agreement that did not specify the scope or the 
subject of the dispute, or if the agreement was rendered by a person that is not 
competent to act as an arbitrator or from an arbitrator that has no legal capacity to do 
so or if due process was not uphold, or if the award was void, or the procedure 
became void and affected the award.  
Therefore, if none of those conditions were to apply then the request to set-
aside the award shall be dismissed, moreover articles 131126, 208, 212, 213 of the civil 
procedures, shows that the arbitrator isn’t subject to the same requirements that a 
judge is required to uphold. However, the arbitrator is required to uphold the 
procedural requirements stated in the arbitration chapter and what the parties agreed 
upon, and if the arbitration is a court-annexed one which is an arbitration that occurs 
based on a court order or the parties agreement in front of the court, then the arbitrator 																																																								
1125 Which are stated in article 216. 
1126 Article 13 of the civil procedures law, supra note 5, state:” The procedure shall be null if the law 
has stipulated expressly its nullity or if it has been impaired with a defect or an essential imperfection 
because of which the procedure purpose has not been fulfilled. In case the procedure purpose has been 
proved, the nullity shall not be decided in spite of the stipulation thereon.” 
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is required to uphold the requirements of paragraph 1 and 2 of article 213 of the civil 
procedures, and if the arbitration occurred outside the court either ad-hoc or 
institutional then the arbitrator need to uphold the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 
213. Therefore, it is not required in arbitration that occurs outside the court from the 
arbitrator to issue a record of the hearing, if the parties or the institute did not require 
that from him, and what is meant by violating the process of adjudicating is the 
arbitrator failure to uphold due process and the procedures that the parties agreed 
upon, even if articles 208 and 212 require the arbitrator to notify the parties of the 
hearing and to be able to present their defense in order to uphold due process, 
nevertheless this notification isn’t one of the requirements of the civil procedures law, 
moreover the purpose of having this requirement is to ensure that the parties are able 
to present their defense in front of the arbitrator, and as such it is not sufficient to set-
aside the award to claim that the arbitrator failed to notify the parties to the start of the 
proceedings, but they are required to establish that this failure is a direct result of their 
inability to present their defense, as such this failure doesn’t relate to the public policy 
since this requirement has been established for the benefit of the parties, and that the 
party who claims that  his right to present his defense was infringed should present 
evidence supporting their claim. 
Therefore, there is no sufficient evidence supporting the appeal court decision 
to set-aside the award nor does it provide that the arbitrator failed to uphold those 
provisions, moreover the arbitration agreement state in clauses two and three that the 
arbitrator is authorized to “mediate the dispute and is not bound by the provisions of 
this civil procedures law except in regards to the public policy” as such there is no 
ground for setting-aside the award based on the arbitrator failure to notify the parties 
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of the hearing, which is waivered given the fact that the award shows the defendant 
were able to present their defense to the arbitrator.  
Thus, the court decided to uphold the first instance decision to recognize the 
arbitral award. 
 
10. Appeal no. 272/20081127 
The appellant company started the litigation1128 against the defendant 
company, asking the court to appoint an accounting expert as an arbitrator, claiming 
that they are sole agent for the defendant according to the agency contract between 
them dated 8-6-2000. However, the defendant concluded commercial contracts within 
the appellants jurisdiction in the UAE without giving the appellant his commission 
from 2001 and to this date, and given that clause 13 of the Agency contract between 
the parties states that “in the event of a dispute between the parties of this contract it 
shall be settled through arbitration…” and given the fact that the defendant refused to 
appoint or name their arbitrator to settle this dispute and refuse to receive the 
notification by the appellant dated 17-6-2007, it forced the appellant to start this 
proceeding. The court decided to dismiss this claim; the appellant appealed this 
decision1129 and on the 25-9-2008 the court decided to uphold the appealed decision, 
this decision was appealed to the cassation court on the 23-11-2008, the defendant 
pleaded to the cassation court to dismiss the appeal, the court decided to hear the 
appeal and to dismiss the defendant plea. 
The appeal was based on two grounds, the appellant argues that the court 
decision to dismiss the appointment request, by claiming that the request should have 
																																																								
1127 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 272/2008, issued on the 25th of January 2009.. 
1128 Dubai Court of First Instance case no. 782/2007, issued on 18/5/2008. 
1129 Dubai Court of Appeals, appeal no. 486/2008 (civil). 
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been made to the ICC1130 in Paris. However, article 18 of the commercial agencies 
law gives the jurisdiction to the UAE courts to settle any dispute that rises from the 
execution of those contracts, which led the appellant to raise the dispute in regards to 
the appointment to the court. Furthermore, the defendant did not object in the first 
hearing to dismiss the case based on the existence of an arbitration clause and they did 
not reply to the appellants notification of the appointment dated 17-6-2007, which 
constitute a waiver of their right to uphold the arbitration clause and the jurisdiction 
falls back to the UAE courts. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that based on the courts 
jurisprudence the arbitration clause cannot be taken in part and should be taken as a 
whole, and amending the clause regarding the appointment of the arbitrator should not 
be assumed, and the both parties should consent to this amendment, which falls under 
the discretion of the court in understanding and interpreting the facts of the case and 
the contract. Furthermore, article 204/1 implies that disputes in regard appointing the 
arbitrator should be submitted to the court that has the jurisdiction to hear the dispute, 
in the event that the arbitration agreement lacks the process of the appointment. 
However, if the clause or the agreement identified a process of appointment then the 
court cannot step in, and since the clause in this instance referred to the ICC, which 
state in articles 8 and 9 that the appointment of the arbitrator shall be concluded 
through the arbitral tribunal after submitting the dispute to the ICC and they shall 
appoint the arbitrators if one of the parties refused to appoint their arbitrator. 
 Therefore, the appellant has no right to submit their dispute to the court after 
agreeing to arbitrate and the appellants plea that the defendant failed to counter claim 
in the first hearing to the existence of the arbitration clause and the they did not accept 
																																																								
1130 See general Redfern and Hunter, supra note 59 at 9, were they give a brief overview of the ICC. 
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the notification to the appointment has no affect, since the appointment process has 
been stated in the clause to be conducted under the rules of the ICC. Thus, the court 
decided to dismiss the appeal. 
 
 
11. Appeal no. 337/19911131 
The defendant started the dispute1132 against the two appellants, asking the 
court to refer the dispute to arbitration under the courts supervision and to appoint an 
arbitrator and finally to recognize the arbitral award. The defendant claims that based 
on construction contract between the parties the amount of 75139 dhs. is in the 
appellants debt, they claim that this amount is in exchange for executing the contract, 
and given that the construction contract contained an arbitration clause they are 
requesting to refer the dispute into arbitration and in the event that the parties did not 
agree to appoint an arbitrator they are requesting that the court appoint one in their 
place. The defendant amended their request to the court to only include the amount of 
the, on the 16/7/1991 the court decided to accept the defendants request and order the 
payment of the amount of the claim. This decision was appealed and the appeal 
court1133 decided to uphold the appealed decision, this decision was appealed to the 
cassation court on three grounds. 
The appellant argues in the first ground that the court decision that the parties 
are not willing to submit their dispute to arbitration is flawed, basing their decision on 
their representative counter-claim to deny the defendants claim after amending their 
request to the court. However, this counter-claim did not touch upon the subject 
																																																								
1131 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no.337/1991, issued on the 7th of March 1992. 
1132 Dubai Court of first instance, case no.144/1990. 
1133 Dubai Court of appeals, appeal no.155/91. 
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matter of the dispute in order for the court to consider it as a waiver of the parties 
right to arbitrate. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that the arbitration is an agreement 
to grant the arbitrator the right to settle the dispute in place of the court and the natural 
judge, the nature of this agreement doesn’t relate to the public policy thus the parties 
can waiver this agreement and their right to arbitrate either explicitly or implicitly. 
Therefore, when the defendant amended their request and the appellant counter 
claimed by denying the defendant claim, which constitute as an implicit waiver of 
their right to arbitrate. 
The second and third ground of appeal doesn’t relate to arbitration and was 
dismissed by the court1134.  
Therefore, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
 
12. Appeal no.346/19911135 
 The defendant started the dispute1136 by asking the court to appoint an 
accounting expert to examine the records between the parties, the defendant claim that 
they agreed with the appellant to form a company; afterwards they decided to end the 
company and liquidate its assets and since the appellant failed to fulfill his obligation 
to ease the liquidation process, which forced the defendant to seek the court for relief. 
On the 20/10/1990 the litigants agreed in front of the court to refer their dispute into 
arbitration, both parties named their arbitrator and the court appointed the third 
arbitrator, the arbitrators started their proceedings and issued an award that was 
recognized by the court. The appellant appealed this decision1137, the court decided to 																																																								
1134 Which relate to the courts ability to interpret the evidence. 
1135 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no.346/1991, issued 23rd of May 1992. 
1136 Dubai Court of First Instance, case no.1172/1990. 
1137 Dubai Court of Appeals, appeal no. 182/1991, issued on 25/11/1991. 
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dismiss the appeal and uphold the appealed decision, this decision was appealed to the 
cassation court on two grounds: 
The appellant argues that the award should be dismissed based on the fact that 
it was issued after the agreed upon time, the appellant claim that the court decided to 
recognize the award by stating that the parties agreed to extend the arbitration time. 
However, the appellant claim that he did not agree to the extension in addition any 
extension of the arbitration period requires the courts recognition, neither the parties 
nor the arbitrators has the right to grant this extension on their own, which is only 
reserved to the court since it has the authority to supervise over the arbitration 
procedure, and the fact that the arbitrators have requested the amendment from the 
court is not sufficient unless the court renders a decision in this request, for the 
following reasons the award should be set-aside. 
The court dismissed this argument; stating that one of the attributes of 
arbitration is the fact that it is a voluntary process, implying that the parties have the 
right to agree in the arbitration clause to a certain time for the arbitral award to be 
issued or to extend it either by providing a process for extension in the arbitration 
clause or delegating that authority to the arbitrators, this delegation of authority can 
either be explicit by stating it in the arbitration agreement, or implicit by the parties 
appearance in the arbitration hearing after the extension and presenting their 
argument. Furthermore, the appeal court established that the appellant representative 
have agreed in the arbitral hearing dated 4/6/1991 to authorize the arbitrators to 
extend the arbitration time, which the arbitrators used to extend the arbitration from 
15/6/1991 to 4/8/1991. This procedure is not affected by the arbitrators informing the 
first instance court of the extension, since as it is proven from the facts of this dispute 
that the arbitrators has the authority to extend the arbitration on their own. 
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The second ground of appeal argues that the appellant upheld the argument 
that the award is void, claiming that the arbitrators didn’t uphold due process by 
dismissing his request to refer the dispute back to the court to examine the evidence, 
the appeal court answered this request by stating that the arbitral tribunal have given 
him the opportunity to present his defense and that the purpose of his request is to 
extend the period of the dispute. 
The court dismissed this argument, by confirming that the arbitrators have 
upheld due process in this dispute. 
Thus, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
 
13. Appeal no. 91/19921138 
The appellant company started the dispute1139 against the appellant asking the 
court to order the payment of the amount of the claim; the appellant attorney claims 
that the appellant constructed a building for the benefit of the defendant and according 
to the agreement between them, in exchange for 4829340 dhs. which the defendant 
paid 4727873 dhs. of that amount, the appellant asked the defendant to pay the 
reminder of the payments, which they refused to do so forcing the appellant to seek 
the court; the defendant counter claimed to dismiss the dispute based on the existence 
of an arbitration clause in the contract between the parties. The court decided to 
dismiss the dispute based on an existence of an arbitration clause, the appellant 
appealed this decision1140 the court decided to uphold the appealed decision, 
explaining that the amount of the claim is part of the fees that resulted from the 
construction contract and as such the parties should first uphold their contractual 
agreement by settling their dispute through arbitration before seeking the courts. The 																																																								
1138 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no.91/1992, issued 21st of November 1992. 
1139 Dubai court of first instance case no. 3/1991, issued on 17/10/1991 
1140 Dubai Court of appeals, appeal no. 91/222, issued on 24/2/1992. 
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appellant decided to appeal that decision to the cassation court on the 25/3/1992, the 
defendant pleaded to the court to dismiss the appeal on the 15/6/1992. However, the 
court decided to hear the appeal. 
The appeal was based on three grounds, the first and second argues that the 
appealed decision upon deciding to dismiss the dispute based on the existence of an 
arbitration clause, even though this dispute doesn’t fall under the scope of the 
arbitration clause since the dispute is in regards to a debt claim, which is not based on 
the contract in which the arbitration clause was stated in. Furthermore, the arbitration 
clause is invalid and void since it lacks the sufficient information that makes it a valid 
clause, such as the determination of the number of the arbitrators or the method of 
choosing them and the place of the arbitration and the law that governs the arbitration 
process and the contract and the time of the arbitration. 
The court dismissed this argument stating that article 17 of the contract 
between the parties stated that:” the disputes shall be settled through arbitration”, and 
since the dispute in this litigation involves the reminder of the payment of the 
construction contract, which rises from the construction contract that contains the 
arbitration clause, which renders this argument void. Furthermore, according to the 
jurisprudence of the court all that requires for the validity of the arbitration clause is 
the parties agreement, thus it doesn’t require any agreement on the details of the 
dispute at the time of drafting the clause.  
The third ground of the appeal argues that the appealed decision failed to 
uphold due process, since the appealed decision did not answer the appellant’s 
defense. 
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The court dismissed this ground stating that the appeal court based their 
decision on sound grounds; moreover the court has no obligation to answer all the 
litigants’ claims. 
Therefore, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
 
 
14. Appeal no. 171/19921141 
The defendant company started the dispute1142 against the first appellant (an 
institution) and the inheritors of the appellants, asking the court to order the payment 
of the amount of 5963816.40 dhs. in addition to the interest from the time of the claim 
and until the fulfillment of the payment, claiming that the appellants are indebt to the 
defendant company in exchange for constructing a storage unit for the institution 
which is owned by the appellants inheritor who signed the contracts in his capacity as 
a patron, and since he refused to pay the amount of the claim they referred the dispute 
to the court. The appellants also started a suit1143 against the defendant company 
asking the court to refer the dispute to arbitration based on an arbitration agreement 
between the parties, and to order the company to pay a compensation in exchange of 
the damages that occurred due to their failure to uphold the construction requirements. 
The court decided to combine both suits and to refer the dispute to arbitration; the 
litigants sought the court again due to the fact of the passing of one of the litigants and 
to dispute the appointment of one of the arbitrators, the litigants agreed in front of the 
court on the 21/2/1989 to appoint a sole arbitrator that has the authority to mediate 
and arbitrate the dispute and that his decision should be final and binding to the 
parties, lastly the parties have the right to submit the award to the court to recognize 																																																								
1141 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no. 171/1992, issued on the 22nd of November 1992. 
1142 Dubai Court of First Instance, case no.396/1982. 
1143 Dubai Court of First Instance, case no. 1149/1982. 
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and enforce it; they agreed that the minimum amount of the award should not be less 
than one million Australian pounds in favor of the defendant company and doesn’t 
exceed 4.3 million Australian pounds. The litigants failed to name an arbitrator and on 
the 24/4/1989 the court appointed an engineering expert as an arbitrator and on the 
31/3/1991 the arbitrator issued an award in the amount of 3357467 Australian pounds 
in favor of the defendant company and to return the bills of exchange to the 
appellants, the defendants attorney asked the court to recognize the award and on the 
29/12/1991 the court decided to recognize and enforce the award.  
The appellants appealed this decision1144, asking the court to partially nullify 
the award to what has been decided in excess of one million Australian pounds, on the 
21/6/1992 the appeal court decided to uphold the appealed decision, the appellants 
appealed this decision to the cassation court on the 13/7/1992, asking to partially 
nullify the decision in regards to what have been decided in excess of two million 
Australian pounds, the defendants representative pleaded to the court to dismiss the 
appeal since the appeal didn’t contain the defendants address, furthermore this 
decision is not subject to appeal according to article 217 of the civil procedures, 
which doesn’t allow appeals in arbitral awards in the event that the arbitrators were 
authorized to mediate the dispute or if the parties have given up their right to appeal, 
which is the case in this dispute since the parties have agreed to waiver their right to 
appeal. 
The court dismissed the defendants plea, first in regards to dismissing the 
appeal for the failure to add the litigants address, which was dismissed by the court 
according to article 1771145 of the civil procedures, which implies that such 																																																								
1144 Dubai Court of appeals, appeal no. 23/1992. 
1145 Article 177 states:” 1- The appeal through cassation shall be prosecuted with a pleading deposited 
in the clerk's office of the court and signed by a lawyer who is admissible for the prosecution there 
before, and attached with what certifies the full payment of the fees with the mortgage, and the appeal 
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information requires to be presented to the cassation court. However, paragraph 2 of 
article 131146 of the same law state that the court would not decide to nullify a 
procedure if the purpose of that procedure has been met, and even though the 
appellant failed to provide this requirement the purpose of article 177 have been met 
by notifying the parties of the appeal. The court also dismissed the defendant plea that 
was based on article 217, explaining that this article states that the arbitral award are 
not subject to appeals if the parties have agreed to authorize the arbitrators to mediate 
or if they explicitly waivered their right to appeal in agreement, which is an exception 
to the general principle of adjudication mentioned in article 1581147, which allows the 
individuals to appeal the decision of the trial court to the appeal court. However, this 
doesn’t apply to appeals to the cassation court that falls under article 1731148, which 
state that once a decision have been issued by the appeal court and have met the 
requirements of this article the parties would be able to appeal it to the court of 
cassation, and since the appeal decision in question was issued on the 21/6/1992, 
which occurred after the civil procedures law came into power on the 9/6/1992, thus 
the appeal is granted even if it was in regards to recognizing an arbitral award, which 
has been agreed upon to authorize the arbitrators to mediate or if the parties agreed in 
the arbitration agreement that the award is final and not subject to appeal, which is 
																																																																																																																																																														
shall immediately be recorded in the file prepared for that. 2- The appellant should deposit, when he 
submits the pleading, a number of copies thereof equal to the number of persons against whom the 
appeal has been prosecuted and a copy to the clerk's office. 3- The appellant should, before retaining 
the appeal for the decision, deposit a document of the retainer of the lawyer delegated in the appeal.....” 
1146 Article 13 states: “The procedure shall be null if the law has stipulated expressly its nullity or if it 
has been impaired with a defect or an essential imperfection because of which the procedure purpose 
has not been fulfilled. In case the procedure purpose has been proved, the nullity shall not be decided in 
spite of the stipulation thereon.” 
1147 Article 158 states: “The litigant parties, in other than the circumstances excepted by the law 
stipulation, may appeal the decisions of the courts of first instances before the authorized court of 
appeal…..”, this article was amended by the federal law no. 30 on the 30/11/2005. 
1148 Article 173 states:” The opposing parties may appeal with a cassation in the decisions issued from 
the appellate courts if the action value was more than two hundred thousand Dirham or was not 
valuated and that in the following circumstances….”, this article was also amended by the federal law 
no. 30. 
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limited to appeals from the first instance court to the appeal court. Therefore, the court 
allows the appeal to the cassation court. 
The appellant argues that the court have recognized the arbitral award, which 
was issued based on an agreement that have been nullified by the parties, and the 
arbitrators have added interests and compensation to the claim without any basis. 
Therefore, the appealed decision is contradicting the first instance decision by 
allowing the first instance decision to be appealed, by stating that the arbitrators has 
the right to add interests to the amount of the claim, furthermore the decision did not 
answer the appellants plea in regard to the delay penalties which is in the amount of 
two million Australian pounds, which should been limited to the amount that the 
parties have agreed to. Lastly, the appealed decision failed to uphold the parties’ 
freedom of contract after the arbitrators have decided to compensate based on a 
percentage of the agreed amount. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that once the parties have agreed in 
the arbitration clause that the arbitral award is final then they should not argue on the 
subject matter of the dispute in front of the cassation court, even if the dispute 
occurred before the enactment of the civil procedures law, furthermore there is no 
contradiction between the first instance and the appeal court decision. 
Therefore, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
 
15. Appeal no. 165/19921149 
The appellant started the dispute1150 against the defendant, asking the court to 
award him the amount of 30000 dhs. in addition to the legal interest, explaining that 
the defendant have issued a check no. 18262 in the amount of the claim, upon 																																																								
1149 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no. 165/1992, issued on the 28th of November 1992. 
1150 Dubai Court of First Instance, case no.1325/1989. 
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submitting the check to the bank it turns out that he lacked the sufficient funds, the 
defendant was found guilty in the criminal case no.1625/891151, the court appointed an 
expert in the case and on the 19/2/1991 both parties agreed to submit the dispute to 
arbitration by agreeing to appoint a sole arbitrator in the dispute, they also agreed to 
not dispute the award. The court accepted their request and after the arbitrator 
submitted his award 1152on the 10/7/1991 for recognition, the court decided on the 
25/11/1991 to partially recognize the award in regards to clause 2 and 3 of the award 
and set-aside the fourth clause; the defendant appealed this decision1153 and the 
appellant appealed the same decision in a separate appeal1154, the appeal court decided 
on the 2/6/1991 to amend the award in regards to deciding that the check in question 
is null and to dismiss the appellants appeal.  
The appellant appealed the decision on the 2/7/1992, asking the court to 
nullify the appealed decision and to recognize the arbitrator award in what have been 
decided in regards to ordering the defendant to pay the amount of 100000 dhs. and the 
amount of 200000 dhs. that is registered in his account in two different companies, the 
defendant submitted a plea to dismiss the appeal, which was dismissed by the court. 
The appeal was based on four grounds, the appellant argues that the appealed 
decision failed to uphold the law, claiming that the appealed decision recognized an 
award, which decided that the check was issued as an insurance to fulfill the 
obligation of the company towards the appellant. However, this decision was based on 
speculations and even the arbitrator have admitted that he is not sure in regards to this 
issue, furthermore the arbitrator have exceeded the scope of the arbitration by 
investigating the purpose of the check and added the amount of 200000 dhs. from the 																																																								
1151 In the UAE it is considered a criminal offence to issue a check without funds, according to article 
401, of the Federal Law no. 3/1987, concerning the penal code. 
1152 The court is labeling the arbitral award in this dispute as a report. 
1153 Dubai Court of appeals, appeal no. 736/1991. 
1154 Dubai Court of appeals, appeal no. 746/1991. 
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appellants account in the company and in the second pay ordered the defendant to pay 
the amount of 100000 dhs., which the appealed decision did not recognize. 
The court dismissed this argument stating that arbitration is an exception to the 
individuals right to seek their natural judge, thus it is limited to what the parties have 
agreed to submit to the arbitration tribunal, and as such it is not sufficient to say that 
the since its an exception the arbitrators don’t have the right to decide over disputes 
that relate to the main issue that the parties agreed to arbitrate upon, as such arguing 
that the issues that raises after the submitting of the main dispute should be submitted 
to the court and not the arbitrator has no basis. Moreover, the court upon recognizing 
an arbitral award doesn’t look at the subject of the award, and since the appellant have 
started the dispute against the defendant to request the payment of 30000 dhs. which 
the defendant have submitted a check without sufficient funds, and the defendant 
claimed that the check was submitted to the appellant as an insurance to fulfilling 
their obligation, and then the parties agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration and the 
arbitrator issued an award that came to the conclusion that the check in question was 
in fact issued as a guarantee and that the check has no affect and is void, and ordered 
the payment of the amount of 125000 dhs. and the amount of 7500000 dhs. to the 
appellant from the accounts of the company, and that the defendant should pay the 
amount of 100000 dhs. to the appellant. 
 Thus, the appealed decision has a legal basis, as such the court decided to 
dismiss the appeal. 
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16. Appeal no. 10/19951155 
The defendant company started the dispute1156 by asking the court to recognize 
an arbitral award dated 15/11/1993, which was based on an arbitration agreement in 
which the parties agreed to settle their dispute through arbitration and appointed a sole 
arbitrator to settle the dispute, they also agreed that the award shall be final and is not 
subject to appeal, the arbitrator issued an award, which decided first to order the 
appellant to register the property number 6 in Jordan in the defendants name; second 
to order the appellant to pay the amount of 1041114.93 dhs. and 9% interest from the 
date of the award and until the fulfillment of the payment, the arbitrator submitted a 
copy of the award to both parties. The appellant counter claimed that the award is null 
and should be set-aside, the court decided to partially recognize the award by 
dismissing the first part of the award. The appellant appealed the award1157 asking the 
court to set-aside the award, the court decided to uphold the appealed decision. This 
decision was appealed to the cassation court on the 17/1/1995, the appellant asked the 
court to set-aside the award on the following grounds: 
The appellant argues in the first part of the first ground that the court decided 
to recognize the arbitral award even though it is null, claiming that it was based on a 
null arbitration agreement, since the parties have agreed outside the court to arbitrate 
their dispute, even though the dispute was being heard by the court at the same time, 
which makes this a parallel litigation, and since the courts hold the original 
jurisdiction over the dispute then they should be the one that decide on the dispute, or 
it would constitute a breach of the public policy and of the principles of adjudication. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that article 210/1 of the civil 
procedures implies that even if a dispute was brought to the court this doesn’t mean 																																																								
1155 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 10/1995, issued on the 8th of October 1995. 
1156 Dubai Court of First instance, case no. 225/1993, issued on 27/4/1994. 
1157 Dubai Court of Appeals, appeal no. 527/1994, issued on 22/11/1994. 
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that the parties are unable to opt-out into arbitration, the only requirement is that the 
court hasn’t decided the dispute. Therefore, opting-out into arbitration at the time of 
hearing the dispute in front of the court doesn’t constitute a ground for setting-aside 
the award nor is it a parallel proceeding.  
The second part of the first ground of appeal, argues that they have upheld the 
argument that the award is null due to the fact that the arbitrator has no legal capacity 
to rule on the dispute, the appellant argues that they refused the arbitrator request to 
pay the arbitrator fee, which is fifteen thousand US dollars in order for him to act as a 
mediator between the appellant and the banks in order to approve the appellant loans, 
which was dismissed by the appeal court based on article 207/4. However, this article 
addresses court-annexed arbitration and cannot be applied to ad hoc arbitration, which 
is the case in this dispute. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that even though the arbitrator 
capacity to rule is one of the grounds for setting aside the award under article 216. 
However, the grounds mentioned in this article have been explicitly identified, and in 
regards to article 207/4 which determines the conditions under which dismissing the 
arbitrator is possible, have set a time limit in which this request can be made to the 
court, the request should be made to the court within five days and this requirement 
applies to both ad-hoc and court-annexed arbitration. Therefore, in order for the award 
to be set-aside it needs to meet those requirements that have been explicitly stated in 
the law. 
The third part of the first ground and the first and second part of the second 
ground of the appeal, argues that the appellant argued in front of the trial court to 
nullity of taking an oath in the arbitral procedure, claiming that the statement that was 
given by the defendants companies representative under oath, was given without the 
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presence of the appellant or their representative, and after it was amended by the 
arbitrator in a way that contradicts the facts of the disputes and without informing the 
appellant of this amendment. Furthermore, the arbitrator did not present any reason 
for conducting that session on the 7/10/1993 without the presence of the appellant or 
his representative. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that according to article 212 the 
arbitrator is not bound by the same procedures that bind the court. However, the 
arbitrator is bound by the procedures that are stated in chapter three of the civil 
procedures that addresses arbitration and what the parties agreed upon, and is required 
to uphold due process by allowing both parties the opportunity to present their 
defense and pleas, and by informing the parties of the hearings in which they have 
present their evidence and claims. Furthermore, the judge has the authority to amend 
the format in which the oath needs to be taken either by the parties’ request or from 
his own, the only requirement is that the purpose of this amendment is to clarify the 
statement given under oath. Thus, the nullity of the award due to the failure to uphold 
due process and the procedures of adjudication occurs if the arbitrator exceeded and 
failed to implement those principles and what the parties have decided upon, and 
since the parties have agreed in the sixth clause of the arbitration agreement that the 
arbitrator has the right to decided on the procedures that shall be implemented in the 
arbitration, and that the appealed decision have examined this fact by stating that the 
appellant have been notified by that hearing on the 7/10/1993 and that the appellant 
have sent a fact to the arbitrator asking him to delay the hearing for half an hour, the 
appellant also stated in front of the court that his representative was late to that same 
hearing, thus the arbitrator have upheld due process in this arbitration. Therefore, the 
court decided to dismiss this ground of appeal. 
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The appellant argues on the third part of the second ground, stating that they 
upheld the argument that the courts decision to dismiss the first part of the award is 
null, which was based on the fact that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of the 
arbitration agreement and recognized the rest of the award, is an implication that the 
entire award is null, since both parts of the award cannot be divided for nullifying one 
constitute nullifying the entire award and setting it aside. 
The court accepted this argument, stating that if part of the award was nullified 
based on the arbitrator exceeding the scope of the arbitration agreement, which 
constitute nullifying the other half of the award that relates to the first part, which falls 
under the consideration of the trial court once they have based their decision on sound 
reasoning, and since the appealed decision responded to this argument by stating that 
the appellant has no right nor interest to appeal, which is a void decision since it failed 
to uphold due process. 
Therefore, the court decided to nullify the appealed decision and refer the 
decision back to the appeal court to decided again on the dispute. 
 
17. Appeal no. 295/19931158 
The defendant company started this dispute against the appellant1159, by asking 
the court to order the payment of 25162.5 dhs. which the defendant claim is in 
exchange to the defendant fulfilling their contractual obligation to construct and 
maintain a building as per the agreement, moreover they claim that the appellant 
agreed in writing to complete the payments on the 30/3/1991. However, upon the 
appellant refusal to pay the reminder of the payments after the passing of the deadline 
the defendant started these proceedings. The court dismissed the appellant’s plea to 																																																								
1158 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 295/1993, issued on the 30th of January 1994. 
1159 Dubai Court of First Instance, case no. 1190/1992, issued on 12/1/1993. 
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dismiss the dispute based on the existence of an arbitration clause1160, deciding to 
grant the defendant their request. The appellant appealed that decision; the appeal 
court decided to uphold the appealed decision.1161 That decision was appealed to the 
cassation court on the 24/11/1993, the defendant’s attorney submitted a plea to the 
court to dismiss the appeal, and the court dismissed the defendant’s plea and decided 
to hear the appeal. 
The appeal was based on three grounds; the first ground argues that the 
appealed decision dismissed their request to submit the dispute into arbitration, the 
courts reasoning was that there is no dispute between the parties in regard to the 
execution of the contraction contract, which makes this dispute falls outside the scope 
of the arbitration clause since the construction have already been completed, the court 
based their argument on the meeting dated 2/5/1991 between the parties and 
concluded that the construction have been completed between the parties. The 
appellant argues that this dispute falls under the scope of the arbitration clause, since 
the parties agreed in the clause to refer all dispute that raises from the execution of 
this contract into arbitration, which include disputes that occur through the 
construction period and before the endings of the contract or after the fulfillment of 
the contract, as such the defendant claim in regards to the payments raises from the 
contract, which falls under the scope of the arbitration clause. Furthermore, the 
appellants claim that they agreed on the 7/3/1991 to complete the payments, which is 
before the defendant’s delivery of the property to the appellants that should have been 
on the 7/4/1991. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that the trial court has the authority 
to interpret the agreement and the will of the parties without the supervision of the 																																																								
1160 Which was concluded on the 22/12/1992 between the litigants. 
1161 Dubai Court of Appeals, appeal no.76 /1993, issued on 25/10/1993. 
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cassation court, once they base their interpretation on sound legal basis. The trial 
court reasoning was that: “… the tenth clause of the construction contract dated 
21/12/1989, states that any dispute that rises between the parties in connection to this 
agreement, regarding the contract or its execution should be referred to a engineering 
expert in order to settle the dispute…” and this dispute relates to the final payments 
and the final finishes of the construction making this dispute fall outside the scope of 
the arbitration clause, which is supported by the litigants meeting on the 2/5/1991 that 
confirmed the fulfillment of the construction contract. 
The appellant second and third grounds argue in regard to the payment that the 
defendant requested, which was dismissed by the cassation court. 
Thus, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
 
18. Appeal no.260 and 261/19941162 
The defendant company started the dispute1163 asking the court to recognize 
and enforce an arbitral award, which was issued based on an arbitration clause 
between the parties dated 11/5/1991, they claim that based on a construction contract 
dated 10/4/1988 the appellant asked the defendant company to decorate their villa in 
exchange for 6500000 dhs. the appellant also requested on the 12/9/1989 to decorate 
his Majlis1164 in the same villa in exchange for 550000 dhs. a dispute rose between the 
parties and on the 11/5/1991 they agreed to refer the dispute to a sole arbitrator and 
that his decision is final and binding and is not subject to appeal, the arbitrator issued 
an award on the 3/7/1993 and delivered a copy of the award to both parties. The court 
																																																								
1162 Dubai Court of cassation appeal no.260 and 261/1994, issued on the 16th of October 1994. 
1163 Dubai Court of First Instance, case no.158/1993, issued on 11/1/1994. 
1164 “Majlis” usually refers to the room in which the guests are being greeted and seated at. 
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decided to recognize the award. The appellant appealed the decision1165; the appeal 
court upheld the decision. The appellant appealed this decision in two appeals that 
were submitted to the court on the 13/6/1994 and 14/6/1994, the defendant submitted 
a plea to dismiss the appeals.  
 Appeal 260/1994 was based on two grounds, the first part of the first ground 
argues that the UAE legislator decided to treat arbitration in the same level as a courts 
decision, which implies that the arbitral award is subject to the same provisions as a 
court decision, since article 10 of the Dubai law no. 3/1992 1166requires that the court 
decision be issued under the Ruler of Dubai’s name, which is a requirement that the 
arbitral award is required to uphold as well, since the award in question failed to 
contain this requirement it should be set-aside. 
 The court dismissed this argument, stating that this is not a requirement that 
the arbitrators are required to present in their awards, even if the arbitral award has the 
same affects as a judicial decision. However, it still has its own unique nature that the 
legislator has regulated in the civil procedures law, as such it is not bound to the same 
requirements as a courts decision. 
The second and third part of the first ground of appeal, argues that the 
appellant continued to uphold the argument that the arbitrator have exceeded the 
scope of the arbitration agreement, claiming that the clause was general and didn’t 
define the scope of the arbitration, since there exist two construction contracts 
between the parties, the arbitrator have decided to include both of the contracts under 
his jurisdiction. Moreover, the arbitration clause did not contain which of the dispute 
																																																								
1165 Dubai Court of Appeals, appeal no.133/1994, issued on 15/5/1994. 
1166 This law concerns the organizing of the courts in Dubai, Dubai Law no. 3/1992. 
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falls under the scope of the arbitration, implying that the arbitrator exceeded the scope 
of the arbitration, which is a ground for setting-aside the award. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that the trial court has the right to 
interpret and explain the contract, the only requirement is that the interpretation is 
done according to the law, since the appealed decision came to the conclusion that the 
scope of the arbitration agreement contain both of the contracts, which implies that 
the arbitrator did not exceed the scope of the arbitration agreement. 
The second ground of the appeal, argue that the appellant argued in front of 
the court that the arbitrator decision is null, due to the fact that the arbitrator didn’t 
uphold the fifth clause of the arbitration agreement, which requires the arbitrator to 
hear both parties of the dispute, thus he failed to uphold due process, by not giving the 
appellant the opportunity to present his case and to question the defendant. 
Furthermore, the arbitrator based their decision on the letters between the parties, the 
appeal court decided to dismiss this argument thus making their decision subject to 
nullification. 
The court dismissed this argument based on article 212/1, which implies that 
the arbitrator is not bound by the normal procedures that binds the court, even though 
the arbitrator is required to follow the procedures mentioned in the chapter regarding 
arbitration and to uphold due process and the parties right to fair trial. However, in 
this dispute it is clear that the arbitrator gave the appellant the opportunity to present 
his defense, which is what the court used to base their decision that the arbitrator 
upheld due process. 
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Therefore, based on the previous discussion the court decided to dismiss 
appeal no. 260/1994, and since the second appeal (261/1994) is based on the same 
grounds it shall be dismissed as well. 
19. Appeal no. 167/19941167 
The appellant started the dispute against the defendant1168, asking the court to 
appoint an arbitrator to resolve the dispute between the parties in regard to a 
precautionary receivership in case no.1937 and to order the payment of 237248 dhs. 
In addition, they requested to recognize and enforce the award once it is issued and 
the defendant should be responsible for the court and lawyer fees in case no. 
48/19921169, the appellant claim that they are bound by an arbitration clause in a 
construction contract to arbitrate, they also claim that they contacted the arbitrator on 
the 28/2/1993 and the defendant on the 31/3/1993 to start the arbitration proceedings. 
However, both of them failed to respond within 90 days, implying that they are not 
willing to comply with this request to arbitrate; the court decided to dismiss this suit. 
This decision was appealed1170, the court decided to uphold the appealed decision. 
The appellant appealed that decision to the cassation court on the 21/4/1994. The 
defendant pleaded to the court to dismiss the appeal, claiming that article 204/2 of the 
civil procedures implies that appointment decisions are not subject to appeal. The 
court dismissed this plea, stating that the decisions that are not subject to appeal under 
article 204 are the ones that concerns appointing of an arbitrator by the court, which is 
an exception to the general rules of appeals and as such should be limited, thus the 
court decided to hear the appeal. 																																																								
1167 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no. 167/1994, issued on the 13th of November 1994. 
1168 Dubai Court of First Instance, case no. 163/1993, issued on the 2/1/1994. 
1169 Which is in the amount of 20819 dhs. 
1170 Dubai court of appeals, appeal no. 123/1994, issued on the 27/3/1994. 
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The appellant based his argument on seven grounds, which is summed up in 
the following, the appellant argues that there is no dispute between them in regards to 
submitting the dispute into arbitration, and that the appellant tried to initiate the 
arbitration proceedings but the defendant and the arbitrator ignored the appellants 
notice, the court dismissed this claim stating that there is no evidence supporting this 
claim since there is no record, which shows the defendant or the arbitrator receiving 
that notice and that the recorded message, which the appellant presented is not 
sufficient to be considered a notification. In essence, the court’s decision to refuse the 
appointment is implies that the court has waivered the appellant right to request an 
appointment from the court according to article 204. 
The court dismissed this argument; stating that in the event that the parties 
agreed to appointing an arbitrator and to arbitrate their dispute, then the arbitration 
clause has been invoked and the parties are bound to submit their dispute to the 
arbitrator that they have chosen. In this instance the parties have waivered their right 
to submit their dispute to the court to appoint a new arbitrator, except if the arbitrator 
refused to do his job or is dismissed by the parties or the court decided to dismiss him, 
and that there is no agreement between the parties that regulates this process, in this 
instance they have the right to seek the court to appoint an arbitrator according to 
article 204, the obligation to prove that one of those conditions has been fulfilled, falls 
to the party that is requesting the court to appoint the arbitrator. Furthermore, 
according to the jurisprudence of this court, the examination of the evidence falls to 
the determination of the trial court that the claim has been submitted to, without 
supervision from the cassation court, if they have based their decision on sound legal 
reasoning, as such the appealed decision was based on both sound evidence and legal 
reasoning. 
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Therefore, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
20. Appeal no. 294/19941171 
The defendant company started the suit1172 against the appellants asking the 
court to liquidate the company agreements and records between the parties, the 
appellants counter claimed in a separate suit1173 asking the court to examine the 
accounting records between the parties, the court decided to combine both suits. The 
parties agreed in front of the court to refer the dispute into arbitration, the parties 
chose an arbitrator that managed to issue an award and submit it to the court for 
recognition, the defendant company asked the court to recognize the award, the 
appellants pleaded to the court to set-aside the award stating that the arbitrator did not 
examine the original accounting records, the court decided to recognize the award. 
The decision was appealed1174 the court decided to uphold the appeal decision. The 
decision was appealed to the cassation court, the defendants pleaded to the court to 
dismiss the appeal, the court dismissed the defendant plea and decided to hear the 
appeal. 
The appeal was based on two grounds, the appellant argues on the second 
ground that the appeal court decided to dismiss their appeal on the ground that the 
arbitrator was authorized to mediate the dispute between the parties, which is 
mentioned in the arbitration agreement between the parties that state ” that the arbitral 
award is final and binding- once the parties agree that the arbitrator is authorized to 
mediate and the dispute didn’t end in front of him through mediation”. However, they 																																																								
1171 Dubai court of cassation appeal no. 294/1994, issued on the 26th of November 1994. 
1172 Dubai court of First Instance, case no. 962/1987, which was later changed to 420/1992, issued on 
13/1/1993. 
1173 The number of the case is not mentioned. 
1174 Dubai court of appeals, appeal no. 156/1994, issued on 13/6/1994. 
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agreed in the arbitration agreement that the arbitrator is bound to uphold due process 
and hear the parties arguments, which doesn’t imply that the arbitrator is authorized to 
mediate the dispute, moreover their agreement that the award is final and binding 
doesn’t mean that they given their right to appeal the first instance decision to 
recognize the arbitral award. 
The cassation court agreed with this ground, stating that article 217, implies 
that the exceptions to appealing the decisions to recognize arbitral award is limited to 
the situation in which the arbitrator is authorized to mediate the dispute, the will of the 
parties to authorize the arbitrator to mediate is not assumed it need to be explicitly 
stated in the agreement, thus agreeing in the arbitration agreement that the award is 
not subject to the rules of the civil procedures and that the award is final and binding, 
doesn’t imply that the parties intended to authorize the arbitrator to mediate the 
dispute; this is justified given the fact that arbitration that includes a mediation 
procedure is a dangerous process, since the arbitrators that are authorized to mediate 
are not bound by the law except to the rules of public policy. What is meant by the 
waiver of the parties right to appeal in article 217/3, is the parties explicit waiver of 
the right to appeal the decision to recognize the arbitral award or setting it aside, not 
the right to appeal the arbitral award, since the award itself is not subject to appeal 
according to article 217/1.  
Even though the court has the right to interpret the parties’ agreement this 
right is limited, since the court is required to interpret the agreement within the 
confines of the terms of the agreement. Therefore, the fifth clause of the arbitration 
agreement, which states: “in regards to the mediation between the parties” and the 
seventh clause, which states “ with the exception of the above the arbitrators award 
	 383	
either he was authorized to mediate or not is a final and binding award for both parties 
and they are obliged to enforce it, except if it was in contrast to a public policy rule or 
the law”, implies that the parties didn’t authorize the arbitrator to mediate the dispute, 
this is not change by what have been written in the third clause, which state “the 
arbitrator is not bound by the normal procedures of the court”.  
Therefore, the parties agreement doesn’t imply that they have given the 
arbitrator the right to mediate the dispute, the phrase “final and binding” in the 
agreement doesn’t mean that they waivered their right to appeal the courts decision of 
recognition. Thus, the court decided to dismiss the appeal and refer the decision to the 
appeal court. 
21. Appeal no. 307/20021175 
The defendant company started the dispute1176 asking the court to recognize an 
arbitral award issued on the 31/10/2001, the defendant claims that they asked the 
court in a previous case1177 to appoint an engineering expert to settle the construction 
dispute between the parties, regarding the execution of a construction contract, which 
the court granted. The arbitrator decided on the 7/2/1999 on the following: 1- the 
respondent (the appellant) should pay to the claimant (the defendant) the amount of 
126087 dhs. in exchange for the execution of the construction contract. 2- the 
responded should pay the legal interest to the claimant starting from 9/8/1995 and 
until the fulfillment of the payment. 3- the respondents shall pay the arbitration fees. 
4- both parties are responsible of the attorney fees. The court decided to recognize the 
																																																								
1175 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 307/2002, issued on the 30th of November 2002. 
1176 Dubai Court of First instance, case no. 857/2001, issued on 27/1/2002. 
1177 Dubai Court of First instance, case no. 398/98. 
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arbitral award. The appellant appealed this decision1178, the appeal court decided to 
uphold the appealed decision. The appellant appealed this decision to the cassation 
court on the 23/6/2002, asking the court to dismiss the appeal, the defendant 
company’s attorney pleaded to the court to dismiss the appeal, the court dismissed the 
defendants plea and decided to hear the appeal. 
The appeal was based on two grounds, the appellant argues that the appealed 
decision failed to uphold the law by deciding to recognize the arbitral award, arguing 
that the court recognize the award even though the arbitrator decided to award the 
defendant more than what they asked for in regards to the interest, which is against 
articles 173/1 and 216/1 since the arbitrator awarded the defendant more than he 
requested, given that the arbitrator decided to award the interest from the 8/9/1995 
and not from the start of the arbitration proceedings on the 8/9/1999, as per the 
defendant request. The appellant claim that they upheld this argument, however, the 
court decided that the arbitrator has the authority to order the interest rate from that 
date, justifying their decision on the fact that this request can be interpreted in this 
way, however, the arbitrator doesn’t have the right to order that amount. The appellant 
requested that this decision should be referred back to the arbitrator according to 
article 214, in order to and amend their decision in regard to this point. 
The court accepted this argument, stating that article 216/1 allows the parties 
to request the arbitral award to be set-aside on this ground, moreover, the court has 
the authority to supervise over the arbitral award in order to ensure that the arbitrator 
issued the award within the scope of the parties agreement and within the scope of 
																																																								
1178 Dubai Court of Appeals, appeal no. 202/2002, issued on 26/5/2002. 
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what the parties requested, in order to ensure that the arbitrator didn’t decide more 
than what the parties requested.  
Therefore, the court decided to partially nullify the award in regard to the 
interest rate. 
 
22. Appeal no.140/20071179 
The appellant company started the dispute1180 by asking the court to order the 
payment of 9,491419 dhs. and 9% interest rate from the start of the litigation and until 
the fulfillment of the payment, stating that this is amount is in exchange of 
construction the project, which the defendant requested on their property in Sheikh 
Zayed’s road in Dubai; the defendant pleaded to the court to dismiss this dispute 
based on the fact that the contract contains an arbitration clause, the appellant 
amended their request to the court to appoint an arbitrator and to recognize the arbitral 
award once its issued, the court dismissed this dispute due to the existence of an 
arbitration clause. The appellant appealed this decision1181; the appeal court upheld 
the appealed decision. The appellant company appealed this decision on the 13/6/2007 
to the cassation court and the defendant pleaded to the court to dismiss the appeal.1182 
The appellant argued that the court dismissed their request to appoint an 
arbitrator; on the ground that the appellant didn’t follow the appointment procedures, 
which the parties agreed upon in the contract, which is to mediate the dispute before 
initiating arbitration procedure. However, the appellant claim that they submitted a 																																																								
1179 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no.140/2007, issued on the 7th of October 2007. 
1180 Dubai court of first instance case no. 684/2006, issued on 14/2/2006. 
1181 Dubai Court of appeals, appeal no. 167/2007, issued on 15/4/2007. 
1182 This decision doesn’t contain the cassation court response to the defendant’s plea. 
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letter from an engineering expert (the mediator) in which they asked him to settle the 
dispute, despite the fact that the obligation of proving those facts falls to the 
defendant. Furthermore, this expert shouldn’t be appointed as an arbitrator in the 
dispute between the parties, since he cannot act as an arbitrator and be an adversary at 
the same time, which makes this clause void since it infringers public policy rules. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that based on the general principles 
of contracting, arbitration is considered a contract or an agreement between the 
parties, as such the parties have the right to agree on any condition or procedure that 
doesn’t contradict the rules of public policy1183. Thus, agreeing on certain conditions 
or procedures prior to submitting the dispute to arbitration in the arbitration 
agreement, which implies that the parties are obliged to fulfill those conditions before 
referring the dispute into arbitration, since they are bound by contract in this 
condition. Furthermore, the obligation to prove that these conditions have been met 
falls to the party that is requesting the submission of the dispute into arbitration, 
moreover arguing that the clause is void based on the fact that the expert is both an 
adversary and an arbitrator has no grounds, since the parties have agreed by their own 
free will to submit the dispute to the mediator (the engineering expert) before 
submitting it into arbitration, moreover the expert is not considered as an arbitrator in 
this instance, which is supported by clause 67 of the construction contract between the 
parties that state: ” in the event of a dispute between the parties either during the 
construction of the project or after the completion of the construction or after the end 
of the contract or after the termination of the contract, the dispute should be presented 
to an engineering expert to mediate the dispute within 90 days from the submission of 
the written request, if the mediator failed to settle the dispute within this period or if 																																																								
1183 The court is confirming the parties’ freedom of contract in this decision. 
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the parties didn’t agree to his conclusion, then the dispute should be referred to an 
arbitration tribunal to settle the dispute within 90 days…”. Furthermore, the fact of 
this dispute shows that the appellant didn’t request the settlement of the dispute 
through mediation in compliance to this clause. Therefore, his request to appoint an 
arbitrator should be dismissed since it didn’t meet the requirements that the parties 
agreed upon, moreover submitting a copy of a letter doesn’t constitute a fulfillment of 
this requirement, which the appellant claims that they submitted to the engineering 
expert in order to explain the dispute to him, for this letter on its own is not sufficient 
to prove the fact that the mediator have received it. 
Therefore, the court decided to dismiss this appeal and upheld the appealed 
decision. 
 
23. Appeal no. 429/20021184 
The defendant started the dispute1185 against the appellant by asking the court 
to order the payment of the amount of 70700 dhs. in addition to 9% interest rate from 
the start of the litigation and until the fulfillment of the payment. The defendant claim 
that an agreement was concluded between the parties on the 11-10-1998, in which the 
defendant asked the appellant to purchase surveillance camera and install them in Al-
Quasis police station in exchange for an amount of 404000 dhs. the appellant asked 
the defendant to amend the surveillance cameras operations software, in exchange for 
an amount of 8700 dhs. the defendant claims that the appellant paid 342000 dhs. and 
refused to pay the reminder of the amount resulting in this litigation. The court 																																																								
1184 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no.429/2002, issued on the23rd of February 2003. 
1185 Dubai Court of First Instance, case no.2092/2001, issued on the 26/3/2002. 
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decided to order the payment of the amount of the claim in addition to the interest 
rate. The decision was appealed1186; the appellant requested that the dispute should be 
dismissed due to the existence of an arbitration clause in the contract in clause no. 
18/1 of the sub-construction contract. The court decided to uphold the appeal 
decision. This decision was appealed to the cassation court on the 16-10-2002, the 
defendant pleaded to the court to dismiss the appeal1187. 
The appellant based his appeal on two grounds, claiming that the dispute 
should be dismissed based on the existence of an arbitration clause in the contract 
between the parties, which state: “the agreement to arbitrate in this contract refer to 
dispute about the construction contract, and the documents referred to in index two of 
this agreement, the contract include all aspects of payment and conclusion of the 
contract and submitting it to the owner, and the second index include the description 
of the advisors …” implying that the arbitration clause interpretation includes all the 
disputes that raises from the construction agreement from the start and until the 
fulfillment of the contract. The appellant argues that the appealed decision didn’t 
agree with this interpretation of the clause, which resulted in dismissing the clause by 
claiming that article no. 18/1 of the agreement, which contains the clause limits the 
scope of the arbitration between the owner and the contractor in regards to the 
fulfillment of the specification of index two of the contract and doesn’t include the 
sub-construction contract. 
The court agreed with this argument, stating that according to article 203 and 
the jurisprudence of this court, which defines arbitration as an exceptional method of 
dispute resolution that constitutes of excluding the individuals from their right to seek 																																																								
1186 Dubai court of appeals, appeal no.458/2002, issued on 25/9/2002. 
1187 The decision lacks a response to the defendants plea. 
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their natural judge and the guarantees that are included from submitting the dispute to 
them, thus, the court should limit the scope of the arbitration to what the parties agree 
upon to in the arbitration agreement.  
Even if the trial court has the right to interpret and explain the parties contracts 
and clauses, this interpretation is governed by the parties intent and the court is 
required to base that interpretation on sound reasoning and doesn’t exceed the parties 
agreement, they are also required to look at the entire contract and the nature of the 
agreement, not to mention the customs that governs the transaction. In essence, the 
construction contract between the parties defined the terms of the contract in clause 1 
of the contract and the dispute settlement method in clause 18 of the contract, by 
examining both of them it becomes clear that the sub-construction contract falls under 
the arbitration clause. Furthermore, since the appellant failed to appear in front of the 
first instance court, thus the first hearing in which they can argue on the existence of 
the arbitration clause is considered the one in front of the appeal court according to 
article 203. 
Therefore, the court decided to nullify the appealed decision, based on the 
existence of an arbitration clause between the parties and refers the dispute to 
arbitration. 
24. Appeal no. 21/20031188 
The appellant started the dispute1189 by asking the court to recognize and 
enforce an arbitral award, which was issued on the 24-9-1998, the appellant claims 
that the defendant requested architectural designs for their property in Dubai, 																																																								
1188 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no. 21/2003, issued on the 13th of August 2003. 
1189 Dubai court of first instance, case no. 151/2000, issued on 13/11/2000. 
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afterwards a dispute rose between them in regards to the fulfillment of the agreement, 
they appointed an arbitrator to settle that dispute as per their agreement, the arbitrator 
started the arbitration and issued an award on the 24-9-1998; the defendant counter-
claimed to set-aside the award, claiming that the arbitrator failed to notify him of the 
start of the proceedings. The court decided to recognize the award in addition to 
awarding the appellant the legal interest of 12%. The appellant appealed this 
decision1190, the appeal court decided to partially dismiss the decision in regards to the 
interest rate and to uphold the decision to recognize the award, the defendant appealed 
that decision to the cassation court by the defendant1191 and by the appellant1192, the 
court decided to dismiss the appellants appeal and to accept the defendants appeal to 
set-aside the award and refer the dispute back to the appeal court. The appeal court 
decided on the 11-11-2002, in the absence of the litigants to set-aside the arbitral 
award. The appellant appealed that decision to the cassation court on the 14-1-2003, 
the defendant attorney submitted a plea to the court to dismiss the appeal, the court 
decided to hear the appeal1193. 
The appeal was based on two grounds, the appellant argues in the first ground 
and the last part of the second ground on the following; the decision of the court in 
case no. 83/98, which decided that this is a new award (issued on 24-9-1998) and not 
an explanatory award for the previous arbitration between the parties (which was 
issued on the 15-6-1997), basing their decision to set-aside the award on the 
assumption that the arbitrator failed to uphold due process, since the arbitrator failed 
to notify the parties of the start of the proceedings and the submission of their 
documents. However, the arbitral award that was issued on the 24-9-1998, which is 																																																								
1190 Dubai court of appeals, appeal no. 2235/2000, issued on 20/10/2001. 
1191 Dubai court of cassation, appeal no.387/2001, issued on 17/2/2002. 
1192 Dubai court of cassation, appeal no. 414/2001, issued on 17/2/2002. 
1193 The decision lacks information on the courts response to the defendant plea. 
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the one that the appellant is requesting to be recognized, isn’t a new award but rather 
an explanatory award to the one issued on the 15-6-1997, which can be noted from the 
similar outcome of both awards, since this second award is only an explanatory 
award, the arbitrator is not obliged to uphold the same procedures such as notifying 
the parties of the hearing dates 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that the court jurisprudence in 
addition to article 212 both implies that if the parties didn’t agree on a certain 
procedure to be followed in the arbitration, then the arbitrator is bound by the 
procedures mentioned in the civil procedures law, such as the notification of the 
parties and hearing their defense, this obligation is required both from an arbitrator 
that is authorized to mediate or not, notifying the parties of the hearing doesn’t mean 
that they need to be present in order to uphold due process. In essence, the failure to 
uphold due process is one of the grounds for setting-aside the arbitral award according 
to article 216, which implies that the party that who’s right to due process were 
infringed have the right to request setting-aside of the award. Moreover, according to 
article 49 of the evidence law1194 this decision is considered a final judgment that 
received res judicata, as such the parties doesn’t have to raise the same arguments that 
were brought in front of the court and was answered by a final decision and the 
determination if this is the same dispute would fall to the trial court and their decision 
is not subject to vacation once they base their decision on sound reasoning, as such 
																																																								
1194 Evidence law, article 49 states:” Res Judicata judgments are absolute proof as to the matters finally 
decided of the litigation, and no proof is admitted against the legal presumption resulting therefrom, 
provided that such judgments refer to rights between the parties themselves acting in the same 
capacities and having the same object and the same cause. The court, by its own initiative, shall decide 
the incontestable character of this proof.” 
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the trial court interpretation that this is a new award is a sound interpretation, since it 
doesn’t relate to the previous award.  
The appellant argues in the first part of the second ground, that the award 
issued by the arbitrator is final and binding and received res judicata status, as such 
there is no grounds for appealing it. 
The court dismissed this claim, stating that even though the arbitral award 
once its been rendered has a binding affect between the parties of the arbitration, this 
binding affect is put on hold once the award is being brought to the court, furthermore 
since the award has been set-aside in appeal no.2235/2000 then this affect has been 
removed, as such this ground is dismissed. 
Thus, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
25. Appeal no. 161/20031195 
 The appellant company started the dispute1196 against the defendant, asking the 
court to recognize the arbitral award that was issued in front of the court1197, and to 
order the defendant to pay 440323/50 dhs. in addition to 9% interest until the 
fulfillment of the payment. The appellant claims that they started the dispute in case 
no. 98/222 against the defendant by asking the court to appoint an arbitrator to settle 
the dispute between them regarding a construction contract, on the 20-3-1999 the 
court appointed an engineering expert as an arbitrator in the dispute, the arbitrator 
issued an award, which concluded that the defendant is indebted to the appellant, thus, 
the appellant started this proceeding in order to recognize the award. On the 26-11-																																																								
1195 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no. 161/2003, issued on the 14th June 2003. 
1196 Dubai Court of First Instance, case no.98/2002 (commercial circuit), issued on 26/2/2001. 
1197 Dubai Court of First Instance, case no.98/222 (civil circuit). 
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2001 the defendant counter claimed to set-aside the award, claiming that the arbitrator 
failed to uphold due process, the court accepted the defendant claim and decided to 
set-aside the award. This decision was appealed1198, the appeal court decided to 
uphold the appealed decision and dismiss the appeal. The decision was appealed to 
the cassation court on the 18-3-2003, the defendant pleaded to the court to dismiss the 
appeal, the court decided to hear the appeal.1199 
 The appeal was based on three grounds; the appellant argues that the arbitrator 
is not bound by the same procedures that binds the court, except to the procedures 
mentioned in article 212, which regulates the procedures that govern the hearing and 
the notification of the parties of the hearing dates and upholding due process, the 
appellant claims that the arbitrator upheld those requirement, in addition to upholding 
due process, moreover the defendant claim that the arbitrator failed to uphold due 
process by not giving him the opportunity to respond to the appellants. However, the 
defendant had prior knowledge of the appellant request, which can be deducted from 
his disposition in front of the arbitration in which he acknowledged these facts, 
moreover that request that was made in front of the arbitrator, furthermore the court 
should have investigated whether or not the defendant was aware of this request, 
rather than dismissing it based on comparing it with the experts report. Lastly, the 
award shows that the defendant was aware of the appellant’s request; moreover they 
confirmed this request, however, the court agreed with the defendant claim without 
proper proof from the defendant.  
																																																								
1198 Dubai Court of Appeals, appeal no. 931/2002, issued on 18/1/2003. 
1199 There is no explanation of the defendant plea in the decision. 
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 The court dismissed this claim, stating that article 2121200 even though it states 
that the arbitrator is not bound by the same procedures of the court, however, the 
arbitrator is bound by the general principles of adjudication and due process, which 
includes giving the parties the opportunity to examine the documents presented in the 
arbitration, the failure to uphold those principles would constitute a ground for 
setting-aside the award. Furthermore, it is no sufficient to uphold those principles to 
claim that the arbitrator noted in the award that the documents were presented to the 
defendant, which cannot be amended later on by referring submitting the award back 
to the arbitrator or to investigate it by the court by asking the arbitrator or the litigants 
or any of the witnesses that were present in the arbitral hearing. Moreover, according 
to the appealed decision and the arbitral award, the arbitrator have noted the 
submission of the document in question on the 18-10-2001, however, that document 
wasn’t presented to the defendant until the 10-1-2002, which is after the issuing of the 
arbitral award, thus, the arbitrator failed to uphold due process in this instance and the 
award shall be set-aside in this instance, moreover, the appealed decision stated that 
the documents presented doesn’t show that the appellant have been present on the 18-
10-2001 and that the arbitrator note of the submission of this document is not 
sufficient on its own to prove that it was submitted on that date. 
 Therefore, the court came to the right conclusion by deciding to set-aside the 
award, based on the jurisprudence of this court that the disposition requires to be 
determined with not doubt, if any doubts were presented then the disposition would be 
dismissed. Lastly, the appellant’s argument that the defendant disposition constitutes 
an acknowledgement of this fact has no legal basis; as such the entire appeal has no 
legal basis. Therefore, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 																																																								
1200 Id. 
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26. Appeal no. 294/20081201 
The defendant company started the dispute against the appellant1202, asking the 
court to appoint an arbitration tribunal according to the construction contract between 
the parties, the defendant claim that the appellant requested the construction of a 
building on his property no. 9139, in exchange for an amount of 28250000 dhs., 
which the defendant claims that the appellant deducted the amount of 475267 from 
the final payment and since the parties agreed in clause 67 of that construction 
contract to submit the dispute between them into arbitration, they asked the appellant 
to appoint an arbitrator, which the appellant failed to appoint resulting in this 
litigation. The court decided to appoint the arbitrators and the arbitrator should submit 
their award in six months from the start of the first hearing. The appellant appealed 
this decision1203, the court decided to nullify the appointment and to appoint new 
arbitrators, an engineering expert and to two new arbitrators. The appellant appealed 
this decision to the cassation court on the 22-12-2008, the defendant company pleaded 
to the court to dismiss the appeal, the court decided to hear the appeal. 
The appeal was based on three grounds, the appellant argues that the court 
failed to interpret and apply the law, the appellant claim that they upheld in their 
argument that clause 67 of the contract between the parties state that the defendant 
should have named a sole arbitrator before submitting the dispute to the court to 
appoint the arbitration tribunal and notify the appellant of this appointment, which is a 
requirement that the defendant should have fulfilled and if the appellant did not agree 																																																								
1201 Dubai Court of cassation, appeal no. 294/2008, issued on the 1st of March 2009. 
1202 Dubai Court of First instance, case no. 132/2008, issued on the 18/6/2008. 
1203 Dubai Court of Appeals, appeal no. 564/2008, issued on 30/10/2008. 
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on the sole arbitrator they should move to the second stage, which is appointing an 
arbitration tribunal, in which case the defendant should appoint their arbitrator and 
then notify the appellant in order for them to choose their arbitrator and then the two 
arbitrators would choose the third arbitrator. However, the defendant notified the 
appellant to submit the dispute to arbitration on the 24-7-2007 and then again in their 
letter on the 6-9-2007 and started the proceedings before fulfilling this requirement, 
the appealed decision stated that the letter on the 6-9-2007 contained the name of the 
defendants arbitrator, however, in that letter it stated that they have chosen a mediator 
to settle the dispute between the parties and a mediator is not an arbitrator since his 
decision isn’t final and binding, which makes this decision subject to vacation by the 
court. 
The court decided to dismiss this ground, stating that article 204 implies that if 
the arbitration clause or agreement didn’t contain a method of appointing an arbitrator 
or their number, the court shall appoint the arbitrators upon the request of one of the 
parties. Furthermore, clause 67 of the contract implies that the parties agreed before 
submitting their dispute to arbitration to mediate the dispute, if the mediator failed 
then they shall submit their dispute to the arbitration tribunal and if the parties failed 
to appoint the arbitrators within 15 days then the parties could request the court to 
appoint the arbitrators. The court interpreted the sole arbitrator requirement to be a 
mediator, basing this interpretation on the fact that the clause states that “the arbitrator 
shall mediate the dispute between the parties” and on article 265/21204 and 2581205 of 
																																																								
1204 Article 265 of the civil transaction law, supra note 166, states: “1- When the wording of a contract 
is clear, it cannot be deviated from in order to ascertain by means of interpretation the intention of the 
contracting parties. 2 - Where the contract has to be construed, it is necessary to ascertain the common 
intention of the contracting parties and to go beyond the literal meaning of the words, taking into 
account the nature of the transaction as well as that loyalty and confidence which should exist between 
the parties in accordance with commercial usage.” 
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the civil transactions, which implies that the purpose of the contract should be 
deducted from the what has been drafted and the intent of the parties, therefore, the 
court should search for the parties intent upon interpreting the contracts text and they 
are guided in their interpretation by the nature and customs of that transaction.  
Therefore, the defendant company upheld the arbitration clause between the 
parties, and as such the appeal is dismissed. 
 
27. Appeal no. 142/2009 and 146/20091206   
 The claimant started the litigation against the defendants1207, asking the court 
to order the payment of 4669250 dhs. in addition to 12% interest rate from the time of 
the claim and until the fulfillment of the payment, they claim that on the 15/9/2004 
they entered in a contract with the first defendant in order to construct and maintain 
six warehouses on the defendants property. However, the defendants didn’t fulfill 
their contractual obligation by failing to construct those warehouses on the claimant’s 
requirement, which resulted in the claimant to initiate a plea to the court in the 
preliminary hearing no. 24/2007 in order to determine the state of the construction, 
the expert that was appointed in that hearing came to the conclusion that 18% of the 
construction is still unfinished, which is in the amount of 153000 dhs. Resulting in the 
claimant to start this suit in order to appoint a new expert, the claimant amended their 
request asking the court to confirm and recognize the new report submitted by this 
																																																																																																																																																														
1205 Article 258 states: “1-In contracts, purposes and meanings are decisive, not the wording or 
construction forms. 2-True meaning is the basis of words. A word shall not bear a metaphor unless it is 
impossible to construe them according to their true meaning.” 
1206 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeals no.142/2009 and 146/2009, issued on the 13th of September 
2009. 
1207 Dubai Court of First Instance, case no. 179/2008, issued on the 26/1/2009. 
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expert, the court decided to order the payment of 550575 in favor of the claimant in 
addition to 9% legal interest from the time of the claim and until the fulfillment of the 
payment and to order the payment of 17085 dhs. also in favor of the claimant and to 
dismiss the rest of his requests. The defendant appealed this decision1208, asking the 
court to nullify the appealed decision and to dismiss the dispute based on the 
existence of an arbitration clause or to appoint an engineering expert; the claimant 
also appealed the decision1209, asking the court to accept all of his requests and to 
dismiss the defendants appeal. The court decided to amend the payment amount that 
should be paid to the claimant and to uphold the appealed decision. The claimant 
appealed this decision in appeal no. 142/2009, the defendants attorney pleaded to the 
court to dismiss the appealed based on article 177, the second defendant attorney also 
pleaded to the court to uphold the appealed decision The first defendant pleaded to the 
court that the appeal didn’t fulfill the requirements of article 177, as such the appeal 
should be dismissed, the court dismissed this plea and decided to hear appeal no. 
142/2009. The first defendant also appealed the appeal courts decision in appeal no. 
84/2009. 
a. Appeal no. 142/2009: 
The appellant based this appeal on one ground, they argue on the courts 
acceptance of the new expert report, instead of the report of the expert that was 
appointed in the preliminary case no.24/2007. The court dismissed this argument 
stating that the court has the right to understand the facts of the case without the 
supervision of the cassation court. 
																																																								
1208 Dubai Court of Appeals, appeal no.84/2009, issued on the 23/3/2009. 
1209 Dubai Court of Appeals, appeal no.160/2009, issued on the 23/3/2009. 
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 The appellant also argued on the amount of the claim, claiming that since the 
contract is null then the court should have implemented article 2741210 of the civil 
transactions instead of the 7th clause of the construction contract. The court accepted 
this argument, stating that in the event that the contract is void or has been nullified 
then the court should implement article 274, moreover article 9821211 of the civil 
transaction, which implies that the construction contract ends by the end of the 
construction work or by a mutual agreement to end the contract or by nullifying it. 
Thus, the court accepted this argument in regard to the damages. 
b. Appeal no. 146/2009. 
 This appeal was based on three grounds, the appellant argues in the first 
ground that the appeal court decided to dismiss their request to dismiss the dispute 
based on the existence of an arbitration clause, claiming that their attorney was 
present in the first hearing1212 and requested an extension to present his power of 
attorney, the appellant argues that the first hearing is the one in which they are present 
in or whom ever they choose to represent them are present, since the attorney 
presented the agreement on the 2/6/2008 and upheld this clause on that hearing then 
that should be considered as the first hearing. 
																																																								
1210 article 274, state: ”When a contract is or shall be rescinded, the two contracting parties shall be 
reinstated to their former position, prior to contracting, and in case this is impossible, the Court may 
award damages.” 
1211 Article 982 of the civil transaction, states: “1 - If two persons have deposited a joint property with 
another, and one of the depositors has asked the depository to restitute his share, in the absence of the 
other, he shall have to restitute it, if among fungibles; otherwise he shall turn down the request until 
acceptance of the other depositor. 2-If the thing deposited is subject of dispute between them, he shall 
abstain to restitute it to one of them without the consent of the other or a court order.” 
1212 Which was conducted on 5/5/2008. 
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 The court dismissed this arguments stating that article, 501213 and 551214 of the 
civil procedures implies that the first hearing is the one that the attorney or the 
defendant is present in and this fact doesn’t change by requesting an extension to 
present the agreement, furthermore, article 203 of the civil procedures requires from 
the party trying to uphold the arbitration clause or agreement to take a positive action 
in the first hearing, otherwise it would be considered as a waiver of their right to 
uphold arbitrate, since it is viewed as a waiver of the arbitration clause. 
The rest of the appellant grounds argued on what the court decided in regard to 
the damages, which was dismissed by the court.  
 
28. Appeal no. 157/20091215 
The appellant company started the dispute1216 against the defendant in order to 
recognized the arbitral award dated 25/3/2008. The appellant claims that the parties 
entered into a construction contract on the 18/5/1998, in order to construct a building 
for the defendant per his request, in exchange for 18200000 dhs. this contract 
contained an arbitration clause in the event of a dispute, the appellant claims that the 
defendants failed to fulfill their obligation, which resulted in the appellant to initiate 
the arbitration proceeding according to the clause, the arbitral tribunal issued an 
award on the 25/3/2008, which awarded the appellant the amount of 2484010 dhs. and 
																																																								
1213 Article 50 of the civil procedures, supra note 5, states: “On the day fixed for examining the action, 
the opposing parties shall appear (attend) by themselves or whoever they brief (authorize - appoint - 
delegate).” 
1214 Article 55 states: “1 - The court shall accept from the parties whoever they shall appoint as proxy 
according to the law. 2 - The proxy must establish his appointment as proxy for his client by an official 
document. 3 - The proxy may be done through a declaration recorded in the session's minutes.” 
1215 Dubai Court of cassation appeal no.157/2009, issued on the 27th of September 2009. 
1216 Dubai Court of First Instance case no.399/2008. 
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9% interest rate; the appellant started this suit in order to recognize the award. The 
defendants counter claimed to dismiss the suit, claiming that the award is null due to 
the fact that it was issued in violation to the parties agreement, since the request to 
arbitrate should have occurred within 70 days of the end of the construction, 
furthermore, the award was rendered without an arbitration agreement, they also 
claim that the arbitrators exceeded the time given to them to issue the award, since the 
first hearing was at 26/1/2006 and the award was issued on the 25/3/2008 and that the 
they didn’t agree to this extension neither explicitly nor implicitly, lastly they claim 
that the award was issued without a signature from the arbitral tribunal. The court 
decided to recognize the award. This decision was appealed by the defendant, the 
appeal court decided to set-aside the arbitral award1217.  
The appellant appealed this decision to the cassation court on the 13/5/2009, 
the defendants pleaded to the court to dismiss the appeal, the court decided to hear the 
appeal.  
The appellant based their appeal on two grounds, claiming that the appeal 
court came to the conclusion that the arbitration agreement has ended due to the 
passing of time, without basing their decision on any legal principle in regards to 
determining the first hearing of the arbitration, furthermore, the arbitrators have 
decided that the first hearing was on the 26/9/2007 and not 11/9/2007, in addition the 
court should have applied article 214 and should have asked the arbitrators to confirm 
the date of the first hearing. The appellant argue that the first hearing is the hearing in 
which the parties present their defense and arguments; they claim that they presented 
their requests on the 22/10/2007 and the tribunals notified the defendants to the 
																																																								
1217 Dubai Court of Appeals, appeal no. 1039/2008. 
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appellants request and gave them a time limit to present their defense on the 
29/11/2007, which confirms the fact that the first hearing wasn’t that of 11/9/2007. 
Furthermore, since the arbitration agreement states that the arbitration falls under the 
laws of Dubai and the UAE, which includes the civil procedures law, which enables 
the tribunal to postpone the hearing basing their decision on article 54 of the civil 
procedures1218, which allows the hearing to be postponed in the event that the 
defendants was not notified properly to appear in front of the tribunal. In addition, the 
six-month period starts after the parties’ signing of the arbitration agreement and the 
request to start the arbitration, as such the meetings that happened between the parties 
and the arbitrators before that time doesn’t constitute as a hearing nor as a start of the 
arbitration period. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that article 208 and 212 of the civil 
procedures implies that the arbitration hearing and process start by the appearance of 
the parties in front of the tribunal or by notifying them; moreover, it requires the 
arbitrators to notify the parties within 30 days of their appointment to the date of the 
first hearing. Furthermore, it is not required for the parties to be present in the 
arbitration hearing, the only requirement is that the arbitrators have given the parties 
the opportunity to present their defense; the court state that since confidentiality is the 
nature of the arbitration hearing and that it is the norm when it comes to arbitration, 
unless the parties agree to the contrary all that is required from the arbitrators is to 
uphold due process and the parties right of defense. Therefore, arbitration doesn’t fall 
under the civil procedures law when it comes to notifying the parties and their 																																																								
1218Article 54 states: “1- If the court has noticed, upon the absence of the defendant, the nullity of his 
notification of the initiatory pleading, it should postpone the action to a following session and serve 
him again a valid notification. 2- Should the court, upon the absence of the plaintiff, notice that he is 
not legally aware of the session, it should postpone the action to a following session of which the 
clerk's office of the court shall notify him.” 
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presence in the arbitration hearing. However, the arbitrators are bound by the rules 
stated in the arbitration chapter; as such and according to the jurisprudence of this 
court any deficiency in the award cannot be amended by asking the arbitrators to 
explain or complete any shortcoming in the award, such as asking the arbitrators to 
prove the first hearing. Therefore, once the arbitrators have agreed and notified the 
parties of the first hearing date they are unable to change that date, in order for the 
time period to be properly calculated. Moreover, determining the first hearing falls to 
the discretion and interpretation of the trial court, according to articles 210 and 216 
and the courts jurisprudence, which implies that the one of the grounds for setting-
aside the award is that it was issued after the agreed upon time. Therefore, based on 
the appealed decision, which determined the first hearing dated to be on the 
11/9/2007, since postponing the hearing on that date doesn’t change the fact that this 
is the first hearing. As such the court decided to dismiss the appeal for the previous 
reasons. 
29. Appeal no. 317/20091219 
The defendant company started the litigation in case no…/20081220 in front of 
the Dubai First Instance court against the appellants asking the court to appoint an 
arbitrator, based on an arbitration clause in the insurance contract between the parties 
and to recognize the arbitral award once its been issued. The defendant claim that 
based on an insurance policy between them they notified the appellants to pay the 
insurance claim amount, which they refused to pay and since on an arbitration clause 
exists in the insurance policy between the parties and due to the fact that this clause 
requires the insurance company to initiate the arbitration proceedings in the event of 																																																								
1219 Dubai Court of Cassation appeal no. 317/2009, issued on the 14th of February 2010. 
1220 The court omitted the number of the decisions in this dispute. 
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the dispute, which they failed to do so for more than 16 months from the start of the 
dispute, the appellant sought the court in case no…/2004 and the subsequent appeal 
no…/2005 both of which decided that the court lack the proper jurisdiction to hear the 
dispute, due to the existence of an arbitration clause. They claim that they asked the 
insurance company to appoint an arbitration, which they did on the 16-8-2005, 
however, the arbitrator couldn’t fulfill his duty and resigned from his position, the 
defendant claim that they waited for the insurance company again to appoint an 
arbitrator, which they failed to do, thus, forcing them to seek the court to appoint an 
arbitrator on their behalf. The court decided on the 1-6-2008, to appoint an arbitrator 
to settle the dispute between the parties in six months from the start of the first 
hearing, the arbitrator rendered an award on the 1-2-2009, in favor of the defendant 
company they brought that award to be recognized, the insurance company counter 
claimed to dismiss the award. The court decided on the 19-5-2009 to recognize the 
arbitral award. The insurance company appealed this decision in appeal no…/2009 the 
court decided on the 9-9-2009 to dismiss the appeal and uphold the appealed decision. 
They appealed this decision to the appeal court on the 3-11-2009. 
The appeal was based on five grounds, the appellant claim in the first ground 
of the appeal that the court has mixed up the start of the arbitration and the extension 
of the arbitration, by miss interpreting articles 208 and 210 of the civil procedures in 
regards to the first hearing, they claim that the first hearing was on the 3-7-2008 in 
which they requested the arbitrator to hold the proceedings until the court renders a 
decision in appeal no…/2008 which they refused, thus making it the first hearing and 
not a preliminary hearing as the appealed decision claims that this was a preliminary 
hearing and that the first hearing was on the 10-7-2008. Thus, the arbitrator should 
have issued the award on the 2-1-2009 and not 1-2-2009, the appellants upheld this 
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argument as a ground for setting-aside the award based on article 216 of the civil 
procedures, the appeal court dismissed this argument based on article 210, claiming 
that the hearing on the 3-7-2008 is a preliminary hearing. The appellant argues that 
there is no such thing as a preliminary hearing and that the hearing that comes after 
the appointment of the arbitrators is the first hearing. 
The court accepted the appellant argument, stating that article 208 defines the 
commencement of the arbitral proceedings to be the hearing in which the parties 
appear in front of the tribunal or were notified to appear. 
Therefore, the court decided to set-aside the arbitral award without the need to 
address the remaining grounds of the appeal. 
30. Appeal no. 73/20101221  
The appellant institute started the dispute against the defendant in case 
no…/20091222, asking the court to recognize an arbitral award no…/2007 issued from 
the Dubai international arbitration institute on the 13-7-2006, they claim that on the 5-
3-2006 the parties entered into a construction contract that included an arbitration 
clause, and after a dispute rose they started the arbitration procedure and an award 
was issued. The defendant counter claimed to set-aside the award, claiming that the 
award was issued based on arbitration agreement that didn’t identify the scope of the 
arbitration, and that the arbitration tribunal was appointed by a non authorized person, 
since the defendant is not authorized from the owner of the project to enter into an 
arbitration agreement, and that the arbitration agreement is void since the agreement 
only contained the appellants signature. Furthermore, the appellant decided to 																																																								
1221 Dubai court of cassation appeal no.73/2010, issued on the 9th of May 2010. 
1222 Again the case number was omitted in this decision. 
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arbitrate on the 22-8-2007, which is after the end of the 70 days time limit in which 
they are able to submit the dispute into arbitration according to clause 67/1 of the 
contract, moreover the arbitration was conducted in Dubai and not in Um al-Quwain 
per the agreement, they also claim that the arbitrators awarded interest rate, which is 
outside the scope of the arbitration agreement. The first instance court decided on the 
18-10-2009 to recognize the award and dismiss the counter claim, both the appellant 
and the defendant appealed this decision; the appellant requested that the recognition 
decision need to be expedited in appeal no…/2009 and the defendant requested to set-
aside the award in appeal no…/2009, the appeal court decided to dismiss the 
appellants appeal and accept the defendants, by deciding to set-aside the arbitral 
award on the 7-2-2010. The appellant appealed that decision to the cassation court, 
the defendant pleaded to the court to dismiss the appeal, the court decided to hear the 
appeal. 
The appellant argues that the appeal court decided that the letter of acceptance 
dated 5-03-2006, didn’t contain any indication of settling the dispute according to the 
rules of FIDIC contract or to the arbitration clause, which is emphasized by the fact 
that the parties didn’t sign the arbitration clause in that contract, furthermore, the 
letter of acceptance of the FIDIC is a general acceptance that doesn’t involve an 
acceptance of the arbitration clause of that contract. The appellant argues that this is a 
binding contract between the parties, and the letter of acceptance shows that the 
parties’ intended to settle any dispute rising from the construction contract through 
arbitration. 
The court accepted this argument, stating that article 203 and 216 of the civil 
procedures implies that arbitration is “the disputants choosing an impartial arbitrator 
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to settle the dispute between them without referring the dispute to the court, this could 
be in relation to a dispute that occurred or will occur and based upon an arbitration 
agreement or a clause, the arbitration focuses on the parties intent and agreement, this 
agreement is the main source that the arbitrator authority is derived from and in which 
the parties are able to opt-out of the court, which is the reason why the legislator have 
put extra assurances in place such as the arbitration agreement need to be in writing 
and that the arbitrator renders an award within the scope of the arbitration agreement, 
and that the arbitration agreement is not required to be in a single document for the 
acceptance of the agreement can be in another document, moreover it can be proven 
in writing or through the parties communication and letters if the documents and 
letters were signed by the sender, and it can be proven through any form of written 
communication, arbitration cannot be initiated unless the parties intent to arbitrate is 
proven, which can be proven if the arbitration clause have been included in the main 
contract or in a separate arbitration agreement signed by the parties”. Accordingly, a 
construction bidding is considered as a construction contract agreement, moreover the 
trial court has the right to deduce the parties intent to arbitrate from the facts of the 
dispute without the supervision of the cassation court, the only requirement is that it is 
based on factual reasoning, the court explains that the reasoning is null if the courts 
deduction is not valid from a subjective perspective or that the records show that the 
court didn’t understand the facts of the case. Therefore, and based on these facts the 
arbitration agreement is considered valid, and the court decided to uphold the first 
instance rule and dismiss the appeals court. 
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31. Appeal no. 41 and 74/20101223  
The appellant company (insurance company) started the dispute against the 
defendant (investment company) in front of the Dubai first instance court, asking the 
court to order the payment of the amount of the claim in addition to 12% interest rate 
from the date of the claim until the fulfillment of the payment, they claim that a tenant 
leased two shops from the defendant in the shopping mall that they own and operate, 
the tenant also insured those shops and the goods in them with the appellants 
company, they claim that due to a leaking pipe from the mall the tenants store 
suffered damages that extended to the goods that were covered by the insurance 
agreement, the appellant paid the insurance amount to the tenant, and started this suit 
against the defendant in place of the tenant. The defendant counter claimed to dismiss 
the suit, based on the existence of an arbitration clause in the contract between the 
parties. The court decided on the 25-2-2009, to dismiss the defendants counter claim 
and accept the appellants claim. The defendant appealed this decision, the appeal 
court appointed an expert that issued a report, which changed the amount of the 
damages, and the appeal court confirmed this report on the 10-1-2010. The defendant 
appealed this decision to the cassation court in appeal no. 41/2010, the appellant 
pleaded to dismiss the appeal; they also appealed this decision in appeal no. 74/2010. 
The court decided to hear both appeals. 
Appeal no.41/2010: 
The appeal was based on four grounds, the appellant argues in the first and 
third grounds that they upheld their argument that the court should dismiss the case 
based on the existence of an arbitration clause in the lease contract between them and 																																																								
1223 Dubai Court of cassation appeal no. 41 and 74/2010, issued on the 2nd of June 2010. 
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the tenant (the insurer), claiming that the court dismissed this argument by stating that 
they don’t have the right to arbitrate, claiming that the defendant (the insurance 
company) have initiated this damage claim not based on the lease contract that 
contains the arbitration clause, but based on the principle of torts, which makes this 
dispute falls outside the scope of the arbitration clause. 
 The appellant claims that the insurance company don’t have the right to ask 
for damages based on tort, since the lease agreement contained a clause that exempt 
them from any suits based on tort, they claim that this agreement doesn’t infringe the 
public policy or order and as such the court needs to uphold it. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that even though the jurisprudence 
of this court accepts the parties’ agreement to exempt tort claims. However, this 
exemption is limited to the parties ability to prove that the tort claim accord due to an 
act that is a direct result to the other party action, which exceeds their contractual 
obligation and as such they are liable either by the contract or not. Furthermore, the 
court has the right to identify the basis of the damages on their own without the 
request of the parties, moreover the agreement between the parties to submit what 
dispute raises between them from a certain agreement into arbitration doesn’t affect 
third parties that are not bound by that agreement. Furthermore, articles 296 of the 
civil transaction law states that all clauses that exempt the party from tort liability is 
void1224, the court explained that in this dispute the parties liability is based upon the 
principles of the tort and not the lease contract, since the leaking of the pipes that 
resulted in the damages to the goods is not a part of the lease agreement. Therefore, 
																																																								
1224 Article 296 of the civil transaction law, states: “Any condition exonerating from tort liability shall 
be deemed null and void.” 
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the appeal court came to the right conclusion in dismissing the appellant’s request to 
arbitrate. 
The rest of the grounds argue on the tort and the parties’ liability, appeal 
no.74/2010 doesn’t concern the arbitration clause as well. 
 
32. Appeal no.181/20101225 
The defendant started the litigation against the appellant in front of the Dubai 
first instance court in case no…/2009, asking the court to recognize the arbitral award 
issued on the 14-11-2009; the defendant claims that they are sellers of construction 
material and they entered into a contract with the defendant to buy three thousand tons 
of iron, they claim that they annulled the contract due to the financial crisis that hit the 
international market, which resulted in a drop in the price of iron, which they claim is 
a ground of nullifying the contract under the force majeure doctrine, the appellant 
didn’t accept this claim, since an arbitration clause exist in this contract they asked the 
appellant to appoint an arbitrator upon their refusal the defendant sought the court to 
appoint an arbitrator, the court issued a decision on the 11-6-2009 to appoint an 
arbitrator. The arbitrator issued an award, which is being brought to the court for 
recognition, the appellant counter claimed to set-aside the award based on a 
procedural failure; the court decided to recognize the award on the 22-2-2010. This 
decision was appealed to the appeal court (appeal no…/2010), the court decided on 
the 15-4-2010 to uphold the appealed decision.1226 
																																																								
1225 Dubai Court of cassation appeal no.181/2010, issued on the 26th of September 2010. 
1226 The case numbers were omitted in this decision. 
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This decision was appealed to the cassation court on four grounds, the 
appellant claims in the third part of the third ground and the second ground, that the 
award is null since it was issued by a non-authorized party and in contrast to what the 
parties agreed on in the contract, and that the arbitrator failed to notify the appellant of 
the introduction of a third-party in the proceedings. 
The court dismissed this ground, stating that there is nothing in the papers that 
suggest that the parties of the arbitration are not the ones that agreed to arbitrate, 
therefore, the claim that a third party was introduced in the proceeding is null and 
without a basis. 
The appellant first ground argues that the arbitrator didn’t uphold the 
requirements of article 213 of the civil procedures, since the arbitrator didn’t submit 
the award and the rest of the arbitration document within 15 days of the issuing the 
award, which infringes the requirement of that article. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that article 213 and 204 of the civil 
procedures, implies that the request for appointing an arbitrator doesn’t mean that it is 
a court-annexed arbitration, for in this instance the court is simply enabling the parties 
to arbitrate, as such the arbitrator didn’t violate article 213 since he is not bound by 
the procedures in that article. 
In regard to the remaining grounds of the appeal, the appellant argues that the 
court recognized the award without examining their defense in regard to their 
fulfilling their contractual obligation, in contrast to what the arbitrator decided in his 
award. 
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The court dismissed this argument, stating that the court when recognizing an 
arbitral award doesn’t examine the subject of the award; furthermore article 216 of the 
civil procedures limited the conditions of setting-aside the award. 
 
33. Appeal no.131/2009 (civil/construction)1227 
The appellate company started the dispute1228by asking the court to appoint an 
arbitrator in the dispute between them and the defendant company, they claim that 
based on a construction contract dated 14-5-2005, they agreed that the appellate will 
construct and maintain warehouses and offices on the defendants property in Jabil-Ali 
in accordance to the engineering consultant plans, a dispute arose between the parties 
in regard to the payments, and since article 31 of the contract dictate that any dispute 
shall be submitted to arbitration, upon the parties failure to appoint an arbitrator the 
appellant sought the court to resolve this dispute. The defendant counter-claimed by 
stating that the court has no jurisdiction to hear the dispute, according to the 
arbitration clause in the contract and article 34/4 of the construction contract. The 
court decided; first to affirm their jurisdiction on the dispute, second to appoint the 
engineering expert as an arbitrator between the parties. The defendant appealed this 
decision, the appeal court decided to vacate the appealed decision and dismiss the 
case1229. The appellant appealed this decision to the cassation court on one ground. 
																																																								
1227 Dubai Court of Cassation, appeal no. 131/2009, issued on the 14th of June 2009. 
1228 Dubai Court of Fist Instance, case no.393/2008, issued on the 30/10/2008. 
1229 Dubai Court of appeals, appeal no. 951/2008. 
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The third part of the first ground argues that the appellant requested the 
appointment of an arbitrator, which the court accepted making this decision un-
appealable according to article 204 of the civil procedures. 
The court dismissed this this argument, stating that article 204/2 of the civil 
procedures indicate that the decisions that are not subject to appeal are the ones that 
concern the appointments of the arbitrator in accordance to the conditions set in 
paragraph one of the same article, which is an exception to the general principle in 
regard to appeals, as such the court is limited when interpreting and applying this 
article, therefore, it should be limited to appeals in regard to the appointment of the 
arbitrator or replacing them, and doesn’t extend to other preliminary decisions that the 
appointment decision is bound to them, such as interpreting the arbitration clause in 
order to determine if it contained a process of appointment or not, and since the first 
instance court decided to appoint an arbitrator, without upholding the procedures that 
are mentioned in article 31 of the contract, which states that the arbitrator should be 
named by one of the parties before starting that arbitration procedure, as such the 
appeal court has the right to accept the appeal and determine if those conditions have 
been met. 
The appellant first and second part of the first ground, argues that the clause 
no.31 of the contract determines that in the event of a dispute between the owner and 
the contractor and the consultant, in regard to this contract it shall be referred to a sole 
arbitrator to settle the dispute, and since the parties didn’t agree on an arbitrator and a 
dispute have risen between them then the appellant request to the court is lawful, for if 
the parties agreed to the appointment they wouldn’t have sought the court, 
furthermore, the appeal court stated that there reason for nullifying the first instance 
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decision was that it infringed the parties right and will that a dispute should raise first 
in regard to appointing an arbitrator before seeking the court. 
The court agreed with this argument, stating that article 204/1 of the civil 
procedures and clause 31 of the contract both implies that the parties agreed to 
arbitrate and there is no condition in that clause that prohibit the parties from seeking 
the court to appoint an arbitrator. 
Therefore, the court decided to nullify the appealed decision and uphold the 
first instance decision to appoint an arbitrator and refer the dispute to him. 
 
 
Federal Supreme Court of the UAE  
1- Appeal no. 225/231230 
 The defendant started the litigation1231 against the appellant asking the court 
to appoint an accounting expert to revise the parties accounts and to determine the 
amount that the defendant is claiming to receive in return to his supervising over the 
project, he claim that he have agreed with the appellant to supervise over the project 
based on his expertise as a architectural engineer to supervise over the furnishing and 
the construction of the appellants house, the defendant argues that he have fulfilled his 
obligation towards the appellant but the later refused to pay the defendants fees. The 
first instance court appointed an accounting expert that presented a report to the court, 
which the court have recognized that orders the appellant to pay 270,867 dhs. to the 
																																																								
1230 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 225/23, issued on the 6th of March 2003. 
1231 Um Al Quwain Court of First instance (civil circuit), case no. 13/98. 
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defendant. The appellant appealed this decision the court, which decided on the 
26/2/2001 to uphold the appealed decision1232. 
 This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court on five grounds; the second 
ground argues that the first instance court decided to dismiss the appellant’s request to 
dismiss the dispute based on the existence of an arbitration clause, based on the fact 
that it was not presented in the first hearing, although the appellant representative 
pleaded in the postponed hearing dated 3/10/1998. 
 The court dismissed this argument, stating that this plea relates to the public 
policy and should be presented before arguing on the subject matter of the dispute, 
otherwise it would be considered a waiver of their right to arbitrate according to 
article 84 of the civil procedures1233. 
 The appellant first, fourth and the first part of the fifth grounds argues that the 
appeal court decided to combine the two appeals 80/2000 and 91/99 and rendered a 
decision in appeal no. 80/2000 and failed to render a decision in the second appeal. 
 The court dismissed this claim stating that this is within the courts right to 
interpret the facts of the case as they see fit. 
 The following ground of appeal, argues that the court have requested the 
defendant to give their testimony under oath, given the fact that the court decided to 
uphold the rules of article 19 of the law of evidence1234, by asking the defendant to 
																																																								
1232 Ajman Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no.80/2000. 
1233 Article 84 of the civil procedures, state: “1-The plea to local jurisdiction and the plea to forward the 
action to another court for setting the same litigation there before, or for engagement, and the refutation 
of nullity which is not related to the public order, and all of the pleas related to the discontinuing 
procedures, should be revealed together before presenting any other procedural plea, request, defense 
in the action, or disapproval, otherwise the right of what hasn't been revealed thereof shall be 
extinguished, and also the right of the appellant shall be extinguished in such pleas if he hasn't revealed 
them in the appeal initiatory pleading. 2-It shall be imperative to exhibit together all the aspects on 
which the plea, related to the procedures which are not connected to the public order, shall be based, 
otherwise the right to what hasn't been revealed thereof shall be extinguished.” 
1234 Article 19 of the Evidence law, states:” 1- In case the requestor establishes the veracity of his 
request or if the opponent admits that the document or paper is in his possession or keeps silent, the 
court shall order the submission of the document or paper at once or within the shortest delay fixed by 
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present documents, which contradict his testimony and in contradiction to the expert 
report that the court have confirmed, as such the court should vacate the decision. 
 The court dismissed this argument as well, stating that this is within the 
authority of the subject court to consider these facts when deciding their case without 
supervision from the Supreme Court; the court has the authority as well to take the 
entire expert report into consideration or part of it. 
 
2. Appeal no.42/231235 
The defendant insurance company started the dispute1236 against the 
appellants, asking the court to order them to submit there account records, since the 
first appellant is an agent of the insurance company in order to determine the 
defendants commissions, they also requested the appointment of an accounting expert. 
The first instance court decided to accept the appellants counter claim, to dismiss the 
case based on the existence of an arbitration agreement and to appoint an accountant 
as a sole arbitrator in the dispute. The defendant appealed this decision to the appeal 
court1237, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. The defendant appealed that 
decision to the Supreme Court1238, the court decided on the 21/11/1999 to nullify the 
appealed decision and refer the dispute back to the first instance, they also dismissed 
																																																																																																																																																														
it. 2- Should he fail to submit satisfactory evidence proving the veracity of his request and the opponent 
denies the existence of such document or paper, the latter must take oath that the document or paper 
does not exist, that he has no knowledge of its existence or its place and that he did not conceal it or 
neglect searching for it in order to deprive the requester from using it as evidence. 3- If the opponent 
fails to produce the document or paper on the date fixed by the court, or refuses to take the 
abovementioned oath, the copy of the document or paper submitted by the requester shall be 
considered true and conform to the original. In case he did not submit copy of the document, the court 
may accept his oral statement as to the form and substance of such document.” 
1235 Federal Supreme court of the UAE appeal no.42/23, issued on the 13th of April 2004. 
1236 Sharjah Court of First Instance, case no.146/1996. 
1237 Sharjah Court of Appeals, appeal no.135/97. 
1238 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no.463/19, issued on the 21st of November 1999. 
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the appellants counter claim of the existence of an arbitration clause. The appellants 
appealed that decision again to the Supreme Court on four grounds. 
The appellant argues that the court decided to dismiss the arbitration clause, 
by stating that there is nothing in the papers that indicate that the parties have agreed 
to extend the arbitration period or to allow the court to extend this period; which 
resulted in the court decision to dismiss their request to refer the dispute into 
arbitration. The appellants claims that they submitted a letter to the appeal court from 
the arbitrator dated 7/5/1995, which indicate that the parties have verbally agreed that 
the arbitrator is going to decide on a hearing date once the defendant manager returns 
from his trip abroad, they also claim that the defendants didn’t start any action in front 
of the court until 9/7/1996, which is an implicit indication of his agreement to extend 
the arbitration period, moreover the defendant requested in that suit from the court to 
ask the arbitrator why is he taking a lot of time in issuing an award? However, the 
court decided to dismiss his request. 
The court dismissed this claim, stating that based on articles 203 and 210 
implies that if the parties have agreed in writing to submit a dispute into arbitration 
and decided on a time period for the arbitrator to issue a decision, then the arbitrator is 
bound to issue an award within that time period, and in the event that the parties 
didn’t agree on a period then the period shall be six months from the start of the first 
hearing, otherwise it is acceptable to submit their dispute to the court after the passing 
of that period. Furthermore, the parties have the right to explicitly or implicitly to 
extend the arbitration period or to authorize the arbitrator to extend that period, 
moreover the court has the right to extend the arbitration period upon the request of 
the parties. Which, indicates that the law obliges the arbitrator to issue a decision 
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within the agreed period and didn’t authorize the arbitrator to extend that period on 
his own unless the parties agreed to this extension either explicitly or implicitly or by 
a court order. Furthermore, the court has the right to interpret the facts of the dispute 
and to determine whether the parties agreed to extend that period or not. Therefore, it 
can be deduced from the facts of the case that the arbitrator issued the award after the 
passing of the time period. 
Thus, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
 
3. Appeal no. 304/231239 
The appellant institute started the dispute1240, against the defendant company 
asking the court to register the arbitration clause in the construction contract between 
the parties, and to appoint an arbitrator to settle the dispute between them under the 
supervision of the ICC1241 in Paris and to order the parties to identify the scope of the 
arbitration according to article 203; they claim that they entered into a sub-
construction contract with the main contractor (the first defendant), claiming that they 
have fulfilled their contractual obligation, however, the defendant have deducted from 
their pay, which resulted in the appellant to start a suit in front of the AD court1242 in 
which the defendant counter claimed to dismiss the case based on the existence of an 
arbitration clause, the court in that suit decided to dismiss the case and the appeal 
court upheld that decision as well1243, which resulted in appealing the dispute to the 
																																																								
1239 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 304/23, issued on the 24th of March 2003. 
1240 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, commercial circuit case no. 218/2000, issued on the 
27/11/2000. 
1241 This International Chamber of Commerce. 
1242 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First instance, case no. 1373/1988. 
1243 No mention of the appeal courts case number. 
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Supreme Court, which decided to dismiss the appeal1244. The appellant argued that the 
arbitration clause referred to the rules of the ICC in regard to appointing the 
arbitrators, which disregard the international jurisdiction rules of the courts in the 
UAE, and since the clause doesn’t insinuate that the dispute should be settled in Paris, 
thus the UAE courts still has jurisdiction in regard to the appointment. The first 
instance court decided that the court lacks the jurisdiction to settle the dispute and 
dismissed the case, by referring the dispute into arbitration and asking the judicial 
council to nominate a sole arbitrator in the dispute. The defendants appealed this 
decision to the appeal court1245, the appeal court decided to nullify the appealed 
decision and to dismiss the appellant request to register the arbitration agreement. 
The appellant appeal to the Supreme Court was based on the following 
grounds; that the parties agreed in the arbitration agreement to settle the dispute 
according to the ICC rules, which doesn’t mean that the parties agreed to submit their 
dispute to be administered under the ICC institute, it only means that the party agreed 
to apply the same rules used by the ICC in regards to the appointment of the 
arbitrators, and that the courts in the UAE should still supervise over the dispute. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that the procedure of registering the 
arbitration agreement in the court was a procedure that was required under the AD 
civil procedures law no. 3/1970, which has been abolished by the introduction of the 
Federal civil procedures law no. 11/1992, as such the jurisdiction in regard to the 
registration of this dispute and the start of the proceedings should be done through the 
ICC. 
																																																								
1244 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no.38/12, issued on the 6th of December 1990. 
1245 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no.1018/2000, issued on the 25/2/2001. 
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Therefore, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
4. Appeal no. 194/131246 
The appellant started the dispute1247 against the public works and service 
department of AD requesting the registration of the arbitration clause between the 
parties, they claim that a judge…. was appointed as chief of the arbitration tribunal in 
place of its former chief on the 29/7/1989 by the judicial authority, which resulted in 
the appellant to seek the first instance court in case no. 2160/84, requesting the court 
to dismiss this judge from the arbitration tribunal since the appointment procedure 
was conducted in contrary to what the law states, for the previous chief didn’t request 
to be dismissed and was not dismissed by the proper authority that appointed him 
which is the court, furthermore the appellant objected in front of the arbitration 
tribunal in the hearing dated 31/7/1989 to the appointment of that arbitrator in contrast 
to the law and the arbitration clause. The first instance court decided to dismiss the 
appellant’s request; the appeal court upheld that decision.1248 
The appellant appealed that decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that the 
court decided that since this decision doesn’t end the dispute and as such it’s not 
subject to appeal. However, the Supreme Court in appeals no. 76/10 and 90/10 
decided that disputes in regard to appointing an arbitrators and determining the 
authority responsible of his appointment are separate disputes from the arbitration, as 
such those decisions do end the dispute, as a result they are appealable. 
																																																								
1246 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 194/13, issued on the 28th of April 1992. 
1247 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First instance, (civil circuit) case no. 2160/984. 
1248 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no. 37/1990. 
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The Supreme Court agreed with the appellant’s argument, stating that the 
decisions of the appointment do indeed end the dispute and as such subject to appeal. 
Therefore, the court decided to nullify the appealed decision and refer the dispute 
back to the appeal court to render a decision. 
 
5. Appeal no. 325/20101249 
The defendant started the suit1250 by asking the court to appoint arbitrators to 
settle the dispute between the parties, they claim that based on an agreement between 
the parties the appellant rented a land from the defendant, they claim that damages 
resulted due to the appellant usage of the land, therefore, they requested from the 
appellant to appoint an arbitrator to resolve the dispute between them as per the 
agreement between the parties, which the appellant refused to do, forcing them to 
seek the court to order the appointment of the arbitrator. The first instance court 
decided to appoint three arbitrators to resolve the dispute, the arbitrators managed to 
issue an award in favor of the defendant, which was brought in front of the court to be 
recognized, the appellant counter claimed to dismiss the award and to order the 
defendant to pay the amount of 200,000. Dhs. The court decided to dismiss the 
dispute, stating that they lack the proper jurisdiction and referred the dispute to the 
Abu Dhabi First instance court1251. This decision was appealed by both the defendant 
and the appellant1252, the court decided that the first instance court has the jurisdiction 
to issue a decision in the dispute; the appellant appealed that decision to the Supreme 																																																								
1249 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 325/2010, issued on the 28th of December 2010. 
1250 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 753/2007.  
1251 This dispute occurred in a transition period, when the Emirate of AD decided to rescind from the 
Federal Courts system and create their own judicial body by establishing their own court system and 
cassation court.  
1252 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of appeals, appeal no.29 & no.33/2010, issued on the 25/5/2010. 
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Court. Pleading to the court to hear the case by claiming that the exception mentioned 
in article 151 is limited to the conditions stated in that article, they also claim that the 
judicial authority of the emirate of Abu Dhabi became a separate entity after 1/9/2007 
when Abu Dhabi decided to rescind from the Federal Judicial system1253, as such this 
decision is subject to appeal. The court accepted this plea and decided to hear the 
appeal. 
The appellant appeal was based on one ground, claiming that the court decided 
that the Federal courts of Abu Dhabi has the authority to hear the request of 
recognizing the arbitral award. However, since this is not a court-annexed arbitration 
as such the parties are not required to present their requests or dispute to the federal 
court, based on the fact that the jurisdiction in this dispute falls to the judicial 
authority of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. 
The court responded by stating that since the emirate of AD decided to rescind 
from the Federal System, then the determination of the jurisdiction between the 
federal courts and the local authority is a matter that relates to the public policy, based 
on articles 204 and 213, which imply that the award issued by an arbitrator that was 
appointed by the court is a court-annexed arbitration, as such it would fall under the 
conditions mentioned in those articles, in regard to the procedure of recognizing a 
court-annexed arbitral award, which in this instance would fall under the jurisdiction 
of the Federal First Instance court of Abu Dhabi. 
Therefore, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
 
																																																								
1253 Supra note 27. 
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6. Appeal no. 142/171254 
The defendant company started the dispute1255 against the appellant, claiming 
that they entered in a contract with the appellant to supply and install medical 
equipment in their facility, after they fulfilled their obligation the appellant refused to 
pay the reminder of their pay, and since they agreed in the contract to submit any 
dispute that rises from this contract into arbitration, they asked the court to refer the 
dispute into arbitration, the court decided to refer the dispute into arbitration. The 
arbitrators issued an award stating that the appellant should pay the amount of the 
claim to the defendant, the court decided to recognize the award; the appellant 
appealed that decision to the appeal court which upheld the appealed decision 
resulting in an appeal to the Supreme Court. 
The appeal was based on two grounds, the first part of the first ground argues 
that the arbitrators accepted the defendant’s claim that the appellant failed to pay the 
defendant fees in the agreed dates, for even if this claim were to be true it doesn’t 
entitle the defendant to stop the construction and installation from their part. 
The court dismissed this claim. 
The appellant second part of the first and second grounds of the appeal, argues 
that the court refused their request to set-aside the award, they argue that the court 
should set-aside the award since it was based on a foreign document that was not 
legally translated into Arabic, which constitute a ground for setting-aside the award 
according to the civil procedures law. 
																																																								
1254 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 142/17, issued on the 28th of November 1995. 
1255 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 1661/1988 
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The court decided to dismiss this claim, stating that in order for this ground to 
be enforced the court should have based their decision on those documents or on the 
documents that have been presented without the other parties’ knowledge. However, 
the appealed decision was based on facts that has been accessible to the appellant and 
were contested by the appellant in the arbitration procedure, and were not based on 
those papers that were not translated. 
Thus, the courts decided to dismiss the appeal.  
 
7. Appeal no.5/20091256 
The appellant started the dispute1257 against the defendants, asking the court to 
nullify the lease committees orders number 858, 859, 1071/2007, which were issued 
on the 26/6/2007, claiming that based on a lease agreement they leased two shops 
from the defendant, later on the defendant informed them that if they wished to renew 
the contract the rent would increase, the appellant refused to renew the lease with an 
increase in the rent and as a result the defendant cut the power from the appellants 
shops, resulting in a dispute between the parties that ended up in front of the lease 
committee. The committee dismissed the appellant request and decided to accept the 
defendant request, by ordering the appellant to vacate the property for the failure to 
pay the rent. The first instance court decided to dismiss this suit, and the appeal court 
decided to uphold that decision1258. The appellant sought the Supreme Court to nullify 
that decision; the defendant submitted a plea to the court to dismiss the appeal. The 
																																																								
1256 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 5/2009, issued on the 17th of February 2010. 
1257 Ajman Federal Court of First Instance, case no.72/2007.  
1258 Ajman Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no. 74/2008. 
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defendant claims that the appeal was filed after the passing of the appeal time, the 
court dismissed this plea and decided to hear the appeal. 
 The appellant argues in the first and second part of the first ground of the 
appeal, that they upheld their claim in front of the court of the nullity of the 
committee’s decision, claiming that the decision was issued without an arbitration 
agreement, they also claim that the head of the committee is a relative of the 
defendants. 
The court decided to dismiss the first part, by stating that according to articles 
15/2, 16 and 18 of the Emir decree no. 6/2005 in regard to regulating the lease 
transaction in the Emirate of Ajman1259, which implies that in order to set-aside the 
committees decision it need to fall under one of the conditions of article 216. 
Moreover, the legislator have set forth new rules that regulates lease transaction 
disputes by having them fall under the committees jurisdiction, which are in exception 
to the general rules of adjudication, in addition to clauses 6 and 7 of the lease contract, 
which requires the parties to refer all disputes that raises between them to the lease 
committee of Ajman. In regard to the second part, in which the appellant is contesting 
the head of the lease committees relation to the defendant, the court stated that in 
order to dismiss him the appellant would have had to follow the rules mentioned in 
article 207/4, which requires such pleas to be submitted within a time limit, which is 
within five days of the plaintiff knowledge of one of those conditions. Otherwise, it 
would be considered as a waiver of their right to dismiss the arbitrator. 
																																																								
1259 Emirates of Ajman, Emir decree no. 6/2005 in regard to regulating lease transaction in Ajman. 
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The appellant’s third part of the first ground of the appeal argues that the court 
dismissed their request to nullify the award, claiming that they have been willing to 
pay the rent and as such there is no grounds for ordering them to vacate the property. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that even though article 16 of the 
decree state that the committees decisions are not subject to appeal, however, article 
18/7 of the same decree allows the parties to set-aside the award on grounds that 
matches those of article 216, and since the civil procedures law didn’t state on a 
reason that relates to the subject matter of the dispute as a ground for setting-aside the 
award, as such the courts authority doesn’t extend to examine those arguments that 
relates to the subject matter of the dispute, such as the ones presented by the 
appellant. 
The second ground of the appeal argues that the appeal court have referred to 
the reasoning of the first instance court, without answering the appellants plea and as 
such have failed to uphold due process. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that the appeal court has the right to 
refer to the reasoning of the first instance court, in the event that the appellant didn’t 
present any new pleas in front of the appeal court.  
Therefore, the court decides to uphold the appealed decision and dismiss the 
appeal. 
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8. Appeal no. 116/171260 
The defendant started the dispute against the appellant1261, claiming that they 
and the appellant are partners in the ownership of a group of companies, which 
includes a construction group that has bought a number of construction equipment, 
and based on an agreement between them they registered some of those equipment’s 
under the defendants name and the others under the appellant, and based on another 
agreement between the parties, they decided to divide the assets of the company 
between them on the 3/1/1990. However, the appellant refused to pay an amount that 
they both agreed upon in order divide the assets between them, which resulted in this 
dispute. The first instance court appointed an expert then decided to first dismiss the 
plea, stating that the court lacks the proper jurisdiction to hear the dispute. The 
appellant sought the appeal court to nullify this decision; the appeal court accepted his 
plea and vacated the trial courts decision.1262 
The appellant appealed this decision to the Supreme Court on ten grounds, the 
tenth ground of the appeal argues that the appealed decision was issued in contrast to 
the jurisdiction rules, claiming that the subject of the dispute is the collection of rent, 
which is governed under the lease law no. 92/1977, which gives the jurisdiction to 
hear the dispute to the municipality of Sharjah arbitration committee. However, the 
defendant disregarded this requirement and sought the court. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that this committee’s jurisdiction is 
limited to the disputes that rises from lease agreements between the landlord and the 
tent in regard to the execution of that agreement only, and that the parties in this 																																																								
1260 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 116/17, issued on the 31st of October 1995. 
1261 Sharjah’s Federal Court of First Instance, in case no. 1428/1990. 
1262 Sharjah’s Federal Courts of Appeals, appeal no. 104/1993. 
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dispute don’t fall under that category, since in this instance the dispute is between the 
owners in which case the court has the jurisdiction to hear the dispute. 
The appellant other arguments revolve around the expert report, which were 
accepted by the court, the court decided to vacate the appealed decision and refer the 
dispute back to the appeal court. 
 
9. Appeal no. 62/171263 
The appellant started the dispute against the defendants1264, by asking the court 
to nullify the termination order, which ordered the appellant termination from his 
position as a CEO of the Indian School in Al-Ain, the appellant also requested the 
implementation of article 295 of the civil transaction law1265 and to reestablish the 
previous status quo between the parties and to order the payment of 80,000 dhs. as a 
compensation for the damages, claiming that by the end of 1988 he became the CEO 
of that School, later on a dispute rose between the parties, which resulted in his 
termination by the defendants and slandering his name. The first instance court 
decided to dismiss the dispute, stating that they lack the jurisdiction to hear the 
dispute; this decision was appealed and the appeal court decided to uphold the 
appealed decision1266. The appellant sought the Supreme Court to nullify this 
decision, the defendants pleaded in front of the court. The court dismissed this plea 
and decided to hear the appeal. 																																																								
1263 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 62/17, issued on the 20th of June 1995. 
1264 Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 166/1994, issued on the 12/10/1994. 
1265 Article 295 of the civil transaction, states that: “Damages will consist of a money payment. Upon 
request of the victim, however, the judge may, in accordance with the circumstances, order that the 
damage be made good by restoring the parties to their original status, or by performing, in 
compensation, a specific matter connected with the prejudicial act.” 
1266 Federal Courts of Appeals, appeal no. 294/1994. 
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The appellant based his appeal on two grounds, the first ground argues that the 
court dismissed the suit based on the existence of an arbitration clause and as a result 
this implies that the jurisdiction in this dispute falls under that arbitral clause; the 
appellant argues that at the time of the dispute the arbitrator (the Indian ambassador) 
was outside the country. Furthermore, the appellant claims that they have already 
presented their dispute to the previous ambassador; however, he failed to initiate the 
arbitration proceedings. 
The court dismissed this claim, they state that the appealed decision explained 
that the reason behind dismissing the claim is “the will of both parties to resolve their 
disputes through arbitration, this will has been manifested through clause fifteen of 
the schools constitution, which state that in the event of a dispute between the board 
members this dispute shall be resolved through arbitration and the arbitrator shall be 
the schools owner and his decision shall be final and binding to the parties; therefore 
this clause prohibits the parties from seeking the courts to resolve their disputes, 
moreover the appellants disregarded this clause and the rules of article 203 of the civil 
procedures both of which prohibits the parties from seeking the courts to resolve their 
dispute in the presence of an arbitration agreement. In essence, this interpretation by 
the appeal court has a basis both in the agreement and the law and as such falls under 
their power of interpretation, which makes the appellants argument void. 
The appellant second ground argues on the amount of the claim; the court 
decided to dismiss this argument as well.  
As a result the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
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10. Appeal no. 249/151267 
The first defendant (The UAE Armed Forces) started the dispute, against the 
appellant and the third defendant1268 by asking the court to order them to pay the 
amount of 224695.04 dhs. claiming that on the 20/11/1987 while the appellants truck 
that was driven by the third defendant was unloading, its load it hit one of the 
communication towers, which resulted in damaging that tower, they also claim that 
the appellant have stated in a written letter to the first defendant that they would cover 
the entire costs of the incident. The appellant asked the court to include the second 
defendant (insurance company) in the dispute. The first instance court decided to 
order the appellant and the third defendant to pay the entire amount of the claim and 
dismiss the second defendant from the dispute. The first defendant appealed this 
decision1269, asking the court to nullify the decision to dismiss the second defendant 
from the dispute, and the appellant appealed it as well1270. The second defendant 
counter claimed, by asking the court to dismiss the dispute, arguing that the court 
lacks the proper jurisdiction to hear the dispute due to the existence of an arbitration 
clause in the insurance policy. The court decided to include the insurance company in 
the dispute and to accept their request. The appellant appealed this decision to the 
Supreme Court, the second defendant pleaded to the court to dismiss the appeal, the 
court decided to hear the dispute. 
The appellant based his appeal on four grounds, the first part of the first 
ground argues that the appealed decision decided to implement the eleventh clause of 
the insurance policy, which is an arbitration clause that refers any dispute that raises 																																																								
1267 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 249/15, issued on the 26th of March 1995. 
1268 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 635/1990, issued on the 13/5/1992. 
1269 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no. 422/1992, issued on the 25/5/1993. 
1270 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no. 446/1992, issued on the 25/5/1993. 
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from this insurance policy into arbitration. The appellant argues that this clause were 
present in the general rules of the insurance policy and not in a separate document, 
which is null since it infringes the requirements of article 1028 of the civil transaction 
law1271. However, the court justified their decision to not implement this article, by 
claiming that this transaction falls under the commercial transactions law, which 
allows an exception in this regard, the appellant claims that this interpretation by the 
court is flawed and as such their decision should be vacated. 
The court accepted this argument, stating that law no. 1/19871272 have made an 
exception when it comes to commercial transaction from being governed under the 
civil transaction law. However, based on the general rules of adjudication and article 
1028-d of the civil transaction law1273, which implies that any arbitral clause which is 
included in an insurance policy is null, unless the parties agreed to arbitrate in a 
separate document, the court states that this rule was put in place due to the 
importance of this clause and the need to protect the insurer, furthermore, this is a 
general rule that applies to both commercial and civil insurance policies, as such this 
arbitral clause is null since it was included in the insurance policy and not in a 
separate agreement. 
The other grounds of appeal don’t concern arbitration. 																																																								
1271 Article 1028 of the civil transaction states: “The following conditions in a policy of insurance are 
void: a - The condition providing for the forfeiture of the right to insurance on account of a breach of 
the laws, unless such breach constitutes a deliberate felony or misdemeanor; b - The condition 
providing for the forfeiture of the insured’s right due to his delay in notifying the authorities that have 
to be notified, or in producing documents, if it appears that the delay was for an acceptable excuse; c - 
Any printed condition relating to cases involving nullity of the contract or forfeiture of the insured’s 
right , which is not shown in a clear manner; d - The arbitration condition included in the printed 
general conditions of the policy and not as a special agreement distinct therefrom; e - Any arbitrary 
condition , the breach thereof appears that it has no bearing on the occurrence of the event insured 
against.” 
1272 Federal law no. 1/1987 is the law that amended and revised the Federal law no.5/1985 in regard to 
the civil transaction. 
1273 id states:” The following conditions in a policy of insurance are void: …… d- the arbitration 
condition included in the printed general conditions of the policy and not as a special agreement 
distinct therefrom.” 
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11. Appeal no. 181/151274 
The appellant started the suit1275 in order to set-aside the award issued by the 
arbitration tribunal of the municipality of Sharjah, arguing that they have leased the 
property owned by the defendant for one year in exchange of five hundred thousand 
dhs. they further argue that the lease term have ended, in contrast to what the tribunal 
have declared that the contract have been verbally extended, and based on that the 
appellant should pay an additional 225 thousand dhs. to the defendant. The first 
instance court decided to dismiss the appellant request and to uphold the award. The 
appeal court came to the same conclusion and upheld the appealed decision. This 
decision was appealed to the Supreme Court on the following grounds. 
 The appellant first ground of appeal argues that they pleaded in front of the 
court to set-aside the award, claiming that the defendant representative didn’t present 
the proper documents that identify him as the defendants attorney, the court dismissed 
this plea stating that those documents has been presented in front of the courts clerk; 
the appellant argues that those documents should have been brought in front of the 
court to examine it and that the clerk doesn’t have the right to examine those 
documents. 
 The court dismissed this argument, stating that the presence of the 
defendant’s attorney doesn’t affect the appellant’s right to adjudicate, furthermore, the 
appellant notified the defendant’s attorney of the appeal, implying that the appellant 
and accepts the appointment of the defendant attorney. 
																																																								
1274 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 181/15, issued on the 19th of March 1995. 
1275 In front of the Sharjah’s Federal Court of First Instance, however, the case number was omitted. 
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The appellant second ground of appeal argues that the court based their 
decision on the arbitration tribunal being a judicial tribunal, implying that their 
awards are equal to a court’s decision, in doing so this tribunal has the right to hear 
witnesses and to use any of the evidence procedures available for the court, which is 
in contrast to the Emir Decree no. 3/81, which limits the scope of this tribunal and 
jurisdiction to be limited to the disputes between the owner and the tents in regard to 
the execution of lease contracts, moreover, article 96 of that decree shows the 
difference between the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal, which is based on the 
parties agreement or by a reference from the court or from the complains that are 
based on the execution of the contract, as such if the dispute was based on an 
arbitration then it shall follow the rules of arbitration and if it was based on a 
complaint then it shall follow those rules and its role would be to mediate the dispute 
between the parties. Moreover, the federal law no. 6/78 in regard to the federal courts 
and delegating their jurisdiction to local judicial authorities, didn’t state on a 
mechanism or a procedure in regard to judicial tribunals as such the arbitration 
tribunal of the municipality of Sharjah doesn’t fall under this law and doesn’t prohibit 
the parties from presenting their dispute for a second time in front of the court, and 
their awards doesn’t receive res judicata status. 
The court response to this argument was that the arbitration tribunal of the 
municipality of Sharjah, is an administrative tribunal, which can be emphasized from 
the way it was established and the nature of the members of the tribunal. However, 
the legislator in the Emirate of Sharjah added to this tribunal the responsibility to 
settle disputes between the tenants and the owners under the law no. 92/77 and its 
amendments 7/86, 4/88, furthermore article five of that law has stated on the 
conditions in which the tenants fail to fulfill his obligation, which is the base of the 
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complain that the defendant stated in their plea in front of the tribunal. Moreover, 
based on article nine of that law the tribunal has the jurisdiction to settle the dispute 
between the parties, it also gives the party that want to object on the tribunals award 
the right to do so in front of the court, within fifteen days from them being notified by 
the issuing of the award, otherwise the decision would be binding and enforceable in 
front of the execution judge, furthermore, the only decisions that are enforceable in 
front of the execution judge are judicial decisions and as such the tribunal awards has 
judicial power equal to that of a courts decision. This fact isn’t affected by the federal 
law no.6/78 in regard to establishing the federal courts, which didn’t govern those 
tribunals for the legislators intent in here is to leave the power of governing those 
tribunals to the local authorities. 
The appellant third ground of appeal argues that the emir decree no. 3/81, 
which granted the arbitrators the authority to mediate the dispute between the parties, 
however, this doesn’t imply that they have the right to hear or question witnesses, 
since this is part of the courts authority, moreover, the arbitrators are not judges and 
as such lack the authority to question or hear witnesses as well. 
The court response was that based on the emir decree no.92/77, which gave 
this tribunal the authority to settle lease disputes, which implies that the tribunal 
decisions are of a judicial nature, this fact doesn’t change if the members of those 
tribunal are part of the judicial authority or not, moreover in order to enforce the 
award issued from this tribunal it doesn’t require a judge to issue this award. 
The fourth ground of the appeal argues that the appeal court have re-examined 
what have already been settled by the trial court, in regard to the fact that the tribunal 
lacks the ability to hear witnesses, and the fact that a verbal evidence doesn’t 
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outweigh a written document nor it has the capability to overturn what has been 
established in that document, furthermore, the appellant requested that the witnesses 
affidavit should be dismissed, since one of the witnesses works as an accountant for 
the defendant. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that based on the previous the 
response to the appellants grounds of the appeal, the tribunal has the authority to hear 
those witnesses, moreover, in regard to the appellant argument that the witnesses 
affidavit cannot rebut a written document, has no merit in this dispute since the 
appealed decision was not based on the extension of the contract but to the 
compensation to the owner for their failure to hand over the leased property back to 
the owner. 
The appellant argue in the fifth ground on the subject matter of the dispute; 
which was dismissed by the court. 
Thus, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
 
12. Appeal no. 503/201276 
The appellant started the dispute1277 by asking the court to order the defendant 
to pay the amount of 20,000 dhs. claiming that this amount represent a compensation 
for the damages that was a result from the defendants action, the appellant claims that 
based on an arbitration clause that was concluded on the 23/4/1983 the defendant was 
appointed as the head of the arbitration tribunal in order to settle a dispute between 																																																								
1276 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 503/20, issued on the 15th of October 2000. 
1277 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 854/1993. 
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the appellant and the department of public work in AD, claiming that they entered 
into a contract with the AD department of public works in order to construct 100 
villas. The arbitral tribunal started its proceedings on the 12/5/1983. However, the 
defendant excused himself without a proper justification from continuing his work as 
an arbitrator on the 15/11/1984, which resulted in a delay in settling the dispute for 
eight years, which the appellant claims resulted in damages due to this delay, 
moreover, they claim that the defendant issued a check in the amount of 20,000 dhs. 
and from the arbitration tribunal accounts after he excused himself from the tribunal. 
The first instance court decided to dismiss the claim. The appeal court decided to 
dismiss the appeal as well1278, the appellant appealed the decision to the Supreme 
Court1279, the court decided to nullify the appealed decision and refer the decision 
back to the appeal court. The appeal court decided to uphold the appealed 
decision1280, which resulted in this appeal. 
The appellant based his appeal on two grounds, the appellant argues that the 
appealed decision decided that the defendant doesn’t have any responsibility for the 
delay that occurred in the arbitration, the court states that the delay was a result of an 
external factors that doesn’t relate to the defendant, despite the fact that the arbitration 
was delayed for three months, even though the dispute was ready to be settled. 
Moreover, the appellant claims that the defendant reason to excuse himself from the 
arbitration, directly relates to their plea that the arbitration proceedings are null due to 
the fact that the arbitral tribunals authority has ended and the appellant contesting the 
defendants authority, which the defendant viewed as an attack on the arbitral tribunal, 
the arbitrator and the court viewed this as a justifiable reason to excuse the arbitrator 																																																								
1278 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no.1266/1994. 
1279 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 219/18, issued on the 26th of October 1997. 
1280 Which was decided on the 28/6/1998. However, there is no mention to the case number in this 
instance. 
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from the proceedings. The appellant argues that their plea was meant to insure that the 
arbitration proceedings would be conducted according to the law and the parties 
agreement, in order to insure that the extension of the arbitration meets those 
conditions, however, those pleas were rejected by the arbitrator, making the arbitrator 
excuse to step down as a result of the appellants attack ungrounded. Moreover, the 
appealed decision stated that the arbitrator gave a request to the high judicial council 
to be dismissed from the arbitration, which the appellant claims that this didn’t occur, 
for the arbitrator confirmed that he have withdrew from the arbitration based on his 
own will, which occurred on the 15/11/1984, resulting in the appellant to seek the 
court to appoint a new arbitrator1281, as a result of the minister of justice and the 
respondent failure to appoint a new arbitrator within a week according to the 
requirements of law no.3/1970, moreover, this council doesn’t have the right to accept 
such a request by the arbitrator. 
The court dismissed this argument, based on article 86/1 of the civil 
procedures law no. 3/19701282, which implies that the legislator gave the arbitrator the 
right to withdraw from the arbitration if one of the conditions have been met, in 
essence the arbitrator is required to provide a justifiable reason to withdraw from the 
arbitration, which complies with what the Federal civil procedures law require in 
article 207/2. Moreover, the determination of whether this is a justifiable reason or not 
falls to the trial court discretion. 
Therefore, the court decided to dismiss this appeal. 
 
																																																								
1281 Abu Dhabi Court of First instance, case no. 2160/1984. 
1282 Which is the civil procedures law of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. 
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13. Appeal no. 263/181283 
The defendant started the dispute1284 by asking  
, claiming that they constructed a car showroom for the appellant based on a 
construction contract between them, and due to the appellants failure to fulfill his 
obligation the project wasn’t finished and the appellant nullified the contract, which 
resulted in deducting the defendants fee, the parties agreed to submit this dispute to 
arbitration, however, the appellant refused to execute this agreement resulting in this 
litigation. The first instance court decided to refer the dispute into arbitration; the 
arbitrators submitted their award, which the appellant requested to set-aside, the court 
decided to recognize the arbitral award. The appellant appealed that decision, the 
appeal court decided to dismiss the appeal.1285Resulting in an appeal to the supreme 
court by the appellant, the defendant submitted a plea to the supreme court to dismiss 
the appeal, stating that the parties agreed in front the first instance court that the award 
is not subject to appeal, according to article 217/3. 
The court dismissed this plea, stating that this article implies that the legislator 
intent was to prohibit appeals on decisions that recognize the arbitral award or in the 
event that the parties agreed to waiver their right to appeal, which is an exception to 
article 158. Moreover, the appeal courts decision are subject to appeal according to 
article 173, even if article 150/1 allows the parties to waiver their right of appeal. 
However, in order for this waiver to be granted it should be explicitly identified, and 
since the appeal court decided that the decision is not subject to appeal, even if the 
parties agreed to waiver their right in front of the court in the hearing dated 13/5/1992. 																																																								
1283 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 263/18, issued on the 8th of December. 
1284 Al-Ain Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 45/1992, issued on the 21/1/1996. 
1285 Al-Ain Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no. 77/1996, issued on the 20/5/1996. 
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However, the arbitration agreement that has been submitted to the court shows that it 
was concluded on a later date, and it doesn’t include any limitation or a waiver on the 
parties right to appeal, which implies that the parties have amended that condition and 
as such the court accepts the appeal. 
The appellant argues that the appeal court dismissed their appeal based on the 
parties agreement in front of the court to waiver their right to appeal. However, this 
waiver needs to be stated in the arbitration agreement. 
The court accepted this argument, stating that the waiver of the parties right to 
appeal is required to be stated in the arbitration agreement. 
Thus, the court decided to nullify the appealed decision. 
 
14. Appeal no. 620/211286 
The defendant started the dispute1287 against the first appellant, asking the 
court to order the payment of 1,198,000 dhs. which they claim that it represent the 
amount of the defendant employment benefits, in addition to the amount of 468,500 
dhs. which represents the amount of the defendant work for the appellant. 
Furthermore, the defendant started another suit against the second appellant1288, 
asking the court to order the payment of 290,000 US dollars, which they claim that 
the appellant borrowed from them. Moreover, the second appellant counter claimed 
by asking the court to order the defendant to pay 4,847,108 dhs. which they claim that 
																																																								
1286 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 620/21, issued on the 19th of December 2000.. 
1287 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 19/1998.  
1288 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 160/1996. 
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the defendant borrowed from them, furthermore the appellants started a separate suit 
against the defendant, in which they asked the court to confirm the existence of an 
arbitration clause1289. The first instance court decided to dismiss the appellant request 
to confirm the arbitration clause, and in case no.160/1996 the court decided in favor 
of the defendant, in case no.19/1998 the court decided to dismiss the claim based on 
the existence of an arbitration clause and in case no.20/1998 the court decided that the 
right to uphold the arbitration clause is waivered. The appellants decided to appeal 
this decision before the court decide to appoint an expert; the appeal court decided in 
appeal no. 151/1999 to vacate the appealed decision and refer the dispute in case 
no.19/1998 back to the first instance court, in appeal no.219/1999 to dismiss the 
appeal and refer the dispute to the first instance court as well, in appeal no.399/1999 
to uphold the appealed decision in case no.390/1999. Moreover, before the court 
rendered a decision in case no.160/1996 the appellants appealed that decision to the 
cassation court. 
The defendant submitted a plea to the Supreme Court to dismiss the appeal, 
claiming that according to article 151 the court should dismiss the appeal, they argue 
that since the determination of whether or not to implement the arbitration clause is a 
decision that doesn’t settle the dispute, as such the court should dismiss the appeal. 
The court dismissed this plea, stating that the request to dismiss the case based 
on an existing arbitration clause is in fact a jurisdictional plea, which is allowed under 
article 151. 
The appeal was based on five grounds; the appellants argue that the appealed 
decision determined that the agreement dated 24/1/1998, is in fact an arbitration 																																																								
1289 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 390/1998. 
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agreement, however, the parties didn’t determine the scope of that agreement, which 
makes the arbitration un-executable and the defendant has the right to seek the court. 
However, the scope of the arbitration has been identified in regard to determining the 
parties’ obligation in the “seidco construction” company or in regard to any dispute 
that rises between the parties, which allows the parties to ask the arbitrator to issue 
term of reference. However, the appealed decision miss interpret the term of reference 
and the parties obligation to have the arbitration agreement in writing and between the 
determination of the scope of the dispute, which can be determined in front of the 
arbitrator, moreover, the appealed decision didn’t have any legal basis for their 
decision to vacate the arbitration agreement, and started to hear the dispute in cases 
no.20/1998 and no.160/1996, as a result the court lacks the proper jurisdiction to hear 
the dispute, moreover they didn’t answer the appellants plea that the first instance 
court in case no.160/1996 appointed an expert without a request by one of the 
litigants, which is an implication that the court dismissed the arbitration clause in that 
dispute, as a result it makes it lacking the jurisdiction to hear the dispute in case 
no.390/1998 in regard to confirming the arbitration clause and having a contradictory 
ruling in that dispute, since the court decided at the start that the arbitration cannot be 
enforced since the parties didn’t agree on a term of reference, then they stated later on 
that the arbitration time limit has ended which makes the arbitration un-executable. 
 The court dismissed those grounds of appeal, stating that according to article 
203, which implies that the arbitration is an exception to the parties right to seek their 
natural judge in front of the court, which in turn has the jurisdiction to hear the 
dispute, thus, the legislator requires the arbitration agreement to properly identify the 
scope of the arbitration or the parties should determine the scope in front of the 
arbitrators in the event that the agreement didn’t contain a determination of the scope. 
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However, if the arbitration agreement lacked the scope and the parties failed to agree 
on the scope in front of the arbitrator then the arbitration shall be null and void.  
 Moreover, the arbitration agreement between the parties didn’t contain a scope 
of the arbitration, this fact isn’t change by delegating that right to the arbitrator since 
that clause is a general one that includes all disputes between the parties and doesn’t 
specify the scope of the arbitration or the subject of the dispute, which resulted in the 
parties to draft a term of reference in front of the arbitrator, in order to determine the 
scope of the arbitration, implying that if the scope was clearly determined in the 
agreement the parties wouldn’t have to resort to this solution. However, the parties 
didn’t agree on the scope in front of the arbitrator, which can be inferred from the fact 
the passing of arbitral hearing without reaching an agreement on the arbitration scope, 
which in turn nullifies the arbitration agreement, which is a fact that doesn’t change 
by the appellants request in case no.390/1998 to determine the scope of the 
arbitration, for the court doesn’t have the right to intervene in order to determine the 
scope in place of the parties given the fact that arbitration is based on the will of the 
parties. 
Thus, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
 
15. Appeal no. 95/181290 
The defendant started the dispute1291 against the appellant asking the court to 
recognize and enforce an arbitral award that was issued on the 26/4/1995, claiming 
																																																								
1290 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 95/18, issued on the 23rd of June 1996. 
1291 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 222/95. 
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that they entered into a contract with the appellant on the 11/12/1991 and after they 
fulfilled their obligation the appellant denied them their pay, and given that the 
contract between the parties requires them to resolve their disputes through arbitration 
under the rules of the AD chamber of industry and commerce they sought that 
chamber to resolve their dispute, the chamber refereed the dispute to their arbitration 
institute, the arbitration tribunal issued a decision in the dispute in case no. 8/94 in 
favor of the defendant, since the appellant refused to enforce the award the defendant 
resorted to the court. The appellant counter claimed in a separate suit1292, asking the 
court to set-aside the arbitral award, claiming that the contract between the parties 
which contained an arbitration clause has ended, subsequently they sought the court in 
another suit in order to nullify the arbitration clause1293. However, the court decided to 
dismiss their request based on the existence of an arbitration clause and the appeal 
court upheld that decision1294, and afterwards the appellant decided to continue with 
the arbitration proceedings. Resulting in the arbitral award that was issued on the 
26/4/1995, which is a void award given that the tribunal didn’t decided to dismiss the 
arbitration based on the fact that the arbitration clause has ended by the end of the 
contract that contained the clause.  
The court decided to combine both of the suits, and dismissed the claim in 
case no.229/95 and to recognize the award in case 222/95. The appellant appealed this 
decision and the appeal court decided to uphold the appealed decision1295. 
The appellant appealed that decision to the Supreme Court on two grounds; 
the first ground argues that they pleaded in front of the first instance court in case 																																																								
1292 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 229/95. 
1293 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 315/94. 
1294 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no. 262/95. 
1295 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no. 576/95. 
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315/94 that the contract between the parties has ended. However, the court decided to 
dismiss this plea by stating that this plea concerns the execution of the contract and 
since the parties agreed in that contract to resolve their dispute through arbitration as 
such this plea falls under the arbitrators jurisdiction; the appellant claims that they 
upheld that argument in front of the arbitrators and in front of the first instance and 
appeal courts, despite that the appeal court stated that the appellant didn’t upheld that 
argument in front of the arbitration tribunal as their right to argue on this jurisdictional 
issue has been waivered. 
The court agreed with this argument, stating that the waiver of the right should 
be proven without any room of a doubt, and that the courts decision to refer the 
dispute to arbitration doesn’t imply that the appellant has waivered his right to this 
argument. 
Thus, the court decided to nullify the appealed decision and refer the dispute 
to the appeal court. 
 
16. Appeal no. 605/211296 
 This is a continuation of appeal no. 95/18, after the Supreme Court vacated the 
appealed decision they referred the dispute back to the appeal court, which decided to 
recognize the arbitral award that decision was appealed to the Supreme Court in 
appeal no. 157/191297, which decided to vacate the appealed decision and refer the 
dispute back to the appeal court, which decided to uphold the appealed decision and 
																																																								
1296 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 605/21, issued on the 24th of May 2000. 
1297 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 157/19. 
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recognize the award, which meant that it was appealed for a third time to the Supreme 
Court. 
 The appellant based their appeal on two grounds, the first argues that the 
arbitrators didn’t define the scope of the arbitration and that one of the parties to the 
arbitration agreement didn’t have the capacity nor the authority to conclude the 
arbitration agreement, for the agency agreement doesn’t allow him to enter into an 
arbitration agreement. 
 The court dismissed this argument, stating that article 203 implies that the 
scope of the arbitration can be determined either in the arbitration agreement or in 
front of the arbitrators, it also requires the arbitration agreement to be concluded by an 
individual that has the legal capacity to do so. Moreover, the court has the right to 
interpret the facts of the case and the contracts, which includes determining whether 
or not a party has the capacity to enter into a contract such as an arbitration 
agreement, this interpretation is not subject to the supervision of the Supreme Court if 
the trial court based their interpretation on sound legal basis. 
 The appellant second ground of appeal argues that the first instance decision 
no. 315/94, which decided to accept the defendant’s request of referring the dispute 
into arbitration didn’t answer the appellant’s plea, which argued that the arbitration 
clause has ended. 
 The court dismissed this argument stating that based on article 187 of the civil 
procedures1298, which gives the Supreme Court decisions res judicata status between 																																																								
1298 Article 187, states: “It is not possible to appeal against the cassation decisions through any of the 
appeal manners, and that with the exception of what has been issued there from in the litigation source 
where it shall be possible to appeal therein through the petition of reexamining the cases stipulated in 
clauses 1,2 and 3 of article 169.”  
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the parties, implying that the parties cannot submit the same dispute back to the 
Supreme Court. 
17. Appeals no. 267 & 297/201299 
The appellant started the dispute1300 against the defendant, asking the court to 
recognize the arbitral award no. 11/1990 issued from the high federal judicial council, 
they claim that they entered into a contract with the defendant to construct the road 
network system in the emirate of Ras Al-Khaimah, after the execution of the project 
they asked for their fees the defendant refused to pay and given that an arbitration 
clause exist in the contract between them, they submitted their dispute to arbitration, 
the arbitral tribunal issued an award on the 16/5/1994 in favor of the appellant.  
The first instance court decided to partially recognize the award by dismissing 
the 12% interest rate. Both parties appealed that decision, the appeal court decided to 
dismiss the defendants appeal, and to amend the appealed decision by fully 
recognizing the award. The defendant appealed that decision to the Supreme 
Court1301, the court decided to partially vacate the decision in regard to the amount of 
the damages and the interest rate and refer the decision back to the appeal, which 
decided on the 22/12/1997 to dismiss the appellant appeal and amended the award yet 
again. That decision was appealed to the Supreme Court in two appeals. 
First appeal no. 267/20: 
The court dismissed this appeal based on article 177/1, which require the 
signature of a certified attorney in order for an appeal to be accepted in front of the 																																																								
1299 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeals no.267 & no.297/20, issued on the 14th of May 2000. 
1300 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 238/1994.  
1301 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no.404/18. 
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Supreme Court, as such this article prohibits appeals submitted by an attorney that 
lacks this requirement, this requirement isn’t fulfilled by submitting the appeal by a 
certified law firm, since the signature is an essential requirement that need to be 
present. 
Second Appeal no.297/20: 
The appellant based this appeal on three grounds, the first ground argues in 
regard to the courts amendment of the interest rate that the arbitrator have awarded, 
the appellant argues that based on the commercial transaction law, which allows those 
forms of interests the court has no right to amend the interest rate in this instance. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that according to article 203, which 
allows the individuals to opt-out into arbitration based on their will to arbitrate, as 
such the arbitrators are limited when settling the dispute to the parties will, which is 
manifested through their agreement and what they decided to submit into arbitration, 
and since the arbitration clause didn’t contain any indication that the parties will went 
to authorize the arbitrators to grant interest. Therefore, the arbitrator doesn’t have the 
right to grant interest in this instance; thus, the courts decision to dismiss the interest 
rate from the award is acceptable deduction, since it was based on the fact that the 
parties didn’t include interest rates in their arbitration agreement. 
The appellants second and third ground of appeal argues that the appealed 
decision dismissed their request to return damages awarded to the defendant based on 
delay penalty; claiming that the court based their decision on the fact that this request 
wasn’t presented in front of the arbitration tribunal or in their closing statement in 
front of the court, they argue that they have indeed made this request in front of the 
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arbitral tribunal, and that the appealed decision dismissed their request without 
identifying their reason. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that the court has the right to 
identify the facts of the case, they argue that the appeal court decision was based on 
the fact that the appellant didn’t include this request in front of the first instance court, 
which meant that the appeal court based their decision on what was presented in front 
of the trial court; this fact that doesn’t change by claiming that the arbitral clause is a 
general one, since their request in front of the court is still required in order for the 
court to decide. 
 
18. Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 9/201302 
The defendant company started the dispute1303 against the appellant company, 
by asking the court to notify them of the start of the arbitration proceeding and to 
consider this litigation as an arbitration agreement, claiming that they are the main 
contractor in a project and that they delegated the manufacture of certain materials 
(manholes) to the appellant, after the appellant submitted those parts it turned out that 
they contained manufacturing flaws, which resulted in damages to the property as a 
direct result of this flaw, the defendant claim that they asked the appellant to fix those 
manholes, which they refused to do resulting in the defendant to seek another 
company to fix those manholes; given that the seventh clause of the construction 
agreement state on arbitration as a method of resolving disputes, the defendant asked 
the appellant to start the arbitration proceeding, which they refused to abide by their 																																																								
1302 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 9/20, issued on the 13th of February 2000. 
1303 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 162/96  
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contractual obligation resulting in this suit. The first instance court decided to appoint 
an accounting expert as an arbitrator; this decision was appealed and the court of 
appeals decided to dismiss the appeal1304. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of 
the appellant on the 20/2/1997 and submitted it to the court for recognition, the 
defendant contested this award and asked the court to correct the mistakes in the 
award before recognizing the award; the court decided to recognize the award in 
regard to the appellant liability. This decision was appealed by both litigants; the 
appeal court decided in both appeals to uphold the appealed decision1305. The 
appellant appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. 
The first ground of appeal argues that the trial court dismissed their request to 
set-aside the arbitral award; claiming that the award was based on a null arbitral 
agreement since the appellant agent refused to sign the arbitration agreement, which 
was drafted by the arbitrator and asked that the dispute should be referred back to the 
court, moreover, they requested that the records of the arbitration should show their 
objection and plea and that the arbitrator refused to respond their request, which 
constitute a failure to abide by the rules of article 209/21306. 
The court dismissed this ground, stating that once the courts decision has been 
based on sound reasoning this ground has no affect, for the Supreme Court has the 
right to correct any flaws in the decision without the need to vacate it. Furthermore, 
articles 203 and 204 implies that if the parties agreed either in the main contract or in 
a later agreement to submit their dispute into arbitration, without choosing the 
arbitrator, then the court shall appoint an arbitrator upon the request of one of the 																																																								
1304 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no. 80/97 
1305 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of appeals, appeals no.458 & no.459/97 
1306 Which regulates the instances in which the arbitrator has the right to seek the courts, in situations 
that the arbitrator lacks the jurisdiction to order the parties, such as asking the court to penalize 
witnesses that failed to appear and forcing the individuals to present documents. 
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parties. In addition, article 212 states that the arbitrator shall issue his decision 
without being bound by the normal procedures of the court, however, the parties has 
the right to agree on the procedure they wish to be applied in their dispute in that case 
the arbitrator would be bound by those procedures, furthermore, the law doesn’t 
oblige the arbitrator to stop the procedures unless one of the conditions of article 209 
has been met, as a result the first instance court appointment of an arbitrator was per 
the request of the defendant and as a result of the appellant refusal to start the 
arbitration procedure and to sign the arbitration agreement; which has no affect on the 
start of the arbitration nor does it constitute a ground for pausing the arbitration under 
article 209.  
The appellant second ground argues that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of 
the arbitration, given that the arbitrator decided to settle the accounts between the 
parties, which the appealed decision stated that this is a subject error and the court has 
the right to amend it in according to article 215/1. However, it is a matter that exceeds 
the arbitration scope and as such the award should be set-aside under the rules of 
article 216. 
The court dismissed this argument, by explaining that article 215 requires the 
recognition of the court in order for the award to be enforced; as such the court is 
required to examine the award and ensure that nothing would hinder the enforcement 
of the award and correct any material errors in the arbitral award upon the request of 
the parties. Moreover, to set-aside part of the award constitutes setting-aside the entire 
award, except if the setting-aside of this part wouldn’t affect the entire award. 
Therefore, the first instance decision of partially recognizing the award has a basis in 
the law and as such the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
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19. Appeal no. 357/20091307 
The appellant started the dispute1308 against the defendant, by asking the court 
to order the payment of 840,000 dhs. which they claim that it represent their labor 
fees, in addition to five million dhs. that represent 10% of the annual revenues of the 
institute and a clearance letter. The first instance court appointed an expert and after 
he submitted his report the defendant counter claimed to dismiss the suit based on the 
existence of an arbitration clause between the parties1309, the court accepted this plea 
and decided to dismiss the case. This decision was appealed and the appeal court 
decided to uphold the appealed decision and dismiss the appeal.1310  
The appellant based his appeal on one ground; arguing that the defendant 
didn’t uphold their plea to dismiss the dispute for the existence of an arbitration clause 
in the first hearing, which infringes the requirement of article 203. 
The court accepted this plea, stating that even though article 210/1 allows the 
parties to agree to arbitrate their dispute, even if the dispute have already been 
submitted to the court, with one condition that the court have not issued a decision in 
the dispute, however, it also requires the party upholding that agreement to express 
their will to arbitrate through a positive action by submitting their request to arbitrate 
in the first hearing, otherwise it would constitute as a waiver of their right to arbitrate 
and the vacation of the clause under article 203/5. As such the parties in this dispute 
agreed in a later date, after the dispute has been submitted to the court, to refer the 
dispute into arbitration, accordingly they drafted an arbitration agreement on the 
21/2/2007; the defendants attorney appeared in front of the court on the 18/6/2007 																																																								
1307 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no.357/2009, issued on the 18th of November 2009. 
1308 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 68/2005  
1309 Which has been concluded on the 24/2/2009 
1310 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no. 9/2009. 
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after the parties agreed to arbitrate, however, their attorney failed to make the request 
to refer the dispute into arbitration in that hearing, which is considered to be the first 
hearing in this instances as such their right to arbitrate has been waivered. 
Thus, the court decided to vacate the appealed decision and refer the dispute 
back to the appeal court. 
 
20. Appeal no. 427/20091311 
The defendant started the dispute1312 against the appellant by asking the court 
to enforce the arbitral clause in the sales contract1313 between the parties, as well as 
appointing an arbitration to initiate the arbitration proceedings, they claim that they 
bought a farm from the appellants agent (the appellants wife) and when they wanted 
to harvest the crop of that farm the appellant denied them their right to gather the 
farms harvest, and given that the appellant refused to uphold the arbitration clause in 
the contract, the defendant sought the court to enforce this clause. The court decided 
to appoint an arbitration tribunal to settle this dispute, the tribunal issued an award on 
the 1/2/2009 that confirmed the ownership of the farm to the defendant1314, the court 
decided to recognize the arbitral award. The appellant appealed that decision and the 
appeal court decided to uphold the appealed decisions.1315 
The appellant appealed that decision to the Supreme Court, basing his appeal 
on three grounds; the first ground argues that the appealed decision dismissed their 																																																								
1311 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE appeal no. 427/2009, issued on the 29th of October 2009. 
1312 Al-Ain Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 918/2007.  
1313 Which was concluded on the 23/4/2005 
1314 In addition to number of things besides their ownership of the farm. 
1315 Al-Ain Federal Court of appeals, appeal no. 38/2009. 
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argument that the public prosecution office should have been notified, given the 
presence of a minor in the dispute. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that even if the prosecution office is 
required to be present in a civil suit that involves a minor. However, this argument 
shouldn’t be presented to the Supreme Court for the first time, it should have been 
upheld in front of the lower courts in order for the appellant to present that argument 
in front of this court, moreover, the first instance court notified the public prosecution 
office of the presence of a minor, which they responded to by a letter notifying the 
court of their opinion in the dispute as such this plea is ungrounded. 
The appellant second ground argues that the arbitral award didn’t contain a 
draft and that the arbitrators didn’t sign every page of the award, both of which are 
grounds for setting-aside the arbitral award. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that based on the jurisprudence of 
the court and on article 212, which grants the arbitral award the same status as a 
courts decision. However, the fact remains that it is not a decision issued by the court 
and since the civil procedures states that the arbitrator is not bound by the courts 
procedures in issuing the award, except in regard to upholding the rules mentioned in 
the arbitration chapter and since those rules do not require the arbitrators to sign every 
page and include a draft this argument is void. 
The third ground argues that the appellant didn’t sign the sales contract and 
that his wife wasn’t his agent at the time of the sale. Moreover, he argues that the 
sales contract is void, by claiming that his wife entered into that contract when she 
was ill and on her deathbed, which can be proven by the doctor reports as such this act 
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conducted on her deathbed is void, moreover, the selling of this farm contradicts the 
ruler decree that such farms are not subject to selling. 
The court dismissed this ground, by establishing that a plea to set-aside an 
arbitral award is one that is subject to the requirements of article 216, those grounds 
addressed the arbitral award as being an act of a law, as such they concern 
establishing a flaw in the procedures and not a flaw in the determination of the facts 
of the dispute, moreover, those grounds are explicitly stated in this article and concern 
the arbitration agreement and the arbitral dispute; the ones that concern the arbitration 
agreement relate to issuing an award without an arbitral agreement or with a void 
agreement, or if the arbitrator exceeded the scope of the arbitration … etc. The ones 
that concern the arbitral dispute relate to an award that is issued by arbitrators that 
were not appointed according to the law…etc. Furthermore, the court when 
addressing the issue of recognizing the arbitral award cannot address the subject of 
the award, since the arbitral award once it fulfill the previous condition receive res 
judicata status. 
Therefore, since the appellant have upheld arguments that concerns the subject 
of the dispute, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
21. Appeal no. 266/20091316 
The defendant started the dispute against the appellant1317, by claiming that 
they notified the appellant through a letter to initiate the arbitration proceeding in 
order to settle their dispute, in compliance with article 15 of the contract; they also 
asked the court to confirm the appointment of their arbitrator and to appoint the 																																																								
1316 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 266/2009, issued on the 21st of October 2009. 
1317 Ajman Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 64/2006, issued on the 12/11/2008. 
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appellants arbitrator and the third arbitrator1318, the defendant claim that they were 
asked by the appellant to decorate the interior of a building owned by the appellant, 
which they claim that they fulfilled according to the contractual obligation, however, 
the appellant refused to pay the defendants fees claiming that they failed to execute it 
in the agreed upon time, which resulted in the appellant to seek the court1319, to send 
an engineering expert in order to prove the quality of the work done by the defendant, 
they also notified the defendant to resolve their dispute through arbitration after they 
appointed their arbitrator. The court decided to appoint the third arbitrator and 
confirm the appointment of the plaintiffs arbitrators1320, on the 3/7/2008 the 
arbitration tribunal issued an award and submitted it to the court for recognition; the 
appellant pleaded to the court to set-aside the award, claiming that the arbitration 
agreement is null since the arbitrators issued their award after the agreed upon time. 
The court decided to dismiss the appellant claim and recognize the arbitral award. 
This decision was appealed1321, the court decided to uphold the appealed decision, 
which resulted in the appellant to appeal that decision to the Supreme Court. 
The appellant first ground of appeal argues that the 6th clause of the 
arbitration agreement stated that the arbitrators should render an award within six 
months from the start of the first hearing, and given that the first hearing was 
conducted on the 16/6/2007, then the six months period would have to have ended on 
the 16/12/2007, and the arbitral tribunal extension request that has been made on the 
22/12/2007 occurred after the passing of the deadline, which renders the award that 
were issued as a result of this extension null. 																																																								
1318 The defendant also requested from the court to order the payment of 10168943.28 dhs. in addition 
to 12% interest rate until the fulfillment of the payment, which they claim is an equivalent of what the 
appellants own them. 
1319 Ajman Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 6/2005. 
1320 Which was done on the 27/12/2006 
1321 Ajman Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no. 142/2008, issued on the 29/4/2009. 
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The court dismiss this argument, stating that according to the court 
jurisprudence that the determination of a date for the end of the arbitration procedures 
doesn’t mean that it cannot be extended either explicitly or implicitly1322 or by 
authorizing the tribunal, as well as the court ability to extend this time based on the 
parties request or of that of the tribunal, the only requirement is that this extension 
should be connected and not interpreted. Furthermore, the appeal court responded to 
this argument by explaining that the arbitration agreement states that the extension 
should be granted exclusively by the court, and based on the facts of the case the 
tribunal upheld this requirement by seeking the court to grant them the extension, as 
such the appellants argument has no basis. 
The appellant second ground of appeal, argues that the tribunal dismissed their 
request to confirm and accept the expert report, which has been confirmed by the 
court in case no.6/2005 and since the arbitral tribunal ruled contrary to what have 
been determined in that case, which renders the award null and subject to setting-aside 
since it contradict a courts decision. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that article 68 of the civil and 
commercial evidence law1323, implies that the purpose of such claims are to proof a 
certain legal status, which they are in fear of being changed, as such it doesn’t 
concern the establishment of individuals rights and doesn’t mean that the parties are 
not able to seek the court to settle their dispute. Furthermore, the decisions issued 																																																								
1322 The court explained an implicit extension by the appearance of the parties in front of the tribunal 
after the end of the arbitration time and arguing on the subject of the dispute. 
1323 Article 68, states: “ 1- Whoever apprehends the loss of the features of a fact that may constitute an 
object of dispute before the courts, may request, in the presence of those concerned and in the usual 
manner, from the judge of summary matters to proceed with the survey and in this case, the preceding 
provisions shall be observed. 2 - In the foregoing case, the judge of summary matters may delegate an 
expert to move, survey and hear witnesses without oath; the judge then shall fix a hearing to take 
knowledge of the observations made by the parties to the litigation on the expert’s report and acts. The 
rules provided for in the Title concerning Expertise shall be followed.” 	
	 457	
based on a summary ruling does not bind the court, it is a temporary ruling in which 
the judge views it is necessary to establish and confirm the existence of a certain legal 
status or condition; as such the court has the right to over rule this decision; the 
appealed decision upheld this rule, which renders this argument void.  
Thus, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
22. Appeal no. 713/271324 
The appellant started the dispute against the defendant by asking the court to 
recognize the arbitral award1325, claiming that on the 11/10/1979 they entered into a 
passenger transport contract that was signed in Russian, article 14 of the contract state 
that the end of the contract shall be by a written notice and it shall go into force after 
the passing of 45 days of that notification, moreover, article 17 of the contract states 
that in the event of a dispute it shall be resolved through arbitration in front of the 
Foreign Commercial Tribunal of the chamber of commerce in Moscow and that their 
award is final and binding, the appellant complied with those requirement by 
notifying the defendant to the end of the contract. However, the defendant disregarded 
this notification, the appellant also claimed that they tried to mediate their dispute 
without success, which forced the appellant to enforce article 17 and try to resolve 
their dispute through arbitration, by seeking the arbitration tribunal in the Moscow 
chamber of commerce; on the 27/7/2003 the tribunal decided that the previous 
contract has ended on the 5/7/2002, this decision was recognized by the Russian 
Foreign Ministry and the UAE embassy in Russia; the appellant claims that the 
defendant refused to enforce the award, which resulted in the appellant to seek the 																																																								
1324 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 713/27, issued on the 6th of May 2009. 
1325 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 235/2005 (commercial circuit), issued on the 
31/10/2004. 
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court in this proceeding. The first instance court decided to dismiss the appellant’s 
request, resulting in the appellant to seek the appeal court, which upheld that 
decision1326, subsequently the appellant sought the Supreme Court in this appeal. 
The appeal was based on three grounds, the appellant argues that the court 
dismissed their request to recognize the award, by claiming that the award cannot be 
enforced in the UAE, claiming that one of the requirements for enforcing the award 
isn’t met, which is that the UAE court shouldn’t have jurisdiction over the dispute. 
However, there is an arbitration agreement between the parties, which implies that 
they have agreed to opt-out from the courts jurisdiction, despite this fact the court 
refused to recognize the award, even after they submitted a copy of a courts decision 
between the same parties in which the court decided to dismiss the dispute based on 
the existence of an arbitration agreement1327, a fact that was dismissed by the trial 
court and is not amended by the appeal court upholding that decision, by stating that 
the trial courts decision to set-aside the award was based on factual reasons. 
Therefore, the court should vacate that decision. 
The court dismiss this argument stating that article 235, which addresses the 
issue of recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitral awards, allows the enforcement of 
those foreign award by the court after they examine it and decide whether the courts 
has jurisdiction over the dispute or not. Moreover, article 6 of the law no. 18/81 in 
regard to regulating the commercial agencies and its amendment in law no. 14/881328, 
which implies that the arbitral clause that refer to a foreign arbitral tribunal in those 
																																																								
1326 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no. 544/2004. 
1327 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 891/2001. 
1328 Article 6 of the Federal law no. 18/81 in regard to regulating the commercial agencies amended by 
the law no.14/88, states that: “The commercial agency contract shall be deemed for the mutual interest 
of the contractors, the States courts shall be competent to adjudicate any dispute arises from its 
execution between the principal and the agent, any agreement to the contrary shall be annulled.” 
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contracts is a void clause, and if one of the parties to that contract sought a foreign 
arbitral tribunal and requested the courts in the UAE to recognize that award, then the 
court is obliged to refuse to recognize those awards and dismiss their request, as such 
their decision is valid given that its based on the law. Thus, the court decided to 
dismiss the appeal 
 
23. Appeal no. 7/141329 
The defendant started the suit in front of the first instance court1330, by asking 
the court to refer the dispute between them and the appellant into arbitration, claiming 
that the appellant is an insurance company and that they insured their shop with that 
company, they also claim that the insurance policy in question covers fires, on the 
21/7/1989 a fire started in the shop that destroyed all of the goods, the defendant 
submitted a claim to the insurance company asking them to pay the amount of the 
claim based on the insurance policy between them, the defendant claim that the 
insurance company refused to pay the amount of the claim and since the eighteenth 
clause of the insurance policy requires the parties to submit their dispute into 
arbitration, the defendant upheld that clause by seeking the court to enforce this 
clause. The appellant counter claim by claiming that the arbitration clause is null and 
that the defendant doesn’t have the right to request the submission of the dispute into 
arbitration, moreover, the defendant have waivered their right to seek compensation 
from the appellant. The first instance court decided to dismiss the appellant plea and 
continue the hearings in regard to the defendant request of submitting the dispute into 
																																																								
1329 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 7/14, issued on the 19th of April 1992. 
1330 There is no record of the case number in this decision. 
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arbitration. The appellant submitted an appeal after the court dismissed their counter 
claim, the appeal court decided1331 to dismiss the appeal by stating that this decision 
didn’t end the dispute between the parties and as such it is not subject to appeal.  
 The appellant decided to submit an appeal to the Supreme Court, their appeal 
was based on two grounds; they claim that the trial court issued a decision on the 
subject of the dispute by agreeing to refer the dispute into arbitration; which imply 
that they have ended the dispute as a result of that their decision is subject to appeal, 
moreover, the reason given by the appeal court to justify dismissing the appellants 
appeal is in contrast to the requirement of article 1028/d of the civil transition law1332, 
which requires the arbitration clause to be stated in a separate document from the 
insurance police and are excluded from the general clauses of that policy.  
The Supreme Court accepted this argument, stating that the defendant have 
made a request to the first instance court to register the arbitration clause according to 
article 95/2 of the civil procedures law of 19701333, and the court by accepting this 
request and dismissing the appellant counter claim in essence have ended the dispute 
in regard to identifying the competent authority that has the jurisdiction to hear the 
dispute, as such this dispute is subject to appeal. 
Therefore, the court decided to vacate the appealed decision and refer the 
dispute back to the appeal court to resolve the dispute.  
																																																								
1331 There is no record in the decision of the case number; the only thing that was mentioned in here is 
that the appeal was submitted to the Abu Dhabi Federal appeal court. 
1332 Article 1028/d of the civil transaction law, states: “The following conditions in a policy of 
insurance are void: …. d- The arbitration condition included in the printed general conditions of the 
policy and not as a special agreement distinct therefrom…”. 
1333 There is no record of which civil procedures law this refer to, however, it can be assumed that 
given the fact that this dispute was submitted to the AD courts that this would refer to the AD civil 
procedures law. 
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24. Appeal no. 5/141334 
The defendant company started the litigation against the appellant 
company1335, by requesting from the court to order the payment of the amount of 
2,919,000 dhs., claiming that based on a sub-construction contract they agreed that the 
defendant is going to supply aluminum to the appellant, the defendant claims that they 
have fulfilled their side of the contract and that the appellant failed to fulfill his side of 
the contract by refusing their pay resulting in this litigation; the appellant company 
counter claimed that the court lacks the jurisdiction to hear the dispute based on an 
arbitration agreement between the parties that requires the submission of the dispute 
into arbitration prior to seeking the court, the appellant company started a separate 
litigation1336 in which they asked the court to order the defendant to pay the amount of 
8,924,291 dhs. claiming that the defendant failed to fulfill their contractual obligation. 
The court appointed an expert on the 21/12/1986, afterwards the expert submitted his 
report the court and a response to the appellants claim, the court decided based on this 
report. The appellant disagreed with that ruling and decided to appeal the decision; the 
appeal court upheld the first instance decision1337. The appellant appealed that 
decision to the Supreme Court. 
The appellant based their appeal on three grounds; the first and second argues 
that the first instance court decided on the 13/2/1986 that they lacked the jurisdiction 
to hear the dispute, thus, the court cannot revise their ruling in this regard, moreover, 
the appellant upheld this argument in front of the court, to which the court responded 																																																								
1334 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 5/14, issued on the 20th of May 1992. 
1335 Al-Ain Federal Courts of First Instance, case no. 7/1986, issued on the 26/12/1990. 
1336 There is no record of the case number in this decision. 
1337 Al-Ain Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no. 11/91, issued on the 23/12/1991. 
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“that the first instance court didn’t rule to that they lack the jurisdiction to hear the 
dispute, they just put the phrase dismiss the dispute between brackets”, which the 
appeal court should have decided to dismiss the dispute rather than upholding the 
appealed decision. The appellant claims that they have upheld their argument that the 
parties have agreed to arbitrate, which the first instance dismissed and the appeal 
court ignored to respond to their argument, which is a ground for vacating the 
appealed decision. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that the trial court didn’t decided to 
dismiss the dispute and refer it into arbitration on the 13/2/1986, on the contrary they 
decided to postpone the hearing to 20/2/1986, a brackets have been placed over the 
phrase the court decided to dismiss the haring and the judge in that dispute decided to 
amend that phrase since it was written by mistake in the judgment, the appellant 
didn’t object to this act at the time and the appealed decision shows that they have 
indeed respond to the appellant argument in this regard. In addition, the local 
jurisdiction is not a matter of public policy as such the litigants right to object on the 
courts jurisdiction is waivered once they argue on the subject of the dispute, 
moreover, the objection on the existence of an arbitration clause is based on the 
parties agreement to arbitrate, which is also a matter that doesn’t relate to the public 
policy and can be waivered either explicitly or implicitly by arguing on the subject of 
the dispute, and given the fact that the appellant have argued on the subject of the 
dispute, and started a separate litigation with their claim, which implies that they have 
waivered their right to arbitrate. 
The appellant third argument, argues on the subject of the expert report, which 
was dismissed by the court. 
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Thus, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
 
25. Appeal no. 121/141338 
 The facts of this dispute can be summarized as follow; the second 
defendant1339 entered into a contract with the first defendant1340 to construct a modern 
irrigation network in some farms1341 this contract includes an arbitration clause; as a 
result when a dispute rose between the parties they agreed to submit it to an 
arbitration tribunal, which decided that the respondent (the UAE government) should 
pay to the claimant the following amount (403070805 dhs.) as a compensation, the 
claimant requested that the award should be submitted to the court for recognition; the 
court decided to recognize and enforce the arbitral award, and dismiss the counrt 
claim of setting-aside the award.1342 
 The public prosecution office appealed this decision to the Supreme Court on 
five grounds; the first ground argues that according to the jurisprudence of the court 
the arbitrators are required to uphold the basic adjudication principles and all of the 
procedures that relate to the public order, such as the decision should be preceded by 
deliberation from the tribunal and having a draft signed by all of the arbitrators that 
participated in that deliberation, if those requirement weren’t present in their 
award1343 then it’s a null and void, which is the case in this dispute for the draft of the 
																																																								
1338 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 121/14, issued on the 27th of December 1992. 
1339 Is the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
1340 This decision state that the first defendant is a company without indicating the name nor the nature 
of this company, however, it can be assumed that it’s a construction company. 
1341 There is no mention of the location of the farms, however, the arbitration was conducted in AD, as 
a result it can be safely assumed that the farms are located in AD. 
1342 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no.2283/1990, issued on the 29/1/1991. 
1343 This decision refers to the award as a report. 
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award was signed by one arbitrator and was missing two signatures, implying that the 
deliberation didn’t occur before issuing the award, moreover, the reasons and the 
decision both were written in separate documents, which require a signature in each of 
those documents as well. 
 The second ground of appeal argues that one of the arbitrators doesn’t speak 
Arabic, which meant that the arbitration tribunal would have to translate certain 
documents from Arabic into English. However, there is no evidence stating that the 
arbitral award and the decision have been translated into English, which proofs that no 
deliberation has been conducted in this arbitration. 
 The third ground of appeal, argues that the descending opinion, which has 
been stated by one of the arbitrators and has been included in the case file on the 
24/10/1990. However, the arbitral award is dated on the 25/8/1990, which is an 
indication that the descending opinion wasn’t included in the delegation before 
issuing the award. 
 The fourth ground of appeal argues that the award stated that the respondent is 
the government of the UAE, which is an indication that the tribunal is unaware to the 
parties of the dispute, since the respondent in this dispute was the ministry of 
agriculture and fisheries, which is a major error on their part and a ground for setting-
aside the award.  
 The fifth ground argues that the tribunal accepted a couple of English 
documents without including a legal translation of those documents, which is in 
contrast to the law and despite the objection of the ministry, in addition to the fact that 
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the chief arbitrator have amended a couple of errors in the translation on his own, 
which is in violation of the law in regard to ruling based on personal knowledge. 
 The Supreme Court accepted all of the grounds of appeals; by stating that even 
though the court accepts the fact that the arbitral tribunal is not bound by the normal 
procedures of the court in order to ease and accelerate the decision making process, in 
addition to the fact that in some cases the arbitrators are not lawyers. However, this 
rule is bound by the principles of justice and by the rules that relates to the public 
policy and preserving due process, which includes delegating the facts of the case 
before rendering a decision, which needs to be proven through the documents and the 
facts of the case. Therefore, based on the established principles in the law and within 
the courts doctrine the arbitral award is required to have a draft, the purpose of having 
a draft is to prove that due process and that the tribunal delegated the dispute before 
issuing the award, moreover a signature from all of the members of the tribunal is 
required according to law no. 3/1970, this requirement doesn’t breach the 
confidentiality principle in arbitration. 
Furthermore, according to article 12 of the law no.8/81 in regard to regulating 
the translation profession, which dismisses any document that is not translated by a 
certified legal translator, which is a rule that relates to the public policy and the 
arbitral tribunal, is not at liberty to breach it. Therefore, the court is required to 
supervise over the arbitration proceeding, in fulfill their role they are required to 
ensure that the arbitral award is issued according to the requirement of the law 
no.3/1970, which can only be achieved if the court ensures that the arbitral award 
fulfills all of those requirement, by ensuring that the arbitral award is supported by the 
documents presented in front of them. Subsequently, the arbitral tribunal should have 
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dismissed any document that has not been legally translated into Arabic, and by 
basing their decision on those documents; the tribunal is essentially basing their 
decision on their own knowledge, which is inadmissible to the court nor to the arbitral 
tribunal, therefore, having the arbitrator correct the translation submitted to them by a 
legal translator is a breach of this rule.  
Thus, the court decided to vacate the appealed decision and set-aside the 
arbitral award, with referring the dispute back to the arbitral tribunal to settle the 
dispute. 
 
26. Appeal no. 49/201344 
The appellant started the litigation1345 against the defendant, they requested to 
refer the dispute into arbitration under the courts supervision according to article 14 of 
the sub-construction contract, they claim that the defendant entered into a contract 
with the public works department to construct and maintain 24 houses, according to 
the sub-construction contract the defendant requested from the appellant to supervise 
over all aspects of electrical and mechanical works in this project in  exchange for 
17800000 dhs. they also agreed in that contract to refer any dispute that raises from 
this contract into arbitration, in accordance to the laws of AD and the UAE, and since 
the arbitral award would ultimately be presented to the court whether it were ad-hoc 
or court-annexed arbitration, and since the arbitration clause doesn’t prohibits the 
court from hearing the dispute and referring it to the arbitration under their 
supervision, the appellant made this request to the court. The first instance court 																																																								
1344 Federal Supreme Court of the UAE, appeal no. 49/20, issued on the 14th of May 2000. 
1345 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of First Instance, case no. 518/1996, issued on the 25/6/1997. 
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decided; first to dismiss the case based on the existence of the arbitration clause, 
second to order the defendant to return the bank guarantee letter no. 3010/1994 to the 
appellant1346. The defendant appealed this decision1347, in regard to the second part of 
the decision, the court decided to amend the decision in regard to the bank guarantee. 
The appellant appealed that decision to the Supreme Court on eight 
grounds1348; arguing in the fourth and fifth ground that the court decided to dismiss 
their request after amending it, in regard to appointing an arbitrator according to 
article 204, which allows them to request the arbitrators appointment from the court in 
the event that the parties didn’t agree on the arbitrators appointment; the court 
reasoning for dismissing their request was that they should first seek the chamber of 
commerce and industry in AD to appoint the arbitrators in the event that the parties 
didn’t agree on an arbitrator before seeking the court, to follow the requirement of the 
arbitral clause between the parties, the appellant claims that they made this request to 
the chamber and were denied. Therefore, they are entitled to seek the court to appoint 
the arbitrators. 
The court dismissed this argument, stating that court has the right to interpret 
the facts of the case and to weigh the evidence presented to them. Furthermore, clause 
14 of the sub-construction contract, implies that the process of appointment should 
start first by an agreement between the parties, if they failed to agree on the arbitrator 
then the parties have the right to seek the head of the chamber of commerce to appoint 
an arbitrator on their behalf, and if that failed then they have the right to seek the 
court, furthermore the appellant claim that they have fulfilled this procedure is a new 
																																																								
1346 One of the requests that was made to the court is the return of this guarantee.  
1347 Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeals, appeal no. 567/1997. 
1348 The reset of the grounds doesn’t concern arbitration. 
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claim, which should be presented in front of the trial court and cannot be presented for 
the first time in front of the Supreme Court. 
 Thus, the court decided to dismiss the appeal. 
	
 
